



1. Party family of Commissioners



In recent times questions on scope and influence of partisan orientation in the EU have gained in importance in EU studies. The graph shows the composition of the particular Commissions regarding their Commissioners' party affiliation. It covers the first Hallstein to the first Barroso Commission. Every Commissioner having served in the listed Commissions has been assigned to one of the following party families: Conservatives/Christian Democrats, Liberals, Independent, Greens, Social Democrats, Communists and Allies. Assignment is based on which group in the EP the Commissioner's party in question belonged to at the time (party family groupings build on and further develop Hix and Lord 1997). The graph allows making statements about the relative ideological heterogeneity as well as possible ideological or partisan biases of the various Commissions. This is particularly relevant where we abstain from considering the European Commission a neutral administration.

2. Development of Commission Directorates



The services of the EU Commission are often treated as monolithic and static. This graph displays the development of Commission DGs according to the number of Directorates they comprised during the respective Commissions. It thus provides sectorally specific information on the EU Commission as an evolving organization.

We chose to focus on a small number of DGs to illustrate the changes in the number of Directorates. These are DG ADMIN, DG AGRI, DG ECFIN, DG ENV, DG REGIO, DG BUDG and DG MARKT. The observed changes point at three different, potentially relevant explanations.

First, increasing numbers of Directorates might reflect the rise in prominence of a policy area. In the EU context this is often related to an expansion of supranational policy making. The 'greening' of European policies could thus be linked to an expansion of DG ENV or respectively growing community competences in economics and finance to increasing numbers of Directorates in DG ECFIN. Secondly, portfolios with a strong territorial dimension such as DG AGRI or DG REGIO experience task extension with every round of EU enlargement. This is likely to mirror in organizational differentiation and Directorate growth. Finally, administrative changes oscillating between high and low numbers of Directorates (e.g. DG ADMIN or DG BUDG) may reflect that horizontal services are at time provided 'in-house' and at other times centrally by a separate service (Bauer 2008), reducing Directorates in the central service in the former case, while pushing the number of directorates up in the later case.

3. Historical distribution of portfolios in the European Commission


	CLAFG	RELEX	TRADE	MARKT	ENTR	TAXUD	COMP	
Barroso I (2004 - 2009)	'Enlargement'	'External Relations'	'Trade'	'Internal Market and Services'	'Enterprise and Industry'	'Taxation and Customs Union'	'Competition'	
Prodi (1999 - 2004)				'Internal Market'	'Enterprise'			
Santer (1995 - 1999)	DDIA 'External Relations: Europe and newly independent States, Common Foreign and Security Policy, External Services'	DD1 'External Relations: Trade Policy, Relations with North America, the Far East, Australia and New Zealand'	DD2 'External Relations: Southern Mediterranean, Middle East, Latin America, South and Southeast Asia and South-South Cooperation'	DD101 'Internal Market and Financial Services'	DD8 'Industrial Affairs'	DD100 'Taxation and Customs Union'		
Delors III (1993 - 1995)	DDIA 'External Political Relations'	DD1 'External Economic Relations'	DD108 'Enterprises, Trade and Social Economic'			DD100 'Indirect Taxation and Customs Union'		
Delors II (1989 - 1993)	/	DD1 'External Relations'				DD100 'Customs Union and Indirect Taxation'	DD104 'Financial Institutions and Company Law'	
Delors I (1985 - 1989)								
Thorn (1981 - 1985)								
Jenkins (1977 - 1981)						DD104 'Financial Institutions and Taxation'		
Delors (1973 - 1977)				DD10 'Internal Market'	DD8 'Industrial and Technological Affairs'			
Malfatti (1970 - 1973)				DD10 'Internal Market, Administrative Law'	DD8 'Industrial Affairs'	DD100 'Financial Control'		
Diez (1967 - 1970)			DD10 'External Trade'					
Hallstein II (1962 - 1967)								
Hallstein I (1958 - 1962)				DD8 'Internal Market'				

This graph is devoted to the development of the Commission's organizational structure over time. It reveals the EU Commission as an evolving organization. First, new areas of activity have continuously been added since the founding days. This partly reflects increasing competence transfers to the supranational level but also demand for more portfolios with enlargement rounds that increased the number of Commissioners seeking to head 'their own house'. In addition, this may reflect administrative changes, a new President's political priorities or functional differentiation and policy developments. Second, boundaries between portfolios are far from stable. Most 'new' areas belonged to established portfolios before they became independent services, in this case quiet often units dealing with similar issues are taken from different DGs and merged into a new portfolio. An example in the graph is the formation of DG III on the Internal Market and Industrial Affairs in the Jenkins Commission that incorporated not only units but even entire Directorates previously located in the neighbouring DGs 'Industrial and Technological Affairs', 'Internal Market' and DG Relex, which at the time was responsible for external trade.


