

Tobias Hofmann

Class

Office hours

Ihnestr. 22, #105


Wednesdays, 4:00-6:00 pm

Wednesdays, 2:00-4:00 pm

atasp@fu-berlin.de

Cisco Webex Meetings

By appointment



This course introduces you to quantitative research in international relations (IR). It provides you with a better understanding of classic as well as more recent statistical, large-n studies on such topics as peace and conflict, international trade, investment, and monetary relations, and the design and effectiveness of international institutions in protecting human rights and the environment.

Focusing on a narrow set of substantive topics, the course does not only offer you the opportunity to deepen your knowledge of the scientific study of international politics, but to develop general analytical skills that have wide applicability in all of the social sciences. Going beyond reading and evaluating academic literature, the aim is for you to be able to reproduce published work and to actively contribute and improve on existing IR research using appropriate quantitative methods.

While there are no formal prerequisites for this course, you are assumed to have mastered the material covered by the *Einführung in die internationalen Beziehungen*, and a background in statistics and/or prior experience with statistical software (e.g., Stata, R) would be beneficial.

Assignments and Grading

To receive a *Teilnahmeschein* or graded *Leistungsschein*, you are required to complete the following assignments:

(1) *Active and informed participation*

Active and informed participation consists of attending our class meetings prepared with readings completed, asking relevant questions as they arrive, volunteering focused answers that demonstrate knowledge of the readings, and participating in virtual classroom discussions.

- a. Attendance: As active class participation without attending the class meetings is impossible, you are expected to attend.
- b. Readings: Since they serve as the basis for discussion, all reading assignments must be completed prior to class. I encourage you to have the assigned readings accessible

during class meetings so that you can point us to specific pages that back your claims. In addition to the assigned readings, you are expected to keep up with current international affairs by reading major daily newspapers (e.g., New York Times, Süddeutsche Zeitung) or weekly magazines (e.g., Economist, Spiegel) and accessing reputable internet news sources (e.g., BBC News, Deutsche Welle, Council on Foreign Relations) and blogs on a regular basis.

- c. Discussion questions: Starting in week 5, you are required to post two questions about the assigned readings for general class discussion on Blackboard (almost) every week.

(2) **Presentations**

Depending on whether you are interested in a *Teilnahmeschein* or *Leistungsschein*, you will give one or two types of presentations.

- a. Discussion leader: This presentation (approx. 35 minutes *with interruptions*) focuses on an assigned reading and serves as the starting point for discussion. Presenters should outline the authors' theoretical arguments, critically discuss their research design and methods, identify potential problems and flaws in their empirical analyses, and address the broader issues, themes, and questions underlying the assigned reading. Prior to the presentation and in addition to any slides they may use, presenters must submit concise memos (approx. 500 words) that summarize the presented reading and include a short list of recently published work that addresses similar research questions.
- b. Replication: This presentation (approx. 10 minutes) focuses on (the draft of) your replication paper, highlighting your preliminary findings, discussing the difficulties that you have encountered, and presenting the Stata or R code you wrote as part of your replication efforts.

(3) **Replication paper** (*Leistungsschein students only*)

For this assignment, you replicate the main empirical findings (tables and graphs) of a quantitative academic journal article, diagnose its shortcomings, and improve on it by adding your own 'twist' to the analysis. In addition to your paper (approx. 3,500 words), you have to submit your replication data and a detailed Stata do-file or R script that allows for the replication of all the tables, graphs, and other findings presented in your paper. A selection of possible articles for replication will be provided, but you may pick any research article published in a leading academic journal as long as you discuss your choice and the feasibility of your replication with me on Wednesday, January 5, 2022. **Deadline:** Thursday, March 31, 2022, 11:59 pm.

