Mesomobilization: Organizing and Framing in Two Protest Campaigns in West Germany[1]

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The concept of mesomobilization is introduced as a specification to the prevailing literature on mobilization processes. Mesomobilization actors have a dual function: They first provide the structural basis for mobilization by coordinating micromobilization groups and collecting the resources required for action and then try to achieve a cultural integration of the various groups by developing a master frame to interpret the triggering event in a way that is conducive to mobilization. Two empirical cases: the mobilization against U.S. President Ronald Reagan's visit in Berlin in 1987 and the mobilization against the yearly meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in Berlin in 1988 are investigated to develop hypotheses that indicate what structural and cultural factors are important to a successful mobilization.

I. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH QUESTION

Many theories and concepts that are sometimes contradictory have been offered to explain successful mobilization for collective protest. Recent work in this field has made some progress in integrating several theoretical concepts into a common framework (Klandermans and Tarrow 1988; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1988). For example, Bert Klandermans and Dirk Oegema (1987) distinguish between different steps of mobilization and relate specific explanatory variables to each of these steps. A successful mobilization begins with a mobilization potential which, in

turn, depends on macrostructural factors such as demographic and ideological variables. These factors predispose individuals and social groups toward the means and goals of mobilization. The transformation of these objectively given dispositions into subjectively perceived definitions of problems presupposes collective actors with resources and access to networks who can reach the "available" mobilization potential and offer meaningful interpretations of the issues at stake. This is a precondition for forming a consensus in a specific campaign (Klandermans 1988; Snow et al. 1986).

A mobilization potential's existence, however, is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for actual protest; the potential also has to be activated. Activation requires that collective actors with resources gain access to the mobilization potential, convince people to participate in collective protest, and thus achieve action mobilization (Klandermans 1988).[2]

In recent years, various authors have emphasized the relevance of mediating structures for forming consensus and for mobilizing people to act. In their overview of more recent movement research, however, McAdam et al. (1988) conclude that precisely this analysis of intermediary structures represents a decisive deficit in movement research: "what is needed is more systematic, qualitative field work into the dynamics of collective action at the intermediate or mesolevel. We remain convinced that it is *the* level at which most movement action occurs and of which we know the least" (McAdam et al. 1988, p. 729). Nevertheless, a few scholars have dealt explicitly or implicitly with mobilizing structures on the mesolevel by promoting different categories and concepts.

First, there is the notion of *multiorganizational fields*. These are defined as the "total possible number of organizations with which the focal organization might establish specific linkages." (Curtis and Zurcher 1973, p. 53).[3] The authors identify two levels of interorganizational processes that conceptually overlap: "the *organizational* level, where networks are established by joint activities, staff, board of directors, target clientele, resources, etc.; the *individual* level, where networks are established by multiple affiliations of members."[4] Bert Klandermans (1990)

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[2] The steps necessary for successful mobilization for protest participation could be labeled as follows: macrosocietal conditions → mediating structures and frames → mobilization potential → mediating structures and frames → protest activities.

[3] Roberto M. Fernandez and Doug McAdam (1989) adopted this concept in their analysis of the network that underlay the Freedom Summer mobilization.

[4] Roger V. Gould (1991) made a similar distinction between organizational networks and informal networks. In his analysis of the mobilization process in the Paris Commune in 1871, Gould provides an interesting analysis of the interrelation between both kinds of networks. He empirically demonstrates that the interaction of both levels not only has an additive effect but forges and maintains solidarity among insurgents.

has also used the idea of multiorganizational fields in his recent work. However, he deliberately extends the meaning of the term to include opponent organizations under the same label and then distinguishes an alliance system and a conflict system with regard to a social movement organization. With this broader meaning of the term, Klandermans comes close to what other scholars have called the *social movement sector*, which refers to all social movement organizations in a society, no matter to which movements they are attached (Zald and McCarthy 1980; Garner and Zald 1985). The concept of multiorganizational field is important insofar as it emphasizes the embedding of a movement in its wider organizational environment. However, it is not very specific about various targets, steps, and tasks of mobilization.

Second, the concept of *political opportunity structure* (Tarrow 1983) also includes the aspect of alliances as one element that facilitates social movement mobilization. In this context, however, allies are considered as agents outside the movement rather than as a part of it. Moreover, there is no distinction between various levels of mobilization, nor any specification of different functions of the alliance structure.

Third, there is a concept that explicitly claims to bridge the gap discussed above at the intermediate level of mobilization. McAdam et al. (1988, p. 709) make a conceptual suggestion for closing the gap by introducing the concept of *micromobilization contexts:* "The key concept linking macro and micro processes is that of the micro-mobilization context." Micromobilization contexts can be preexisting political groups (e.g., unions), nonpolitical groups (e.g., churches), or informal groups (e.g., friendship networks). Despite the differences in the size and degree of formal organization of these various collective settings, common to all of them is that they fulfill three functions for mobilization processes. We consider two of these functions to be central: "First, they provide the context in which the all-important process of collective action can occur" (McAdam et al. 1988, p. 710). This implies framing the issues, causes, and solutions (Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988).[5] Second, they "serve as the 'organizational staging ground' for the movement" (McAdam et al. 1988, p. 715) insofar as they provide members, leaders, and communication networks.

The concept of micromobilization contexts contains two ambiguities that we hope to clarify by specifying the concept. First, the authors do

[5] "The term 'frame' (and framework) is borrowed from Goffman to denote the 'schemata of interpretations' that enable individuals 'to locate, perceive, identify, and label' occurrences within their life space and the world at large. By rendering events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective" (Snow et al. 1986, p. 464).

not distinguish between the mobilizing collective actors, on the one hand, and their environment, which consists of individuals, groups, and networks (the context in the strict sense of the word), on the other. We suggest that the term "micromobilization contexts" be limited to the environment and that the term "micromobilization actors" be used to indicate the mobilizing collective actors.

Second, previous authors do not distinguish between the different levels of the mobilization process and the targets of mobilization. Micromobilization actors function mainly to mobilize individuals to participate in protests. We propose the use of the term *micromobilization potential* for those individuals who are the targets of micromobilization actors. However, the various micromobilization actors, who usually pursue their own special goals, constitute an atomized or only very loosely connected structure. In order to pursue a common campaign, these actors must first be linked together. Besides achieving the involvement of individuals in protest activities, the groups of micromobilization actors themselves, need to be linked and integrated. We assume that mobilization will be successful in quantitative terms only if these micromobilization groups can be linked to each other thereby allowing for a sort of "bloc recruitment" (Oberschall 1973, p. 117; Jenkins 1983, p. 62). The concept of micromobilization leaves open the question of how the micromobilization groups themselves are linked together. McAdam et al.'s (1988) claim to have bridged the macro-micro gap with their concept of micromobilization is only half fulfilled by the part of the bridge that extends from the microshore. We will make an explicit distinction between the micro- and mesolevels and specify the functions of the latter.

We introduce the term *mesomobilization actors* and by this we denote those groups and organizations that coordinate and integrate micromobilization groups.[6] The latter can, from the point of view of the mesomobilization actors, be considered as the *mesomobilization potential*. Mesomobilization actors play a role similar to that of micromobilization actors; in contrast to them, however, they mobilize not individuals but groups, organizations, and networks.[7] In fulfilling this task they have two functions. First, they provide a *structural integration* by connecting groups with each other, collecting resources, preparing protest activities, and

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[6] Neidhardt (1985, p. 197) has even suggested considering social movements as "mobilized networks of networks." Similarly, Gerlach and Hine (1970) have emphasized the horizontal more than the vertical linkage of social movement groups. The authors saw "segmented, polycephalous, integrated networks"—SPIN organizations—as an ideal type of social movement organization.

[7] For empirical analyses of the networks underlying a social movement see, e.g., Kretschmer and Rucht (1987) and Klandermans (1990).

doing public relations. Second, they aim at a *cultural integration* of the various groups and networks in developing a common frame of meaning. This serves to interpret the issue at stake and to link the specific concerns to this issue.

Hence, the mobilizing structure for protest activities is twofold, consisting of both mesomobilization actors and micromobilization actors. The first link and integrate various micromobilization groups; the second motivate and mobilize individuals within and outside of these groups. Both types of actors are in a complementary relationship with each other. Together they form the intermediary structure that is a fundamental part of the micro-macro bridge.

We will develop and specify the concept of mesomobilization on a theoretical level and demonstrate its usefulness by investigating empirical cases. We have selected two prominent cases of mass mobilization in the recent history of the Federal Republic of Germany as an illustration: the protest campaign against the visit of Ronald Reagan in 1987 and the campaign against the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) Congress in 1988.[8] Both events took place in Berlin. With the two cases we want to show how mesomobilization actors (*a*) achieve a structural integration by organizationally connecting groups with each other and (*b*) achieve a cultural integration of the various groups and networks by developing a common frame of meaning to interpret the issue at stake.

Because no refined theory of mesomobilization exists, we use empirical material to develop hypotheses indicating which structural and cultural mesomobilization characteristics are important in a successful mobilization. In this respect, we are not testing a refined theoretical model but are using empirical material to develop theory and generate hypotheses.

