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**Scientific Necessity and Political Utility  
A Comparison of Data on Violent Conflicts**

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## **Zusammenfassung**

Die systematische Erfassung und Aufbereitung von Daten in den Sozialwissenschaften im allgemeinen, in der Konflikt- und Kriegsursachenforschung im besonderen, ist nicht nur eine notwendige Vorbedingung für den Erkenntnisfortschritt, sondern auch Voraussetzung für die Verwertbarkeit in der politischen Praxis (Gewaltprävention). Das wiederum setzt voraus, dass die Daten den Kriterien der intersubjektiven Nachvollziehbarkeit ebenso genügen wie sie für die Analyse des Konfliktprozesses verwertbar sein müssen. Um den Nutzen und die potentiellen Schwächen der wichtigsten vorhandenen Datensätze zu gewaltsamen Konflikten und Kriegen zu ermitteln, werden diese einer vergleichenden Analyse unterzogen. Das Ergebnis ist, dass die Datensätze unterschiedliche „Welten der Gewalt“ abbilden bzw. konstruieren, unabhängig davon, ob sie auf qualitativen oder quantitativen operationalen Kriterien beruhen. Zudem bieten die meisten Datensätze keine hinreichenden Informationen für die Analyse der Konfliktodynamik. In der Konsequenz sollte dies dazu führen, dass die begrenzten Ressourcen nicht in die Entwicklung immer neuerer Datensätze investiert werden, sondern dass angesichts der aufgezeigten Unterschiede ein Konsens über den Gegenstand selbst und eine konsolidierte Datenbasis angestrebt werden.

## **Abstract**

Data making in the social sciences in general, data collection on interstate and intrastate violence in particular, is not only a necessity for the growth of knowledge but also potentially useful for practice. The latter is only true if the data satisfy specific criteria. As we argue for that latter purpose a process perspective on violence is needed given the severe limitations of a structural approach. Several datasets on internal and external lower and higher levels of violence are compared. As the results show each dataset portrays a different world of violence. It does not make a difference whether qualitative or quantitative criteria are used to identify violent events. Most of the datasets are limited in their use for the analysis of the dynamics of violence. One of the conclusions is that greater efforts should be invested in reaching a consensus about the data rather than spending time and money in constructing new datasets.

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## 1. Introduction: Purposes of Data Making

Data making in international relations research in general, conflict research in particular is not a terribly attractive intellectual activity. The result of this activity, however, is absolutely vital for the growth of knowledge. Data making and data analysis can not be looked at as exclusively academic activities. If one distinguishes between basic and applied research for each of these activities data making and data analysis serve different purposes. The question is whether that distinction really applies to the social sciences in contrast say to chemistry or physics. This semantically irritating construct, *applied basic research* coined by the Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) to characterize its activities, bridges these difference. This distinction is plausible in: international relations offer theoretical building blocks, systematic descriptive accounts of international processes and a growing number of empirically grounded hypotheses, all of which contribute to the growth of knowledge. At the same time they offer some orientation to the various practitioners in an increasingly complex environment.

In his introduction to Quincy Wright's (1965) monumental *Study of War* Karl Deutsch (1965:xii) wrote that "war, to be abolished, must be understood. To be understood, it must be studied". We would add: to understand war, we must analyze it. To analyze it systematically we need good time series. Thus, research on war (or on violence, to put it in more general terms), is almost by definition simultaneously relevant for academics and practitioners. For the latter, however, not every aspect of research is that important.

In the analysis that follows we will argue that if research on violence or war is considered from a purely academic point of view research needs no further justification. From the practice point of view, however, the problem arises: knowledge for what purpose? The Deutsch citation defines such a purpose. Today, rather than focusing on the abolishment of war or violence, one would preferably speak of conflict prevention. Since the end of the Cold War prevention has widely been praised as the solution to the various forms of violent conflict by governments, international organizations and the nongovernmental sector (cf. Lund, 1996; Väyrynen, 2000). Prevention is an attractive concept for scholars alike, due to its integrative potential for a multidisciplinary approach and for some as a means to avoid conflict regulation with military force.

The following analysis evaluates a variety of datasets on domestic and international violent conflict. We have now reached a stage where, once again, a rigorous assessment of what

we have achieved and what we have not is necessary. We will do so by first discussing the emergence of systematic research on international conflict. We will then discuss the structural versus the process orientation approach to the study of conflict and the data requirements that can be derived from these two alternatives in general, related to conflict prevention in particular. The empirical analysis will then compare various datasets in order to assess their degree of convergence. This comparative analysis includes both internal and external violent conflict events on the one hand, high level violence events and lower level of violence events on the other. Finally, some suggestions will be made for the future directions of the scientific study on violent conflict and assess the use of the datasets available for practical purposes.

## 2. International Conflict Research

Disregarding the ancestors of international conflict research on the study of war such as Richardson, Sorokin and Wright, the first systematic dataset on international conflict respectively war has been compiled by the Correlates of War Project scholars, which started some forty years ago under the direction of J. David Singer (cf. Singer/Small, 1972; Small/Singer, 1982). The basic assumption was theoretically convincing: armed conflict, i.e. violent conflict, was conceptualized as a phenomenon in its own right. Conflict as such is, as Deutsch (1957) has argued elsewhere, the fundamental motor of change. Conflict is crucial for the integration within and between societies as long as violence is absent, thus a major productive force in the evolution of the relations within and between societies. If, however, violence is used conflict is disruptive if not destructive.<sup>1</sup>

The Correlates of War Project, grounded in the Realpolitik paradigm, took a disciplinary perspective by focusing primarily at inter-state violence, i.e. war. At the time this research program started no substantive justification was needed for such a research program even though its quantitative approach was certainly contested (and still is in some quarters). It was consistent with the way the bipolar international system seemed to be structured and operating. The limited disciplinary perspective on the study of international conflict was equally unproblematic. Attempts to conduct conflict research beyond disciplinary borders, in particular the analysis of the domestic foreign conflict linkage (cf. among other Rosenau, 1980), we-

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<sup>1</sup> Coser has developed this distinction in his study on the *functions of social conflict*. This does not exclude that major wars can be the motor of fundamental constructive international system change (cf. Holsti, 1991).



were not terribly successful (cf. in handbook) thereby supporting the restricted focus on the study of war. One of the reasons why that specific research direction did not become institutionalized is probably that the gap between the theoretical problem (which was not formulated in a highly sophisticated manner) and the data used (mainly event interaction data for international conflict and various domestic violence indicators from the World Handbook; cf. as an example Eberwein et al., 1979) was too large.

The third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991) played an important role in the revival of the study of war in general, the analysis of the democratic peace proposition in particular (cf. among others, Chan, 1993; Maoz, 1997). From the theoretical point of view four specific insights stimulated research. First, the empirical support for the democratic peace proposition turned out to be robust irrespective of the specific operational definitions of democracy used (cf. Russett, 1993; Ray, 1995). Second, research revealed that the transition to democracy is accompanied by a high incidence of international violence (Maoz/Abdolali, 1989). Third, if the regime transition process occurs in a revolutionary fashion the new regimes are more likely to get involved in violent conflicts with other nations before finally becoming socialized so to speak into the international community of states (ibid.). This latter finding made scholars aware that domestic conflict in general may not be conducive to interstate violence but that some type of conflict may actually lead to such an externalization process. These - and other - findings did not disprove the prevalent Realpolitik paradigm at large even though the debate seemed to be framed in these terms. But these insights showed that the domestic setting has much greater weight than the neorealists have been willing to accept as a matter of fact (cf. among others Waltz, 1993).

The collapse of Communism and Soviet hegemony contributed to broaden even further the theoretical framework of conflict research and international relations at large. At least initially the expectation seems to have been that the international system was gradually moving towards the establishment of a system of stable nation-states, towards a system of democratic states. The events in the aftermath of the breakdown of communism were indicative of the partial disintegration of the interstate system. This raised a whole series of complex issues for research due to this new trend of global fragmentation which became apparent in the dissolution of a number of states in conjunction with a new type of internal war (Kaldor, 1999; see also Holsti, 1996). Whereas the so-called classical domestic conflicts or wars, as Leader (2000, cf. also Jean/Rufin, 1996) argues, could be interpreted as the *continuation of politics by other means*, the new conflicts, in contrast, represent the *continuation of economics by*

*other means*. Violence is the means for the appropriation of resources to finance the fighting, but it is also the goal in terms of enrichment (cf. Berdel/Malone, 2000). This process involves among others private security forces, clans or mercenaries<sup>2</sup>. As Mary Kaldor (1999:93) noted: „regular armed forces lose their character as the legitimate bearer of arms and become increasingly difficult to distinguish from private paramilitary groups. [...] The most common fighting units are paramilitary groups, that is to say, autonomous groups of armed men generally centered around an individual leader“. Conceptually, inter-related phenomena like the evolution of civil war economies and the privatization of violence are closely related to the structural problem of weak or failed states (see among others, Holsti, 1996).

These new conflicts represent a challenge to international politics (state and non-state actors, international organizations etc.) and to the scientific discipline of international relations in general, conflict research in particular. With super power confrontation no longer threatening and therefore the danger of such a confrontation escalating to a nuclear exchange having become extremely unlikely, the more narrow disciplinary focus on interstate war was no longer justifiable. The same is also true with respect to the traditionally narrow focus of security studies (cf. Kolodziej, 1992). Environmental security (cf. among others Eberwein/Chojnacki, 2001) or the danger of violent conflicts over scarce resources, among others water wars (cf. Klare, 2001; Suliman, 1999), made it on the security agenda. Equally troublesome to international politics were the atrocities that took place in the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the genocide in Rwanda, ethnic cleansing accompanied by mass murder and torture on the Balkans, to give but two examples. In addition to the stability issue these events raised the question of the normative foundations of the international system in terms of human rights. Anything but clear are the implications for theories of international relations.

The emergence and diffusion of these violent episodes raised political concerns which found their expression in the challenge to the non-intervention principle, among others in a growing number of UN Security Council resolutions concerned with domestic affairs of some UN member states. The justification for this fundamental change is based both on political as well as on normative (if not moral) arguments: on the one hand interference in domestic affairs is considered to be a legitimate means for the maintenance or reestablishment of international stability, on the other it is seen as an issue of global order in that major human rights

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<sup>2</sup> This trend is possibly reinforced by the new type of „corporate mercenarism“ (Aning, 2001:151-152). Unfortunately, we can not go into the details in this paper. The core is the privatization of the military which states such as the US, the UK or France seem to be highly supportive of.

violations (which may not necessarily represent a threat to global stability) are no longer viewed as acceptable in principle. In the political domain internal and international violence are no longer viewed as two separate problems given the erosion of the sovereignty respectively the non-interference principle in the internal affairs of another state.

For conflict research in general, for data making in particular violence is a relevant phenomenon, whether internal or external. This type of event signals the break-down of the existing domestic order which also has repercussions on the international order as well. To come to grips with these new issues we definitely need data on both types of events. That, however, requires some general notion about the theoretical foundations of conflict in general.

### **3. Data - Theoretical and Practical Aspects**

Even if, as we argued, any dataset may be used for disciplinary or interdisciplinary as well as for single or multiple purposes this still requires the data on conflict to satisfy theoretically defined conditions. This issue will first be taken up before looking separately at several datasets on domestic and international conflict.

