This paper seeks to explore the potential of a constructivist theoretical framework that will underpin further research for my dissertation thesis. My research explores the question of how the EU promotes a global environmental norm that would persuade states to take responsibility for avoiding runway climate change by significantly reducing their carbon footprints in the short to medium term.

The research to prepare this paper has been carried out with the express purpose of surveying possible avenues for further research. More empirical work within this framework will be done by interviewing Brussels-based European and Chinese policy-makers in January 2009 and by attending the Copenhagen climate change conference in December 2009 as part of the delegation of the Sierra Club of Canada. Attendance of an energy and climate policy-focused conference in Beijing in the first half of 2010 with the support of the University of Alberta's China Institute will add further empirical material.

DRAFT
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Title: Can the EU call itself a norm entrepreneur? The EU's promotion of a global environmental norm on the mitigation of climate change vis-à-vis China

1. Introduction

The European Union (EU) has been widely credited as a global leader on environmental issues as a result of its major contribution to the development of the international climate change regime, both in the negotiation as well as the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol. However, the results of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol in terms of climate change mitigation have been disappointing.

When the world community gathers in Copenhagen at the end of 2009 to negotiate the commitment period to follow 2008-2012, two major elements will be very different from the previous negotiations in 1997. Firstly, the climate change deniers are losing the battle over whether or not climate change is occurring. The rise in temperatures is having an increasingly obvious impact around the world in terms of melting ice caps and glaciers, droughts, rising sea levels, heat waves, increased cyclone activity, etc. Moreover, there is now widespread agreement – as reflected in the 2009 Group of Eight Leaders' Declaration (G-8, 2009, 19) – on the need to prevent global warming beyond the critical threshold of 2°C. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), this requires emissions "to peak in the next 10 to 15 years and then be reduced to very low levels, well below half of levels in 2000 by mid-century" (UNFCCC Secretariat, 2007, 2). Secondly, since signing on to the Kyoto Protocol, developing countries with emerging economies like China have joined the ranks of the world's major emitters, after having substantially increased their emissions compared to the baseline year of 1990. The Kyoto Protocol did not impose an obligation on developing countries to reduce emissions under the principle of 'common but differentiated responsibilities', recognizing that their per capita emissions were (and still are) relatively low compared to so-called 'Annex I countries' of the industrialised world. Nonetheless, in 2006, China had the questionable honour of becoming the world's largest emitter of CO2, overtaking the United States (US) in terms of absolute emissions (Vidal & Adam, 2007).

In December 2009, the world community will come together in Copenhagen to hammer out a new deal for the period after 2012 that will need to address the flaws in the Kyoto

Protocol and take into account the radically changed situation in terms of accelerated climate change and the energy intensity of economic development in countries like China. In order to avoid 'dangerous' levels of global warming, world leaders will likely need to pursue two goals: the Conference of Parties (COP) will need to agree on ambitious global mitigation targets for Annex I countries and they will also need to extract meaningful commitments from emerging economies, such as China.

European officials have again claimed a leadership role for the EU: The British Foreign Secretary David Miliband (2009) has delivered speeches, entitled "Green Peace: Energy, Europe and The Global Order". European Commissioner for the Environment Stavros Dimas (2008) has proclaimed that "EU leadership is […] a key driver in efforts to reach an international agreement on climate change at the UN Conference in Copenhagen in December 2009". For evidence of this leadership, European officials point to the EU's long-standing objective of "limit[ing] the average global temperature increase to less than 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels". Since 2007, the EU has committed itself to 'unilaterally' reducing GHG emissions by 20% by 2020.

Apart from setting its internal targets, the EU is clearly seeking to engage other key global partners, in particular by encouraging other developed countries to join its carbon market. To demonstrate this commitment, the EU is willing to cut its GHG emissions by up to 30% by 2020, provided other developed countries agree to the same obligation. Over time, the EU will also seek to include developing countries that are large emitters, calling on them "to limit the rise in their GHG emissions through nationally appropriate actions to 15-30% below baseline by 2020".

While the EU as a whole is a major contributor to climate change, the total combined emissions of its 27 Member States rank as 'only' the third largest emitter of GHG.[1] To effectively combat climate change (i.e. limit global warming to maximum 2°C), the EU's unilateral actions will not suffice: The EU will also need to convince other large emitters of their responsibility to reduce their emissions. Currently, the world's two largest emitters are China and the US.

[1] "[GHG] emissions in the EU-27 account for approximately 10.5% of global greenhouse gases covered by the [UNFCCC]. Total EU-27 emissions are dominated by EU-15 Member States, in particular Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, France and Spain (by decreasing order)" (European Environment Agency, 2008).

2. Research question & theoretical framework

The aim of this paper is to develop an understanding of the EU's foreign policy that can help to identify the factors that influence the EU's performance in international institutions, *in casu* the COP to the Kyoto Protocol. By focusing on 'performance', this paper is interested in the factors that influence "the ability [of the EU] to alter the negotiating positions of both the developing world and fellow developed countries" (Lightfoot and Burchell, 2005, 84). This ability will be studied in the context of the EU's leadership on international negotiations on climate change. In particular, I wish to explore how the EU seeks to promote mitigation targets vis-à-vis China, which combines the status of a developing country with, currently, being the largest emitter of GHG. This paper combines different sets of constructivist literature such as research on the emergence and diffusion of global norms, norm entrepreneurs and the EU as a 'normative power'.

In order to avoid tautological statements, whereby the correlation between a norm and relevant actors' behaviour in line with the norm are seen as indicative of the robustness of a norm, both Legro (1997) and Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 892) emphasize the importance of "[operationalising] a norm in such a way that it is distinct from the state or nonstate behaviour it is designed to explain". The emerging global environmental norm on climate change that is analysed in this paper would oblige states to take responsibility for drastically reducing GHG emissions in the short to medium term to avoid runway climate change. A useful indicator for the emergence of such a norm will be the mitigation commitments that both developed and developing countries will agree to at the Copenhagen Conference in December 2009.[2] By focusing on the early stages of the development of a global mitigation norm, the paper seeks to explore the factors that influence the first stage of a norm's 'life cycle', namely norm emergence.[3] I now turn to

[2] Such a norm would resemble the 'contraction and convergence' approach to the mitigation of GHG, as developed by the Global Commons Institute (2009): After the emissions of developed and developing countries have peaked, with the former peaking earlier than the latter, "[a]ccelerating convergence to equal shares per head, relative to the global rate of contraction, observes the principle of equity in the UN Treaty".