It is not possible to compare the relative weight of mesomobilization factors with other variables referred to in the literature such as the political opportunity structure or the frequency and intensity of similar protest activities in the past. On a descriptive level, however, we can demonstrate first, that mobilization resulted not from an aggregation process of individual discontent, but through the activation and coordination of already existing protest groups and, second, that these groups combined their own primary concerns with the new issue. A master frame designed for the controversial issue was connected to the group-specific frames,

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[8] We assume that these preexisting mesomobilization contexts and the previously developed ideological frames also provided favorable conditions for the mass mobilization opposing the U.S. military engagement against Iraq in 1991. During this war, many large demonstrations also took place in Berlin where more than 100,000 people were mobilized for a single event.

thus allowing heterogeneous groups to be allied in the same mobilization campaign.

II. A DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT OF THE TWO CASES

A. The Anti-Reagan Campaign

A short visit by U.S. President Ronald Reagan to Berlin was planned for July 12, 1987. Once this plan became known, protest groups began to mobilize for a protest campaign as they had on various other occasions, including that of Reagan's visit to Berlin five years earlier.[9] This campaign aimed at demonstrating that Reagan and the political course he represented were not acceptable to the groups protesting and that he was therefore not welcome in Berlin. The leaflet calling for the central mass demonstration said that Reagan "represents interests in the USA which will stop at nothing in their efforts to make the USA the undisputed world and military power" (our translation, see App. fig. A1).

The first considerations and initiatives for organizing a protest demonstration had already begun in December 1986. Preparation intensified in the weeks before Reagan's visit. Various events in these weeks—including clashes with the police, arrests, seizures, house searches, and the suicide of a political figure being held for questioning—had already increased the explosiveness of the political situation. This atmosphere was further heightened by the substantial expansion of the police force including the importation of West German police forces—and media hype regarding the "battle" surrounding the Reagan visit.

The day before the visit, about 50,000 people demonstrated with the motto, "We are saying no to Reagan's policy." A wide spectrum of 140 political groups had joined the call for the demonstration. Among these were the youth organizations of some parties and unions, left-extremist, humanistic, religious, feminist, peace-movement, and ethnic groups.

While Reagan gave his speech to about 20,000 people under heavy police protection (so that he could quickly escape the city relatively unscathed), there were several clashes in the city between demonstrators and the police. The Kreuzberg district, the stronghold of the militant political scene, was cut off from the outside world and public transporta-

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[9] Aside from this specific event, the political climate among the protest groups in this period was already heated. This was not merely due to the varying policies of the conservative administration, which used both the carrot and the stick in dealing with the protest groups. More specifically, tensions had been caused by the national census carried out at that time and the costly and resplendent ceremonies and festivals to celebrate the 750th anniversary of the city of Berlin. This anniversary, by the way, was the immediate reason for inviting Reagan to visit Berlin.

tion to and from the area was shut down. Several hundred people were surrounded by police and detained for several hours. In the nights that followed, further clashes occurred in Kreuzberg including arrests, people's being chased through the streets, and the use of riot batons and tear gas. A number of innocent bystanders and journalists were injured.

B. The Anti-IMF Campaign

The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank held their yearly congress in Berlin, September 21–27, 1988. All established parties in Berlin greeted the two bodies as welcome guests of the city. However, protest groups had begun mobilizing against this congress two years before the event. The emphasis of the protests was to be that the IMF and World Bank were not welcome in Berlin because the world economic order they represented actively promotes the exploitation of Third World countries by Western industrialized countries. The protesters hoped that the public mobilization would induce the two institutions to cancel the Third World countries' debts, which were perceived as indicative of this unjust world order.

During the process of mobilization and the protest campaign, we recorded a total of 475 different public actions (Gerhards 1991). These consisted of informational meetings, stage productions, sketches, memorial services, religious services, smaller demonstrations, and two large events: a countercongress with experts speaking against the policies of the World Bank and the IMF and a large demonstration. There were 133 groups calling for the demonstration against the IMF and World Bank congress and some 80,000 people who responded to the call to take part in the demonstration.

The preparations of the security agencies paralleled the preparations and activities of the protest groups. Police from throughout West Germany were again assembled in Berlin in large numbers; the spokesman for the city's Department for Internal Affairs said that this was the largest deployment of force in Berlin since the war. Here, again, the media dramatized the great battle between the congress's opponents and the security forces, and again there were violent clashes between the demonstrators and the police. The police's confining of several journalists for some hours aroused widespread public indignation and also had international repercussions.

We can conclude from the large number of support groups in both campaigns that preexisting micromobilization groups were successfully integrated into the process of mobilization. Moreover, this integration seems to have enabled the mobilization of a large number of participants in the mass demonstrations (they involved 50,000 and 80,000 partici-

pants, respectively). In addition, the activities were widely discussed in the mass media. In the case of the IMF conference, we counted 688 articles and short news reports in Berlin-based newspapers on the protest activities (Gerhards 1993).

In the following sections, we want to analyze in greater detail how and why mesomobilization actors were successful in integrating micromobilization groups. We will first analyze the organizational aspects of these integration processes and then the ways in which the issues were framed.

III. THE STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF MESOMOBILIZATION

In this section we will describe which micromobilization groups were recruited to the two campaigns and how well the mesomobilization potential was tapped. We will then ask how the different groups were mobilized and coordinated and which mesomobilization actors participated in the mobilization. In conclusion, we will attempt to determine the factors that led to the successful mesomobilization.

A. Micromobilization Groups and Micromobilization Potential

We begin by analyzing two leaflets, both of them published several days before the mass demonstration. These leaflets give us condensed information about the successfully mobilized micromobilization groups and the content of each campaign. The design and layout of the leaflets are similar (see App. figs. A1 and B1). The front page includes the slogans and arguments in support of the demonstration and the call for action. The back page (not shown) lists, in alphabetical order, all the micromobilization groups that explicitly supported the call for the mass demonstration.[10]

The list for the anti-Reagan campaign includes 140 supporting groups and that of the anti-IMF campaign, 133 groups. When we examine the characteristics of the groups listed on each leaflet, the considerable heterogeneity of the groups becomes apparent. The list includes a wide range

[10] These two lists do provide a complete listing of all supporting and/or participating groups. From media reports immediately following the events we know that the final number of "official" supporting groups was somewhat higher than the number given in the list. Moreover, there were also groups participating in the preparatory work and/or in the protest event itself who were not included in the list. This is particularly true for most of the militant groups called "Autonome." One reason for their absence from the list of individual groups is their semi-underground status; these groups are simply not interested in being publicly identified. Moreover, because of their highly radical stance, some of these groups disagreed with the claims and slogans of the leaflet and therefore would not explicitly support this specific call for action, although they took part in the demonstration and/or related activities.

of organizational forms—such as branches of established political parties, environmental associations, loose circles of politically engaged individuals, sections of trade unions, neighborhood initiatives, international friendship committees, religious groups, cooperatives, student representative bodies, and so forth. In terms of social groups, they range from Turkish women to "U.S.-Americans for Peace," from "Revolutionary Workers from Iran" to lesbian groups, from "Artists for Peace" to self-help groups of unemployed. In ideological terms, they include orthodox Marxists, Greens, Christians, atheists, anarchists, liberals, and so forth.

To understand the composition of these micromobilization groups better, we aggregated groups with the same focus of activity and classified the sets according to their objectives.[11] Groups that were oriented toward more general objectives and could therefore be seen as multi-issue groups were classified as "groups with non-specific aims." Groups with a single specific concern were labeled "issue groups." This category also includes groups especially created to prepare the protest event (anti-IMF groups and anti-Reagan groups). Table 1 gives an overview of the distribution of the various kinds of groups supporting the two protest events.

Although roughly the same number of groups signed the call for a demonstration in each campaign, the composition of the two groups varied. First, only Berlin-based groups participated in the anti-Reagan campaign; whereas the IMF campaign also involved 22 groups from other West German cities and other countries. Obviously, the IMF conference was perceived as an event which went beyond local and even national interest. Although its mobilization had a greater spatial dimension, the anti-IMF campaign mobilized fewer local groups. There seems to have been a trade-off here between the territorial scope of the mobilization and the success rate of the local mobilization.

Second, the attractiveness of the two campaigns varied among specific categories of groups. For example, more peace groups and student/youth groups were mobilized in the anti-Reagan campaign, whereas more Third World groups and women's groups supported the anti-IMF campaign. The absolute number of groups mobilized, however, is not very meaningful because the total number of existing groups in each category could have changed between the campaigns. For this reason we have preferred to define the local mesomobilization potential of the two campaigns in a manner analogous to that of Klandermans and Oegema's (1987) defini-

[11] Of course, attributing some groups to these main categories is arbitrary. For instance, a group called "Women for Peace" could be classified either among women's groups or peace groups. Our general rule was to categorize a group according to its dominant, or more stable, collective identity. In this particular case, knowing that most women in this group were and still are engaged in other women's issues, we classified the group under women's groups.