#### **3.1 Conflict Conceptualization - Implications for Data Making**

From data making in international conflict several lessons could be learned. One lesson was that restricting the data analysis (therefore by implication data collection) exclusively on events with high levels of intensity imposes severe limits on the understanding of conflict. Even worse, such a restriction can not be upheld on theoretical grounds. We can assume that high level intensity conflicts are a special class of events deserving a separate treatment. The problem is whether that type of conflict occurred by chance or whether it was more or less unavoidable given specific structural conditions. Arguing the latter way amounts to a kind of structural probabilism if not determinism.

Conceptually, the disturbing problem is that whereas the structural conditions conducive to war prevail most of the time wars occur only exceptionally. Lebow (2000-2001:592) has argued that “social scientists often assume that major social and political developments are specific instances of strong or weak regularities” but he thinks that the occurrence of an event “is always a matter of chance.” Bremer (1996) had suggested that there are multiple

paths to war. Both Bremer and Lebow agree that structural conditions alone can hardly explain why war breaks out. Structural explanations do at best account for the predisposition of nations to go to war but they can not explain the decision to wage war. The obvious reason is that war as the highest level of violence is the result of an ongoing interaction process among at least two parties. This interaction process consists of a series of discrete actions. Even if we postulate that each single action causes the following one there still is the problem that each actor is not limited to just one option. She or he always has a freedom of choice and does not pursue the intention to escalate per se the ongoing conflict.

The process notion implies that wars do not necessarily start as wars in the first place. They begin usually at lower levels of conflict and result from the interaction process between at least two parties. In other words, structural conditions may predispose some nations (or national leaders) to use force in international politics, but other nations may actually use force as a consequence of the interaction dynamics of which they are part. This is what Bremer's conceptualization of multiple paths to war actually suggests. The same is true for internal wars, meaning by this that these events are characterized by high levels of fatalities. Under these conditions the theoretically postulated difference between domestic and international politics no longer applies in that the normally hierarchically structured domestic systems come close to the anarchical state of affairs characterizing the international system, i. e. the absence of a central (and even less a legitimate ) authority.

If this line of argument is plausible, the consequences are obvious. Analyzing conflict processes requires information about different escalation levels. That in turn requires a painful decision for data collection: how specific must the information be in order to be able, from a theoretical point of view, to analyze escalation processes? As the resources are limited we know that we cannot collect all the information we would want to. But even if we had the resources we might not get the information for quite a number of cases.

This poses a dilemma because a process perspective is necessary for the study of conflict prevention. Prevention means manipulation or, in more neutral terms, intervention in ongoing conflict processes. Structural indicators alone are not suited for that purpose. Necessary are indicators to describe the conflict process, i.e. specific insights about the evolution of specific types of behavior over time. One could argue that the greater the level of disaggregation of conflicts and the more specific their attributes the greater their value for the analysis of prevention and, possibly, the applicability for practical ends. The dilemma is that we may not

be in a position to collect such fine grained information. In addition, if the information is too specific, we may no longer be able to derive some meaningful generalizations.

An equally relevant issue relates to the processes of state-building or state failure. Historically, if states stopped to exist this was primarily due to voluntary integration (Germany or Italy for example in the 19<sup>th</sup> century) or conquest. States could also cease to exist after a major war and be recreated afterwards (such as the two Germanies after World War II). But virtual statehood as embodied in the failed state concept was not thought of at all, it was at best a residual category. From a theoretical point of view the failed state concept possibly differs from the simple concept of regime transition. If such non-states are increasingly gaining in importance and have an impact on international order and stability, which remains to be seen in the years to come, then violence prevalent in failed states seems to be equally relevant for the study of conflict in general, international conflict in particular. The open question then is how to include this new category into the theoretical framework of conflict research. The various conceptualizations offered thus far are certainly important (cf. Holsti, 1996; Berdal/Malone, 2000; Kaldor, 1999; Sarkees/Singer, 2001a, 2001b), their relevance for these new kinds of conflicts in contrast are less than obvious.

Drawing the conclusions from the foregone analysis the core is that from a theoretical point of view the evolution of conflict is fundamentally a dynamic process. This reduces to the question: under what conditions is the highest level of violence reached? That begs the question when a violent conflict begins. This leads to two seemingly contradictory requirements. On the one hand, not every form of violence is relevant, that is, what are the types of events to be included and which ones excluded? On the other, the concept should be broad enough to allow for the extension of the typology so as to include at some point new types of events, in particular those violent conflicts that occur in failed states. Obviously, we must include the new kind of wars (Kaldor, 1999) or wars of the third kind (Holsti, 1996) in the era of globalization.

From a theoretical point of view the answer is relatively easy: when one party threatens to use force or actually uses force this is taken as the benchmark for violent conflicts. This has been recognized for a long time by the Correlates of War Project which began to collect the data on Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) about three decades ago. The problem in this case is located at the operational level. In contrast, the concept of statehood, i.e. what an independent state is, requires further qualification from a theoretical point of view. Sierra Leone, for example, is still formally an independent state, but in reality it is a non-state.

### 3.2 Bridging the Gap: Operational Issues

Empirical research cannot logically avoid the gap between theoretical concepts and observable phenomena. For that purpose operational definitions are needed as crutches. Operational definitions are arbitrary. They are based upon decisions. The criterion of intersubjectivity is the regulatory mechanism used to compensate for the definitional voluntarism. Any person must be able to reproduce the same dataset using the same criteria and, by logical implication, to reproduce thereby the results obtained by others.<sup>3</sup> But intersubjectivity in the classical sense is of little help when the data collections respectively the operational definitions relate to different theoretical foundations. In this case the time series could still match in terms of the number of events recorded over time. But if this is not the case, as one would expect, we have a serious problem. Under these conditions we are confronted with different worlds of violence. This not only poses problems to the scholars but to the practitioners as well.

The datasets on international violence to be compared use different operational definitions. The theoretical assumptions differ to some extent, but it is not fully clear what exactly the differences are. They all represent intra- and interstate violent events. The advantage is that various data sources are available which allow the scholars to define individually, for example, which operational measure to use for low or high levels of violence. There is, however, a price to be paid for that pluralism. Gleditsch et al. (2001:15) compared the KOSIMO, COW and Uppsala datasets on violent conflict. They report intercorrelations in the range of a low of 0.37 between COW and KOSIMO and a high of 0.65 between COW and Uppsala for the 1945-99 period.

The real world is one, but the data on violent conflicts suggest different worlds of violence. This illustrates the fact that there is a problem that needs to be clarified first before a solution, if at all, can be found. This is the starting point for the empirical analysis that follows. The analysis is guided by two objectives: first, to establish to what extent the different datasets included give similar or different representations of violence in the international sys-

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<sup>3</sup> The most extreme case social scientists can run into is the problem when no reliable data are available. The experience of the working group on security policy, established in the early eighties in Germany (Eberwein/Hörsch, 1994) provides an example for a solution of this dilemma. The issue was the East-West military balance, nuclear and conventional. The bitter fight in politics but also among academics in conjunction with the Pershing-2 Missile deployment centered initially about numbers. This debate was absolutely unproductive because it distracted from the real issue, namely the potential threat due to the existing nuclear and conventional imbalance if it was actually highly imbalanced. This group decided to resolve the issue by consensus, i.e. a consensus concerning the numbers as described by Forndran/Krell (1983:9-11). This consensus finally enabled the discussion to move on to the real issue, namely the threat assessment where all involved did start from the same data base. That a consensus was not reached on the substance, should not come as a surprise. But at least the debate about numbers had come to an end.

tem after World War II; and second, to find out whether the datasets are constructed along a process perspective of violence.

### **3.3 Selection of the Datasets Included**

Based on the criteria discussed above, we will first describe briefly the datasets used for comparison. We will do so by first comparing the degree to which their representation of violent conflicts, nationally and internationally, match or diverge. We will then evaluate them with respect to the criteria mentioned. The aim was to include the most pertinent datasets presently available from two vantage points: their comprehensiveness and their specificity. There are four datasets satisfying the first criterion of comprehensiveness:

- the Correlates of War Project datasets (including both international and intra-state wars as well as the “Militarized Interstate Disputes” dataset), originally directed by J. David Singer at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor;
- the AKUF dataset from Hamburg, an extension and updated version of the original dataset collected by Istvan Kende, originally under the direction of Klaus-Jürgen Gantzel;
- the KOSIMO dataset, compiled and continuously updated under the direction of Frank Pfetsch at the University of Heidelberg; and finally
- the Uppsala dataset, compiled and continuously updated under the direction of Peter Wallensteen.

In addition, we have included a specific internal war dataset from the State Failure War Data collection (revolutionary and ethnic wars) where Ted Gurr has been involved. The used datasets are listed in Table 1 including the time span, the number of events recorded and their specific focus (type of events, violence threshold, process perspective).

**Table 1: Used datasets of armed conflict and war**

Dataset	Time span	No. of events	Type of event	Violence threshold	Process perspective
COW Intra-state War	1816-1997	214	Civil Wars (and Interventions)	1.000	-
COW Inter-state War	1816-1997	79	Interstate War	1.000	-
MID	1816-1992	2034	Militarized Inter-state Dispute	different fatality levels	threats, displays, use of force, war
KOSIMO (HIIK)	1945-1999	693	Conflict (no determination of internal or inter-state disputes)	-	latent conflict, non-violent crisis, violent crisis, war
AKUF	1945-1999	208	War (decolonisation, internal, international)	-	-
Uppsala	1946-1999	204	Armed conflict (Inter-state and intra-state)	25, 1.000	minor armed conflict (at least 25 deaths), intermediate armed conflict, war (at least 1.000 deaths)
State-Failure Wars	1954-1996	110	Ethnic and revolutionary war	different fatality levels	-

The Correlates of War Project (COW), originally located at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, now resettled at the University of Pennsylvania under the direction of Stuart A. Bremer, has been the most influential research program on the scientific study of war for more than three decades. Conceptually, COW has generated three different datasets identifying several classes of war: 1. *inter-state wars*, i.e. major armed conflict between two or more members of the international system with a total of at least 1,000 battle-deaths; 2. *extra-systemic wars*, defined as armed conflicts between a member of the international system and a political entity not recognized as a member of this inter-state system (and subdivided into colonial and imperial wars); 3. *civil wars*, defined as any armed conflict that involves military action internal to the metropole, the active participation of the national government, and effective resistance by both actor sides (Small/Singer, 1982:203-222). Extra-systemic and civil wars require a minimum of 1,000 battle-related deaths per year.

Given the perceived conceptual weaknesses and limitations COW recently developed a modified and expanded typology promoting a more comprehensive analysis of the incidence of war (Sarkees/Singer, 2001a). More precisely, as the major alteration the COW Project has changed the definitions of extra-systemic wars and civil wars into “extra-state wars” (armed conflict between a state and a non-sovereign entity outside of the borders of the state) and “intra-state wars” (armed conflict within the recognized territory of the state) respectively



(Sarkees/Singer, 2001a:10). As a consequence, this change has resulted in the reclassification of a number of events formerly labelled as civil wars and extra-systemic wars. Additionally, the redefinition of civil wars has led to two different subsets of internal war: a) wars fought over the control of the government and b) wars over local issues (Sarkees/Singer, 2001a:10ff). Furthermore, they present the new class of “inter-communal wars” between non-state actors within the intra-state war category.<sup>4</sup> This makes perfectly sense given the challenges of new wars, fought by diverse actors in failed states. For the purposes of this analysis, however, we rely only on the two updated datasets (-1997) on inter-state and intra-state wars based on the refined war typology; extra-systemic wars are excluded, given the political status, i.e. membership in the interstate system, as a joint operating rule guiding this comparison.