Your eligibility for a *Teilnahmeschein* or the grade of your *Leistungsschein* are determined using the following formulas:

$$\text{Teilnahmeschein only if } [.2 (\text{participation}) + .2 (\text{presentation})] * 2.5 \\ \geq \text{ausreichend}$$

$$\text{Leistungsschein grade} \\ = .2 (\text{participation}) + .3 (\text{presentations}) + .5 (\text{replication paper})$$

Assignments are graded in accordance with the following grading scale:

Sehr gut		1.0 = 93.8-100%	1.3 = 87.5-93.7%
Gut	1.7 = 83.3-87.4%	2.0 = 79.2-83.2%	2.3 = 75.0-79.1%
Befriedigend	2.7 = 70.8-74.9%	3.0 = 66.7-70.7%	3.3 = 62.5-66.6%
Ausreichend	3.7 = 56.3-62.4%	4.0 = 50.0-56.2%	
Nicht bestanden		5.0 = 0-49.9%	

General guidelines:

- (1) All your written assignments (i.e., memos, replication paper) must be submitted on Blackboard.
- (2) Your written assignments should have a cover page with your full name or student ID, e-mail address, and a word count. Make sure to also insert page numbers and your full name or student ID on every page.
- (3) While there are no firm word limits, your actual word count should be between 80% and 120% of the suggested number. If you write substantially more, you should ask yourself whether it really conveys your points as clearly and concisely as possible. If your written assignment is considerably shorter, it is unlikely that it includes all the necessary features.
- (4) Late assignments will be penalized one grade (e.g., from a *gut* to a *befriedigend*) for each week or fraction of a week late. If you think that you are eligible to submit an assignment late, contact me as soon as possible.

Other Policies and Rules

Students with disabilities: If you require special accommodations to meet the expectations of this course, please bring this to my attention as soon as possible, and I will work with you to make arrangements in accordance with the provisions of the *Berliner Hochschulgesetz*, sections 4(7), 9(2), and 31(3).

Academic honesty: Violations of good scientific practice are dealt with consistent with the guidelines of Free University of Berlin's *Rahmenstudien- und Prüfungsordnung*, section 19(3). Other repercussions aside, you will not receive a *Teilnahmeschein* or *Leistungsschein* if you commit plagiarism and give or receive unauthorized assistance.

Academic dishonesty cheats both you and others in class. If you feel that you are struggling, do not fall prey to the temptation of cheating. I respect and reward honesty and a student's willingness to work. Contact me, and we can try to improve your performance.

Courtesy: Common courtesy is necessary to ensure that all students have the opportunity to learn without distractions. Please join our meetings on time, do not read newspapers, e-mail, or update your social media profiles during class, etc. While class discussions are supposed to stimulate heated debate, all discussions must be scholarly, i.e., respectful of diverse opinions, related to and based on course materials, and free of abuse.

Last, but not least: If you do not understand something, ask! By the way, professors are sometimes wrong, but always pleasantly impressed when students point out their mistakes.

Readings

You do not need to buy any books for this course. All of the assigned readings are available at the library, online, or can be downloaded from Blackboard. Blackboard is also where I post announcements, reminders, slides, and additional course materials.

If you want a broader or textbook-style overview of international relations, feel that you need a general refresher on research methods or an introduction to statistics/econometrics and statistical software, or look for a quick guide on how to improve your academic writing skills, I suggest that you take a look at the following books:

International relations: Carlsnaes, Walter E., Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons. 2013. *Handbook of International Relations*. 2nd edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Frieden, Jeffrey A., David A. Lake, and Kenneth A. Schultz. 2021. *World Politics: Interests, Interactions, Institutions*. 5th edition. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company.

Lake, David A., and Robert Powell. *Strategic Choice and International Relations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Research methods: Creswell, John W., and J. David Creswell. 2018. *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*. 5th edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Kellstedt, Paul M., and Guy D. Whitten. 2018. *The Fundamentals of Political Science Research*. 3rd edition. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Statistics/econometrics: Angrist, Joshua D., and Jörn-Steffen Pischke. 2009. *Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Freedman, David, Robert Pisani, and Roger Purves. 2007. *Statistics*. 4th edition. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company.

Kennedy, Peter. 2008. *A Guide to Econometrics*. 6th edition. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Software: Imai, Kosuke, and Lori D. Bougher. 2021. *Quantitative Social Science: An Introduction in Stata*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kreuter, Frauke, and Ulrich Kohler. 2012. *Data Analysis Using Stata*. 3rd edition. College Station, TX: Stata Press.

Monogan III, James E. 2015. *Political Analysis Using R*. New York, NY: Springer International Publishing.