TABLE 1

SUPPORT FOR THE ANTI-REAGAN AND ANTI-IMF DEMONSTRATIONS

	ABSOLUTE No.		
		Anti-IMF	
KINDS OF GROUPS	Anti-Reagan	Total	Berlin-based
Groups with nonspecific aims:			
Groups of general infrastructure	2	4	3
Party organizations	16	11	5
General political groups	6	5	4
Christian groups	11	8	8
Issue groups:			
Event-specific groups	0	2	1
Peace groups	33	18	17
Third World groups/international cooperation	12	29	21
Human rights/citizenship	8	8	8
Women's groups	13	22	22
Ecological/antinuclear groups	6	6	5
Cultural groups	11	3	3
Student and youth groups	10	6	3
Ethnic groups	3	1	1
Trade unions	4	4	4
Neighborhood groups/urban problems	4	4	4
Nonclassified groups	1	2	2
Total	140	133	111

tion of mobilization potential at the individual level. This will allow us to determine how much of the overall mesomobilization potential—measured as the total number of existing micromobilization groups in various segments of the leftist alternative milieu in Berlin—was activated in each campaign. Drawing on *Stattbuch 3 Berlin* (1984) and *Stattbuch 4 Berlin* (1989) (a collection of self-portrayals of groups and organizations in the alternative milieu in West Berlin), we have obtained rough indicators of the absolute size of various alternative segments at different points in time.[12] We have obtained figures from these sources about the size of some of the segments. In table 2, these figures are compared with those of the Berlin-based support groups in the two protest events.

[12] Again, our analysis remains incomplete. Unfortunately we do not have data on all the types of groups listed in table 1. Moreover, we cannot ascertain the completeness of the *Stattbuch* or whether groups included here are representative. Our current research project, which analyzes the size and changes in the "alternative" movement sector in Berlin using four editions of the *Stattbuch* and additional sources, will allow us to answer these questions.

TABLE 2

ACTIVATION OF SELECTED SEGMENTS OF THE ALTERNATIVE MOVEMENT SECTOR IN WEST BERLIN

Kinds of Groups	Total No. of Groups in Berlin		Berlin-based Support Groups			
			Anti-Reagan		Anti-IMF	
	1987[a]	1989[b]	N	%[c]	N	%[d]
General political groups	41	50	6	14.6	4	8
Peace groups	42	27	33	78.6	17	63
Third World/international cooperation	41	37	12	29.3	21	56.8
Women's groups	125	129	13	10.4	22	17.1
Ecological/antinuclear groups	73	75	6	8.2	5	6.7
Cultural groups	328	324	11	3.4	3	0.9
Ethnic groups	62	75	3	4.8	1	1.3
Neighborhood groups/urban problems	62	56	4	6.5	4	7.1

[a] No. of groups in 1987 is the mean of the groups registered in the 1984 and 1989 editions of the *Stattbuch Berlin*.
[b] No. of the groups registered in the 1989 edition of the *Stattbuch Berlin*.
[c] Percentage of support groups in relation to the total N of groups in 1987.
[d] Percentage of support groups in relation to the total N of groups in 1989.

As the data indicate, groups and organizations with general political aims were not very much mobilized in either campaign. Because both events—the visit of a U.S. President, representing the world's most powerful nation, on the one hand and a major international congress, representing the "world capitalist interests," on the other—are highly significant in political terms, we expected that the groups with general political aims could be relatively easily mobilized and therefore should be overrepresented. We have no explanation for why this was not so, and we have no comparative data with which to determine if this low level of activation is unusual for these kinds of protest events.

Looking at the actual mobilization rate of issue-specific groups, we can see that the anti-Reagan campaign mobilized more than 75% of the total of the local peace groups and about 30% of the Third World groups. In the anti-IMF campaign, the mobilization rate of the peace groups was lower, but many more Third World groups were activated than in the anti-Reagan campaign.

Activation rates of other single-issue groups were significantly lower.[13] Given the fact that U.S. President Reagan was perceived as an exponent of military bloc confrontation and a risk to peace, it is no wonder that his visit could mobilize so many peace groups in Berlin. Similarly, the IMF and World Bank, which are heavily engaged in Third World countries, mobilized a high share of the Third World groups in Berlin. It seems that preexisting single-issue groups whose concern is close to the topic of the event can be relatively easily mobilized, and vice versa. This bridging between group concerns and the event, however, is not an automatic act but a social construction and the result of an organizing effort (see Sec. IV). We also found that there was surprisingly little overlap between the supporting groups in the two campaigns; only roughly one-third (47 groups) participated in both campaigns. Therefore, despite the fact that both triggering events were rather similar and that they occurred in the same city within a time span of only 15 months, each protest event seems to have had its own rationale and dynamics.

In summary, we can state that both protest campaigns were supported by a wide range of political, humanitarian, religious, and cultural groups. In the anti-IMF campaign, the Third World groups played a dominant role; in the anti-Reagan campaign, the peace groups were the most important. In each case the mobilization potential of micromobilization groups

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[13] Even women's groups and neighborhood groups which, at least at first glance, are not concerned by the nature of the triggering event, were activated to a certain degree (ranging between 6.5% and 17%). We will later show that this was a result of a successful frame bridging (see Sec. IV, C).

in these two areas was highly activated. This can be interpreted as a success for the organizers.

B. The Organizational Process and the Role of Mesomobilization Actors

How were the support groups linked to each other? We use several interviews with important organizers in both campaigns and notes from meetings of organization groups to shed some light on the underlying structure and on the process that enabled the bloc recruitment of groups and organizations.

In the anti-Reagan campaign, which we label COORD A, a relatively large and stable network of local groups played a key role.[14] It not only gave the initial impulse for the campaign but also remained its control center during all of its phases. The COORD A network had been established during the rise of the new peace movement in the early 1980s. It embodied a broad range of groups that go far beyond the peace movement, including religious, humanistic, and political groups, with rather different ideological backgrounds, aims, and tactical preferences. One or more representatives of these groups usually met each other once a month to exchange information and discuss common concerns.

When members of this network became aware that President Reagan was to visit Berlin, they decided to launch a protest campaign. As in past joint protest activities, they created a special task force (*Arbeitsgruppe*) to prepare and coordinate the anti-Reagan campaign. This group involved experienced delegates from the core organizations of the network. Apart from organizational and technical matters, the task force was also engaged in the "meaning-work" (see Snow and Benford 1992, p. 5) of formulating a first draft of the leaflet calling for a common action. This first version was produced three months before the protest event. The authors of the draft then either presented it personally to some core groups of the network or mailed it to get reactions from these groups. Although sending a letter seems to be a simple mobilization technique, it was relatively successful because the letter's recipients were groups that had established contacts with the network and been mobilized in previous protest campaigns. Some minor revisions were made on the basis of the feedback from various groups. Together with a letter asking for official support, the final version of the leaflet was then sent to the outer circle of groups belonging to COORD A, as well as to other groups who might support the call for action. Parallel to this, the core organizers

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[14] We use a code name for this and similar networks in order to guarantee their anonymity.

directly contacted members of other groups with whom they had personal ties. Through this process of direct and indirect activation the number of support groups grew from 38 initial endorsements in April 1987 to the 140 groups that eventually signed the call for action and were thus represented in the official list of support groups.

For the IMF campaign, the pattern of mobilization deviated to some extent from that of the anti-Reagan campaign. From the very beginning, since the IMF campaign was conceptualized as both a Berlin campaign and a national campaign, it had a twofold structure. For the purpose of the national campaign, COORD B, together with a special subcommittee, served as the basic coordinating group. The network we call COORD B is a nationwide network of highly politicized leftist Third World groups. At the core of COORD B, three full-time, paid organizers coordinated the various groups and organized the campaign. Two additional organizers were employed by COORD B in Berlin during the last three months preceding the IMF conference. The national Green Party provided much of the money needed to run the campaign. In Berlin, the various activities were coordinated by a separately created committee, COORD C, which included several of the groups listed in table 1.[15] Among these was the *Alternative Liste* (AL), a left-liberal party on the state level that later joined the national Green Party. Given the resources available to a party in the state parliament—money, staff, infrastructure—the AL played a crucial role for the Berlin-based organization in the campaign. The AL employed three people for nine months to prepare the campaign. At a later stage of the preparatory work, COORD A, which had coordinated the anti-Reagan campaign, after having formed its own coordinating group for the anti-IMF campaign, joined COORD C. The first draft of the central leaflet was written by four people from COORD C who were selected to represent most of the political spectrum of the mobilizing groups. The leaflet was then sent to the groups belonging to COORD C and to other groups who were to support the call for action.

Because the planning called for a broad range of protest activities beyond the central mass demonstration, COORD C formed a subgroup for each of the specific tasks. These groups were to prepare (*a*) a "counter-congress," (*b*) the mass demonstration, (*c*) the week of daily protest activities, (*d*) the measures for influencing the mass media, (*e*) the publi-

[15] In addition, the so-called "Autonome," the most radical wing of militant activists, had established a coordinating group which, however, could only represent its own political spectrum. Because these coordinating groups were largely independent from each other and had different opinions about tactical questions, their relationship was marked by some tensions and rivalry. Only in the last few weeks before the protest event could these dividing lines be overcome and common activities become less problematic.

cation of an anti-IMF journal, and (*f*) the coordination with non-Berlin-based protest groups. In view of this sophisticated division of labor and the large investment of personal and financial resources, we can conclude that the organization and coordination of the anti-IMF campaign was much more professionally and organizationally elaborated than the anti-Reagan campaign (see fig. 1).