Violent interstate incidents below the threshold of war are recorded by COW’s “Militarized Interstate Dispute” (MID) dataset. A militarized interstate dispute is defined as a set of interactions between states involving explicit threats to resort to military force, displays of military force or actual uses of military force (Maoz/Gochman, 1984; Jones, Bremer and Singer, 1996). If a militarized confrontation between two states results in a 1,000 or more battle-related deaths, the dispute is classified as a war – as defined by the standard criteria of the COW Project (Small/Singer, 1982). Thus, operationally, the MID dataset covers four stages of hostile interstate interaction: (1) threat to use force, (2) display of force, (3) use of military force and (4) interstate war. Currently, the COW Project is updating the MID dataset (for details see Diehl, 2001).

Another comprehensive research project on the scientific study of armed conflict is the *Conflict Data Project* (CDP) at Uppsala. This group collects data on internal and international armed conflicts. These events consist of three subsets: 1. “*minor armed conflict*” with at least 25 battle-related deaths per year, but fewer than 1.000 deaths during the entire armed conflict; 2. “*intermediate armed conflict*”, defined as an armed conflict with at least 25 battle-related deaths in a given year and more than 1.000 deaths during the whole of conflict, but fewer than 1.000 soldiers killed in a single year; 3. the *highest intensity level* conflicts, i.e. war, an armed conflict which requires a minimum of 1.000 battle-related deaths in a single year. The Upp-

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<sup>4</sup> The modifications made by Sarkees and Singer (2001a) have led to the classification of six types of war: inter-state wars (war type 1); imperial extra-state wars (war type 2), i.e. state vs. independent non-state actor; colonial extra-state wars (war type 3); i.e. state vs. dependent non-state actor; intra-state wars fought for central control (war type 4); intra-state wars fought for local issues (war type 5); inter-communal wars between non-state actors (war type 6).

sala group (in cooperation with PRIO) has recently extended the original dataset<sup>5</sup> to cover the entire post-World War II period on the basis of the information found in various other major datasets such as COW (for details see Gleditsch et al., 2001: 3-5). The Uppsala data used in this analysis refer to the first version of dataset presented at the 42<sup>nd</sup> annual convention of the ISA in Chicago.

While COW and CDP use quantitative criteria for the definition of violent conflicts, the Uppsala group differs from COW by defining armed conflicts as a “contested incompatibility” concerning government (type of political system, replacement of central governmental structures or change of its composition) and/or territory (demands for autonomy or secession). This issue-area-related coding rule leads to the awkward situation that a number of wars reported by COW are missing in the Uppsala data collection - for example Jordan 1970 (a list of critical cases is presented by Gleditsch et al., 2000: 16). It is not fully clear why incompatibility - as a structural condition of violence – is part of the conflict definition. Conceptually, the definition of armed conflict is sufficiently clear, transparent and intersubjectively reproducible but also open enough to integrate any type of contested issues and new patterns of warfare as separate attributes. The growing number of failed states and civil war economies, for instance, evokes new types of issues and new goals such as resource acquisition and enrichment instead of “traditional” incompatibilities concerning government (anti-regime wars) or territory (wars of autonomy or secession). Moreover, in many wars it is hard to precisely identify incompatibilities.

In contrast to COW and CDP, the two German research projects AKUF and KOSIMO (HIK) make use of qualitative definitions of armed conflict and war (cf. Eberwein, 1997). The AKUF group at the University of Hamburg for the post-World War II period defines war as a “violent mass conflict” between two parties or more armed forces (of which at least on one side regular armed forces of a particular government are involved) with a minimum of control and organization on both conflicting sides and a “certain durability” indicating a systematic strategy of fighting (Gantzel/Schwinghammer, 1994:31-35). This definition can lead to different interpretations of specific events. Furthermore, this definition complicates the replication of the data. A major advantage of the dataset is the descriptive information provided for every single war, classified as anti-regime, autonomy and secession, interstate, de-

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<sup>5</sup> Starting point for the original Uppsala dataset is 1989. The information on armed conflict is updated annually in the *Journal of Peace Research*.

colonisation or other intra-state war<sup>6</sup>. Currently, AKUF is revising its research strategy by considering new classes of internal violence and including forms of violent action other than war. Since we did not have access to the revised data we used the presently available dataset. As in the case of COW we exclude AKUF's wars of decolonisation from the analysis.

A comprehensive dataset integrating different stages of armed conflict has been compiled by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIK) at the Department of Political Science at the University of Heidelberg: the Conflict-Simulation-Model (KOSIMO). This particular project defines conflicts as clashes of overlapping interests (positional differences) around national values and issues (independence, self-determination, borders and territories, access to or distribution of domestic or international power) between at least two parties (states, groups of states, organizations or organized groups). Similar to AKUF, KOSIMO uses qualitative criteria such as "some duration" and "magnitude" which are obviously vague and open to interpretation. The intensity of conflicts ranges from a "latent conflict" and a "non-violent crisis", to a "violent crisis" with the use of force and "war" (Pfetsch/Billing, 1994). In the comparison to follow, however, we excluded latent crises and conflicts because of the non-violent character of these types of disputes. These conflicts are based on unreproducible coding criteria – especially the "latent conflict" category. Since KOSIMO offers no precise differentiation between intrastate and interstate conflicts we have recoded the relevant events so that they could be used for comparative purposes (for further details see the methodological appendix).

Finally, we included a specific dataset focusing on internal violence generated by the State Failure Task Force (Gurr/Harff, 1997; Esty et al., 1998). The *State Failure Problem Set* includes internal wars as well as data on genocides/politicides and disruptive regime transitions. We have excluded the latter two datasets since they represent only subsets of domestic violence. Within the included war dataset the research group identifies "ethnic wars" and "revolutionary wars". Revolutionary wars are defined as episodes of violent conflict between governments and politically organized groups seeking to overthrow the government. In contrast, ethnic wars are violent conflicts between governments and ethnic challengers (national, ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities) seeking major changes in their status (Gurr/Harff, 1997). Similar to both COW and CDP the State-Failure data on ethnic and revo-

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<sup>6</sup> For the data comparison we use their integrated databank covering the wars from 1945 to 1998. The missing year 1999 is updated with the information found at AKUF's web page. Unfortunately, the web site is currently only available in German and the databank function for the entire period doesn't work; see <http://www.sozialwiss.uni-hamburg.de/Ipw/Akuf/home.html>.

lutionary use quantitatively defined thresholds of violence. In contrast to COW or CDP, however, the dataset records the number of all the people killed in a given year, not just soldiers, i.e. the battle-related deaths<sup>7</sup>. This makes perfectly sense because many of the civil wars nowadays produce overwhelmingly casualties among the civilian population. The use of this particular time-series may be instructive for our further understanding of violent conflict, especially for the study of new wars in weak or failed states.

The selected datasets obviously differ more or less in their definitions and classification schemes, but they are appropriate for comparison purposes, since they all focus on internal and/or international violence and cover at least four decades of the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>8</sup> Excluded are, in contrast, data-gathering projects covering only a limited time span or focusing on very specific types of conflicts such as Holsti's list of international wars (Holsti, 1991), his data on 'wars of the third kind' (Holsti, 1996) or data collections based on different conflict concepts such as the project on international and foreign policy crises by Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997)<sup>9</sup>. Finally, we also excluded the Minorities at Risk dataset which is not suited for the comparison of internal conflicts, since the project focus are minorities.

With the conceptual criteria and operational definitions in mind, we now turn to the systematic comparison of the different data sources.

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<sup>7</sup> For each war-year State-Failure presents estimates of annual fatalities directly attributed to fighting, armed attacks and revolutionary protest (ranging from less than 100 to more than 10.000 fatalities).

<sup>8</sup> A more detailed explication of definitions and coding rules can be found in the methodological Appendix at the end of this paper.

<sup>9</sup> The concept of 'crisis' remains ambiguous. It is conceptually not fully clear whether a particular crisis is, strictly speaking, conflictual behavior or more a structural background condition of armed conflict and war.

## 4. Comparison of Data on Violent Conflicts<sup>10</sup>

### 4.1 Interstate Armed Conflicts

Given the destructiveness of two total wars in the 20th Century the scientific community has a strong interest in understanding the paths to interstate conflict. Whereas the typical interstate war occurs on the dyadic level (see among others Vasquez, 1993; Geller/Singer, 1998), i.e. between two sovereign states, some armed conflicts are characterized by the intervention of third parties and, therefore, escalate to multilateral wars, sometimes destabilizing the international system at large. In general, however, there is agreement that interstate wars are, statistically speaking, relatively rare events (cf. Bremer, 1996). If the scholarly community has a good understanding of the war phenomenon there should be no major disagreement over this highest level of international violence. As a consequence the overlap between the various datasets should be very high. In order to test this proposition we have selected four major datasets all of which record interstate wars: AKUF, KOSIMO, CDP (Uppsala) and COW's interstate war list. Even though each dataset covers different time periods they all do overlap for several decades, i.e. between 1950 and 1997 or 1999 respectively (cf. table 1 above or the methodological appendix). For the comparison we use the onset of a conflict in a given year as our indicator.<sup>11</sup> A further coding rule concerns the selection of cases: included are those events where the participants are sovereign states as defined by Correlates of War Projects state membership list.

**Table 2: Interstate wars, 1950-99**  
(onset of war)

Dataset	Period	Interstate Wars
COW (Interstate War List)	1950-1997	21
KOSIMO	1950-1999	22
CDP (Uppsala)	1950-1999	22
AKUF	1950-1999	37

<sup>10</sup> The comparison is a revised and updated version of the paper presented at the conference 'Identifying Wars: Systematic Conflict Research and its Utility in Conflict Resolution and Prevention', 8-9 June 2001, Uppsala, Sweden. Included are now the modified and updated data from CDP and from the enhanced COW typology (Sarkees/ Singer, 2001a). Additionally, we have re-checked and corrected the other data for minor bugs.

<sup>11</sup> The country-year as unit of analysis (see the next section on civil wars) would inflate the numbers as that indicator counts the number of conflict participants.

Looking first at the total number of interstate wars reported by the four datasets listed in table 2 we find that AKUF specify 37 interstate wars, the highest number of events of all four datasets, whereas the other research groups report only 22 interstate wars (CDP and KOSIMO) respectively 21 events of international warfare for a more restricted time-span (COW). More precise information as to the similarities or divergencies between the datasets are found in table 3. In order to identify similarities and discrepancies between the major data-gathering projects the table lists the jointly reported events for each pair, the cases with different start dates, differently coded intensity levels for the same cases, different types of conflict (internal vs. international events) as well as the number of specific events reported only by one of them. The far right column reports the percentage of agreement for each pair, that is the number of joint events divided by the total events reported by both datasets.

**Table 3: Interstate wars**  
(onset of interstate)

Datasets	Joint period	Joint events reported	Different start dates	Different intensity level	Different types of conflict	Seperate events	Total events	Percent overlap
AKUF - CDP	1950-99	14	1	13	5	13	46	30.4
COW - AKUF	1950-97	15	-	15	5	5	40	37.5
KOSIMO - CDP	1950-99	12	2	5	1	10	30	40.0
AKUF - KOSIMO	1950-99	17	1	13	4	6	41	41.5
COW - CDP	1950-97	13	1	8	1	4	27	48.1
COW - KOSIMO	1950-97	14	3	3	-	4	24	58.3

The degree of agreement for the joint events reported by the different pairs ranges between 30.4 percent (AKUF and CDP), i.e. not even a third of all reported events, to nearly 60 percent (COW and KOSIMO). In the remaining cases the agreement is between 37.5 and 48.1 percent. The differences concerning the total number of events reported by the dataset pairs are quite large. Whereas the COW-KOSIMO pair lists 24 inter-state wars, the pair AKUF-CDP reports almost the double, namely 46 events. Going more into details, the problem of different start dates for interstate wars is obviously rather small (KOSIMO has some minor deviations). More illuminating are the differences with respect to the intensity level of inter-state violence and the coded types of conflict (inter-state vs. intra-state). In both columns AKUF is largely responsible for these discrepancies. Last not least, the high amount of cases listed by only one of the datasets of each pair is remarkably high. In principle, there is only

consensus on 11 cases for the period between 1950 and 1997 (see the list of inter-state war presented in the appendix).