Writing: McCloskey, Deirdre N. 2019. *Economical Writing*. 3rd edition. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Turabian, Kate L. 2018. *A Manual for Writers of Research Papers, Theses, and Dissertations*. 9th edition. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Course Calendar

Dates	Topics	Readings ¹
October 20	Course overview	Syllabus Chan 2002 <i>Bueno de Mesquita 2002</i> <i>Maliniak et al. 2011</i>
Foundations		
October 27	<i>Einführung in die internationalen Beziehungen</i> refresher	Frieden & Lake 2005 Snyder 2004 <i>Powell 1994</i> <i>Singer 1961</i>
November 3	<i>Methoden der Politikwissenschaft</i> refresher	Bennett 2004 Kellstedt & Whitten 2018 (chapters 1-4) <i>King et al. 1994 (chapters 1-3, 6)</i> <i>Mahoney & Goertz 2006</i>
November 10	<i>Methoden der Datenanalyse</i> refresher I (descriptive statistics)	Acock 2018 (chapters 1-5) Kellstedt & Whitten 2018 (chapters 5 & 6) <i>Mitchell 2004 (chapters 1, 2, & 9)</i> <i>Freedman et al. 2007 (chapters 3-7)</i>
November 17	<i>Methoden der Datenanalyse</i> refresher II (inferential statistics)	Acock 2018 (chapters 6, 8, & 10) Braumoeller & Sartori 2004 <i>Kellstedt & Whitten 2018 (chapters 7-12)</i> <i>Lewis-Beck 1980</i>
Security Studies		
November 24	Interstate war	Gartzke 1999 Hegre 2008 <i>Bennett & Stam 2000</i> <i>Bremer 1992</i>

¹ While the readings in *italics* are optional, you are strongly encouraged to read at least one of these optional readings per week.

Dates	Topics	Readings
December 1	Democratic peace	Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999 Russett et al. 1998 <i>Gartzke 2007</i> <i>Partell & Palmer 1999</i>
December 8	Civil war & peacekeeping	Fortna 2004 Heger & Salehyan 2007 <i>Collier & Hoeffler 2004</i> <i>Fearon & Laitin 2003</i>
	International Political Economy	
December 15	Trade	Kono 2006 Mayda & Rodrik 2005 <i>Ehrlich 2007</i> <i>Morrow et al. 1998</i>
January 5	Replication paper consultations	Janz 2015 <i>King 1995</i>
January 12	Preferential trade agreements & the World Trade Organization	Gowa & Kim 2005 Mansfield et al. 2008 <i>Mansfield & Reinhardt 2003</i> <i>Bush & Pelc 2014</i>
January 19	International investment & finance	Elkins et al. 2006 Leblang 2010 <i>Bütke & Milner 2008</i> <i>Jensen 2003</i>
January 26	International monetary relations & exchange rates	Bernhard & Leblang 1999 Singer 2010 <i>Leblang 2003</i> <i>Coplovitch & Pevehouse 2010</i>
February 2	Development & aid	Bearce & Tirone 2010 Dreher et al. 2009 <i>Schneider & Tobin 2010</i> <i>Stone 2004</i>

Dates	Topics	Readings
	Transnational Politics	
February 9	Human rights & the global environment	Bayer & Urpelainen 2016 Hafner-Burton 2005 <i>Bernauer et al. 2010</i> <i>Hollyer & Rosendorff 2011</i>
February 16	Draft replication paper presentations	Achen 2002 Kennedy 2002 <i>King 1986</i> <i>Schrodt 2014</i>
	Wrap-up & review	
March 31	Deadline: Replication paper	

References

Course overview

- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 2002. Domestic Politics and International Relations. *International Studies Quarterly* 46: 1-9.
- Chan, Steve. 2002. On Different Types of International Relations Scholarship. *Journal of Peace Research* 39: 747-756.
- Maliniak, Daniel, Amy Oakes, Susan Peterson, and Michael J. Tierney. 2011. International Relations in the US Academy. *International Studies Quarterly* 55: 437-464.

Suggested:

- Colgan, Jeff D. 2016. Where Is International Relations Going? Evidence from Graduate Training. *International Studies Quarterly*.
- Smith, Ron. P. 1998. Quantitative Methods in Peace Research. *Journal of Peace Research* 35: 419-427.

Einführung in die internationalen Beziehungen refresher

- Frieden, Jeffrey A., and David A. Lake. 2005. International Relations as a Social Science: Rigor and Relevance. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 600: 136-156.
- Powell, Robert. 1994. Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate. *International Organization* 48: 313-44.