The special committees described above—the task force for COORD A in the anti-Reagan campaign and those of COORD B and COORD C in the anti-IMF campaign—played a crucial role in the mobilization process. They formulated a platform for joint action, collected resources such as money and technical equipment, mobilized the outer circle of the network, and even negotiated with the police on the eve of the protest events. These preparatory teams served as professional or semiprofessional planners and organizers on the mesolevel, whereas the numerous activities designed to inform and mobilize sympathizers and the public at large were carried out by the micromobilization groups of the inner and outer circles of the overall network. Activated members of these groups mobilized their own constituency and probably also mobilized friends and acquaintances.

C. Factors for Successful Mesomobilization

What were the preconditions for this effective mobilization and coordination of micromobilization groups through mesomobilization actors? Four factors appear to us to be especially relevant.

The first is that the basic structure of the network of micro- and meso-mobilization actors that fueled the two campaigns in the second half of


FIG. 1.—The organizational structure of the anti-Reagan and the anti-IMF campaign.

the 1980s had already been formed during the first years of the decade. The COORD A network, in particular, emerged with the rise of the new peace movement in the early 1980s, although it included many protest groups that had been formed previously. Delegates from about 40 of the existing groups had met regularly over several years, thus creating close interpersonal ties and overlapping memberships. The network had previously carried out activities similar to those of the anti-Reagan and anti-IMF campaigns several times, including a large anti-Reagan demonstration in June 1982.[16] In comparing the 175 support groups from this demonstration with the 140 support groups in 1987, we found that 50 groups were identical. Given the fact that a certain share of the 1982 support groups no longer existed in 1987 and that some of the 1987 support groups did not yet exist in 1982, this shows the continuity of the micro- and mesomobilization actors. Hence, the mobilization for the two campaigns we focus on was based on a preexisting network of experienced groups. Since relatively large common protest campaigns had been previously organized, there was a certain probability that many groups belonging to the local network might also join in the next campaign. What McAdam (1988) has found in a different context could be demonstrated in our cases as well: The leftist community is held together by a dense network of overlapping "bridging" ties that link the various groups together. We have identified these bridging ties on two levels, an underlying, more or less permanent, infrastructure and a specific structure exclusively designed for the concrete campaign.

Besides remarking on the West Berlin protest sector's continuity over time, it is important that we stress its extraordinary size. Berlin had an especially well-developed alternative protest sector (Claesens and de Ahna 1985). The city was considered "the capital" of the leftist and alternative movements in West Germany (Roth 1989). In comparison with other cities in the Federal Republic of Germany, not to speak of many other countries, West Berlin's conditions for protest were especially favorable.[17]

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[16] This demonstration was even larger than that in 1987. According to the organizers, about 100,000 people participated in 1982.

[17] We have to keep in mind that West Germany as a whole is probably also exceptional in regard to these kinds of activities. Looking at the next IMF and World Bank conference after that in Berlin, it becomes obvious that both the size of the mass demonstrations and the violent activities accompanying the event in Berlin were far from being "normal." The congress, held in September 1989 in Washington, D.C., provoked little protest. There were only a few oppositional groups present. Some 50 people came together for a parallel meeting in a Presbyterian church. Some members of more militant U.S. groups such as Earth First and Rain Forest Action Network also organized a small blockade which, in accord with an agreement with the police,

Generalizing these findings, we suggest that the greater the number of preexisting contacts among the mesomobilization actors, the greater the number of successful protest activities they have carried out in the past, and the more developed the overall local infrastructure of protest movements, the more successful the campaign will be on the level of mesomobilization.

The second factor that probably facilitated the mobilization process in the two campaigns was the organizational flexibility and ideological pluralism of the mesomobilization actors. To begin with, the coordination networks were generally open to all people and groups who wanted to participate. As a consequence, each group had a chance to influence the envisaged protest activities in the early planning stage. Then, each group decided autonomously whether, and under what conditions, it would participate. Even a common decision to undertake one kind of activity, for example, a protest rally, usually allowed for various special activities within this broad framework of action, such as performing street theater, distributing group-specific flyers, or selling buttons. Finally, there was hardly any pressure for ideological conformity. Groups coming from very different movements and political backgrounds were invited to participate. We therefore hypothesize that the greater the organizational flexibility and ideological plurality of the mesomobilization actors, the higher the activation rate of the mesomobilization potential.

Third, our description of the process of actual mesomobilization has shown that this work was done by specifically created organizational bodies with experienced organizers and was based on an internal division of labor. In the anti-IMF campaign, a great deal of the preparatory work was even done by staffers hired exclusively for this purpose. For reasons we will refer to in the concluding section, we believe that more organizational efforts were needed to mobilize the same amount of groups in the anti-IMF campaign than in the anti-Reagan campaign. We therefore hypothesize that the more experienced and professional the mesomobilization actors are and the greater their resources and their division of labor, the more successful the mobilization.

Fourth, although the historical continuity and institutionalization of mesomobilization actors, their organizational and ideological openness and, finally, their professionalism and division of labor were good starting conditions for the activation of micromobilization groups, momentum also developed and increased the mobilization chances further. The first

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did not last longer than four minutes. In addition, some 60 nongovernmental organizations held a congress which, however, was hardly noticed by the international press. With this level and type of mobilization in mind, it becomes obvious how successful the Berlin groups were in terms of mass mobilization.

draft of the leaflet had already been signed by so many groups that, in sheer numbers, a critical mass existed. Klandermans and Oegema (1987) have demonstrated that the probable number of people participating in a protest event has a positive effect on the individual motivation to take part in this event. We suspect that this connection is also true for micromobilization groups. When a certain threshold in the number of groups has been exceeded this has a positive effect on the willingness of other groups to join the mobilization. Momentum was further increased by the fact that the initial signers of the call for action, (a) covered a wide ideological spectrum, (b) included groups that enjoyed an excellent reputation within the leftist-alternative protest milieu, and (c) also consisted of groups that belonged to important umbrella organizations or movement segments. This presumably made it easier for the marginal groups to take the step of joining the mobilization. In summary, we formulate the following hypothesis: the greater the number of groups who initially sign the call for action, the greater their ideological range, the better their reputation, and the more these groups belong to important umbrella organizations or movement segments, the more other groups will join the call for action.

No matter how strong, broad, interlinked, and professional the organizational structure for mesomobilization is, it only provides the structural basis for a mobilization process. A second crucial task for a successful mobilization is an adequate framing of the issue. The issue at stake has to be perceived as important and provoking, the forms of the proposed action must be acceptable, and the organizers and allies must appear to be reliable. In order to activate the existing structure for concrete support and to attract many micromobilization groups from the mobilization potential, this "hardware" structure has to create and apply a kind of "software." In the second major step of our analysis, we therefore turn to the framing processes.

IV. FRAMING THE ISSUES

Framing processes play a decisive role in mobilization campaigns. The best chance for protestors to influence society consists in their capacity to make their definition into a public definition of the problem, to convince as many groups and people as possible by their framing of the situation, to create support for their cause, and to motivate others to participate in the protest (Klandermans 1988). Promoting public definitions of problems and their solutions is not just one of many components of protest campaigns and social movements that have to be considered in an analysis; instead, to the extent that movements can exert influence only through mobilizing the public, it is the key factor. Protest move-

ments usually have no other resources or only small amounts of them (money, power, connections to decision makers) at their disposal (Neidhardt and Rucht 1991, p. 452).

Although the importance of framing to mobilization processes has been emphasized time and again in recent years and theoretical concepts for dimensioning have been developed (Neidhardt 1985; Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988, 1992; Gamson 1988; Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Klandermans 1988, 1992), there are no empirical analyses of frames and framing processes. The following considerations begin to fill this research gap.

As in the analysis of the structure of mesomobilization, the current literature does not allow us to apply a deductive procedure to test hypotheses in analyzing frames. For this reason we will be developing appropriate hypotheses inductively, using our empirical material. In the first step, we attempt to describe the general interpretive frames of the two mobilization campaigns and look for the central interpretive frames, the master frames (Snow et al. 1988, p. 475), which integrated the different groups and motivated them to participate in the protest campaigns. In the second step, we compare the two master frames and develop hypotheses about the factors that influence the mobilizing capacity of frames. In the third step we finally move from the level of mesomobilization to that of micromobilization. We look at the extent to which the different micromobilization groups that supported the mobilization, but primarily pursued other objectives, could combine their own group-specific frame with the IMF issue or with the Reagan visit. That is, how did they succeed in frame bridging? (See Snow et al. 1986.)

Before we start our analysis, however, we need to make some methodological reflections. The problems with using empirical methods to analyze frames result from the fact that the objects of the analysis are texts and frame analysis refers to *the system of meaning* represented by these texts. Conventional, quantitative-content analysis does represent an intersubjectively verifiable procedure for data analysis. It would not, however, do justice to the goal, which is reconstructing the system of meaning represented by texts, because it breaks up the text into isolated elements—topics, statements, and arguments. Hermeneutic qualitative procedures do reconstruct the context of meaning of texts, but it can be argued that the text analysis procedure, itself, represents a subjective interpretation.

In our analysis we will pursue two strategies to compensate for the methodological problems of a frame analysis mentioned above. First, the difficulties of data analysis can be at least partially compensated for by the selection of the texts, by sampling. We consider the two leaflets signed by all supporting groups as valid indicators for the groups' common

frames.[18] The use in each case of only one leaflet signed by the support groups reduces the text corpus to only two pages.[19] At the same time, however, we think that the two pages can be considered to be a highly meaningful source.[20] The reduction of the text corpus to limited, but meaningful material makes it possible to present not only the interpretation, but also the texts themselves (see App. figs. A1 and B1), so that the reader can check the plausibility of the frame analysis.