How can these enormous deviations be explained? One explanation is that the different projects use diverging operational criteria and different coding rules with respect to the highest level of violence (quantitative vs. qualitative definitions). The other is that the projects use different classification schemes for conflict and war (inter-state, intra-state, interventions, miscellaneous types).

With respect to the first explanation we would expect only minor variations between the two projects using well defined casualty thresholds of war (COW and CDP) and greater variations between them and the other two (AKUF and KOSIMO), because the latter use “qualitative” coding criteria. But as table 3 reveals we cannot find major variations between the data collections using qualitative and quantitative definitions. Even though COW and CDP have fairly stringent and explicit coding criteria, the “war world” of the Correlates of War Project and the Uppsala group does not match at all. Given the fact that COW and CDP use stringent operational criteria with a threshold of 1.000 deaths in a given year they do agree in only 48.1 percent of the cases. In most of the remaining cases they disagree with respect to the hostility level. That the percentage overlap between AKUF and all other datasets remains in the range between 30 and 40 percent is, in contrast, less surprising. AKUF reports the highest number of wars and lists many cases under the threshold of war as defined by COW and CDP.

The second explanation if not expectation is related to the different typologies of war. Whereas some projects classify inter-state wars as a distinct type of violence, other datasets do not provide a sufficient differentiation (KOSIMO) or they present a mixed war category including both internal and international violence such as AKUF.<sup>12</sup> As a result of different typologies, some projects classify a particular event as an inter-state war, whereas others code them as a civil war. Critical cases are the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974, the Bangladesh war 1971 (India vs. Pakistan) or the Yemen unification war listed as an inter-state war by AKUF, as an intra-state war by all other projects (for further details see the list of inter-state war presented in the appendix). In contrast to other projects the Uppsala group disaggre-

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<sup>12</sup> In the case of AKUF we have tried to judge whether a particular war is more inter-state or more internal in its basic characteristics. Three wars of AKUF’s so-called conflict type ‘mixed wars’ are classified as interstate wars assuming that these cases start and/or escalate basically on the international level (India vs. Pakistan, 1971; the Turkish intervention on Cyprus, 1974; and, Uganda vs. Tanzania, 1971). Another problem with AKUF occurs because some international wars such the Ethiopian-Somalian war in 1977 are embedded in the mixed category covering a wider time span and starting as internal conflicts.

gates, for example, the Arab-Israeli war in 1967 into three several dyadic wars (Israel vs. Egypt; Israel vs. Jordan, Israel vs. Syria). As a consequence, the dyadic breakdown of some major international conflicts inflates the degree of disagreement between the Uppsala group and the other data-gathering projects.

As the comparison shows the situation concerning interstate war is problematic. There is agreement on several wars, but the level of disagreement concerning the level of intensity, the type of conflict and the inclusion or exclusion of major armed conflicts between the datasets is difficult to accept. What makes the situation awkward is the fact that one can not exclude a priori any dataset as deficient or determine rationally one's preference for one data collection over another. This is certainly true for those which offer intersubjectively reproducible results, i.e. COW and CDP.

How is the situation concerning those violent events below the threshold of war? These data have, as we argued above, the advantage to be used for analyzing the evolution of conflict. COW, Uppsala and KOSIMO code lower levels of interstate armed conflict. Such a process perspective is implicit in the COW Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset, which includes four stages of militarized disputes (threat, display, use of force, war). CDP presents three levels of armed conflicts (low, middle and high) and, as noted above, KOSIMO introduces a so-called violent crisis level (for operational definitions and coding details see the methodological appendix).

In a previous paper Gleditsch et al. (2001: Figure 12) compared a subset of the interstate conflicts in MID (*use of force*) and the Uppsala disputes – limited to those events in both datasets with 25 or more battle deaths. While the resulting curves look virtually identical (with the exception of the period around the Gulf War) a closer look at the data reveals some striking discrepancies. Disaggregating the time series leads to different results. In table 4 we compare the data on the onset of serious interstate conflicts (start dates) with a threshold of 25 deaths but lower than war (use of force in the MID dataset; minor and intermediate armed conflict in the CDP dataset). We have also included the 'violent crisis' from the KOSIMO dataset (not reported in the paper presented by Gleditsch et al.).



**Table 4: Interstate armed conflicts**  
(onset of interstate armed conflict)

Dataset	Joint period	Joint events reported	Separate events	Total events	Percent overlap
COW*-CDP*	1950-92	28	63	91	30.8
CDP*-KOSIMO	1950-99	31	59	90	34.4
COW*-KOSIMO	1950-92	52	62	114	45.6

\* (more than 25 battle deaths, less than 1.000 battle-related deaths)

As table 4 shows there are considerable discrepancies in the worlds of violent interstate conflict lower than war reported by the three groups. First of all, the datasets differ with respect to the total number of events. Whereas COW (n=84) and KOSIMO (n=83) report a similar amount of serious interstate conflicts, CDP lists only 38 events. Thus, the total number of militarized interstate disputes (COW) and violent crises (KOSIMO) is twice as high as the Uppsala 'world' of interstate armed conflict. Moreover, the percentage overlap of the different pairs of datasets presented in table 4 is not very high. The degree of agreement lies between 30.8 percent (COW and CDP) and just 45.6 percent (COW and KOSIMO). In principle, the MID subset matches better with the violent crises events from KOSIMO than with the Uppsala data. But we also find that this pair reports more separate events than joint events. Why the discrepancies exist remains to be explained. Before drawing any further conclusions we will next look at the internal violence data.

## 4.2 Internal Armed Conflict and War

The end of the Cold War has led to new interaction opportunities and to changing normative orientations (consensus concerning minority and human rights, diffusion of democracy, erosion of the non-intervention norm) in international relations on the one hand, a high amount of violent internal conflicts in weak or failed states (see for example Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone) on the other hand. These new risks and opportunities in international politics represent a major challenge to the scientific community in the field of conflict and war studies. Given the empirically observed decline of international wars and the increase in new wars the scientific study of internal conflict has attracted an increasing number of scholars (cf. among others Holsti, 1996; Kaldor, 1999). From the data making perspective the focus on internal conflicts is nothing new. Thus, it is no surprise at all that COW, CDP, AKUF and

IIK (KOSIMO) have not only collected data on interstate armed conflicts but also on domestic violence.

In the following comparative analysis we focus, first, on the onset of intra-state war. Secondly, we use the incidence of armed conflict in a given year and country as our basic unit of analysis, i. E. the amount of violence under way in a given year. With respect to the incidence of conflict we will both look at the highest level of violence, i.e. civil war, and on domestic violence below the war level. Theoretically, the incidence of armed conflict reflecting the duration of collective violence seems to be a crucial determinant for the study of internal war. Conceptually, using the country-years as our indicator allows the comparison with the results presented by the Uppsala group (Gleditsch et al., 2001). The basis, again, is the Correlates of War state membership list. Given these specific coding rules, wars of decolonization were, by definition, excluded – to use the COW terms, as well as imperial and colonial wars. Using the country-year format for the analysis of the incidence armed conflict we have included 6,945 nation-years for the period 1950-99.

**Table 5: Onset of internal wars, 1950-99**

Dataset	Period	Internal Wars
KOSIMO	1950-1999	57
CDP (Uppsala)	1950-1999	84
COW	1950-1997	96
AKUF	1950-1999	138

With regard to the onset of domestic violence (table 5) we find that in this case, too, the different datasets represent different worlds of intra-state wars. The differences in internal violent conflicts reported are substantial. Whereas KOSIMO lists only 57 civil wars for the period between 1950 and 1999, AKUF reports more than the double, namely 138 wars within states. COW and CDP range between these extremes with 96 and 84 internal wars respectively. The relevant cases are listed in Appendix 2.

A more detailed comparison of data on the onset of internal wars is presented in table 6. The table lists the jointly reported events for each pair (same start dates), cases with different start dates, differently coded intensity levels, and different types of conflicts as well as the number of specific events reported only by one of them (“separate events”). In addition, we have added the category “multiple wars” reflecting either additional wars due to different

counting (for example 1966-72 and 1978-84 instead of 1966-1984) or additional violent events within a given state at the same point in time.

**Table 6: Internal wars 1950-99**  
(onset of intra-state war)

Datasets	Joint period	Joint start dates	Different start dates	Different intensity level	Different types	Multiple wars	Separate events	Total events	Percent overlap
COW - AKUF	1950-97	35	36	-	4	20	61	156	22.4
AKUF - KOSIMO	1950-99	33	15	56	1	18	23	146	22.6
AKUF - CDP	1950-99	41	30	29	3	31	17	151	27.2
COW - KOSIMO	1950-97	31	17	30	-	5	19	102	30.4
KOSIMO - CDP	1950-99	30	17	29	1	6	11	94	31.9
CDP - COW	1950-97	37	24	14	3	10	26	114	32.5

Given the different operational criteria (CDP and COW vs. AKUF and KOSIMO) and the differentiation of armed conflicts by levels of hostility (CDP and KOSIMO), we should expect some level of agreement between similar projects, i.e. COW and CDP, greater disagreement between quantitative-based and qualitative-oriented research projects. Furthermore, it seems to be likely to uncover discrepancies with respect to those pairs of datasets where at least one project takes into account different intensity levels of armed conflict.

The results listed in table 6 show, first of all, the low degree of percentage overlap between the different pairs of datasets. As the far right column<sup>13</sup> reveals, the range of agreement for the same starting points of internal wars lies between 22.4 percent for the quantitative-qualitative pair COW-AKUF and 32.5 percent for the quantitative research groups of COW and Uppsala (CDP). Altogether, we find only seven identical cases reported jointly by the four datasets (same start years and duration) and another 12 cases with identical start years but different duration and/or multiple wars. Moreover, the detailed list of internal wars presented in Appendix 2 to this paper reveals three intra-state wars with different classifications (Hungary 1956, Cyprus 1974, Yemen 1994), 47 cases with different start years and/or different thresholds, and, finally, 70 cases which are reported by one of the datasets only. These results are consistent with the prior findings on international violence and, again, the findings are highly troubling.

<sup>13</sup> The percentage overlap for each dataset pair presented in the far right column is the number of joint events divided by the total of events reported by both datasets.

Going more into details, table 6 shows different sources accounting for the deviations between the pairs of datasets compared. Whereas the problem of varying classifications (internal violence vs. international wars) remains rather small and negligible, there is a significant number of cases with different start dates. For the Tigrean liberation war in Ethiopia, for instance, the included data projects give four different start years: 1974 (KOSIMO), 1975 (AKUF), 1976 (CDP) and 1978 (COW). Such variations affect the number of nation-years at war in the international system and the duration of wars respectively. Table 6 also confirms the assumption that diverse definitions and operational standards either lead to the coding of separate events or to the classification of intensity levels below the threshold of war. With respect to the latter, we find several pairs pointing to violent conflicts other than war. Obviously, ambiguities exist both within qualitative research projects (AKUF-KOSIMO) and between the qualitative and quantitative groups (KOSIMO-CDP). This points to the problem of vague definitions by the qualitative projects as well as to the necessity of clarifying the concept of conflict stages.