[3] Researching the emergence of a global environmental norm on the mitigation of climate change lies beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that such a norm does not score highly regarding the three criteria of specificity, durability and concordance, which Legro (1997, 34-35)

the theoretical writings on two factors that influence the EU's ability to promote a global norm on mitigation.

First of all, "[n]orms do not appear out of thin air; they are actively built by agents [or norm entrepreuners] having strong notions about appropriate or desirable behaviour in their community" (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, 896). While this concept is usually reserved for non-government actors such as Transnational Advocacy Coalition Networks (see Keck & Sikkink, 1998), the EU's leadership in pushing for strong commitments to mitigate GHG emissions in the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol as well as the European tenacity in pushing for the Protocol's entry into force against the active opposition of the US under George W. Bush qualify the EU as a norm entrepreneur. This normative stance, frequently invoked by European policy-makers, is reflected in the concept of the EU as a Normative Power. Having elaborated this concept, Manners (2002, 239) explores the EU's "ability to shape conceptions of 'normal' in international relations". The Normative Power of the EU is "an ideological power, that is, the power to shape the patterns of discourse when it comes to basic principles and values" and is "understood as a practice by which the EU seeks to spread its core norms, such as human rights, democracy, rule of law and environmental protection, internationally" (Scheipers & Sicurelli, 2007, 453 and 2008, 609).

The constructivist literature on norm entrepreneurs (see Risse & Ropp, 1999, 277) and the writings on the EU as a Normative Power both emphasize the importance of policy coherence for actors like the EU that wish to promote changes in the domestic policies of other states. Reviewing the EU's Normative Power on the death penalty and minority protection, Lerch and Schwellnus (2006, 318) conclude that the EU's Normative Power depends "on the interaction between its policy goals, means and justifications, and therefore varies between different issue areas". In other words, the EU's credibility as a coherent Normative Power depends on the specific policy area. For example, the EU's protectionist agricultural and fisheries policy severely compromises its Normative Power vis-à-vis developing countries when it tries to promote sustainable development. For the

developed to judge the robustness of norms. With regard to specificity, a global mitigation norm is still badly understood and does not offer clear guidelines for actors to follow. With regard to durability, a mitigation norm does not have long-standing legitimacy and only really emerged in the 1990s with the signing of the Kyoto Protocol, which only entered into force in 2005. With regard to concordance, a global mitigation norm has not yet achieved a high degree of intersubjective agreement in diplomatic discussions and continues to be quite controversial.

EU to be an effective Normative Power on environmental issues, both Groenleer and Van Schaik (2007) as well as Lightfoot and Burchell (2005, 88) point out that "coherence between its external commitment and its internal policies is crucial".[4] This paper will first address the issue of the EU's policy coherence on climate change mitigation as an important factor in studying the EU's impact on decision-making in this area.

Secondly, constructivists have focused on norm diffusion or "how norms 'out there' in the international system get 'down here' to the national arena and have constitutive effects" (Checkel, 1999, 85). A number of scholars on norm diffusion (e.g. Klotz, 1999; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999; Wheeler, 2002; Finnemore, 2003) have focused on human rights and issues of (humanitarian) intervention. Surprisingly, constructivists have not focused much of their attention to the emergence of global environmental norms, even though their emergence – due to the often trans-boundary nature of environmental problems – has a distinctly international origin. The 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm is widely credited as having jumpstarted "the emergence of a comprehensive 'green' society of states" (Epstein, 2006, 42) by establishing a whole host of environmental initiatives, treaties and national and international institutions.

The main critique of constructivist work on norm diffusion has been its selection bias on successful instances of norm emergence neglecting "the critical issues of which norms matter, the way in which they matter, and how much they matter relative to other factors" (Legro, 1997, 31) and its bias towards 'outside-in' and overly structuralist explanations (Checkel, 1999, 86; Cortell & Davis, 2000, 67-68; Risse, 2002, 602). To counterbalance this trend in the literature, calls are made 'to bring agency back in' and develop a more 'social' diffusion model, focusing on the domestic variables that influence norm diffusion.

[4] The importance of policy coherence is widely accepted in different approaches that study the EU's performance in international affairs. Bretherton and Vogler (2006, 30) echo the importance of policy coherence as a factor in determining the 'actorness' of the EU. Their work emphasizes the importance of coherence (i.e. "the level of internal coordination of EU policies") and consistency (i.e. the degree of congruence between the external policies of the Member States and of the EU") (see also Bretherton & Vogler, 2000 and 2008). Writing on the EU as a Normative Empire, Laidi (2008) and Zielonka (2008) emphasize the need "to be exemplary in environmental matters" or an empire by example, if the EU seeks to promote global environmental norms. Building on role theory for foreign policy analysis, Elgstrom & Smith (2006, 248) conceptualise the gap between the EU's own conception and its actual performance in international politics as a problem of vertical inconsistency: "Self-declared leadership roles are often marred by perceived 'double standards' or role ambiguity".

For Legro (1997, 59), the challenge for scholars using a constructivist theoretical framework is exploring how unit-level ideologies interact with and/or are superseded by systemic-level norms.

Constructivists have developed the concepts of cultural match (Checkel, 1999, 86), norm resonance (Risse and Ropp, 1999, 271), domestic salience (Cortell & Davis, 2000, 69-70) and adjacency claims or path dependence (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 908) to explain why some international norms resonate in some domestic contexts, but not in others. For Checkel (1999, 86), more attention needs to be focused on the norm adopter's experience, norms, values and intentions when studying norm diffusion: "Diffusion is more rapid when a cultural match exists between a systemic norm and a target country, in other words, where it resonates with historically constructed domestic norms […]".