Second, to analyze the leaflets, we draw on a method for analyzing decision-making processes developed by Robert Axelrod (1976). Using this method, the internal structure of frames can be investigated with the help of a graphic presentation of the argumentative structure of the frames.[21] The graphic presentation takes the form of a directed graph of points and the arrows between the points. The total information of the texts is thus reduced to the bare bones of the argumentation. The degree of abstractness of the frame, the range of the topics addressed, and the logical connection of the arguments thus become visible and comparable between different frames.

A. Master Frames[22]

To be successful, mesomobilization actors must not only organizationally link and coordinate a heterogeneous set of groups, but also integrate

[18] We believe that the two leaflets represent a commonly shared interpretation of Reagan's visit and the IMF conference, respectively. This is an interpretation that marks both an internal consensus and what is meant as a position to be presented to the external world.

[19] We will only refer to additional sources such as group-specific leaflets for the analysis of frame bridging.

[20] Bert Klandermans (1992) differentiates three levels of public discourse where processes of meaning construction take place: the macrolevel, the mesolevel, where movement organization and opponents practice persuasive communication, and the individual level, where consciousness raising takes place. In the following, we concentrate solely on the mesolevel and only on the frames of the mobilizing actors. The frames of other actors (media, state), including competing frames, are excluded from the analysis for practical reasons, even though we concur with Klandermans that frames are always constituted in opposition to and in conflict with alternative frames.

[21] The term, structure of argumentation, could be defined similarly to Axelrod's definition of cognitive maps: "A cognitive map is a certain way of representing a person's assertion about beliefs with respect to some limited domain, such as a given policy problem. The representation takes the form of a directed graph of points and the narrows between those points" (Axelrod 1976, p. 72).

[22] Before we begin the analysis of our empirical material, there is a need for terminological clarification. The concept of framing, as it was introduced in the study of social movements by Snow et al. (1986), was developed mainly on the basis of symbolic interactionism. It does not have much of a theoretical tradition in political sociology,

these groups ideologically. This idea has recently been elaborated by David Snow and Robert Benford. The authors refer to the ecological scope of a master frame defined as "the diffusion of movement activity across different population and organizational sectors of society" (Snow and Benford 1992, p. 26). The notion of ecological scope parallels our conception of a master frame's capacity to integrate various micromobilization groups.[23] In the following section, we will take a closer look at the overarching frames that are shared by all the support groups in both protest campaigns.

We can reconstruct a relatively closed and highly conceptualized interpretive frame, both from the leaflet written by the mobilizing actors for the demonstration against the Reagan visit (App. fig. A1) and from the leaflet for the demonstration against the IMF congress (App. fig. B1). The frame in each case consists of a set of arguments that are linked and complement each other. The frame for the IMF congress will be termed as an "ideology of imperialism," the frame for the Reagan visit as a "hegemonic power ideology."[24] Because both frames are highly conceptualized we use the term ideology.[25] We will first describe the structure of the argumentation of both frames in the following two sections and

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however, which deals with phenomena termed as "belief systems," "ideologies," "cognitive schemes," etc. As the literature in this field is not clear and precise, we would like to introduce some definitions. For our all-encompassing category we refer to belief systems, as suggested by Philip E. Converse (1964, p. 297): "We define a belief system as a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence." In a second step, depending on whether belief systems refer to individuals or collectivities, we can distinguish between individual belief systems and collective belief systems. In the former, the concept refers to individual configurations of interrelated ideas and attitudes situated in the minds of individuals. These ideas serve to interpret the world. The category of individual belief systems is meant to be synonymous with that of cognitive schemes (for an overview, see Schissler and Tuschhoff 1988). In the second case, it refers to the interpretative patterns of collective actors as they are presented, e.g., in programs, resolutions, and leaflets. We suggest the term "frame" for the belief systems of collective actors. Both cognitive schemes (individual belief systems) and frames (collective belief systems) may involve different degrees of conceptualization (Converse 1964). If cognitive schemes are conceptually elaborated, we refer to them as ideological schemes; if frames are conceptually elaborated, we call these ideologies.

[23] A reviewer led us to the still-unpublished paper of Snow and Benford.

[24] Neither "imperialism" nor "hegemonic power" is a term found in the leaflets themselves.

[25] Summing up the respective literature, Hans-Dieter Klingemann (1983, p. 327) defines ideology "as a *far-reaching system* of attitudes whose dominant values and principles involve a high degree of *commitment* and which are *stable* over time. Typically, ideology is represented by *groups* whose interests shape the degree of reality present in the content of their statements."

then compare them in order to develop hypotheses concerning the mobilizing capacity of frames.

The Ideology of Imperialism as a Master Frame

1. The IMF and the World Bank are seen as central institutions of the world economic order.
2. The world economic order is, in its basic structure, an order designed for the exploitation of the Southern Hemisphere countries by the countries in the Northern Hemisphere.
3. The causes for the exploitation are to be found in the capitalist character of this order. This emerges as imperialism in the relationship between North and South and as capitalism within the individual countries.
4. The IMF and the World Bank—with a majority of their members coming from the northern countries—support this system in two ways. On the one hand, they take part in the exploitation through their own project financing and their awarding of loans and determining the conditions for repayment. On the other, these institutions serve as a guide for the policies of the banks and corporations. After the World Bank and the IMF force countries to pursue a capitalist course, then the banks and corporations of the industrialized countries come in and exploit them. Together, arguments 1–4 form the "theory of the world economy."
5. The consequences and problems ensuing from the system of world economy are numerous. They are the direct cause for protest activities. The most important consequences are the large indebtedness of Third World countries and the misery and death among the people living there, the destruction of the ecological requirements for life, the particular burdens on women, the weapon exports to the Third World as a special form of exploitation, the exodus of impoverished people who then seek asylum in the First World, the destruction of cultural identities, and finally, unemployment and reductions in the social welfare system in the First World as consequences of the same capitalist system.
6. The demands of the protesters follow from points 1–5: the problems formulated can only be solved by reformation of the world economic order, and this is what the protesters call for. They do not want Berlin to play host to such representatives of a problem-producing world economic order as the IMF and the World Bank.

Similarly to the manner in which Robert Axelrod (1976) has attempted to identify the structure of decision-making processes of elites by graphic presentations of cognitive maps, the structure of the arguments encompassed by the ideology of imperialism can be reconstructed and demonstrated schematically (see fig. 2).

The Hegemonic Power Ideology as a Master Frame

The anti-Reagan campaign had a similar, although not as elaborately developed, frame.

capitalistic thirst for profits

World economic order
as an imperialistic order

exploitation system

Weapons exports

The IMF and the World Bank as
representatives of an imperialistic order
- policy of restrictive conditions
- structural adjustment policy

Intensification of
social problems
in the First World
- poverty
- unemployment

Ecological
crisis
- rain forest

High indebtedness
in the Third World

Social conflicts

Dictatorships

Wars

Loss of cultural
identity

Hunger and poverty
in the Third World

Exodus into
the First World

Women
especially
affected

FIG. 2.—Master frame of the anti-IMF campaign: imperialism ideology

1. Ronald Reagan was interpreted as a representative of certain circles in the United States who were striving for their nation's unrestricted economic and military dominance in the world.
2. This striving for hegemony found its empirical expression in four different areas:
   a) The United States was carrying out a unilateral armament against the Soviet Union ("crusade against the East"). The SDI program and the stationing of medium-range missiles in Europe were examples of this.
   b) The United States was carrying out a policy of military intervention. The bombing of Libya, the invasion of Grenada, and the mining of Nicaragua's harbors had shown that.
   c) The United States was supporting the apartheid regime in South Africa and the Contras in Nicaragua and was delivering weapons to the Persian Gulf War for strategic reasons.
   d) With the help of the IMF and special military forces, the United States was carrying out the economic subjection of the Third World.
3. At the center of the hegemonic power ideology was the accusation of unilateral armament. Following this line of argument, the possible consequences of an armament policy were explained in greater detail. Unilateral armament not only increased the danger of a new world war, it also had unacceptable consequences during periods of peace ("Arms do not only kill in war"): poverty, mass unemployment, and the reduction of social services were understood as consequences of the armament policy, women were interpreted to be a group hit especially hard by these consequences.
4. The demands of the protesters followed as conclusions from this chain of argumentation.
   a) The protesters reject armament, interventionist policies, support for unjust regimes, and the exploitation of other countries.
   b) The protesters do not want as a guest the American president who is responsible for the problems that have been defined. Berlin ought to be a city of peace and understanding, a city open to the victims of war and exploitation.[26]

Again, the structure of the argumentation can be presented schematically (see fig. 3).

B. The Mobilizing Capacity of the Two Master Frames: Some Hypotheses

Frames developed by mesomobilization actors aim at convincing as many groups as possible to adopt their interpretations of the world and at motivating as many groups as possible to participate in protest activities.

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[26] A further chain of argumentation begins at this point. The protesters accused the Berlin Senate of wanting to divert attention from Berlin's actual problems (rescinding the rent restraints, the struggle for the 35-hour workweek, the discussion of the national census, the reduction of democratic rights) with the invitation to Reagan.