A controversial case with respect to a restricted definition is the treatment of internal violence in Rwanda 1994 by the Uppsala group. Since CDP (Uppsala) includes only those cases with a “contested incompatibility” and battle-related deaths, the massacres by Hutu and Tutsi are not listed as internal war, but rather as intermediate armed conflict. Controversial is also CDP’s exclusion of armed combat in Rwanda 1963 in contrast to COW. The argument is that one of the sides in the conflict is not an organized actor. In other words, the quantitative research projects produce also different results due to both different definitions and the inclusion of intensity levels. Last but not least, a subset of critical cases is related to the problem of multiple coding, i.e. the fact that the projects either differ in their breakdowns of violent conflict or code the diversity of armed conflict in a given country at the same point in time as separate events. India is such an example. Whereas most of the projects list one or two cases of internal violence in this country during the last five decades, AKUF reports nine internal wars for the same period of time. Another example is the devastating period of internal violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995. Some of the projects list two (CDP) or three (KOSIMO) violent conflicts, while the Correlates of War Project and AKUF report only one intra-state war. But this is only one of the few exceptions where COW and AKUF actually coincide. In principle, the comparison between AKUF and COW shows that there is major disagreement in more than half of the total number of events listed. Again, this shows that it makes a difference which dataset is used to describe violence in the international system or

to explain it. Generally speaking, however, the actual degree of agreement between the data-gathering projects concerning internal war events is higher than the percentages of overlap in the far right column of table 6 suggests. This is due to the high number of cases with different start dates and/or different intensity levels of domestic violence. If one disregards these differences the overlap ranges between 65.8 (CDP-COW) percent and almost 81 percent (CDP-KOSIMO) with the exception of the COW-AKUF pair.

Having compared the onset of internal wars we now look at the incidence of armed conflict in a given year. The war-year as unit of analysis is a suitable measure for the frequency of violence in the international system during a pre-defined period of time. How good or bad is the proportion of war-years where the datasets agree and how bad is it with respect to the discrepancies among the various pairs? Table 7 lists the number of nation-years of war reported by each pair of datasets, the number of war-years reported exclusively by the first, the number of war-years listed by the second dataset only, and the total number of nation-years at war, summing the first three columns. Finally, we have listed the proportion of jointly reported high level of violence cases relative to the total number reported by each pair of datasets as well as the bivariate correlations.

**Table 7: Internal war-years**  
(nation-years of internal war)

Datasets	Joint period	Joint war-years	First dataset only	Second dataset only	Total war-years	Percent overlap	Correlation coefficient
AKUF - CDP	1950-99	351	742	24	1117	31.4	0.51
CDP - KOSIMO	1950-99	267	108	282	657	40.6	0.56
COW - AKUF	1950-97	476	42	560	1078	44.2	0.61
KOSIMO - AKUF	1950-99	516	33	577	1126	45.8	0.63
CDP - COW	1950-97	285	65	233	583	48.9	0.64
COW - KOSIMO	1950-97	348	170	173	691	50.4	0.64

The total numbers of war-years per dataset: AKUF (n=1093), KOSIMO (n=549), COW (n=518), CDP (n=375).

The deviations among the different pairs of datasets, as one would expect by now, are considerable. First of all, the total number of war-years reported by each pair is in the range of a low of 583 (CDP-COW) and a high of 1126 (KOSIMO-AKUF) which is almost the double. Moreover, the number of jointly reported war-years differ enormously. Within the pair of AKUF and KOSIMO we find 516 joint war-years, while KOSIMO and CDP agree on 267 years. Largely responsible for the high amount of war-years listed by several pairs is AKUF

reporting 1093 nation-years at war alone, while KOSIMO lists 549 war-years, the Correlates of War Project 518 and the Uppsala group 375 years of internal warfare in the international system. The best match exists between COW-KOSIMO and CDP-COW. But in both cases the datasets agree in only about 50 percent, that is half of the total listed by both datasets. In contrast, AKUF and CDP (Uppsala) only agree in 31.4 percent of the cases. These results are also born out by correlation coefficients reported in the far-right column. The lowest correlation is between CDP and AKUF (0.51), the highest between the revised COW and KOSIMO respectively COW and CDP (0.64).

One reason for serious discrepancies between the data-gathering projects based on quantitative coding rules lies in the coding of periods of inactivity or lesser activity. Whereas COW, for example, lists a war period in Colombia from 1978 up to 1991 (14 war-years), CDP distinguishes between ‘intermediate armed conflict’ and ‘war’ resulting in 12 years of intermediate armed conflict and only two war-years. KOSIMO, as the extreme case, lists only a ‘violent crisis’ for Colombia and thus, no war-years at all. Furthermore, a detailed review of the different datasets indicates that the starting and ending dates for the same cases are not identical (see Appendix 2).

As table 7 reveals the disagreement among all of the datasets is considerable which in itself represents a serious problem both for conflict researchers and practitioners. The world of internal warfare measured by the nation-years at war each dataset reports about differs considerably from the other. The conclusion is that each world of domestic violence reflects the particular view of the data generating group. But which of the worlds reported is the real one? And how is the situation with respect to lower thresholds of internal violence? Whereas the first question remains open to further discussions and theoretical clarifications, the second one is addressed in the next section of this paper.

As noted earlier, only two of the datasets included focus on armed conflicts other than war by capturing different intensity levels of violence. The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) offers a qualitative judgement between ‘war’ and ‘violent crisis’ with the KOSIMO dataset. The Uppsala group (CDP) distinguishes three intensity levels of collective violence: ‘minor armed conflict’, ‘intermediate armed conflict’ and ‘war’. An additional dataset suited for the analysis of the lower levels of violent conflict and, therefore, included in the comparison is the internal war dataset (revolutionary and ethnic wars) from the State Failure Problem Set. On the one hand, this particular dataset presents annual estimates of fatalities starting with 100 deaths per year, i.e. with violent episodes below the criti-

cal threshold of war (at least 1.000 deaths), indicating at least some similarities with the ‘conflict worlds’ of KOSIMO and CDP. On the other hand, however, the dataset does not list battle-related deaths only but the total number of people killed in a given year which includes civilian casualties. Finally, we have included, again, AKUF’s internal war data. The results for this general comparison of internal violent conflict-years are listed in table 8.

As this table reveals, the percentage overlap is in the range of 51.6 percent and 67.5 percent, the correlation coefficients are between 0.63 and 0.77. Thus, the worlds of violent conflict match much better than the ‘war worlds’ presented in the tables 6 and 7. The results are illuminating from at least three perspectives. First, the overlap of the internal war data reported by the State Failure Problem Set with all other datasets is not higher than 60 percent.

**Table 8: Internal armed conflicts**  
(nation-years of conflict)

Datasets	Joint period	Joint conflict-years	First dataset only	Second dataset only	Total conflict-years	Percent overlap	Correlation coefficient
KOSIMO - State-Failure	1954-96	637	432	166	1235	51,6	0.63
CDP - KOSIMO	1950-99	801	220	414	1435	55,8	0.67
CDP - State Failure	1954-96	638	281	165	1084	58,9	0.70
State Failure - AKUF	1954-96	669	134	321	1124	59,5	0.71
AKUF - CDP	1950-99	851	242	170	1263	67,4	0.77
AKUF - KOSIMO	1950-99	930	163	285	1378	67,5	0.77

The total numbers per dataset: KOSIMO (n=1215), AKUF (n=1093), CDP (n=1021), State-Failure Wars (n=804).

One possible interpretation could be that this particular dataset is not as comprehensive as the other datasets included. This is verified by the finding that many conflict-years reported by CDP and KOSIMO are not included in State Failure’s internal war data. A second interpretation is related to the opposite finding that we uncover several ethnic and revolutionary conflict-years not considered by other data-gathering projects. Since Ted R. Gurr and his colleagues from the State Failure Problem Set include civilian casualties in their definition of internal violence we are obviously confronted with several violent episodes other than traditional internal warfare. This is consistent with the assumption that many ‘local’ conflicts are increasingly characterized by the involvement of sub-state actors and by the privatization of violence in weak or failed states (see Kaldor, 1999, Chojnacki/Eberwein, 2000, Sarkees/Singer, 2001a).

Second, we see AKUF's war-years corresponding highly with the conflict-years listed by CDP and KOSIMO. Both pairs reach an agreement of about 67.5 percent and a correlation of 0.77 respectively. This is the highest correspondence to be found among the different pairs in the entire comparison of this paper. The reason seems to be clear: AKUF presents the widest definition of war including many cases considered as lower episodes of violence by other projects. In other words, many wars reported by AKUF are only 'minor' and 'intermediate armed conflicts' (CDP) or 'violent crises' (KOSIMO). Moreover, we find several war-years neither listed as violent conflicts in CDP nor in KOSIMO. A possible explanation is that AKUF includes many periods of inactivity boosting the total amount of war-years. As a consequence, AKUF's list of wars is, to some degree, helpful as a supplementary survey of violence in the international system providing some important qualitative clues, but it lacks of reproducible standards and a process-oriented perspective.

Third, it is still troubling that the two comprehensive datasets, KOSIMO and CDP, including different intensity levels do agree in only 55.8 percent of the conflict-years. Most notably, we find many cases (n=414) only reported by KOSIMO indicating that the vague term 'violent crisis' includes either cases below the threshold of minor armed conflict (less than 25 battle-related deaths per year) or conflict-years where violence is absent. Even though CDP offers more precise intensity levels, both datasets are not suited for a proper timing of the shifts in armed combat due to the presentation of annual aggregates only. Thus, conceptually, none of the datasets included is very useful for the in-depth study of the dynamics of violent conflicts, i.e. for a precise timing of the escalatory shifts in the different intensity levels identified. Nevertheless CDP (Uppsala), HIIK (KOSIMO) and also State Failure provide some information useful for that end.

Summarizing these results for domestic violence we see that the degree of convergence among the datasets is unsatisfactory – particularly with respect to the high intensity level of war. One could conclude: the world is as violent as the dataset one uses. But we do not know which of the 'war worlds' the different datasets inform us is the correct one. Going to the overall category of 'armed conflict' the differences among most pairs of datasets, however, seem not to be that big suggesting that there is at least a subset of major armed disputes where there is agreement.



## 5. Conclusions and Implications

At the beginning of this paper we argued that data on violence in the international system are crucial for two purposes: theoretically for the growth of knowledge concerning the explanation of the occurrence and escalation of violence within and between states on the one hand, practically for contributing to the objective of conflict prevention on the other. Whereas the former activity does not require any further justification the latter needs to be specified. We will address each of these issues separately.

The fact that several time series on internal and external violence in the international system are available can be interpreted as a healthy sign of the discipline. But this pluralism has its price. All the data portray the world of violence as it evolved over the last fifty years, but the worlds of violence they portray differ, in some cases even quite dramatically. This is the conclusion one can draw in a first cut. A closer look at the data reveals that these differences are related to different problems. The simpler issue is that there are differences in the coding rules, in particular with respect to the starting and end dates, with respect to the duration and the disaggregation of a specific conflict treated as a continuous one by one dataset into several separate conflicts by another one. That is to say that the differences among the various datasets are possibly less dramatic when taking these various elements into account, with the exception of AKUF.