In order to explain how norms get diffused, Checkel (1999, 85) underlines the importance of a focus on diffusion mechanisms to trace how international norms have effects in a domestic setting. Depending on the structure of domestic institutions, bottom-up or top-down mechanisms will gain or lose importance. In liberal state structures, the actions of non-state actors and policy networks are key mechanisms for norm diffusion, whereas in non-liberal or 'state-above-society' structures, other mechanisms such as 'social learning' gain importance. Checkel (1999, 89) identifies this diffusion mechanism as particularly relevant in countries – like China – without a liberal state structure, which he labels as 'state-above-society':

> The state sits apart from and exercises considerable control over society. In this top-down policymaking environment, elite learning is necessary if international norms are to be empowered domestically, as learning theory suggests, it is also more likely in this less politicized setting.[5]

For Checkel (1999, 88), "social learning, not political pressure, leads agents – typically elite decisionmakers – to adopt prescriptions embodied in international norms. Norms become internalized and constitute a set of understandings that make behavioural claims".

[5] Checkel cites the political change in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev as an example of social learning in a 'state-above-society'.

To capture the dynamics of the negotiation process between the EU and China on a global environmental norm that seeks to mitigate GHG, this paper focuses both on the EU as a norm entrepreneur and on China as the target of norm diffusion by the EU. To conclude, I focus on two factors that constructivists identify as particularly relevant for norm emergence: First of all, the importance for the EU as a Normative Power or 'norm entrepreneur' to display coherence between external commitments and internal policies on mitigation and, secondly, the degree of cultural match between a global norm on mitigation and the domestic politics of China. Before entering this discussion, it is useful to put EU-China relations in context.

3. The context of EU-China relations

China and the EU couldn't be more different: Whereas China is a state with a rapidly emerging economy, the EU is a supranational organisation of advanced industrialised economies. This is reflected in the very different approaches taken by Chinese and EU foreign policy. There are, despite these differences, a number of similarities.

Both European and Chinese foreign policies are in a state of flux. For the EU, recent constitutional debates will (possibly) bring new institutional improvements such as a president for the Council and a European minister of foreign affairs. The EU has also expanded the reach of its foreign policy beyond the enlargement of the EU with neighbouring countries and the Balkans. The domain now covered by the EU's foreign policy now also includes its wider neighbourhood with the 2004 European Neighbourhood Policy and increasingly seeks to extend its reach to the Caucasus, Asia and Latin America. Similarly, Chinese foreign policy is undergoing a process of expansion (*kuozhang*) with high-level visits by Chinese officials all around the world, including to developing countries, and reconstruction (*chongjian*), which has led to a consideration of new ideas about international relations and "in addition, there is a greater willingness to learn from other states and other international players (such as organisations)" (Lanteigne, 2009, 2).[6]

[6] This was quite different from the height of the Cultural Revolution, when Chinese diplomatic contacts were very limited under Mao, who was suspicious about the newly established UN Organisation as a result of the lack of recognition of the People's Republic of China over the Kuomintang and the 1950 Korean war. Since 1970, many non-communist countries sought contact with China; China was able to regain its seat as a Permanent Member of the UNSC with

There is substantial evidence that both the EU and China accord major importance to the UN as the prime venue for international politics. Especially since the EU's 2003 debacle regarding the invasion of Iraq, the EU has made major strides forward in developing a common European Security Strategy focused around the strategic objective of 'effective multilateralism' with the Charter of the United Nations (UN) as the fundamental framework for international relations and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as the primary international body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Lofty words for the UN's role can also be found in Chinese foreign policy statements.[7] In the issue-area of climate change, both the EU and China see the Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as the only plausible framework for the ongoing negotiations on the global problem of climate change.

4. Factors influencing the EU's performance in the negotiations on a post-2012 climate change regime

4.1. Policy coherence of the EU

Under the Kyoto Protocol, the EU committed as a whole – with the at the time 15 Member States – to a reduction of GHG emissions by 8% by 2012 compared to 1990.[8]

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the support of the many newly independent developing countries. As a result, China has since closely linked its foreign policy to positions of the G-77 as a champion of the developing world. While strong Westphalian, state-centric views of state sovereignty have remained from the Maoist era, China's foreign policy with regard to international cooperation in a UN context has undergone a sea-change (Lanteigne, 2009, 11).

[7] However, their views on the extent to which international policy discussions within multilateral organisations are able and allowed to influence domestic policy discussions are widely different (Zaborowski, 2006, 111). While this is obvious for a post-Westphalian entity like the EU, "[c]ritics of China's multilateralism policy suggest Beijing's embrace of international regimes and norms, while developing, is in many cases shallow or conditional. The era of deep engagement in international institutions, it has been argued, only began in the mid-1990s and Beijing still exercises great caution with regimes, occasionally tending to be passive or even free-riding" (Lanteigne, 2009, 66). This tendency in Chinese foreign policy was demonstrated by Beijing's reluctance in 2003 to share information and permit assistance of the World Health Organisation (WHO) to contain SARS despite being a WHO member, which "indicates that China has yet to accept the consequences of membership of international institutions, especially when it comes to transnational threats that potentially involve external parties in the domestic politics of states" (Odgaard and Biscop, 2007, 65-66).

[8] As 12 new Member States joined the EU after the 1998 burden-sharing agreement, there is no common Kyoto mitigation target for the EU with its 27 Member States, only for 15 Member States that acceded to the EU before 1997. Of the ten new Member States (those acceded on 1 May

Under article 4 of the Protocol, several Parties can agree to meet these targets jointly. The EU agreed in 1998 to use this possibility and agreed upon an internal 'burden-sharing' arrangement or a 'bubble' to allow for flexibility in the allocation of reduction targets.

Hence, the credibility of the EU in Copenhagen will depend, not on individual Member States' performance, but on the ability of the EU as a whole and, in particular, its ability to meet the 8% reduction target. Meeting the Kyoto targets would be a good start for the 'policy coherence' of the EU as a norm entrepreneur.[9] There are, however, two elements that could further enhance the EU's position as a leader in current negotiations.

First of all, the EU can demonstrate a high degree of policy coherence by going beyond the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol, which contains targets that were more political than scientific and were never in line with the recommended cuts in emissions made by climate scientists in the lead-up to the Kyoto Protocol. Thinking back to its proposals for the 1997 negotiations of the Kyoto protocol, "the EU proposed that all OECD countries cut their emissions of CO2, methane and nitrous oxides by 15% by 2010 compared to 1990 levels" (Gupta and Grubb, 2000, 54-55). This ambitious target received a hostile reaction from other developed countries like Japan, the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand and never had any chance of forming the basis of the negotiation texts for the Kyoto Protocol. However, by meeting the targets it originally proposed for all Annex-I countries, the EU could demonstrate a high degree of policy coherence, adding further credibility to its current proposal for a 30% reduction in GHG emissions in case an international agreement is achieved in 2009.