FIG. 3.—Master frame for the anti-Reagan campaign: hegemonic power ideology.

Besides systematically describing the arguments embedded in frames, we can try to generate hypotheses about the variables that influence the mobilizing capacity of frames. In this regard, David Snow and Robert Benford (1988) distinguish between variables referring to the *internal structure* of frames and variables that permit *linking frames to the external dispositions* of potential recipients.[27] First we will focus on the internal structure, namely the argumentative logic of frames, and look for internal characteristics that could increase their capacity to convince groups and people.[28] According to the work of John Wilson (1973) and Snow and Benford (1988, pp. 219 ff.), successful framing depends on three elements: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing. We will draw on these three dimensions in order to compare the internal structure of two master frames.

Diagnostic Framing

"Diagnostic framing involves identification of a problem and the attribution of blame and causality" (Snow and Benford 1988, p. 200). Both

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[27] In describing both sets of variables, Snow and Benford (1988, pp. 205 ff.) introduce the somewhat clumsy categories "infrastructural constraints of belief systems" and "phenomenological constraints." The latter are subdivided into the dimensions "empirical credibility," "experiential commensurability," and "narrative fidelity."

[28] We cannot test whether the factors we consider important for mobilization processes have actually led to increased mobilization of micromobilization groups. Our hypotheses can be made only theoretically plausible.

frames define not just one but a multitude of problems. The fact that we are speaking of problem definitions here does not mean that the problems are invented, that the indebtedness crisis does not exist for many countries in the Third World, and that the United States does not pursue an interventionist policy. It is only that these situations have to be labeled as problems in order for them to become problems. A comparison of the number of elements in the last lines of figures 1 and 2 shows that the number of interpretable problems, the *range and diversity of the problems* defined, is greater in the case of the imperialism ideology.[29] Whereas the anti-Reagan campaign primarily addressed problems related to the issue of peace, the topic catalog of the IMF campaign ranged from the peace issue to the ecological one and to other questions. The range and multitude of the problems defined by the master frame creates points of leverage for a host of political groups focusing on one or several of these particular problems. If we generalize the results of the two cases, then we can formulate the following hypothesis: The larger the range of the problems covered by a frame, the larger the range of societal groups who can be addressed with the frame and the greater the mobilization capacity of the frame.

The fact that the anti-Reagan frame centers on the issue of peace explains the high mobilization rate for peace groups previously described. The central placement of the Third World topic in the anti-IMF frame explains the high mobilization rate for Third World groups.

The connection we formulated between the range of a frame and its mobilization capacity is only valid under certain conditions. A high mobilization capacity cannot be secured through the sheer range and number of problems enumerated. It is important that these problems can be plausibly connected to each other. Otherwise, too broad a range of problems could lead to an overextension of the frame (Snow and Benford 1988, p. 207). The different problems defined by the frames of the two campaigns are not unconnected but understood as different consequences of one system. Both the imperialism and the hegemonic power ideology try to tie disparate problems together into a meaningful context. The degree of *interrelatedness* (Converse 1964, p. 256) between the defined problems seems to be high. The heterogeneity of the problems can be interpreted as the different consequences of one and the same pattern. This fact is illustrated by the arrows in the graphs of figures 1 and 2, which indicate an argumentative connection between problem definitions. In regard to which factors determine the mobilization capacity of frames, we can

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[29] Converse (1964, p. 208) refers to this dimension as the "range of objects that are referents for the ideas and attitudes in the system." See also Snow and Benford (1988, pp. 206–7).

derive the following hypothesis: the better the various defined problems can be argumentively connected with each other through a master frame, the more plausible the master frame appears, and the greater the mobilization capacity of the master frame.

In comparison with the hegemonic power ideology, the ideology of imperialism does not only have a broader, interrelated range; its structure is at the same time more abstract and *more generalized*. This can again be shown by figures 1 and 2. The number of hierarchically ordered levels is greater in the anti-IMF ideology. Whereas the hegemonic power ideology begins directly with the definition of Ronald Reagan as the representative of a hegemonic world power, the imperialism ideology situates the definitions of the IMF and the World Bank in a more abstract framework, which is then again elaborated. We suspect that the following general hypothesis holds true for the mobilization capacity of frames: the more individual problem definitions that can be embedded in a generalized world view, the more plausible the problem definitions, and the higher the mobilization capacity of the frame.

Second, in addition to defining problems, diagnostic framing also includes the definition of causes (Ferree and Miller 1985, pp. 43–44; Snow and Benford 1992, p. 8). Both frames allow for labeling *causes and causal agents*. A congress and a visit of a country's president are "innocent" events in and of themselves. They only become problems if both guests can be labeled as agents causing the problems that have been defined. The causes for the multitude of problems dealt with in the imperialism ideology are located in the system, the world economic order itself. Behind the causes are causal agents in the form of concrete persons and institutions: the IMF, the World Bank, and the large corporations and banks in the First World. The cause of the problems defined in the hegemonic power ideology is the United States's claim to hegemony; the causes are personalized by Ronald Reagan. If both institutions, the IMF and World Bank and the president of the United States, can be successfully labeled as the causal agents for the problems that were highlighted, then the frame gives good reasons to protest against the congress or visit.[30] One can express the connection formulated through concrete examples in the following hypothesis: if the causes for the identified problem can also be defined in a frame and, at the same time, these causes can

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[30] Along with the causal agents, the protest's *addressees* and *objects of attack* (Tarrow 1989, pp. 101–4) are also labeled by the frames to a certain extent. The addressees of the protest were, on the one hand, the two figures labeled as causal agents for the problems defined, Reagan and the combination of the IMF and World Bank; on the other, however, the Berlin Senate, which had invited the international personalities to Berlin, also became an addressee for protest.

be related to concrete persons, then this increases the mobilization capacity of a frame.

Prognostic Framing

Prognostic framing implies "a proposed solution to the diagnosed problem that specifies what needs to be done" (Snow and Benford 1988, p. 199). The solutions for the problems and the demands are defined in both frames. The solutions are, in principle, the reversal of the defined problems and causes. The wider range and more generalized design of the imperialism ideology made it possible to develop more extensive demands in this case. The argument is that none of the problems can be solved in the long run if the world economic order itself is not changed. The hegemonic power ideology is more specific in that regard. The demands here—disarmament, stopping the interventionist policies, and no support for South Africa's apartheid regime—refer to the three sets of problems that were highlighted. Though both frames offer proposals, albeit general and vague ones, for solving the defined problems, they fail to define the means and methods necessary to reach the ends. Assuming that the definition of the means for achieving the ends is an important element of successful mobilization, then we can observe a particular weakness of both frames in this respect. The frames identify and label problems, causes and causal agents, and potential solutions, but offer little help in finding solutions to the problems. We suggest the following hypothesis regarding the mobilization capacity of frames. The closer the frames come to giving solutions for the defined problems and ways to reach these solutions, the higher the mobilization capacity of the frames.

However, prognostic framing is apparently far less important to social movements and protest campaigns than diagnostic framing. In contrast to political parties, social movements and protest groups do not compete to occupy administrative positions in order to propose and implement solutions to problems. Therefore, protest groups, unlike parties, are not usually expected to offer solutions to the defined problems.[31]

Motivational Framing

Motivational framing means "a call to arms for engaging in ameliorative or corrective action" (Snow and Benford 1988, p. 199). Though consensus on problems, causes, and solutions is a precondition for mobilization, it does not by itself lead to mobilization. Motives for participation in

[31] Raschke (1985, p. 386) assumes that social movements have a high capacity for raising problems but a low capacity for problem solving.

specific actions must be created.[32] Both frames lack an explicit motivational framing. Implicitly, the motivation to participate in the respective demonstration is stimulated by the moralizing manner in which the problems are interpreted in the diagnostic frame. Terms such as exploitation, erosion of social security, unemployment, poverty, destruction, misery, and starvation are value laden. They inherently convey a call to struggle against them as evils. A motivational framing specifically designed for the demonstrations could not be found, however. Nonetheless, in general we would formulate the following hypothesis: the mobilizing capacity of a frame increases to the extent that it contains explicit or at least implicit motivating elements, such as appeals to generally recognized moral norms.

The mobilization capacity of a frame is not only determined by the factors within the three dimensions of diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing, but also by its completeness and, above all, by the way the three dimensions are combined. We assume that the better these three dimensions are integrated; that is, the higher the degree of interrelatedness of the frames' elements, the higher their mobilization capacity (Snow and Benford 1988, p. 199). As a matter of fact, both of the frames we analyzed present a comprehensive pattern for interpretation: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing and their integration into a broader system of meaning.

We have analyzed the internal structure of both frames and formulated some hypotheses about the mobilization capacity of frames. The mobilizing capacity of frames, however, depends not only on their internal structures, but also on the leverage points they provide for the *linkage to external recipients*. We assume that the internal structures of the frames as described were favorable for mobilizing different groups. The mobilization potential of the appeal was limited, though, because both master frames build on or reproduce classic leftist theories. This is more obvious for imperialism ideology than for hegemonic power ideology.[33] Referring to the distinction between restricted and elaborated master frames that Snow and Benford (1992, p. 12) have introduced by drawing on the work of Basil Bernstein (1971), both master frames we have found are restricted insofar as their leverage points were confined only to a specific political environment. Because of the leftist slant of the frames, the meso-

[32] Klandermans (1988) asserts that the generation of motives for participation is applicable solely to the motivation of individuals. However, we believe that they are also important for motivating the participation of micromobilization groups.

