Did the Chairman of the European Convention, Valeacutery Giscard d'Estaing (VGE), shape this body's deliberation toward an outcome that would not have occurred otherwise? I contend that VGE was able to influence the form of the Convention's outcome and to some extent its content on issues of minor importance, but not its very substance on institutional matters. Drawing on functional approaches to leadership, I argue that the Convention's rules of procedure constituted an original negotiation setting that allowed the Chairman to wield influence through setting the agenda. But the more the Convention approached institutional questions, the less he was able to generate the preconditions for his leadership. The Convention ultimately turned into an IGC-like, unanimous negotiation setting without any room for the Chairman's influence.
Leadership in the European Convention
Journal of European Public Policy, Volume 14, Issue 8 December 2007 , pages 1227 - 1248