

# **Remuneration of RES and conventional power: Convergence or continued divergence?**

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18th REFORM Group Meeting  
“Climate Policy Strategies and Energy Transition”  
Salzburg, August 26–30, 2013

## Central question

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be marketed through a power market  
based on marginal costs**

**?**

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**Shall F-RES power ultimately  
be marketed through a power market  
based on marginal costs**

**- and should we push for this now ?**


*On a meta level: Do we try to deal with tomorrow's questions  
using yesterday's answers?*

1. Marketing of conventional and renewable power
2. The idea of „market integration of RES“
3. Effects on dispatch of fluctuating renewables (F-RES)
4. Effects on technical lay-out of fluctuating renewables (F-RES)
5. Effects on risk allocation

# My questions to you


1. How to adress this – quite economic – issue from a political scientist perspective?
2. What are your arguments with regard to the question?

# Flexibility options to complement Wind & PV




Source: IZES 2012

# Power Market Merit Order



Source and ©: Schlipf 2012

# Power Market Merit Order





- Sell on future market
- Optimise returns on spot market (day-ahead + intraday market)

## Example

In 2011: Sell 1 MW for 1. – 31.3.2013 for € 50/MWh at future market  
(at fuel costs of 30 €/MWh)

On 10.3.2013: day-ahead market price for 11.3.2013 is at

- 40 €/MWh: use own plant **MAKE or**
- 20 €/MWh: buy at power exchange **BUY**

- Sell on future market
- Optimise returns on spot market (day-ahead + intraday market)

## **(Simple) Theory of liberalised power markets:**

*Power sale returns cover capital (construction) and operational (fuel) costs*

## **In practice**

- Largest part of capacity stock built (and payed back) before liberalisation
- Decicive supportive factors after liberalisation
  - Windfall profits from free emissions trading allowances
  - Premium for CHP plants
  - ...

## **Today**

Power prices too low to cover capital and (hard coal and gas) capital costs of conventional generation

- Sell on future market
- Optimise returns on spot market (day-ahead + intraday market)

## **(Simple) Theory of liberalised power markets:**

*Power sale returns cover capital (construction) and operational (fuel) costs*

*Optimal dispatch of plants = according to their operating (marginal) costs*

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# „Traditional“ fossil + nuclear power marketing vs. „Traditional“ RES remuneration through FIT

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*Power sale returns cover capital (construction) and operational (fuel) costs*

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## **„Traditional“ RES remuneration: Feed-in tariff to cover cap. costs**

Fixed tariff per kWh fed into the grid, irrespective of time + place

## **Theory behind:**

*Without FIT, renewables are too expensive & risky to compete on the power market*

*Every RES kWh fed into the grid is a good kWh*

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„RES should act at the same markets  
as conventional technologies,  
earn returns in this competitive environment  
and bear the market price risks“ (VKU 2013)

# Goals associated with „F-RES market integration“

## Effects on dispatch of F-RES

- Switch off RES in times of negative prices
- Maintenance in times of low prices

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- Wind: large rotors, small generators
- PV: east/west orientation

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## System infrastructure

- Improve RES production forecasts
- Lower need for grid expansion



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## Learning for future transition stages

- Development of F-RES market products

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## Conceptions of justice



- level playing field with conventional technologies with regard to market risks

	<b>Conventional fossil &amp; nuclear</b>	<b>F-RES Wind &amp; Solar</b>
Storageability	Low / expensive	Low / expensive
Cost structure	Significant operating costs	Almost only capital costs
Forecastability	Years ahead, very low outage risk	Hours to 1 day ahead, significant weather risk
Controllability	Gas: fast, large range, cheap  Nuclear, lignite: slow, limited range, associated with costs	Very fast, only downwards, cheap
Current power sale	Future and spot markets	FIT: TSO sell power day-ahead
Current dispatch	According to merit order  Negative bids on power exchange to save costs for Herunterfahren	According to weather conditions  Negative bids on power exchange to secure feed-in priority

# Proposition for „market integration“



Because F-RES destroy their own market prices, they need an additional income to market revenues (Raffaele's principle # 2)

## Replace FIT with fixed premium



Source of graphics: MVV 2013

# Effects on F-RES dispatch



Power price developments are highly uncertain over 10 to 20 years


Current proposals for fix premiums expect

- fix premium: 80% of plant refinancing
- market revenues: 20% of plant refinancing

→ Differences between Options of technical lay-out high & certain enough?




Production risk



Risk of insufficient revenues  
over plant lifetime

Risk of balancing costs for  
forecast errors



Source of graphics: MVV 2013

Higher risks → investors, banks etc. want higher return on investment


**Different options to allocate risks: give the risk to the acteur who**

- „causes“ the risk
- can most easily manage the risk
- can diversify the risk to the highest extent



# Preliminary conclusion

**Too strong „market integration“ today risks F-RES to become flexibility options themselves - instead of pillars of the power system**



Source: IZES  
2012

# Thank you for your attention!


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
# Negative prices in Germany in 2012 and 2013

Number of hours




# Remuneration schemes with uniform price

Both technologies  
needed to reach RES target



Only cheaper technology  
needed to reach RES target



Source: Bofinger forthcoming