[33] Moreover, the two interpretative frames can be combined with each other. The linkage of the hegemonic power ideology with the imperialism ideology was ideologically prepared, although it was not included in either frame.

mobilization potential could not be expanded beyond the leftist political spectrum. However, because of the broad scope of the problems included in the frames, a large proportion of this spectrum could be activated.

C. Frame Bridging: The Linking of Master Frames and Group-Specific Frames

The structural analysis showed that the campaign against the IMF and World Bank congress and the one against the Reagan visit were successfully organized by mesomobilization actors who integrated a multitude of different political groups. The organizational linkage was complemented by ideological integration. The analysis of the master frames has demonstrated that in both cases a host of problems was covered, offering particular leverage points for single-issue groups. In the following section, we examine how the groups pick up the master frames' leverage points and link these with their group-specific frames. This process of frame bridging is central for mobilization processes because it forms the connection between the level of mesomobilization and that of micromobilization.[34] Consequently, we shift our attention from the analytical level of mesomobilization to that of micromobilization.

Most of the groups involved in our study focused on other problems than the IMF and Ronald Reagan's visit. What reasons did they use to make their participation plausible to themselves and others? In looking at the individual groups' leaflets from this perspective and comparing them with the central leaflets that called for participation in the large demonstrations and were signed by all of the groups, we can detect *bridging phrases* that established the connection between the imperialism and hegemonic power ideology used by all groups and the group-specific interpretative framework. Our data only allow us to reconstruct the frame bridging that occurred during the IMF campaign.[35]

We will do this by using five examples.[36] The passages we quote will

[34] "Frame bridging is the principal route to alignment. We may wonder whether any other approach works at all at this level" (Klandermans 1992).

[35] We have too few group-specific leaflets from the anti-Reagan campaign. One reason for this lack could be that the relatively long period of time between the protest event and the data collection meant that we could no longer locate many existing leaflets. Another reason could be that there may have been less frame bridging carried out by the different groups. Here it is important to remember that the range of problems under the hegemonic power ideology was narrower than under the ideology of imperialism.

[36] In selecting leaflets from different groups, we first sorted them into various classes (peace groups, Third World groups, women's groups, etc.) and then made a random choice of one leaflet from each class of groups. In this manner, the text corpus was systematically reduced to a few leaflets. The quotations here were selected and translated by the authors, from whom the leaflets are available on request.

show that frame bridging is done by the groups themselves and is not a construction we have created.

1. In their leaflet, the *peace groups* began with the arguments from the imperialism ideology and labeled the world economic order as unjust. The connecting formulation that brings together the ideology of imperialism and the group-specific frame is: "Peace and justice cannot be separated. Therefore, the peace movement has not only a moral obligation for intervention but, according to its own vital interest, must consider Third World problems as its own problems. Injustice leads to a global destabilization which finds its expression in wars." Here, the concept of injustice is the bridge establishing the connection between the peace frame and the imperialism ideology.

2. The *ecology groups* legitimated their participation in the campaign by focusing on one consequence of the activities of the IMF and World Bank. The World Bank and IMF finance large projects that lead to a destruction of the tropical rain forests—reason enough for these groups to feel themselves addressed and to participate. "The ecological consequences of the policy (of the IMF and World Bank) are alarming. Particularly the rapidly progressing destruction of the tropical rain forests, facilitated not least through large projects financed by the World Bank and the IMF, urgently demand a change in the previous foreign aid policy of the World Bank and the IMF." The emphasis on the ecological problems caused by the policies pursued by the IMF creates the link necessary to convince ecological groups and their adherents that they should participate in the campaign against the IMF and the World Bank.

3. The *women's groups* connected the imperialism ideology with a patriarchy frame. Women in both the First and Third World are affected by the capitalist world order. This connection is demonstrated in several points. Thus, the IMF's austerity policy leads to the impoverishment of the people in the Third World. "Women have to bear the primary burden of this situation: In the present system they have the main responsibility for their own immediate survival and that of their families, and have to compensate for deteriorating life conditions by performing additional work (both wage labor and unpaid reproductive work)." For many women, this means that they have to resort to prostitution in order to survive. The flip side of the impoverishment in the Third World is the wealth in the First World, which primarily benefits the men. Correspondingly, the men are also customers for "sex-tourism" in the Third World. With this interpretation of the problem, women's groups legitimated their own involvement as women's groups and, in addition, legitimated direct actions against several travel bureaus selling airline tickets to Thailand.

4. The *neighborhood groups* were also able to achieve a specific connection between the IMF campaign and their group-specific objectives. They anticipated that the local government would limit the freedom of citizens in Berlin in order to ensure a trouble-free congress: they expected traffic controls, a possible cordoning off of districts in the city, and interruptions in the subway. They were not willing to accept such limitations, especially not for a guest who—here was the starting point for the

imperialism ideology—was responsible for exploitation and misery in the Third World. "The Berlin Senate is assuming responsibility for the security of these ladies and gentlemen who are responsible for exploitation, the worldwide indebtedness crisis and hunger, terror and war. Kewenig's [the Minister for Interior Affairs at that time] proven security machinery will be unleashed on us so that they can make their arrangements without serious 'occupational accidents'. . . . We will have to pay for the security needs of the bankers with considerable restrictions."

5. The *unions* attempted to establish the bridge to the IMF issue by focusing on the impairment of worker interests. These interests are affected by the IMF policy in several ways: first, the austerity policy of the IMF leads to unemployment and low wages in the Third World countries and to the repression of the unions in these countries: "this causes the unemployment of thousands of people." Second, the policy of devaluing the currencies in the Third World weakens their import possibilities, which leads to production losses and increased unemployment in the First World: "lacking capacities for imports in developing countries . . . may cause a decrease of production in First World countries." Third, the indebtedness crisis is likely to induce a worldwide breakdown of the monetary system. This would also lead to considerable impoverishment in the industrialized countries, "thus causing social misery in broad strata of the industrialized countries and the emergence of political crises, as was the case in the world economy of the 1930s."

Each of the groups that participated in the mobilization could name reasons why they wanted to take part in the IMF campaign. They legitimated their involvement by semantically connecting group-specific interpretive frameworks with the IMF frame; they motivated their members and potential followers to participate in the campaign against the IMF and World Bank congress by using argumentative persuasion. The development of a homogeneous interpretative master frame which, at the same time, supplied connecting links for the integration of group-specific interpretative frameworks, was one of the preconditions for a broad integration of different groups within the leftist-alternative spectrum. The successful process of frame bridging by the micromobilization groups probably improved mobilization "at lower levels," namely that of individuals.

An additional favorable condition for the mobilization was that the frame bridging was not achieved for just any micromobilization groups, but for those groups and organizations that had already proved to be central for micromobilization processes. The choice of ecological problems, the specific discrimination against women, and the complex problems of weapons and peace as central topics meant that three semantic contexts were included that were issues of recently mobilized West German social movements whose concerns found a widespread public support (Pappi 1988). Picking unemployment and the reduction of social services as consequences of the imperialist world order and the enormous

expenditures for armaments creates the reference point for labor's classic cleavage with capital. Both mobilization processes were thus successful in creating a connection between the specific issue and the previously defined issues of existing protest actors. If a new issue can be connected with a legitimated value complex and established interest groups and movements, then the cultural resonance of the issue and, consequently, the mobilization power of the frame, will increase.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES

Various authors have emphasized the relevance of mediating structures for mobilization processes in protest campaigns. As a specification to the prevailing literature on mediating structures we have introduced the concept of mesomobilization and mesomobilization actors. We demonstrated its empirical relevance by investigating two protest campaigns, one directed against the visit of U.S. President Ronald Reagan and one directed against the conference of the World Bank and the IMF in Berlin. In both cases, the direct triggering occurrence was a nonobtrusive event. A state visit and a congress are actually "harmless" and short-lived events. They became highly controversial political issues only because they were symbolically loaded and consequently seen as problematic by many groups and individuals. In each case, more than 130 different groups were activated and ultimately supported mass demonstrations that attracted tens of thousands of people.

Mesomobilization was a crucial factor for the success of both campaigns, both in terms of activated groups and of mobilized individuals. First, mesomobilization actors succeeded in establishing an effective structure for organizationally integrating the wide array of micromobilization groups. Second, mesomobilization actors developed interpretative master frames with diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational elements that also allowed for linking group-specific concerns to the master frames. With respect to both dimensions we have developed some hypotheses as to which structural and cultural factors could account for a successful mesomobilization. To this extent we did not carry out an empirical test of an elaborated theoretical model, but have aimed at using empirical material to expand on theory and generate hypotheses.