Singer, J. David. 1961. The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations. *World Politics* 14: 77-92.

Snyder, Jack. 2004. *One World, Rival Theories*. *Foreign Policy* 145: 53-62.

Suggested:

Axelrod, Robert, and Robert O. Keohane. 1985. Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions. *World Politics* 38: 226-254.

Lake, David A. 2013. Theory Is Dead, Long Live Theory: The End of the Great Debates and the Rise of Eclecticism in International Relations. *European Journal of International Relations* 19: 567-587.

Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York, NY: W.W. Norton.

Morgenthau, Hans Joachim, Kenneth W. Thompson, and David Clinton. 2006. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1990. Nuclear Myths and Political Realities. *American Political Science Review* 84: 731-745.

———. 1964. The Stability of a Bipolar World. *Daedalus* 93: 881-909.

Wendt, Alexander. 1992. Anarchy Is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics. *International Organization* 46: 391-425.

Methoden der Politikwissenschaft *refresher*

Bennett, Andrew. 2004. Case Study Methods: Design, Use, and Comparative Advantages. In: Sprinz, Detlef F., and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias (eds.). *Models, Numbers, and Cases: Methods for Studying International Relations*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Kellstedt, Paul M., and Guy D. Whitten. 2018. *The Fundamentals of Political Science Research*. 3rd edition. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Mahoney, James, and Gary Goertz. 2006. A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research. *Political Analysis* 14: 227-249.

Suggested:

Beck, Neal, Gary King and Langche Zeng. 2000. Improving Quantitative Studies of International Conflict: A Conjecture. *American Political Science Review* 94: 21-35.

Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., Henry E. Brady, and David Collier. 2008. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Collier, David, David A. Freedman, James D. Fearon, David D. Laitin, John Gerring, and Gary Goertz. 2008. Symposium: Case Selection, Case Studies, and Causal Inference. *Qualitative & Multi-Method Research* 6: 2-16.

- Fearon, James D. 1991. Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science. *World Politics* 43: 169-195.
- George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Science*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Jervis, Robert. 1990. Models and Cases in the Study of International Conflict. *Journal of International Affairs* 44: 81-102.
- Lieberson, Stanley. 1991. Small N's and Big Conclusions: An Examination of the Reasoning in Comparative Studies Based on a Small Number of Cases. *Social Forces* 70: 307-320.
- Most, Benjamin A., and Harvey Starr. 2003. Basic Logic and Research Design: Conceptualization, Case Selection, and the Form of Relationships. In: Goertz, Gary, and Harvey Starr (eds.). *Necessary Conditions. Theory, Methodology, and Applications*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Snidal, Duncan. 1985. The Game Theory of International Politics. *World Politics* 38: 25-57.

Methoden der Datenanalyse *refresher*

- Acock, Alan C. 2018. *A Gentle Introduction to Stata*. 6th edition. College Station, TX: Stata Press.
- Braumoeller, Bear. F., and Anne E. Sartori. 2004. The Promise and Perils of Statistics in International Relations. In: Sprinz, Detlef F., and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias (eds.). *Models, Numbers, and Cases: Methods for Studying International Relations*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Freedman, David, Robert Pisani, and Roger Purves. 2007. *Statistics*. 4th edition. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Kellstedt, Paul M., and Guy D. Whitten. 2018. *The Fundamentals of Political Science Research*. 3rd edition. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Lewis-Beck, Michael S. 1980. *Applied Regression: An Introduction*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Mitchell, Michael N. 2012. *Visual Guide to Stata Graphics*. 3rd edition. College Station, TX: Stata Press.
- Suggested:
- Agresti, Alan, and Barbara Finlay. 2008. *Statistical Methods for the Social Sciences*. 4th edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Cox, Nicholas J., and H. Joseph Newton. 2017. *One Hundred Nineteen Stata Tips*. 3rd edition. College Station, TX: Stata Press.
- Galderisi, Peter. 2015. *Understanding Political Science Statistics: Observations and Expectations in Political Science*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Gujarati, Damodar N. 2003. *Basic Econometrics*. 4th edition. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Hamilton, Lawrence C. 2012. *Statistics with Stata*. 8th edition. Boston, MA: Cengage Learning.