One of the striking findings is that stringent quantitative operational definitions do not necessarily guarantee consistency across the time series. COW and CDP disagree quite strongly along almost all types of violent conflicts even though they use the same operational criteria. Striking as well is that datasets using different operational procedures, qualitative vs. quantitative criteria, seem to match much better in quite a number of cases.

Nevertheless, the problem remains that there are differences that cannot be easily explained away. The results reveal different - and in part substantially different - worlds of violence. Even if we assume that this is in part a problem of classification and measurement all of the datasets must obviously differ in terms of their theoretical assumptions. That is to say that each of them captures a particular segment of violence depending on different theoretical considerations about the occurrence and escalation of violent conflicts in the international system. Yet these different theoretical assumptions remain concealed<sup>14</sup>.

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<sup>14</sup> A good example for the need of both operational and theoretical considerations is found in the article just published by Fordham/Sarver (2001).

One cannot simply discard this fact and ignore this variety. A simple and pragmatic strategy to find out whether the discrepancies are as pronounced and relevant as we assume would be to test the same hypotheses using the different datasets. If the results are robust, we would have greater confidence in their use. If this were not the case, which we assume, there are two complementary alternatives. The more pragmatic approach would be to sort out the differences among the different data collections leading to consolidated time series of the different types of violence. But this strategy is limited in that it does not really address the core issue: what are the theoretical foundations and justifications of the individual dataset? Logically at least there is an infinite number of conflict theories. Yet scientific progress can only be achieved by formulating a specific theory making the underlying theoretical assumptions and propositions about violence explicit. At this point this is not the case. Since some of the data collections (CDP and KOSIMO) are characterized by more implicit theoretical designs, COW und AKUF, however, have tried to integrate their empirical work in a wider theoretical frame (Realpolitik approach vs. structural history approach). Nevertheless, even if we recognize the theoretical endeavors (such in the case of AKUF), the required linkage between theory and data collection remains vague or partial - to say nothing of the dubiousness concerning the structural history approach.

In the future much more weight must therefore be given to this particular dimension of conflict research. A research program is only progressive (Lakatos) to the extent that theories are developed which allow to include a greater variety of events (i.e. types or classes of events) than the predecessor(s).

This is particularly true when considering the predominately state-centered categories of armed conflict. These are inappropriate for the study of “new” types of internal war. Of course, sovereign states still remain the most important actors in international politics. But if the patterns of armed conflict are changing and if new sets of actors (clans, gangs, security companies etc.) are gaining in importance, then we need additional categories of war including conflicts in failed states between non-state actors within and across borders. For these purposes, COW’s revised typology of war is a step in the right direction (Sarkees/Singer, 2001a). In any case, we need an expansion of our existing typologies opening space for new types of conflict including armed combat other than war and some information about civilian casualties (cf. Smith, 2001).

This still does not answer a central aspect of conflict research: the issue of escalation and de-escalation of violence. To study the evolution of violence requires the ability to trace

the dynamics of the whole process. Both COW with the MID-data and CDP with its own time series identify different levels of intensity. At this point in time this is definitely not enough. The information is still limited (four respectively three levels of intensity) and one gets only the highest level of violence reached, which tells us not terribly much about the dynamics of that process. The Behavioral Correlates of War could be the solution for this particular problem. But we suspect that such a time consuming and high cost undertaking can hardly be pursued continuously (ignoring the fact that one also needs people willing to do such a painstaking job). Yet this means that at least from the systematic research perspective there are limits as to the contribution to the overall issue of conflict prevention.

This brings us to the final issue namely what can conflict research contribute to practice in general, to conflict prevention in particular? Ironical as it may sound, these differences among the datasets seem to support a constructivist perspective which tends to see reality as constructed by the observer. To use a modified version of Alex Wendt's (1989) famous statement about the social construction of international anarchy: *'the state (world) of violence is what researchers make of it'*. This statement fundamentally contradicts the underlying logic of quantitative research which is predicated upon the assumption that reality exists and that intersubjectivity is essential. The discrepancies among the datasets compared seem to support an arbitrary perspective akin to Feyerabend's "anything goes" statement. The consequential problem the scholars have is one of credibility. As we cannot expect practitioners to know or - even if they do - to care about operational criteria or theoretical subtleties they can either simply ignore what research has produced or pick the dataset on the menu of choice we offer them. An alarmist type would probably pick the dataset with the highest numbers, whereas an appeasement type would prefer the time series with the lowest numbers of wars. And we could not even blame the one or the other.

Leaving this issue aside, what can we contribute to the prevention of violent conflicts? Systematic research on violent conflict has a lot of insights to contribute to the outbreak of violence (see among others, Holsti, 1991, 1996; Vasquez, 1993; Geller, 1998). Therefore, we are in a position to provide practice – if one wants to – with some advice pertaining to this particular dimension of prevention. But even if one does that one still has to be cautious in not overselling the findings given the problematic state of affairs on the data side. As far as the prevention of conflict escalation is concerned we are probably still in the state of infancy for two reasons: first, the data available do not give us good representations of the conflict dynamics and second there is the data problem which our analysis revealed.

Our arguments may sound extremely destructive. They are not! On the contrary. Conflict research in general, quantitative research on inter-state and on intra-state violence in particular, has come a long way. Considerable progress has been achieved. But we can still do – and must do - better.

## 6. Appendix 1: Definitions, Coding Rules and Sources

The operational definitions and coding rules of armed conflict and war of the data projects included are described below.

### Correlates of War Project (COW)

For our comparison we use COW's expanded data on intra-state and inter-state war based on the broadened typology of war (Sarkees/Singer, 2001a; 2001b). Excluded are extra-state wars involving armed combat between a territorial state and a non-sovereign entity outside the borders of the state. The definitions for inter-state and intra-state wars are as follows:

*Inter-state wars*: sustained armed combat between two or more state members of the international system with a threshold of a total of 1.000 battle-related fatalities (COW's war type 1);

*Intra-state (civil) wars*: sustained combat between the armed forces of the government and forces of another entity with a threshold of 1.000 battle-related deaths per year (COW's war types 4 and 5).

*Time span*: 1816-1997

COW's inter-state war list is available online (<http://pss.la.psu.edu/ISWarFormat.htm>). The revised civil war dataset has been made available by Meredith Sarkees.

For interstate violence below the threshold of 1.000 battle-related deaths, i.e. international war, we refer on COW's " Militarized Interstate Dispute" (MID) dataset. MID's refer to "united historical cases in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state" (Jones et al., 1996:168). Whereas *threats to use force* are verbal indications of hostile intent, *displays of force* involve military demonstrations but no combat action. *Uses of force* – the highest of the three sub-war categories – are defined as active military operations below the threshold of 1.000 battle-related deaths, i.e. *interstate war*.

*Time span*: 1816-1992

Version 2.1 of the Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset is available online ([http://pss.la.psu.edu/MID\\_DATA.HTM](http://pss.la.psu.edu/MID_DATA.HTM)); the *MID 3 Project* is dedicated to the updating the MID dataset through 2001 (see <http://mid3.la.psu.edu/>)

### **Uppsala Conflict Data Project (CDP)**

*Definition of Armed Conflict:* An Armed Conflict is a contested incompatibility which concerns government (type of political system, replacement of the central government or change of its composition) and/or territory (change of the state in control of a certain territory, secession or autonomy) where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. The separated intensity levels are operationalized as follows:

*minor armed conflict:* at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and fewer than 1.000 battle-related deaths during the course of conflict;

*intermediate armed conflict:* at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and an accumulated total of at least 1.000, but fewer than 1.000 per year;

*war:* at least 1.000 battle-related deaths per year.

*Types of Conflict:* intrastate armed conflict; interstate armed conflict

*Time span:* 1946-2000 (annually updated)

The Uppsala data used in this analysis refer to the first version of dataset presented at the 42<sup>nd</sup> annual convention of the ISA in Chicago

### **Hamburger Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung (AKUF)**

*Definition of War:* A War is defined as a violent mass conflict, satisfying the following three criteria:

*first,* two or more armed forces are involved in the fighting, where at least one of them is a regular armed force of a government in power (military, police, paramilitary forces);

*second,* both sides show a minimum of centrally directed organization of the battles even if this means only organised defence or strategically planned attacks; and

*third,* the armed operations show a certain degree of continuity and are not simply spontaneous, occasional confrontations, the actors involved are acting according to a recognisable strategy.

*Types of War:* internal war (anti-regime wars, autonomy and secession, other intra-state); inter-state war; mixed war (internal and inter-state) – in cases of mixed wars we have tried to judge whether a particular war is more inter-state or more internal in its basic characteristics

*Time span:* 1945-2000 (annually updated)

For the data comparison we use their integrated databank covering the wars from 1945 to 1998. The missing year 1999 is updated with the information found at AKUF's web page.

### **Heidelberg Institute of International Conflict Research (HIIK, KOSIMO dataset)**

*Definition of conflict:* HIIK's starting point is the term "conflict" defining clashes of overlapping interests (positional differences) around national values and issues (independence, self-determination, borders and territory, access to or distribution of domestic or international power); a conflict has to be of some duration and magnitude of at least two parties (states, groups of states, organizations or organized groups) that are determined to pursue their interests and win their case. At least one party is the organized state. Possible instruments used in the course of a conflict are negotiations, authoritative decisions, threat, pressure, passive or active withdrawals, or the use of physical violence and war. The KOSIMO dataset contains both non-violent (latent conflict, crisis) and violent conflicts. For comparison purposes we rely only on the violent conflict data defined as follows:

*Severe crisis:* sporadic, irregular use of force, 'war-in-sight' crisis

*War:* systematic, collective use of force by regular troops

*Type of Conflict:* inter-state, intra-state and internationalized conflicts; since the KOSIMO dataset provides sometimes no adequate information on the type of conflict (inter-state vs. intra-state), we had to recode the various cases for the comparison.

*Time span:* 1945-2000 (annually updated)

Basis for the comparison is the KOSIMO-Database (1945-99) which is available online at [http://www.hiik.de/en/kosimo/kosimo\\_download.htm](http://www.hiik.de/en/kosimo/kosimo_download.htm)

### **Internal wars (Gurr/Harff)**

The State Failure Task Force distinguishes four types of state failures: *Revolutionary War*, *Ethnic War*, *Regime Transition*, and *Genocide/Politicide*. For the purposes of this analysis, we subsume the two war types (ethnic and revolutionary) to the 'internal war' category. Regime Transitions and Genocide/Politicide are, in contrast, excluded since they represent only sub-classes of armed conflict.

*Internal wars:* episodes of violent conflict between the government and politically organized groups (revolutionary wars) and/or episodes of violent conflict between governments and national, ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities (ethnic wars); the minimum thresholds for including ethnic and revolutionary wars in the updated state failure problem set are that each party must mobilize 1.000 or more people (armed agents, demonstrators, troops) and an average of 100 or more fatalities per year must occur during the episode.

*Time span:* 1954-96

The data on internal wars and failures of governance compiled by the "State Failure Task Force" are available online (<http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/stfail/>)

## 7. Appendix 2: List of Inter-state and Intra-state Wars

### *Annotation:*

- a) The year-dates printed in a prevalent fashion point to the periods of international or internal warfare. If a particular conflict contains two or more periods of activity, this has been marked by numbering the conflicts (see, for instance, the Kurdish revolts in Iraq).
- b) Since CDP and KOSIMO present armed conflicts by level on annual estimates, we have fixed the war periods for these datasets consisting of continuous war-years, but possibly interrupted by ‘intermediate armed conflict’ (CDP) or ‘violent crisis’ (KOSIMO). Longer periods of inactivity (including minor conflicts), however, lead to the coding of multiple wars.
- c) Conflicts identified by CDP and KOSIMO never reaching the threshold of war as well as other deviations presented by one of the datasets included (different classifications etc) are set cursive and/or in brackets.