Secondly, the EU was apprehensive regarding the flexibility mechanisms that were proposed by the US. In 1997, the EU wished to avoid a situation in which developed countries could 'buy their way out' of painful domestic reform by funding e.g. energy efficiency projects in developing countries. For example, the EU sought to limit the possibility for Annex I countries to rely on flexibility mechanisms to meet their mitigation

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2004), 8 have individual reduction targets of 6 or 8% under the Kyoto Protocol. Cyprus and Malta remain the only member states with no Kyoto targets (Climate Action Network Europe, 2009).

[9] After years of the debate on an EU-level carbon/energy tax, without tangible results in terms of a workable climate policy instrument, the EU opted in 2003 for a trading based instrument, a concept previously alien to EU environmental policy-making (Climate Action Network, 2009).

targets by proposing a 'concrete ceiling' or a supplementarity cap. Such a cap would put a quantitative limitation on the percentage of their reduction target that could be achieved by funding projects in developing countries (Gupta and Grubb, 2000, 58-60). However, Japan, the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand succeeded in resisting any quantified definition of the term 'supplemental to domestic actions' in article 6.1(d) of the Kyoto Protocol. Nonetheless, the EU's policy coherence on mitigation can be greatly improved in the next round of negotiations, if the EU's targets were achieved mainly through domestic reductions, thereby matching previous European rhetoric with action.

Now, I turn to evaluating how the EU fared with regard to these three indicators of 'policy coherence': meeting the Kyoto mitigation targets, surpassing them and achieving them through domestic action.

In its 2009 submission to the UNFCCC Secretariat, the EEA (2009, 8) stated that, in 2007, the reduction of GHG was 5% compared to the base year, which falls 3% short of the EU's 8% target. Moreover, another EEA report (2008, 50) goes on to point out that most emission reductions were achieved between 1990 and 1993 as a result of structural changes in the Germany economy after reunification. Other explanations of reduced emissions are the relatively low economic growth in the EU-15 throughout the 1990s and a fuel shift from carbon-intensive solid fuels to less carbon-intensive gaseous fuels that took place, in particular in the UK. Clearly, a reduction that was achieved mainly by a collapse of industries in Eastern Europe, low economic growth and fuel shifting in some large Member States and only meets about half of the target a decade after signing the Kyoto Protocol does not bode well for the EU's policy coherence.

However, the European Environment Agency (2008, 3-7) has suggested that the EU can still achieve its joint target in the commitment period 2008-2012. First of all, "additional domestic policies and measures currently under discussion in ten Member States could result in a further reduction of 3.3% relative to the base year". Since 2003, there has also been a flurry of activity at the EU-level with a whole range of directives and initiatives (e.g. the Directive on biofuels, the Directive on the energy performance of buildings, the Directive on the promotion of energy from renewable sources, all approved in 2008). Secondly, "the EU [Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS)] will bring important further reductions, which are not yet fully accounted for by Member States in their projections".

The ETS is the "flagship measure" of the EU's climate policies (Delbeke, 2007 quoted in Ellerman & Joskow, 2008, 1). The first three years of the ETS (2005-2007) are widely acknowledged to be a trial period.[10] The real test for the ETS is considered to be the second commitment period of 5 years, 2008-2012, which coincides with the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.

Nobody believes any longer that the EU could meet the more ambitious targets it originally proposed in 1997, i.e. the 15% reduction by 2010. However, the EEA (2008, 6-7) has not given up hope.

> [A]s indicated in the 2007 analysis, projections from Member States for 2010 suggest that the target will be met by a large margin through further implementation of existing and additional measures, use of carbon sinks and Kyoto mechanisms. [..] Hence, if all the projected reductions from domestic policies and measures, carbon sinks and Kyoto mechanisms were achieved, the EU-15 could reach a level of emissions 11.3 % lower than bas-year emissions, therefore overachieving its 8 % reduction target by 3.3 %.

If these projections prove to be the case, the EU will land between its original target and the target in the Kyoto Protocol.

The main drawback for the EU's policy coherence has become the important role of international offsets in order to achieve the EU's reductions required by the Kyoto Protocol.[11] The Kyoto Protocol foresees the possibility for Annex I countries to trade emissions with each other through Joint Implementation (JI) or with developing countries through Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM). The EU has considerably shifted its position on how to achieve its reductions, away from an almost exclusive emphasis on domestic actions and the supplemental nature of flexibility mechanisms to an important role for CDM and JI projects. In a recent communication, the European Commission (2009b, 4 and 11) states that "[d]eveloped countries should be able to achieve their reduction targets in part through domestic action and in part by using credits resulting from emission reductions in developing countries […]". This U-turn in the EU's position

[10] The European Commission (2008, 2) admitted that the effect of the 1st phase of the EU ETS was "limited due to excessive allocation of allowances in some Member States and some sectors, which must mainly be attributed to reliance on projections and a lack of verified emission data".

[11] For de Sepibus (2008, 3), "[a]n international offset in this context represents a credit which certifies the reduction, removal, or avoidance of greenhouse gas emissions by a project taking place outside of the European Union and that is used to compensate for greenhouse gas emissions occurring in the European Union".

has been widely criticized as a way of 'buying its way out' of the climate change challenge.

In the preparations for the COP-7 in Marrakech in 2000, the EU led the efforts to set quantitative limits to the use of external credits, due to the presence of Green Parties in charge of climate negotiations in key EU Member States (Lecocq & Ambrosi, 2007, 135). At that time, the Council of Ministers suggested that at least half of the reduction implied by the country's assigned limit under the Protocol must be accomplished domestically (see also Ellerman & Joskow, 2008, 4).[12]

However, almost immediately after the approval of the ETS directive in 2003, a 'Linking Directive' was introduced in 2004 at the insistence of some Member States, who realized that the moderate emission reductions under the Burden-Sharing agreement would be hard to achieve. The use of international offsets, made available by the Kyoto Protocol's flexibility mechanism, makes it possible for Member States to Under the Linking Directive, Member States were allowed to decide for themselves how to achieve their respective targets, in particular by setting their own maximum percentages for access to external Kyoto mechanisms in their National Allocation Plans (NAPs) (Open Europe, 2007, 19).