- Kam, Cindy D., and Robert J. Franzese. 2007. *Modeling and Interpreting Interactive Hypotheses in Regression Analysis*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Lewis-Beck, Michael S. 1995. *Data Analysis: An Introduction*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Tufte, Edward R. 1974. *Data Analysis for Politics and Policy*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2016. *Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach*. 6th edition. Boston, MA: Cengage Learning.

Interstate war

- Bennett, D. Scott, and Allan C. Stam. 2000. Research Design and Estimator Choices in the Analysis of Interstate Dyads. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44: 653-685.
- Bremer, Stuart A. 1992. Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36: 309-341.
- Gartzke, Erik. 1999. War Is in the Error Term. *International Organization* 53: 567-587.
- Hegre, Håvard. 2008. Gravitating toward War: Preponderance May Pacify, but Power Kills. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52: 566-589.

Suggested:

- Christensen, Thomas J., and Jack Snyder. 1990. Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity. *International Organization* 44: 137-168.
- Fearon, James D. 1995. Rationalist Explanations of War. *International Organization* 49: 379-414.
- Filson, Darren, and Suzanne Werner. 2002. A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War. *American Journal of Political Science* 46: 819-838.
- Jones, Daniel M., Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer. 1996. Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 15: 163-213.
- Kimball, Anessa L. 2006. Alliance Formation and Conflict Initiation: The Missing Link. *Journal of Peace Research* 43: 371-389.
- Levy, Jack S. 1987. Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War. *World Politics* 40: 82-107.
- Maoz, Zeev. 1990. Framing the National Interest: The Manipulation of Foreign Policy Decisions in Group Settings. *World Politics* 43: 77-110.
- Reiter, Dan. 1995. Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars almost never Happen. *International Security* 20: 5-34.
- Schelling, Thomas. 1966. *Arms and influence*. New York, NY: Yale University Press.
- Starr, Harvey. 2005. Territory, Proximity, and Spatiality: The Geography of International Conflict. *International Studies Review* 7: 387-406.

Democratic peace

- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. 1999. An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace. *American Political Science Review* 93: 791-807.
- Gartzke, Erik. 2007. The Capitalist Peace. *American Journal of Political Science* 51:166-191.
- Partell, Peter J., and Glenn Palmer. 1999. Audience Costs and Interstate Crises: An Empirical Assessment of Fearon's Model of Dispute Outcomes. *International Studies Quarterly* 43: 389-405.
- Russett, Bruce, John R. Oneal, and David R. Davis. 1998. The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 1950-85. *International Organization* 52: 441-467.
- Suggested:
- Barbieri, Katherine. 1996. Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict? *Journal of Peace Research* 33: 29-49.
- , and Jack S. Levy. 1999. Sleeping with the Enemy: The Impact of War on Trade. *Journal of Peace Research* 36: 463-479.
- Boehmer, Charles, Erik Gartzke, and Timothy Nordstrom. 2004. Do International Organizations Promote Peace? *World Politics* 57: 1-38.
- Bussmann, Margit. 2010. Foreign Direct Investment and Militarized International Conflict. *Journal of Peace Research* 47: 143-153.
- Cederman, Lars-Erik. 2001. Back to Kant: Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace as a Macrohistorical Learning Process. *American Political Science Review* 95: 15-31.
- Gartzke, Erik. 1998. Kant We All Just get Along? Opportunity, Willingness, and the Origins of the Democratic Peace. *American Journal of Political Science* 42: 1-27.
- . 2001. Democracy and the Preparation for War: Does Regime Type Affect States' Anticipation of Casualties? *International Studies Quarterly* 45: 467-484.
- , and Quan Li. 2003. War, Peace, and the Invisible Hand: Positive Political Externalities of Economic Globalization. *International Studies Quarterly* 47: 561-586.
- Gelpi, Christopher. 1997. Democratic Diversions: Governmental Structure and the Externalization of Domestic Conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41: 255-282.
- Hegre, Håvard. 2000. Development and the Liberal Peace: What Does it Take to be a Trading State? *Journal of Peace Research* 37: 5-30.
- Lake, David A. 1992. Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War. *American Political Science Review* 86: 24-37.
- McLaughlin Mitchell, and Brandon C. Prins. 1999. Beyond Territorial Contiguity: Issues at Stake in Democratic Militarized Interstate Disputes. *International Studies Quarterly* 43: 169-183.

