

Call for Paper Proposals – *Varieties of Punishment*

Since the end of the Cold War, regional organizations across the globe have increasingly committed to promoting democracy, security, and human rights in their constituencies (e.g. Pevehouse 2002; 2005; 2016; Börzel and Stapel 2015; Fawcett 2004). The spread of regional sanctions (i.e. suspension of membership, economic and targeted measures) has created an unprecedented political mandate for regional organizations in precisely these domains (Closa 2013; von Borzyskowski & Portela 2016). Examples of regional organizations that have used sanctions against members during the 2000s are the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Organization of American States (OAS), the Common Market of the South (Mercosur), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the Council of Europe, the Commonwealth of Nations, and the League of Arab States. This trend towards regional sanctioning disrupts the legacy of negative regionalism, where the main task of the collective was to preserve the sovereignty of the individual units (Hellquist 2015).

However, if a 'global script' of RO-driven norm promotion is in the making, it has 'regional colors' (Börzel and Stapel 2015). Regional organizations display considerable variation in their approaches to sanctions (see Hellquist 2014; Coe 2015). Not only do ROs that are active as senders of sanctions differ in procedure and policy content; some organizations have not joined the trend. For instance, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has deliberately opted against any formalized sanctions mechanism, and the European Union (EU) – uniquely active as a sender of foreign policy sanctions – has never used its internal sanctions provision.

To judge the transformative potential of regional governance for international politics, explaining the increased activity of regional organizations in the field of sanctions is essential. To judge the potential impact of regional governance on domestic politics, explaining the idiosyncrasies displayed across the globe is equally indispensable.

The workshop welcomes paper proposals dealing with any of the following three avenues for enquiries into regional sanctions policies. The corresponding sets of possible research questions are by no means exhaustive, and authors are invited to propose papers with alternative perspectives on the topic.

(i) The Impact of Regional Organizations on Sanctions

The implications of regional sanctions for domestic, regional and global order are closely linked to their perceived legitimacy. We know that foreign policy sanctions are routinely dismissed by targets as illegal and immoral interference in domestic affairs. This legitimacy deficit boils down to a rejection of being made subject to punitive actions from 'the outside' (classical sovereignty-argument). Regional sanctions, on the contrary, are contractual (members have voluntarily agreed to a set of rules) and claim to be imposed from within a normative community ('the region'). Even if a target will still not welcome being punished, these factors might make delegitimation more difficult and improve the chances of a constructive resolution of the situation leading to sanctions.

To empirically substantiate or reject these theoretical possibilities, the workshop encourages paper proposals dealing with questions of the following kind:

- *How do regional organizations justify their use of sanctions, and on which terms are their justifications contested?*
- *Which strategies of delegitimation do targets of regional sanctions employ?*
- *In what ways do the rationales and effects of regional sanctions differ from foreign policy sanctions?*

(ii) The Impact of Sanctions on Regional Organizations

Furthermore, the use of the politically high-profile instrument of sanctions is a litmus test for acceptance of a RO's authority. Sanctions constitute a far-reaching open and formal means of interference in the domestic affairs of members. Endorsement, or at least tolerance, of regional action through sanctions in situations that have traditionally been seen as core areas of national sovereignty could therefore be seen to indicate recognition of the RO's authority. Acceptance of authority is an issue also vis-à-vis other actors on the sanctions scene. Whether regional organizations have a right to take 'enforcement measures' on their own was one of the foundational debates of the United Nations (Doxey 1980; Bebr 1955; Wilcox 1965), and the status of regional sanctions remains highly contested within international law (White and Abass 2010).

Analyzing sanctions as an arena where regional authority is questioned or boosted will speak to the rapidly evolving scholarship on legitimacy in global governance (e.g. Steffek 2004; Risse 2004; Zürn 2004; Buchanan and Keohane 2006; Mulligan 2006; Agné, Dellmuth, and Tallberg 2015). Authors interested in contributing in this direction could take inspiration from questions such as:

- *Under which conditions are regional sanctions provisions considered legitimate by governments, civil society, and external actors?*
- *What is the relationship between current approaches to sanctions and historical experiences of sanctions in the region?*
- *How do different regional identities facilitate or obstruct the formation of regional sanctions policies?*

(iii) Unpacking the Region

A final set of questions pushes the critical assessment of regional sanctions further. Despite being conventionally phrased as means to promote or protect norms of democracy, human rights, and security, in practice regional sanctions are not always at the service of liberal values. On the contrary, they are sometimes used to promote regime stability and often reflect power-struggles between illiberal countries. This can be related to the basic circumstance that in regional cooperation "governments are both rule-makers and enforcers" (Closa and Palestini Céspedes 2015), and might themselves fear to be hit by sanctions one day. Although allegedly imposed to promote or protect collectively agreed norms, regional sanctions may not be truly 'regional', but rather the outcome of simple power politics between member states or regional institutions. To take this possibility seriously, it is necessary to 'unpack' the regional level and consider its building blocks. Papers wishing to do so may address questions such as:

- *How do regional sanctions represent, reproduce and modify power struggles in the region and beyond?*
- *Which and whose values and interests are promoted by regional sanctions in theory and practice?*
- *How can patterns of member state loyalty and dissent with regional sanctions regimes be explained?*

With regards to the three sets of questions outlined above, we welcome studies that have any of the following comparative angles:

- *Interregional comparison*
Comparing the sanctions policies of organizations located in different regions at the level of doctrine and practice.
- *Intraregional comparison*
Comparing the sanctions policies of organizations located in the same region at the level of doctrine and practice (e.g. 'overlapping regionalism').

- *International – regional comparison*
Comparing regional sanctions to UN sanctions or foreign policy sanctions of external actors.
- *Diachronic comparison*
Comparing the sanctions policies of regional organization(s) over time, including formative experiences of sanctions at the early stage of regional cooperation.
- *Policy comparison*
Comparing regional sanctions with other instruments of pressure (naming/shaming, diplomacy, legal action/ICC, military intervention).
- *Case comparison*
Comparing cases where sanctions were imposed with similar cases where sanctions were not imposed.

The workshop aims to initiate a mutually constructive conversation between sanctions scholars with an interest in ROs as emerging senders of sanctions, and researchers of comparative regionalism with an interest in sanctions. In addition, the workshop can be of interest for area specialists and researchers of international and regional organizations. Especially since this is an early emerging field of research, the workshop encourages analytical and methodological eclecticism.

Please submit your abstract of no more than 250 words by **19 December 2016**, to elin.hellquist@fu-berlin.de. Successful applicants will be informed by **9 January 2017**. The deadline for circulation of full papers will be **22 March 2017**. The KFG “The Transformative Power of Europe” will cover accommodation and travel expenses for invited presenters.

Childcare will be offered to workshop participants. If you would like to make use of this service, please let us know upon submitting your abstract.

Any questions can be directed at elin.hellquist@fu-berlin.de

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