According to a 2003 European Commission staff working paper, quoted in a 2007 Open Europe report, the original Commission proposal proposed a 6% of the total cap for the number of Kyoto credits that would be allowed to enter the ETS, "meaning just 25% *reductions* would be achieved outside the EU [emphasis in original]" (Open Europe, 2007, 19).

However, the final Directive allows operators of EU ETS installations to use JI and CDM credits towards fulfilling a proportion of their commitments under the Directive. This proportion must be consistent with Member State commitments to supplementarity and has to be fixed in the NAP. The European Commission has the responsibility to assess

[12] Or in more technical terms: "Net acquisitions by an Annex B Party for all three Kyoto mechanisms together must not exceed the higher of the two following alternatives: 5 % of: its base year emissions multiplied by 5 plus its assigned amount divided by 2, or 50 % of: the difference between its annual actual emissions in any year of the period from 1994 to 2002, multiplied by 5, and its assigned amount" (Council, 1999, 3).

whether the limit is consistent with Member States' commitments to supplementarity[13]: "In defining supplementarity for phase 2, the [European Commission] used 10% of a country's allowance allocation as a rule of thumb in approving NAPs" with a view of limiting the import of external credits to no more than 50% of the 'expected distance to target' for a given Member State (Parker, 2008, 11).

In practice, the Commission has taken the following approach to assessing the requirement of supplementarity: The level of effort to reduce GHG a Member State is required to undertake, is determined by assessing the amount of reduction it is required to undertake in relation to emissions in 1990, 2004, and projected emissions in 2010. In the next step, half of the figure representing the highest effort is calculated. This figure is considered to be the maximum overall amount of JI/CDM credits that a Member State can make use of in addition to domestic action, while respecting its commitment to ensure that the use of the Kyoto mechanisms is supplemental to domestic action (de Sepibus, 2008, 8).

The European Environment Agency (EEA, 2008, 89-91) foresees that the use of CDM and JI credits will become more important in the second trading period 2008-2012. A table in this report shows that the limits, proposed by the Member States in their respective NAPs and accepted by the Commission for EU ETS operators, varies between 0% for Estonia to 20% for the EU's largest polluter Germany. In total, this corresponds to 13.4 % of the EU- wide cap for the second trading period and possibly "more than twice the absolute emission reductions from current levels required by all ETS installations" or "2.2 times higher than the intended use of Kyoto Mechanisms by EU Member States". The EEA concludes at the end of its 2008 report that "operators under the EU ETS do not necessarily have to reduce their emissions but are able to completely offset excess emissions through the acquisition of emission reduction units. In fact, if CDM and JI were used up to the extent allowed, CO2 emissions by ETS installations could increase in the second trading period by 6.8 % or 151 Mt CO2 per year above the verified emissions in 2005/2007 (including additional emissions from installations that are only in the second trading period covered under the ETS)".[14]

[13] Based on criterion 12 in Annex III to Directive 2003/87/EC (Guidance to assist Member States in the implementation of the criteria listed in Annex III to Directive 2003/87/EC) (European Commission, 2003)

[14] While the EEA report doubts that the total amount of Kyoto mechanism credits will be used

For the third trading period, from 2013 until 2020, the 2008 compromise between the Council and the Parliament foresees different scenarios. Article 11 of the 2009 Directive that revises ETS Directive[15] allows operators to receive allowances within the ETS in exchange for Certified Emission Reduction (CER) and Emission Reduction Units (ERU) credits that were issued in the second trading period, but that were not used. In other words, full 'banking' of these credits will be allowed. Moreover, article 11, paragraph 8 allows the continued use of credits after 2013 "up to either the amount allowed to them during the period 2008-2012, or to an amount corresponding to a percentage, which shall not be set below 11% of their allocation during the period from 2008-2012, whichever is highest". And in case an international agreement is reached, the limits for the use of credits generated through projects in third countries will be increased "equal to half the additional reduction effort due to the international agreement", provided that emission reduction credits come from countries, which have ratified the follow-up to the Kyoto Protocol.

While the Commission's proposal already increased the overall importance of the EU's use of external credits in achieving its mitigation targets, the final 2008 compromise between the Council and the Parliament goes even further. According to a Memo, provided by the European Commission after the final compromise between the Council and the European Parliament, "[t]he revised Directive extends the rights to use these credits [from the second trading period] for the third trading period and allows a limited additional quantity to be used in such a way that the overall use of credits is limited to 50% of the EU-wide reductions over the period 2008-2020" (European Commission,

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between 2008-2013, a 2009 report for the OECD and IEA found that about half of this quantity will be used up by 2012 despite the current economic downturn. Given that the revised Directive guarantees the unlimited and automatic banking of EU allowances (EUAs), this will have negative implications for emissions and allowance prices in the EU after 2012 (Baron et alia, 2009, 16). A Sandbag report (Pearson & Worthington, 2009, 12-13) is more pessimistic and states that - given that potential supply of CER credits outstrips demand - "EU rules allow for all of these credits to be bought and converted into ETS permits that are then bankable for use up to 2020. In all scenarios, the need for emissions reductions to take place domestically within the EU is reduced by the availability of CER credits. Companies could choose to meet all of the effort now required for the rest of phase 2 through purchase of CER credits. Because CER credits are currently trading at a lower price than EU permits it is likely that all available CER credits will be used". The important share of external credits under the ETS will significantly reduce the price of carbon within the ETS, thereby undermining the effectiveness of carbon pricing (de Sepibus, 2008, 20)

[15] Directive 2009/29/EC of the European parliament and the Council of 23 April 2009 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of the Community (Official Journal of the EU - L 140/63 – June 5, 2009)

2008).

Moreover, the EU differentiates between the use of external credits for sectors inside and outside the ETS. For emissions outside the ETS, the annual use by Member States of credits from GHG emission reduction projects in third countries is limited to up to 3% of each Member State's emissions in the year 2005, which is the equivalent of a third of the reduction effort in 2020 (European Commission, 2008). However, Member States with an emissions reduction target or target of an increase of at most 5% under the Effort Sharing Decision will be able to use additional credits amounting to 1% of their verified 2005 emissions for projects in least developed countries and small island developing states, given that few CDM projects have been implemented in developing countries.[16]

This explains the anxiety among environmentalist NGOs such as WWF (Euractiv, 2009) and Friends of the Earth (Bullock *et alia*, 2009, 4), who predict that the total percentage of carbon offsets used by EU Member States will amount to more than half of the emissions reduction commitment of the EU.[17]

Given the difficulties that the EU as a whole has faced over the past decade to make the significant cuts in emissions it proposed when negotiating the Kyoto Protocol and its increasing reliance on external credits, we can only assess the EU's performance on policy coherence in its climate policy as 'too little, too late'. Two caveats should be added however.