### a) Inter-state wars (sorted by type of agreement and arranged in alphabetical order)

	<b>COW</b>	<b>CDP</b>	<b>AKUF</b>	<b>KOSIMO</b>
<b>a) identical start year and duration</b>				
Argentina-United Kingdom (Falklands)	1982	1982	1982	1982
Egypt-Israel (Six-Days-War)	1967	1967	1967	1967
Egypt-Israel (Yom Kippur)	1973	1973	1973	1973
Eritrea-Ethiopia	<i>missing</i>	1998-99	1998	1998-99
Iran-Iraq	1980-88	1980-88	1980-88	1980-88
Israel, England, France-Egypt (Suez)	1956	1956	1956	1956
North Korea-South Korea	1950-53	1950-53	1950-53	1950-53
<b>b) identical start year/ different duration</b>				
China-DR Vietnam	1979	1979	1979-88	1979
China-India (Assam)	1962	1962	1962	1962-63
El Salvador-Honduras	1969	1969	1969	1969-70
India-Pakistan (Second Kashmir)	1965	1965	1965	1965-70
<b>c) different classification (internal vs. external)</b>				
India-Pakistan	1971	1971	<i>1971 (mixed war)</i>	1971
North Yemen-South Yemen (70-days-war)	<i>1994 (internal)</i>	<i>1994 (internal)</i>	1994	<i>1994 (internal)</i>
Soviet Union-Hungary	1956	1956	<i>1956 (internal)</i>	<i>1956-57 (internal, violent crisis)</i>
Turkey-Cyprus (Turkish Invasion)	1974	<i>1974 (internal)</i>	<i>1974 (mixed war)</i>	1974



	<b>COW</b>	<b>CDP</b>	<b>AKUF</b>	<b>KOSIMO</b>
<b>d) different start year and/or threshold</b>				
AR Yemen-PR Jemen	1971-72 (use of force)	1972 (minor)	1972	1972 (violent crisis)
Burkina Faso-Mali	1985-86 (use of force)	1985 (minor)	1985	1985 (violent crisis)
Cambodia-Vietnam	1975-79	1975-77 (minor)	1975-	1977-78
Ecuador-Peru (Amazonas)	missing	1995 (minor)	1995	1995
Gulf War (Iraq-Kuwait, Anti-Iraq Coalition)	1990-91	1991	1990 (1); 1991 (2)	1990-91
India-Pakistan (Siachen-glacier)	1984, 1985 (use of force)	1984, 1987, 1989-90 (intermediate)	1984-89	1984-91 (violent crisis)
India-Pakistan	missing	1999	1999	1988-99 (violent crisis)
Indonesia-Netherlands (West-Irian)	1960-62 (use of force)	1962 (minor)	1962	1960-69 (violent crisis)
Israel-Egypt	1969-70	1969-70 (intermediate)	1969-70	1967-73 (violent crisis)
Malaysia-Indonesia	1963-65 (use of force)	1963-66 (minor)	1963-66	1963-66
Morocco-Algeria (Tindouf)	1963 (use of force)	1963 (minor)	1963-64	1963 (violent crisis)
Panama-United States	1989 (use of force)	1989 (minor)	1989	1989-90 (violent crisis)
South Vietnam-North Vietnam	1965-75	1965-75	1957-75 (mixed war)	1964-73
Tunisia-France (Bizerte)	1961 (use of force)	1961	1961	1961-63 (violent crisis)
United States-Grenada	1983 (use of force)	1983 (minor)	1983	1983 (violent crisis)
<b>e) missing wars in one or more datasets (and other deviations)</b>				
Afghanistan-Soviet Union (intervention)		1979-88	internal, part of war No. 141	coded as internal, KOSIMO No. 1
Chad-Libya (Aozou strip)	1986-87 (use of force)	1987		
China-DR Vietnam	1987	1986-88 (intermediate)		
Ecuador-Peru (Amazonas)	1981 (use of force)		1981	1981 (1), 1981 (2)
Ethiopia-Somalia	1977-78		1975-84 (mixed war)	1976-78
India-Pakistan (Rann of Kutch)	1965 (use of force)		1965	1965-99 (violent crisis)
Iraq-United States	missing		1998	
Israel-Jordan (West Bank)	1967-70 (use of force)	1967		
Israel-Syria (Golan Heights)	1973-74 (use of force)	1973		
Israel-Syria (Golan Heights)	1967 (use of force)	1967		
Israel-Syria (Lebanon)	1982			
Laos-Thailand	1987-88 (use of force)	1986-88 (minor)	1987-88	

	<b>COW</b>	<b>CDP</b>	<b>AKUF</b>	<b>KOSIMO</b>
PR Yemen-Saudi Arabia	1969 ( <i>use of force</i> )		1969	
Slovenia-Yugoslavia (Independence)		1991 ( <i>minor, internal</i> )	1991	
Spain-Morocco	1957-58 ( <i>use of force</i> )		1957-58	1957-58 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Uganda-Tanzania (Kagera Salient I)	1971 ( <i>use of force</i> )		1971 (mixed war)	1972 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Uganda-Tanzania	1978-79		1978-79	1978-79

b) Intra-state wars (sorted by type of agreement and arranged in alphabetical order)

	<b>COW</b>	<b>CDP</b>	<b>AKUF</b>	<b>KOSIMO</b>
<b>a) identical start year and duration</b>				
Congo-Brazzaville (UDF)	1997	1997	1997	1997
Congo-Kinshasa/Zaire (CDR)	<i>missing</i>	1998-99	1998-99	1998-99
Guinea-Bissau	<i>missing</i>	1998-99 (war and intermediate)	1998-99	1998-99
Nigeria (Biafra)	1967-70	1967-70	1967-70	1967-70
Sri Lanka (Tamils)	1983-97	1983-84 ( <i>minor</i> ), 1985-99 (war and intermediate)	1983-99	1983-99
Sudan (South Sudan, SPLM)	1983-97	1983-99 (war and intermediate)	1983-99	1983-99
Yemen, Peoples Rep. (Leftists Faction)	1986	1986	1986	1986
<b>b) identical start year/ different duration</b>				
Bosnia-Herzegovina (Serbian Rebellion)	1992-95	1992-95 (war and intermediate)	1992-95	1992-94
Congo-Kinshasa/Zaire (Kabila-ADFL)	1996-97	1996 ( <i>minor</i> ), 1997	1996-97	1996-98
Indonesia (South Moluccas)	1950	1950	1950	1950-65
Iraq (Kurdish)	1961-63 (1); 1974-75 (2); 1985-93 (3); 1996 (4)	1961-70 (war and intermediate); 1973-93 (war and intermediate)	1961-64 (1) ; 1965-66 (2) ; 1969-70 (3); 1974-75 (4); 1976- (5)	1961-70 (1); 1974-75 ( <i>violent crisis</i> ) (2); 1979-86 ( <i>violent crisis</i> ) (3); 1991- ( <i>violent crisis</i> ) (4)
Laos II (Second Laotian, Pathet Lao)	1963-73	1963-73	1963-73	1963-75
Lebanon (Various Organizations)	1975-90	1975 ( <i>minor</i> ), 1976-90 (war and intermediate)	1975-99	1975-97 (war and violent crisis) (1); 1988-90 (2)
Liberia	1989-90 (1); 1992-95 (2); 1996 (3)	1989 ( <i>minor</i> ), 1990-95 (war and intermediate); 1996 ( <i>minor</i> )	1989-96	1989-95
Rwanda	1990-93 (1); 1994 (2)	1990 ( <i>minor</i> ), 1991-94 (war and intermediate)	1990-99	1990-94

	<b>COW</b>	<b>CDP</b>	<b>AKUF</b>	<b>KOSIMO</b>
Sierra Leone (RUF)	1991-96	1991-93 ( <i>minor</i> ), 1994-99 (war and intermediate)	1991-99	1991-99
Tajikistan (Popular Democratic Army)	1992-97	1992-96 (war and intermediate)	1992-97	1992-99 (war and violent crisis)
Yemen, Arab. Rep. (Royalists North Yemen)	1962-69	1962-70 (war and intermediate)	1962-69	1962-68
Yugoslavia (Croatian Indepen- dence)	1991-92	1991	1991-95	1991-95
<b>c) different classification (internal vs. external)</b>				
Cyprus (Turkish Intervention)	1974 ( <i>interstate</i> )	1974	1974 ( <i>mixed</i> )	1974 ( <i>interstate</i> )
Hungary	1956 ( <i>interstate</i> )	1956 ( <i>interstate</i> )	1956	1956-57 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Yemen (South Yemeni Seces- sionist)	1994	1994	1994 ( <i>interstate</i> )	1994
<b>d) different start year and/or thresholds</b>				
Afghanistan	1978-92	1978-99	1978-99	1978-79 ( <i>violent crisis</i> ), 1979-99
Algeria (Islamic Rebels)	1992-97	1992 ( <i>minor</i> ), 1993- 99	1992-99	1992-99 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Angola (UNITA)	1975-91 (1); 1992-94 (2)	1975-95 (1); 1998-99 (2)	1961-99	1975-91 (1); 1992- 94 ( <i>violent crisis</i> ), 1997-99 (2)
Azerbaijan (Nagorno- Karabakh)	1991-94	1992-94	1990-94	1991-94
Bolivia (Leftists)	1952	1951 ( <i>minor</i> )	1946-52	1946-52 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Burundi (Hutu Rebels)	1993-97	1995-96 ( <i>minor</i> ), 1997-99 (war and intermediate)	1994-99	1993-99
Cambodia I (Khmer Rouge)	1970-75	1967-69 (war and intermediate) (1); 1970-75 (2)	1968-75	1970-75
Cambodia II (FUNK, Khmer Rouge)	1978-91 (1); 1993-97 (2)	1978-98 (war and intermediate)	1975-98	1978-91; 1991-99 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Chad (Frolinat Rebellion)	1966-71 (1); 1980- 88 (2)	1965-90 (war and intermediate)	1966-99	1966-80 (1); 1983-90 (2)
China (Tibetans)	1956-59	1956 (1), 1959 (2)	1954-59	1954-59
Colombia (M-19 & Drug Lords)	1984-97	1965-99 (war and intermediate)	1964-99 (1); 1965-99 (2); 1974-90 (3)	1964-72 ( <i>violent crisis</i> ); 1978-99 ( <i>violent crisis</i> ) (1); 1989-99 (war and violent crisis) (2)
Congo-Kinshasa/Zaire (Ka- tanga & Leftists)	1960-65	1960-62 ( <i>minor</i> ) (1); 1964-65 (2)	1960-63 (1); 1964- 66 (2)	1960-63 (1); 1964-65 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )(2)
Cuba (Cuban Revolution)	1958-59	1957 ( <i>minor</i> ), 1958	1956-59	1956-59
Dominican Republic	1965	1965 ( <i>minor</i> )	1965	1965 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
El Salvador (Salvadorean Democratic Front)	1979-92	1979-80 ( <i>minor</i> ), 1981-91 (war and intermediate)	1981-92	1981-92
Ethiopia (Eritrean)	1974-91	1962-67 ( <i>minor</i> ), 1968-91 war and intermediate)	1962-91	1961-67 ( <i>violent crisis</i> ), 1967-93
Ethiopia (Ogaden, Somali Rebels)	1976-77	1976 ( <i>minor</i> ), 1977- 83 (war and inter- mediate)	1963-64 (1); 1975-84 (2)	1978-88 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )