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- Maoz, Zeev, and Bruce Russett. 1993. Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986. *American Political Science Review* 87: 624-638.
- Prins, Brandon C., and Christopher Sprecher. 1999. Institutional Constraints, Political Opposition, and Interstate Dispute Escalation: Evidence from Parliamentary Systems, 1946-89. *Journal of Peace Research* 36: 271-287.
- Reiter, Dan, and Allan C. Stam III. 1998. Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42: 259-277.

Civil war & peacekeeping

- Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. *Oxford Economic Papers* 56: 563-595.
- Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 2003. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. *American Political Science Review* 97: 75-90.
- Fortna, Virginia P. 2004. Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War. *International Studies Quarterly* 48: 269-292.
- Heger, Lindsay, and Idean Salehyan. 2007. Ruthless Rulers: Coalition Size and the Severity of Civil Conflict. *International Studies Quarterly* 51: 385-403.

Suggested:

- Basedau, Matthias, and Jann Lay. 2009. Resource Curse or Rentier Peace? The Ambiguous Effects of Oil Wealth and Oil Dependence on Violent Conflict. *Journal of Peace Research* 46: 757-776.
- Buhaug, Halvard, and Scott Gates. 2002. The Geography of Civil War. *Journal of Peace Research* 39: 417-433.
- Bussmann, Margit, and Gerald Schneider. 2007. When Globalization Discontent Turns Violent: Foreign Economic Liberalization and Internal War. *International Studies Quarterly* 51: 79-97.
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- , Thomas Jackson, and Christin Ormhaug. 2009. Does Globalization Profit the Small Arms Bazaar? *International Interactions* 35: 86-105.
- Doyle, Michael W., and Nicholas Sambanis. 2000. International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis. *American Political Science Review* 94: 779-801.
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- Flores, Thomas E., and Irfan Nooruddin. 2009. Financing the Peace: Evaluating World Bank Post-conflict Assistance Programs. *Review of International Organizations* 4: 1-27.
- Gilligan, Michael J., and Ernest J. Sergenti. 2008. Do UN Interventions Cause Peace? Using Matching to Improve Causal Inference. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3: 89-122.
- Gilligan, Michael J., and Stephen J. Stedman. 2003. Where Do the Peacekeepers Go? *International Studies Review* 5: 37-54.
- Hartzell, Caroline, and Matthew Hoddie. 2003. Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management. *American Journal of Political Science* 47: 318-332.
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- Salehyan, Idean, and Kristian S. Gleditsch. 2002. Refugees and the Spread of Civil War. *International Organization* 60: 335-366.
- Sambanis, Nicholas. 2002. A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative Literature on Civil War. *Defence and Peace Economics* 13: 215-243.
- Stephenn, Nathalie, Clementine Burnley, and Daniele Ehrlich. 2009. Analyzing Spatial Drivers in Quantitative Conflict Studies: The Potential and Challenges of Geographic Information Systems. *International Studies Review* 11: 502-522.
- Vreeland, James R. 2008. The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War. Unpacking Anocracy. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52: 401-425.
- Walter, Barbara F. 2004. Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War. *Journal of Peace Research* 41: 371-388.

Replication paper consultations

- King, Gary. 1995. Replication, Replication. *PS: Political Science and Politics* 28: 444-452.
- Janz, Nicole. 2015. Bringing the Gold Standard into the Classroom: Replication in University Teaching. *International Studies Perspectives* 17: 1-16.

Trade

- Ehrlich, Sean D. 2007. Access to Protection: Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy in Democracies. *International Organization* 61: 571-605.

Kono, Daniel Y. 2006. Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency. *American Political Science Review* 100: 369-384.

Mayda, Anna and Dani Rodrik. 2005. Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist Than Others? *European Economic Review* 49: 1393-1430.

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This syllabus is tentative and subject to change at the discretion of the instructor!

Version: October 8, 2021

Statement of Understanding

After reading this syllabus, you should be in no doubt about class policies and assignments. If you have any remaining questions, I strongly encourage you to contact me as soon as possible.

Please sign the below statement, scan it, and upload it on Blackboard by Friday, December 17, 2021, 11:59 pm.



I certify that I have carefully read the syllabus for *Proseminar 15135: Quantitative Approaches to International Relations (METH)* in its entirety and fully understand its contents.

I intend to complete the assignments for a *Teilnahmeschein* / *Leistungsschein* .

Name

Student ID

Signature

Date