[16] This possibility is subject to a series of stringent conditions under article 5 (5) of "Decision No. 406/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the effort of Member States to reduce the Community's greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments up to 2020" (Official Journal of the EU - L 140/136 – June 5, 2009).

[17] While the ETS is at the heart of the EU's Climate Change Package, other measures have been approved as well, such as the Fuel Quality, Biofuels, Renewable Energy Directives. However, both the use of CDM credits as well as the combination of a carbon market and the subsidy of renewable energy sources risk undermining the EU's objectives and won't add to the EU's policy coherence in the ongoing negotiations leading up to December 2009. An Open Europe report (2007, 50-51) on ETS concludes that these other measures with their own tax and subsidy policies have the potential to cancel out the intended effects of the ETS by "effectively trying to pre-empt the operation of the market and artificially [tilting] investment in their favour". However, this is more a question of policy effectiveness than the subject discussed here,namely 'policy coherence'. Apart from the problematic aspects of the increasing importance of Kyoto credits in terms of the EU's policy coherence on climate change, a wide range of publications (see de Sepibus, 2008, 3) has also drawn attention to the questionable environmental integrity of CDM projects.

First of all, the gap between the EU's rhetoric and actions may be wide, but the EU is the only industrialised country that has not seen a major increase of emissions. While there was some 'luck' (and policy-making to a lesser extent) involved for the EU, no other developed country has achieved this. By comparison, Canada also ratified the Kyoto Protocol with a 6% reduction target, but actually increased its emissions by 27% (Mittelstaedt, 2009). Moreover, the EU's pioneering work in setting up a carbon market is impressive, particularly in comparison to the abysmal trend in emissions in the US, Canada and Australia. In my view, it is important to consider the policy coherence of the EU not in isolation, but in the context of other Annex I countries.

Secondly, while the increased importance attributed to external credits in the EU's efforts to curb emissions may not be appreciated by environmental NGOs and from an ethical 'climate justice' perspective, developing countries were those that pushed for a possibility to finance mitigation and adaptation policies with the help of Annex I countries. JI projects under Article 4 are only open to Annex I countries. According to Gupta and Grubb (2000, 60-61)

> [t]he CDM came about [in 1997] because Parties could not satisfactorily deal with the participation of developing countries (without targets) in the negotiations on JI. A new concept had to emerge to accommodate developing country interests in the underlying rational of JI, the transfer of finance and resources to green investments and practices that benefited all involved.

In Copenhagen, the EU should not make the mistake of focusing exclusively on extracting mitigation commitments from both industrialised and developing countries, because enabling developing countries to cut their emissions and adapt to the effects of climate change has become equally, if not more imperative. This will require "enhanced and targeted transfers of financial resources and relevant technologies, promoting climate-friendly investments and supporting the development of adequate policy frameworks" (Oberthuer & Roche Kelly, 2008, 46-47). The EU's expertise in low-carbon technologies, its experience with CDM projects and its vast experience in developing a carbon market and climate policy more generally – despite the setbacks - could actually pay dividends.[18]

[18] Zielonka (2008, 480) also emphasizes the importance of the EU's "unique know-how in setting up regulatory standards which gives it a clear edge over competitors. […] The US has vast regulatory experience, but its norms are specific to its own particular environment and so less exportable than EU norms, which by their nature are always intergovernmental"

4.2. Cultural match of emerging global norm on climate change

In the section on the theoretical framework, I have categorised China as a 'state-above-society' in Checkel's categorisation of different regimes. Lanteigne (2009, 19-24) stresses that Chinese foreign policy-making is no longer as centralised as it used to be under Mao and that, in fact, a range of ministerial and bureaucratic actors contribute to the decision-making process. Nonetheless, "much of the overall decision-making power over both domestic and foreign affairs rests with the [Chinese Communist Party] Politburo Standing Committee […]. Many analysts seeking to gauge foreign and domestic policy directions often examine the composition of the Standing Committee as it changes every five years" (Lanteigne, 2009, 22-23).[19] The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is the main body in charge of economic and energy policy and has, as a result, become the main driver of policy on climate change. Already in 1990, a National Climate Change Coordination Leading Group was established and in 1998 was supplemented by a Climate Change office, which functions as the secretariat to the coordination group. It is generally accepted that "environmental policy-making in China has been almost exclusively a top-down process" (Harris, 2005, 133).

As with any issue in China nowadays, the foreign policy situation is changing quickly, but – compared to the process of making foreign policy in democratic structures at EU-level or in the US – China can be safely categorised as a 'state-above-society'. Hence, we need to look for evidence of social learning among Chinese foreign policy-makers, inspired by foreign policy efforts of the EU, that persuades them to take responsibility for reducing China's GHG emissions.

Where does one start the search for evidence of socialisation of Chinese policy-makers in line with a global norm on the mitigation of climate change? Cortell and Davis (2000, 70-71 and 76) recommend researching first and foremost 'domestic political discourse' for signs of the possible impact of an international norm on a state's behaviour. This

[19] The Politburo is composed of the President, the vice-President, the Premier, the Vice-Premier, the head of the National People's Congress, the head of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee and other senior officials. Current members of the Politburo are part of the fourth generation of Chinese leaders, which moved through the ranks during Deng's 'open door' economic policy and as a result are less attached to the Maoist views, which constrained China's active stance in international politics (Lanteigne, 2009, 23).

requires a focus on declarations made by authoritative national leaders that repeatedly confirm the legitimacy of obligations imposed by an international norm on a state's domestic policies.