In terms of mobilization, the outcome of the two campaigns was roughly the same. However, the amount of resources producing these protests varied significantly. More time and resources were invested in the organization of the anti-IMF campaign than in the anti-Reagan campaign. For example, we registered 475 preparatory meetings and actions for the anti-IMF campaign, whereas "only" 81 could be found for the anti-Reagan campaign. Moreover, in the first campaign, the mesomobili-

zation process was based on a more differentiated and professional structure. Finally, the framing of the IMF campaign was also more extensive in a number of respects. We speculate that the similar outcome of this differential investment in both campaigns has to do with the existence of more favorable conditions in the case of the anti-Reagan campaign. First, there had been similar large-scale campaigns against Reagan in the past. The previously established channels of communication were, therefore, easy to revitalize. Second, the perceived "evil" could be personalized with respect to one well-known representative from a country which, in the view of many activist groups, was the main risk for peace. A package of interpretations had already been developed (Gamson 1988). The IMF conference lacked these advantages, so more organizational and framing efforts were required to politicize it.

What conjectures can be drawn from these two case analyses for the future of mobilization processes? Several authors of political sociology have recently asserted that, at least in West Germany, the mobilization potential for unconventional political action at the individual level has increased during the last two decades. Fuchs (1990) concludes that the mobilization potential on the individual level, that is, the individual willingness to take part in unconventional protest activities, increased rapidly up until the mid-seventies, and has since remained at a relatively high level with only a slight increase.

Generalizing from the results of the two case studies we can speculate that, at least in Berlin, this latent protest potential will also transform itself into manifest protest participation in the future. A leftist-alternative infrastructure consisting of a multitude of micromobilization groups has emerged; they constitute a large mesomobilization potential. At the same time, an interconnected structure of mesomobilization actors has developed and become institutionalized. These actors have served as catalysts, translating the mesomobilization potential into actual participation on various occasions. Finally, a relatively uniform interpretative frame forms the cultural prerequisite for interpreting different but selected occasions and framing them as issues worth protesting.

Since the individual willingness to take part in political actions has increased, the intermediate structure for protest activities—micromobilization groups and mesomobilization actors—has been established, and a set of elaborated leftist master frames is available, we can expect that manifest protest participation will probably continue to occur in the future.[37] In the light of this, the large protest campaigns against the

[37] It has to be emphasized, however, that the recent developments in Germany and Europe may undermine these favorable protest conditions. Our analysis has demon-

engagement of the United States and its allies in the Gulf War are not surprising. In fact, many of the groups that initiated the protest events investigated in this study also played a crucial role in the anti-war protests in Berlin during January and February 1991.

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strated that the ideological superstructure of intermediate mobilization contexts relies heavily on "classic" leftist world views. The rapid decay of socialist societies in Eastern Europe may also cause these leftist ideologies to lose their credibility. In the terms of Snow and Benford (1992, p. 29), the prevailing "cultural climate" has changed, which has a negative impact on the mobilizing capacity of the leftist master frames.

We say no to Reagan's politics

President Reagan is coming to Berlin (West) for its 750th anniversary. He represents interests in the USA Which will stop at nothing in their efforts to make the USA the undisputed world and military power. Billions of dollars are being spent for continually new arms programs. New strategies for waging war are constantly being developed in the USA and in the NATO. Finally, the Reagan Administration is threatening all of humanity with its SDI plans.

Reagan is trying to bury the Soviet Union in the arms race, despite the fact that Gorbachev has made far-reaching disarmement proposals.

Kohl and Reagan have shown in the past that they want to jointly continue the disastrous "crusade against the East". We demand that the federal government takes seriously the demand that a war should never again be started from German territory and finally introduce concrete steps toward disarmament.

Arms do not only kill in war. The worldwide consequences stemming from the lunacy of the arms race can no longer be ignored. Poverty, reduction of social services, mass unemployment and impoverishment characterize the social climate. Women, more than half of humanity, are especially affected. Complete equality for women - for all people - cannot be achieved under these conditions. We say no to this type of politics and its consequences.

We demand:

- Disarmament in West and East!
- An immediate, sweeping atomic test ban treaty!
- The immediate removal of all medium range missiles in Europe!
- No militarization of outer space!

The Reagan Administration declared the entire third world to be its sphere of interest and plays "world policeman". For example: it bombed Libya using the bombing of the Berlin discothèque "La Belle" as an excuse. It shot up Beirut, got rid of the government in Grenada and mined the harbors in Nicaragua, openly supported the Contras, and supported the racist white government in South Africa for strategic reasons.

The countries of the "third world" are exploited and forced into submission with the help of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and rapid deployment forces. This forces millions of people to leave their homelands. We say no to this policy!

We demand:

Hands off Nicaragua, stop the US aggression in Central America!

No support for the Apartheid regime!

No weapons deliveries in the war on the Persian Gulf!

The cancellation of support agreements (WHNS) for intervention in the third world!!

A 750th anniversary celebration without Reagan is inconceivable for the Senate and that is in spite of the fact that they could see the extent to which his political position was rejected by the people of Berlin in 1982.

The social and political conflicts in this city, but also the political scandal of Reagan's Iran-Contra affair, are to be pushed aside in the course of the big celebration. The struggle for the 35-hour workweek, the mobilization against the removal of rent controls, the discussion over the national census and the reduction of democratic rights are on the agenda for 1987. We want to make this clear in the next few days.

We don't want this city to be used as a base for the "struggle agains evil", we don't want "cold war" slogans with nationalistic undertones to be broadcast from this city. Berlin (West) cannot fall back into the role of an "thorn in the flesh".

We want Berlin (West) to be:

- a city of peace and reduced tensions!
- a center of understanding and balance!
- an open city for the victims of War, exploitation and repression!

We want Berlin (West) to finally enter the worldwide city partnership with Hiroshima and Nagasaki to do away with all atomic weapons.

We are calling for a:

## Demonstration, Thursday June 11, 17:00

Meeting point: Wilmersdorfer Straße/corner of Kantstraße * concluding rally: Breitscheidplatz

Peace and Action Day, Friday June 12

in the city center

Fig. A1.—Leaflet protesting Reagan's visit (translation by Jeffrey Butler)

For the resolution of the debt crisis -

for a just world economic order

In September 1988, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank will hold their yearly meeting in Berlin(West). These two top institutions of the international financial system have a key responsibility in connection with the indebtedness crisis of the "third world" which has been worsening since 1982. Through their rigorous conditions and their so-called structural adjustment programs, the leading Western industrial countries are decisively responsible for the economic exploitation of the "third world", for the impoverishment of the people living there and for the brutal destruction of their natural prerequisites for living.

The present foreign debt of the "third world" amounts to the gigantic, prohibitive sum of 1,2 trillion US dollars. The interest and principal payment of these countries far exceed the influx of new capital in the meantime. The debtor countries must expend a larger and larger share of their export income to pay them back, less and less remains for meeting basic internal needs and making domestic investments.

usually deported to face exploitation, torture and death. The circle of impoverishment, underdevelopment and militarization is closed again. Even the people here do not remain unscathed: unemployment, new poverty and the cutback of social services are only other expressions of the same crisis which is driving the "third world" into ruin. We must find the way out. The disastrous development has to be stopped. The prevailing debt management by the IMF, the World Bank, commercial banks and Western governments with refinancing, new loans and case by case treatment does not provide a solution; on the contrary, it strengthens the dependence and intensifies the crisis.

There is no way out without writing off the debts. The burdens must be borne by those who are responsible for the situation. This requires, at the same time, a change in international relations and the balance of power. This is why the political and social movements who have to push through their interests against the power cartel of corporations, banks, the IMF, the World Bank and

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The causes for this situation are rooted above all in the existing world economic order which forces the countries in the "third world" to play a subordinate role tailored to the needs of the Western industrial countries.

Through a policy of granting initially cheap loans which changed the US high interest policy, the problem of indebtedness and unjust exchange relations was intensified. Each attempt at escaping from underdevelopment, dependence and misery is doomed to fail under these circumstances.

The economic ruin of the "third world" is linked with the dissolution of existing social relations, the destruction of cultural identity and especially affects the women, who have to bear the greatest burden of the devasted living and production structures.

Misery and want lead to societal disruptions. Dictatorship, regional conflicts and wars are the consequences. In many countries in the "third world", almost 2/3 of the national budgets are to purchase weapons and arm the police in the meantime. The weapons manufacturers in the first world earn money from this! More and more people are trying to escape this situation. The borders are closed to them here. As (economic) refugees they are repressed again and elites need our solidarity.

We support the demand of many countries in the "third world" to lay out the concrete conditions for the debt write-off in the framework of an international debt conference with the equal participation of all countries. The debt payments should be suspended until the negotiations are concluded.

A debt write-off alone will not be able to solve the problems in the long run. As long as the relations between the the peoples of the world are regulated by the "free" world market and the principle of te largest possible profit determines political and economic behavior, then the chain of economical crises with their devasting effects will not be broken off.

Resources and finances are tied up world-wide through military armament, both in the "first world" and in the countries of the "third world". We demand concrete arms control and steps toward disarmament. They must be linked with the goal of placing the resources thus freed up at the disposal of the countries in the "third world" for their development.

Disarmament and development must be directly connected.

The establishment of a new, just world economic order is unavoidable.

To mark the yearly meeting of the IMF and the World Bank we are calling for a demonstration and rally on the 25th of September 1988 in Berlin (West)!

11:00, Joachimstaler Straße / corner of Kurfürstendamm

SOLIDARITY WITH THE PEOPLES OF THE "THIRD WORLD"

Fig. B1.—Leaflet protesting the 1988 yearly meeting of the IMF and the World Bank (translation by Jeffrey Butler)

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