In other cases units have been going back and forth between two DGs, depending i.a. on the relative strength of the Commissioners or their respective national governments negotiating the portfolio allocation at the beginning of a new Commission term. Examples are the interfaces of DG ENTR with DG MARKT when it comes to issues of industrial affairs or with DG TRADE on trade issues. At times, all three portfolios had even been handled in one joint DG as was the case during the Thorn and Jenkins Presidencies, when DG III on 'Internal Market and Industrial Affairs' was the all-embracing Commission entity for market, enterprise and trade issues. In particular in the aftermath of the Santer crisis the Commission's reorganisation under Kinnock has entailed a shift in the portfolio structure.

4. Technocratism and Power index

by Commission



by DG



Indices and assessments of politicization of administrations differ substantially. With this Graphs we opt for a view that combines a power and a legitimacy logic of politicization.

In a first step, Commissioners having served between 1958 and 2018 have been assigned to one of the following former professional groups: Academic; Activist; Bureaucrat; Business; Diplomat, Junior minister, Minister for Agriculture, Fishery, Forestry, Minister for Culture, Minister for Defense, Minister for Economy, Budget; Minister for Education, Science and Technology; Minister for European Integration; Minister for Finance; Minister for Foreign Affairs; Minister for Health; Minister for Industry and Trade; Minister for Justice; Minister for Labour and Social Affairs; Minister for Regional Development, Construction and Housing; Minister for the Environment; Minister for the

Interior; Minister for Transport and Communication; Other; Parliamentarian; Party Leader; Prime Minister; Regional Government; Secretary of State; Union Leader. In equivocal cases, where the person under consideration had occupied more than one of the listed position groups, he or she was assigned the category, where the person had occupied the hierarchically highest post.

In a second step, we built two indices of politicization for each Commission and portfolio respectively. Our first index measures political power and assigns a numerical value to each position as defined by Druckman et al. (2005; 2008) and extended by Döring (2007). Based on expert surveys in 28 European countries these authors have developed a ranking of portfolio salience in European parliamentary democracies. Following Döring we add Junior Ministers/Secretaries of State and Parliamentarians as well new scores for a number of positions that had not been considered in detail in existing works. We then took the average value of each position across states to assign a numerical value to each person having served in the Commission. Following this logic, former Prime Ministers have been assigned the highest value (2,27) whereas Activists are the group ranked the lowest (0,22).

Our second index measures political legitimacy and differentiates between 'political' and 'technocratic' professional backgrounds of persons having served in the Commission. Recurring on Schnapp (2004), we assign a positive value of 1 to 'political' positions as those offices which are filled and legitimized by democratic elections, and a '0' to all 'technocratic' posts that do not fulfil this criterion.

The graph 'technocratism and power index by Commission' lists the average values of both indices across time. It clearly supports views on the Commission as increasingly politicized. The graph 'technocratism and power index by DG' gives the average values of both indices for the respective Directorates-General. Here the Secretariat General stands out as politically 'powerful' while DG BUDG, ENV and RELEX are among the most 'political' as regards our second index. This is particularly relevant where we abstain from assessing the Commission as a mainly bureaucratic body. Apparently, the Commission is highly politicized as regards the professional background of its personnel.

5. Further career

Turning to the flipside of prior professional background, this graph uses data on the position the respective Commission member occupied after leaving her job as Commissioner. Analysing further career paths is not only empirically relevant for clientelistic business-Commission rent-seeking coalitions but also for the analytical power of a delegation logic reaching into the Commission. The former argument regards economic interests or expertise as driving reintegration into work life after the Commission. Following this reasoning business has an interest to recruit former Commissioners from portfolios and with them expertise and influence in their area of economic activity. From the later, state governments can hope to call on their Commissioner's loyalty through the options of reappointment or the offer of high-profile domestic positions after the Commission function.

Our graph provides an overview on the first position the respective Commission member occupied after leaving her job as Commissioner or Director-General. We differentiate between 'Business', 'Political' (including Head of State/Government, National Ministers, Regional Government, Parliamentarians, Party leaders, Activists), 'Diplomats', 'Retired' (including category 'deceased while in office'), and 'Still in Commission'. The number of Commissioners returning into politics is greatest, providing further support to a politicization argument of the EU Commission. However, revolving doors into business are also frequent, raising moral questions.

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