I first analyse the stream of joint EU-China statements that been agreed over the last five years. The European Commission (2006, 5) proposed that one of the key topics in EU-China relations should be 'sustainable development' with an emphasis on combating climate change and improving the environment. Apart from the annual EU-China summits, there are a number of Ministerial meetings as well as 'sectoral dialogues'. The main dialogue focuses on economic and trade cooperation. Nonetheless, another important dialogues focuses on the environment and, in that context, there has been frequent contact between Chinese and European environmental ministers and between the European Commission and senior officials of the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) of China. Climate Change was also the main focus of a visit by European Commission President Barroso and nine other European Commissioners in April 2008, including the Commissioners with particularly relevant portfolios such trade, environment and energy. In other words, there have been many opportunities for 'social learning' in order to allow for the diffusion of a global mitigation norm. Since signing a 2005 Joint EU-China Declaration on Climate Change as the basis for an EU-China Climate Change Partnership, EU officials have been meeting with senior Chinese officials twice a year under a bilateral consultation mechanism (European Commission DG Environment, 2009).

However, social learning as the diffusion mechanism that will convince Chinese officials to mitigate emissions faces an uphill battle given the low level of 'cultural resonance' of such a norm in today's China. First of all, public awareness about environmental issues and climate change is quite low, both among elites and the wider public. This deep-rooted attitude stems from decades of poverty and starvation under Mao's rule, which results in the current high degree of tolerance for environmental pollution as the unavoidable by-product of achieving Western lifestyles. Breakneck economic development has exacerbated the environmental problems and led to a series of laws and regulations in response to crises, which reflect a slow change in attitude among the elite and the urban population in particular: "Environment therefore becomes important only when it affects economic growth and wealth generation (Harris, 2005, 127-131).

According to Premier Wen Jiabao (2008, 4), climate change is for China not just an environmental issue, but is ultimately a development issue:

> It is not in the common interest of the mankind to address climate change at the cost of development, or to blindly pursue economic growth in disregard of the threats of climate change. The current climate change is mainly caused by the accumulated emissions by the developed countries over many years. Developing countries, especially the least developed ones are weak in climate change adaptation, thus it is unfair that they have to bear its serious consequences. The developed countries should change their unsustainable consumption mode, significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help the developing countries to embark on a path of sustainable development that is suited to their own national conditions and to strike a balance between pursuing economic growth and tackling climate change.

In a nutshell, this is China's position for the ongoing negotiation that will culminate in Copenhagen. In China, 135 million people still live on less than one dollar a day and income disparities between urban and rural areas have continued to increase during China's economic modernisation. Despite a growing recognition of the environmental costs, sustained economic growth remains an urgent priority for Chinese policy-makers and an integral part of its strategy to reduce poverty (Heggelund, 2007, 159).

China has adopted an "opportunistic" strategy by presenting itself, on the one hand, as a leader of the G-77 alliance of developing countries by resisting any commitments under a post-2012 Copenhagen agreement, while simultaneously joining a wide range of agreements that, for example, "allow China the benefits of an increasing number of CDM projects focused on renewable energy" (Kasa *et alia*, 2007, 121-122).

The EU has so far made little progress in moving Chinese negotiators towards accepting the – non-binding – target the EU suggested for developing countries (i.e. "to limit the rise in their GHG emissions through nationally appropriate actions to 15-30% below baseline by 2020" (European Commission, 2009b, 5)). Nonetheless, Chinese officials have repeated their willingness to commit China to emission-intensity targets. China's premier Wen Jiaboa (2008, 1) stated that his government had set an "obligatory target in the eleventh five-year program on national economic and social development to reduce energy intensity by 20% in five years [i.e. by 2010 with 2005 as baseline year]" (Wen Jiaboa, 2008). In the second half of 2009, a first draft of the next, 12th Five-Year Plan will be announced and is widely expected to set more stringent criteria for energy

consumption.[20]

Given low environmental awareness within the Chinese government and its adherence to an economic growth strategy to deal with China's many social problems (e.g. the growing urban-rural inequalities), Harris proposes to connect climate change policies directly to economic prosperity (2005, 135) as the only possible successful strategy towards changing the course of events in China:

> a willingness in the developed world to provide additional aid to China for truly sustainable development, and to make all aid and foreign investment conditional upon it not being unnecessarily harmful to the environment.

This proposal matches precisely the foreword to China's National Climate Change Programme which stresses the importance of article 4, paragraph 7 of the Kyoto Protocol, i.e. the principle that a developing country like China can only implement its commitments on mitigating climate change, if the developed world makes the necessary financial resources and technology transfers available (NDRC, 2007, 3).

In China, climate change policies are intimately tied with energy policies. China hopes to repeat the 'success' of quadrupling its GDP, while only doubling its energy consumption from 1980 to 2000 in the period from 2001 to 2020. By introducing important changes in energy policy, Chinese officials aim to "reorient the basic structure of energy" away from a heavy reliance of coal (67.7%) and crude oil (22.7%) (Heggelund, 2007, 162). As part of its National Climate Change Programme, China adopted a national renewable energy law in 2005 thereby setting a "target of producing 16% of primary energy from renewable sources (including large hydropower) by 2020, up from about 7% today" (PEW Center, 2007, 3).

If the EU seeks to entice China to reduce its GHG emissions, the only plausible strategy seems to be for the EU to help China acquire the energy security its needs to secure economic growth by reducing the GHG intensity and reliance on fossil fuels of its economy, thereby killing two birds with one stone. While officially sticking to its calls for developing countries "to limit the rise in their GHG emissions through nationally appropriate actions to 15-30% below baseline by 2020", the EU in practice pursued such a strategy and focused its efforts on following up the joint EU-China declaration on

[20] Su Wei, a leading figure in China's climate change negotiating team, confirmed that China might introduce "a national target that would limit emissions relative to economic growth in the country's next five-year plan from 2011" (Watts, 2009, The Guardian).

climate change (European Commission, 2005). This declaration stressed that the focus of the Partnership would be "on concrete action: the development and deployment of clean energy technology".[21] Moreover, "[t]he Partnership will also reinforce EU-China cooperation on the Kyoto Protocol's CDM. It foresees a dialogue on the further development of this mechanism 'post 2012' in combination with an exchange of information and experience on the use of market-based mechanisms such as the EU emissions trading scheme".

