

Compensation and voluntarism

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Current status of the GDF projects

FIN

- construction of URL/GDF (Onkalo) underway at *Eurajoki* since 2004
- planned entry into operation 2020

SWE

- 2000-2011: *Oskarshamn* and *Östhammar* in focus
- 2011: SKB chooses *Östhammar* for a GDF, *Oskarshamn* for encapsulation facility
- Planned entry into operation ~2022

FRA

- URL under construction in *Bure* (east of the country) since 2000
- Bure to host the GDF (Cigéo)
- Cigéo operational 2025

	FIN	SWE	FRA
Implementer	Private industry	Private industry	State agency
National funds for radwaste management (ultimately from the industry)	yes	yes	yes
NGOs and communities can apply for funds	No	Yes, e.g. for information and empowerment	Yes, through local liaison committee
Independent technical oversight	No	Yes: National Council for Nuclear Waste	Yes: national evaluation bodies, but also foreign experts
Licencing	Early parliamentary approval; government then approves construction and operation licence	Government decides, after approval by safety authority and agreement by host municipality	Government decides, after approval by safety authority and evaluation bodies


Benefit packages in Finland, Sweden and France



Negotiated between the municipality and the nuclear industry: ear-marked funding, in the form of infrastructure development
(Municipal property tax)



Added-value programmes: to provide value additional to that generated by the facility
75% - 25% sharing of funds
Ex ante evaluation and ex post monitoring



Legally mandated (1991) economic “accompagnement” to the two départements: local & regional development purposes
Use of funds decided at dept level

Key issues for benefit packages

- Municipal veto (and its timing)
- Institutionalisation: of local-national-industry relations and benefit packages
- Involvement of central government
- Degree of pro-activeness on the part of the municipality
- Direct cash payments to municipalities?
- Competition or cooperation between municipalities
- Independent expertise available to and used by municipality?
- Municipal tax revenue? (property tax in Finland)

Definitions

- Compensation schemes, benefit packages, “accompagnement économique” (econ. support...)
- Perceptions count as much as (or more than) “objective” definitions: “bribe”, “prostitution” or “just compensation”?
- Acceptance/acceptability or resistance?
 - *Ownership*, adhesion and consensus or resistance, conflict, and power?
 - Deliberative and/or agonistic democracy?
- Discursive framing of compensation: politics or market?
 - Ethics, justice, rights, responsibilities
 - Costs and benefits
- Voluntarism? “But do we have a choice?”

Three rationales/types of compensation

1. Mitigation (of real or perceived impacts)

- Engineering or *institutional*
- Institutional: *improve the ability and capacities of the local community to host the facility (training, institution-building, construction of roads, housing, health services for workers)*
- But also:
 - local involvement in decision-making
 - capacity building
 - development of local partnerships and local involvement support packages

2. Compensation (for real impacts and for accepting increased risk)

- To generate “a desired redistribution of the facility’s benefits and costs” (Gregory et al.) or
- “redistributing some of the benefits of the facility to those individuals who are directly impacted by its construction or operation” (Easterling and Kuhnreuter)
- Monetary or non-monetary: arguably the non-monetary ones are more effective at enhancing acceptance
- Two purposes:
 - offsetting the negative impacts of the facility, and
 - rewarding individuals for their responsible behaviour

3. *Incentive* (encouraging communities to become involved)

- “means of helping to achieve the best possible technical solution, one which might not otherwise be implemented because of social and political constraints” (Carnes et al.)
 - assumes societal desirability of the project (framing and “strong legitimisation”, Stirling 2006); or
 - seeking a mutually agreeable solution, without a priori assumptions of desirability (“weak legitimisation”, “fair process”)
- *mitigation* (ex ante), *compensation* (ex post, for actually incurred damage), and *reward* (for accepting the responsibility and taking the risk)
 - presupposes mutual agreement on the nature, extent and existence of risk
- Encouraging the involvement in a siting process without binding commitment

	Locally negotiated	Legally imposed
Mitigation	<p>FIN: construction of infrastructure, agreed between industry and municipality</p> <p>SWE: SKB support to municipalities' engagement and expertise</p> <p>FRA: Details of GIP projects "locally" negotiated</p>	<p>FIN: local veto</p> <p>SWE: local veto & support to NGO and citizen participation</p> <p>FRA: GIP for improvement of capacity; CLIS for empowerment and expertise</p>
Compensation	<p>SWE: Added-value programmes also as a recognition for the fulfilment of 'civic duty'</p> <p>FRA: EDF, Areva, CEA projects of direct support (e.g. 2nd generation biofuels, archives)</p>	<p>FIN: property tax (FRA: GIP, to the extent that responsibility and 'civic duty' are rewarded; also the "dotations", which are unconditional)</p>
Incentive	<p>FIN: Vuojoki agreement</p> <p>SWE: Added-value programmes: to provide value additional to that generated by the facility itself</p>	<p>FRA: GIPs also to incite local municipalities to engage</p>

Context: peripherality and dependence

“Peripherality”

(Blowers and Leroy 1994)

- geographical, political, economic, cultural, and social peripherality
- Borrows from core-periphery theories: relationships of political, economic and cultural domination and exploitation
- peripheral communities: “*geographically remote, economically marginal, politically powerless and socially homogeneous*” (Blowers and Leroy 1994, 203)

Criteria of peripherality

	FIN	SWE	FRA
Remoteness	0	0	yes
Economic marginality	no	no	yes
Powerlessness	0	no	yes
Culture of acceptance	yes	no (?)	yes
Environmental degradation	yes (nuclear industry)	yes	no

Compensations
creating dependence?

Table 1. The major dimensions of socio-economically sustainable development
(adapted from Copus and Crabtree 1996)

Dimensions/Attributes	Structure	Performance	Dependence
Population & demography	Population density and structure, demographics	Rate of population growth, Migration flows	Degree to which current service patterns are sustained by transfers from more prosperous regions
Economic activity	Employment structure and diversity, Importance of primary industries relative to secondary and tertiary sectors, Unemployment rates	GDP and income per capita, Changes in rates of employment and output	Dependence of agriculture on subsidies, Dependence of business activity and investments on assistance from the public sector, Dependence of infrastructure development on national and international assistance
Community & culture	Presence of minority cultures and languages, Strength of regional identity	Changes in community identity, Impact of migration trends	Dependence of the survival of minority cultures and languages on external assistance

Creation of dependence?

- Irreversibilisation, introduction of the project through the backdoor (Bure URL to GDF)
- Bribe effect: FIN & SWE avoided this? FRA: “justified bribe”
- Eurajoki dependent on real estate tax revenue (up to 90% of this tax revenue comes from nuclear industry)
- Bure and surroundings: dependent on GIS funding that has flown in since 2000
- Oskarshamn & Östhammar: dependence on the value-added programmes
- Eurajoki & Oskarshamn & Östhammar: Dependence on nuclear industry?