	<b>COW</b>	<b>CDP</b>	<b>AKUF</b>	<b>KOSIMO</b>
Ethiopia (Tigrean Liberation)	1978-91	1976-91	1975-91	1974-91
Georgia (Gamsakurdia)	1991-94	1991-93 ( <i>minor</i> )	1991-93	1989-99 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Guatemala	1966-72 (1); 1970-71 (2); 1978-84 (3)	1966-67 ( <i>minor</i> ), 1968-95 (war and intermediate)	1962-68 (1); 1980-97 (2)	1960-72 (1); 1980-93 (2)
Guatemala (Conservative)	1954	1954 ( <i>minor</i> )	1954	1954 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
India (Various)	1985-97	1947-99 (war and intermediate); 1983-86 ( <i>minor</i> , <i>Punjab</i> ), 1987-93 (war and intermediate, <i>Punjab</i> )	1954-64 (Nagas I); 1966-80 (Mizos); 1969-75 (Nagas II); 1982-99 (Punjab); 1990-99 (Assam); 1990-99 (Kashmir); 1997-99 (Naxalites); 1997-99 (Bodos); 1999 (Tripura)	1947-69 ( <i>violent crisis, various</i> ); 1981-99 ( <i>violent crisis; Punjab</i> )
Indonesia (East Timor)	1976-79	1975-89 (war and intermediate); 1992, 1997-98 ( <i>intermediate</i> )	1975-94	1974-99
Iran (Kurdish Autonomy)		1979-88 (war and intermediate)	1979-88	1979-88 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Laos I (First Laotian, Pathet Lao)	1960-62	1959-61	1959-61	1953-61 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Lebanon (Leftists)	1958	1958	1958	1958 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Mozambique (Renano)	1979-92	1976-80 ( <i>minor</i> ), 1981-92	1975-92	1978-94
Myanmar (Various Groups)	1968-80 (1); 1983-95 (2)	1948-99 (war and intermediate)	1948-99	1948-99
Nicaragua I (Revolution)	1978-79	1978-79	1977-79	1977-79
Nicaragua II (Contra War)	1982-90	1981-82 ( <i>minor</i> ), 1983-89 (war and intermediate)	1981-90	1981-90
Pakistan (Baluchistan, Baluchi Rebels)	1973-77	1974-77 (war and intermediate)	1973-77	1973-76 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Pakistan (East Pakistan)	1971	1971	1971 (mixed war)	1971 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Peru (Shining Path)	1982-95	1980 ( <i>minor</i> ), 1981- 99 (war and inter- mediate)	1980-98 (1); 1987-94 (2)	1980-96
Philippines (Huks)	1950-52	1946-51	1946-54	1945-54 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Philippines (Mindanao)	1972-80	1970-71 ( <i>minor</i> ), 1972-88 (war and intermediate)	1970-99	1970-99 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Philippines (NPA)	1972-92	1972-80 ( <i>minor</i> ), 1981-94 (war and intermediate)	1970-96	1968-99 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Rumania (Anti-Ceausescu Rebels)	1989	1989 ( <i>minor</i> )	1989	1989-91 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Russia (Chechnya Secessionists)	1994-96	1994 ( <i>minor</i> ), 1995- 96 (1); 1999 (2)	1994-96 (1); 1999 (2)	1991-99
Somalia (Clan Faction)	1982-97	1981-86 ( <i>minor</i> ), 1987-96 (war and intermediate)	1988-99	1988-99
South Vietnam (North Vietnam, FNL)	1960-65	1955-64	1957-75	1955-76 (1); 1960-61 (2)

	<b>COW</b>	<b>CDP</b>	<b>AKUF</b>	<b>KOSIMO</b>
Sri Lanka (Janatha Vimukthi- JVP)	1971	1971	1971	1971 (violent crisis)
Sudan (South Sudan, Anya Nya)	1963-72	1963-72	1955-72	1955-63 (1); 1963-72 (2)
Thailand (Communist Insurgency)	1970-73	1974-82 (intermediate)	1965-80	1965-80 (violent crisis)
Turkey (Kurds)	1991-97	1984-86 (minor), 1987-99 (war and intermediate)	1984-99	1984-89 (violent crisis), 1989-99 (war and violent crisis)
Uganda (Military Faction)	1980-88	1979 (1); 1981-88 (2); 1989-91 (war and intermediate) (3)	1981-92	1981-86 (violent crisis)
Yugoslavia (Kosovo)	missing	1998-99	1998-99	1997-99 (war and violent crisis)
Zimbabwe (Rhodesia, Patriotic Front)	1972-79	1972-75 (minor), 1976-79	1966-79	1972-79
<b>e) missing wars in one or more datasets (and other deviations)</b>				
Algeria (Former Rebel Leaders)	1962-63	1962 (intermediate)		
Argentina (Army)	1955	1955 (minor)		
Argentina (Montoneros)		1973-74 (minor), 1975-77 (war and intermediate)	1968-77	1969-77
Bangladesh (Chittagong)		1975-92 (minor and intermediate)	1973-92	1975-87 (violent crisis)
Bosnia-Herzegovina (Croatian Rep. Of Bosnia-Herzegovina)		1993-94 (war and intermediate)	Part of AKUF No. 211	1992-94
Bosnia-Herzegovina (re-conquest of Krajina)				1995
Burundi (Hutu)	1972		1972-73	1972-73
Burundi (Hutu)	1988			1988
Burundi (Tutsi Supremacists)	1991	1990-92 (minor)		
Chile (Coup, Pinochet)	1973	1973 (minor)		
China (Cultural Revolution, Red Guard)	1967-68			1969 (violent crisis)
China (Kuomintang)		1953		
Congo-Brazzaville (Opposition Militias)	missing	1998-99	1998-99	
Congo-Kinshasa/Zaire (Rebels)	1993			1991-99 (violent crisis)
Congo-Kinshasa/Zaire (Mercenaries)		1967 (minor)	1967	1966-67 (violent crisis)
Congo-Kinshasa/Zaire (Shaba)		1977-78 (minor and intermediate)	1977 (1); 1978 (2)	1977-78 (violent crisis)
Costa Rica (Coup)			1955	
Croatia (re-conquest of Krajina/Westslavonia)		1992-93, 1995 (intermediate)	Part of AKUF No. 200	1995
Cuba (Bay of Pigs)		1961 (minor)	1961	1961 (violent crisis)
Cyprus			1963-64	1963-64 (violent crisis)

	COW	CDP	AKUF	KOSIMO
Dem. Rep. of Vietnam (FULRO)			1964-92	
Djibouti		1991-94 ( <i>minor</i> )	1991-94	1991-94 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Ethiopia (Oromo)		1999 ( <i>minor</i> )	1976-94	1977-91 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
France		1961-62		
Georgia (South Ossetia)		1992 ( <i>minor</i> )	1990-92	1989-99 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Georgia (Abkhazia)		1992 ( <i>minor</i> ), 1993 ( <i>war</i> )	1992-94	1989-99 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Indonesia (Darul Islam)	1953	1953		1947-91 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Indonesia (Leftists)	1956-60	1958-61 ( <i>intermediate</i> )	1958-61	1955-58 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Indonesia (Papua)		1976-78	1965-99	1960-82 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Indonesia (Aceh)		1989 ( <i>minor</i> ), 1990-91 ( <i>war and intermediate</i> ); 1999 ( <i>minor</i> )	1990-93 (1); 1999 (2)	1990-99 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Iran (Anti-Shah-Koalition, Mujahidin)	1978-79 (1); 1981-82 (2)	1979-80 ( <i>minor</i> ), 1981-82		1978-83 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Iraq (Shammar Tribe)	1959	1959 ( <i>minor</i> )		1958-59 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Iraq (Shiites)		1991-96 ( <i>war and intermediate</i> )	1991-96	1991-99 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Israel (PLO, Hamas)		1970-99 ( <i>intermediate</i> )	1968-93	1987-93 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Jordan (Black September, Palestinians)	1970		1970-71	1970-71 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Kenya (Shifta)			1963-67	1965-67 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Kyrgyzstan	<i>missing</i>		1999	
Laos (Meo)			1975-79 (1); 1990-92 (2)	
Mali (Tuareg)		1990, 1994 ( <i>minor</i> )	Part of AKUF No. 197	1990-99 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Mexico (Chiapas)		1994 ( <i>minor</i> )	1994-95	1994-99 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Moldova (Dniestr)		1992 ( <i>minor</i> )	1992	
Morocco (Mauretania)	( <i>extra-state</i> , 1975-83)	1975-89 ( <i>war and intermediate</i> )	1975-91	1976-91 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Nepal		1960-62 ( <i>minor</i> )	1950-51 (1); 1962 (2)	1959-61 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Nepal (UPF)	<i>missing</i>	1997-99 ( <i>minor</i> )	1999	1998-99 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Niger (Tuareg)		1990-92, 1994, 1997 ( <i>minor</i> )	1990-96	1990-95 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Nigeria (Muslim fundamentalists)	1980-81 (1); 1984 (2)		1980	
Nigeria (MOSOP)	<i>missing</i>		1999	1993-99 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Nigeria (TIV)			1964	
Pakistan (Mohajir)	1994-95	1995-96 ( <i>minor</i> )		
Pakistan (Sind)			1988-96	

	<b>COW</b>	<b>CDP</b>	<b>AKUF</b>	<b>KOSIMO</b>
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)		1989-90, 1992-96 ( <i>minor</i> )	1989-99	1988-99 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Peru (MIR)		1965-66 ( <i>minor</i> )	1965-66	1965-66 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Russia (Ingushia)			1992-94	
Rwanda	1963-64		1963-66	1963-64 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Rwanda		1998-99 (war and intermediate)	<i>Part of AKUF No. 189</i>	1994-99 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Senegal (Casamance)		1990, 1992-93, 1995, 1997-99 ( <i>minor</i> )	1990-99	1982-99 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
South Africa (Namibia)	( <i>extra-state, 1975-88</i> )	1966-78 ( <i>minor</i> ), 1979-88 (war and intermediate)	1966-88	1966-90 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
South Africa (Apartheid)		1981-88 ( <i>minor</i> ), 1989-93	1976-94	1976-94 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Spain (ETA)		1980-81, 1987, 1991-92 ( <i>minor</i> )	1968-79	1960-99 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Sri Lanka (Janatha Vimukthi- JVP)	1987-89	1989-90 (war and intermediate)	<i>Part of AKUF No. 157</i>	<i>Part of KOSIMO No. 243</i>
Surinam		1986-88 ( <i>minor</i> )	1986-89	1986-92 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Syria		1979-81 ( <i>minor</i> ), 1982	1982	1982 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Uganda	1966			
Uganda (Lords Resistance Army)	1996-97	1996-99 ( <i>intermediate</i> )	1995-99	
United Kingdom (Northern Ireland)		1971-93 ( <i>minor and intermediate</i> )	1969-94	1968-99 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Venezuela (Military Faction)		1962 ( <i>minor</i> )	1963-67	1960-69 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Yemen, Arab. Rep.		1980-82 ( <i>minor</i> )	1978-82	1978-79 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Yemen, Peoples Rep.			1968	1968-73 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )
Zambia (Mushala)			1976-82	
Zimbabwe (Matabele)			1983-88	1983 ( <i>violent crisis</i> )

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