Despite an initial reluctance to allow Annex I countries to use CDM projects to comply with their reduction commitments, Chinese policy-makers have changed their views considerably and now view such projects as a useful instrument for China to tackle the GHG intensity of its economic development. China has become proactive in soliciting CDM projects and as a result has become "by far the largest source of CDM credits, accounting for over 40% of those generated to date" (PEW Center, 2007). According to Heggelund (2007, 182-183), of the 255 projects approved by the end of 2006, 208 projects focused on energy efficiency and renewable energy projects.[22] As indicated in the abovementioned Joint EU-China declaration on climate change, the EU has become deeply involved in CDM projects, in particular in Chinese projects.

The EU made the decision to invest a total of 2.8 million Euro in an EU-China CDM Facilitation Project, which was launched in June 2007. The project seeks to strengthen the CDM as a central pillar of China's sustainable development policy, focusing at first on increasing China's local and central capacity to generate, verify and administer CDM projects as well as assessing the effectiveness of technology transfer through CDM. This focus of the EU on strengthening China's administrative capacity is important given the poor record of the Chinese state in ensuring compliance with the environmental laws and regulations that are frequently issued at the central level (Heggelund & Backer, 2007, 418). Lack of financial means, inability of local authorities to enforce legislation

[21] Two concrete goals were put forward, namely developing advanced "zero-emissions" coal technology by 2020 and reducing the cost of key energy technologies in order to halve the energy intensity of the Chinese economy by 2020.

[22] While most projects focus on energy efficiency and renewable energy, "most of China's CDM credits come from destruction of trifluoromethane (HFC-23), a potent greenhouse gas that is a byproduct of refrigerant manufacture (HFC-22). HFC reductions account for 52% of expected credits through 2012" (PEW Center, 2007). As a result, the Chinese government has imposed a hefty 65% tax on HFC projects and is channeling the revenues to sustainable energy development.

and widespread corruption are the main drivers for China's poor environmental record, not lack of agencies or laws (Harris, 2005, 133).

Given that even optimistic scenarios foresee that in 2020 coal will still account for over half of China's energy production (Clarke, 2008, 53), the European Commission (2009b, 2-3) has recognized that "[i]t is therefore necessary to make the inevitable combustion of coal more climate-compatible", in particular given "the emissions trajectories for the coal-dependent emerging economies" like China. This is reflected by a recent communication adopted by the European Commission (2009c), entitled "Demonstrating Carbon Capture and Geological Storage (CCS) in emerging economies and developing countries: financing the EU-China Near Zero Emissions Coal Plant project". This follows up the EU's commitment in the 2005 Joint EU-China Declaration to develop two projects with the aim of developing and demonstrating advanced near-zero emission coal (NZEC) technology through carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS).[23]

Apart from the focus on research and development of CCS technology, the EU is also developing a regulatory framework for CCS in the European Union through the STRACO2 Project (Support to Regulatory Activities for Carbon Capture and Storage). By supporting a CCS regulatory framework inside the EU, STRACO2 will be instrumental for establishing best practice standards globally. By incorporating the Administrative Centre for China's Agenda 21 (ACCA21), this project hopes to ensure that the developed solutions are applicable to rapidly developing economies outside Europe (STRATCO2, 2009).

5. Conclusion

The main conclusion of this paper is that it is too early to draw definite conclusions. The theoretical framework developed in this paper allows for the identification of certain correlations, but more empirical work is needed to make causal linkages between the EU's intentions and actions and (lack of) changes in China's domestic energy and climate change policies.

[23] The first is the COACH project (Cooperation Action with CCS China-EU) and second project is the UK's NZEC Initiative. Their combined budget totals more than 6 million Euro.

I believe it is safe to expect the EU's leadership on climate change to be considerably challenged by China and other developing countries at the Copenhagen summit. Even though it has set the most ambitious targets among all industrialised nations by 2020, the EU has not been able to fully live up to its Kyoto commitments, thereby demonstrating a low degree of policy coherence undercutting its performance as a norm entrepreneur.

The EU is not credible as a norm entrepreneur or Normative Power, as the heavy reliance on CDM projects to achieve the modest cut in emissions under the Kyoto Protocol demonstrates that the EU fails to live up to the definition of a norm entrepreneur as "having strong notions about appropriate ore desirable behaviour in their community" (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, 896). By altering its position on Kyoto's flexibility mechanisms, the EU is cutting corners on the restrictions imposed by a nascent global mitigation norm.

Since 2007, there has been a flurry of activity within the EU with a whole range of climate change-oriented directive and initiatives (e.g. the Biofuels Directive, the Directive on the energy performance of buildings, the Directive on the promotion of energy from renewable sources, all approved in 2008), but this may be too little too late. Furthermore, the inherent contradiction between promoting a carbon market while simultaneously promoting and subsidizing renewable energy sources is problematic.

Neither is there a high degree of cultural match between a global mitigation norm and the Chinese domestic policy discourse, where a focus on economic growth continues to trump concerns for climate change. It should be acknowledged that China did make a number of tactical concessions to a global mitigation norm by committing to a drastic reduction in the energy intensity of its economy, but this happened predominantly for fears about China's energy security. Given China's basic argument that the industrialised world has a historic responsibility in causing climate change and that per capita emissions in the developing countries – including China – are many times lower than in Annex I countries, the EU's efforts to make China sign up to more stringent mitigation targets are likely to fail, even though avenues for exchange between European and Chinese officials on climate change and energy policies have multiplied over the past five years, thereby increasing the chances for socialisation.

To conclude, given the EU's low level of policy coherence, describing the EU as a 'green' Normative Power is a stretch. Moreover, the cultural match of a global mitigation norm with China's current economic policies is low. Hence, progress on ambitious mitigation targets at Copenhagen in line with such a norm is unlikely. The EU's focus on concrete projects that help China's efforts to reduce the environmental cost of economic development and that simultaneously help China to achieve the necessary energy security seems to be a more promising – be it a less normatively inspired – strategy. Moreover, such a strategy provides many opportunities to engage with Chinese officials on low-carbon pathways to prosperity and help their socialisation in line with a global mitigation norm over the long term.

Based on the preliminary evidence presented in this paper, analysing the EU as an old-fashioned 'civilian power' instead of norm entrepreneur or Normative power Europe in international negotiations on climate change is a better way of describing its action. The EU as a civilian power on climate change plays to its civilian strengths by predominantly using economic foreign policy instruments such as technology transfer and expertise in developing an environmental regulatory infrastructure.

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