



EUNPACK

A CONFLICT SENSITIVE UNPACKING OF
THE EU COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
TO CONFLICT AND CRISES MECHANISM

The European Union's Crisis Response in the Extended Neighbourhood

The EU's Output Effectiveness in the Case of Mali

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1 Conflicts & Crisis in the EU’s extended neighbourhood, EU engagement and other international actors activities: The cases of Afghanistan, Iraq and Mali in comparative perspective



A well-founded analysis of the EU’s effectiveness in conflict and crisis management in its extended neighbourhood requires a concise sketch of the context of EU engagement by addressing a) the origins and evolution of conflict and crisis (sub-section 1.1), b) the involvement of international actors other than the EU that is non-EU states (e.g. the United States, Turkey, Iran) or international organisations (e.g. the United Nations, the World Bank; in sub-section 1.2), and c) an overview of EU engagement and its variety of policies in each of the cases, i.e. Afghanistan, Iraq and Mali. The latter will provide the respective ‘universe of possible cases(-in-case)’ and a reasoned choice for the following in-depth analysis of the features of EU crisis response across cases in section 2, and a systematic evaluation of EU crisis response policy in its output-dimension in section 3. Moreover, this will facilitate a systematic comparison across cases by identifying commonalities and differences in EU crisis response.²

² Please note: according to the overall research design of the Horizon 2020 EUNPACK research project, the outcome and impact evaluations for the individual cases will follow in deliverable 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4.

1.1 The Evolution of Conflicts and Crisis in Mali 2012-2016

EU engagement in Mali after the 2012 threefold crisis of Tuareg rebellion, Islamist takeover and military coup has first and foremost focused on Mali's weak governance structures, in particular what regards the fragility, credibility and lack of transparency of the country's institutions.³ Later, this picture was amplified by taking into account the severe situation that evolved around the unfolding food and nutrition crisis which affected the whole Sahel region and was considered to further aggravate the state of security in Mali.⁴ However, the substance of the conflict is not limited to the actors and events of 2012 but comprises a multiplicity of agents and interests, most of which can be traced back to the colonial history of the country. When on 4 January 2012, the National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA) launched its uprising, this was by far not the first of its kind. With *Alfellaga* 1963-1964 and *Al-Jebha* 1990-1996, Mali had already seen two Tuareg rebellions since the country's independence in 1960, both of them aiming at the creation of an independent Tamasheq state.⁵ Yet, the most recent events revealed characteristics that distinguish it dramatically from its precursors. With the beginning of the 2000s, Mali received growing international attention due to several factors: the north of the country, particularly the region around the city of Kidal became more and more a global junction for migrant routes to Libya and Europe, for goods smuggling and drug trafficking and for the establishment of Islamic networks (such as the peaceful Muslim movement Tablighi Jamaat but also the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat).⁶ At the same time and despite the efforts taken during a DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration) programme after the second rebellion in the 1990s, the possession of firearms was widespread and had become an integral part of every day life in the northern regions.⁷ Thus, the 2012 crisis had not only gained an unforeseen religious dimension but has been increasingly regarded not only as a regional but also as a broader, international threat which provoked unprecedented international engagement.

What was probably most striking about the events of 2012 was the ease and speed with which both, the military coup in the south and the Islamist takeover in the north, took place. By revealing Mali's porous state structures and the deep tensions that underlie the inherent fragmentation of the country, these events dissolved the international notion of Mali being a beacon for democracy and stability in the region – a notion the country had successfully developed since the beginning of the Third Republic in 1992.

Despite the Al-Jebha rebellion, the birth of the Third Republic was considered a remarkable success of joined civil-military engagement, which led to the overthrow of the regime of Moussa Traoré who had

³See Barroso, Hollande, and Traoré 2013

⁴See European Commission 2016.

⁵A detailed overview over the historical, geographical and political developments in Mali can be found in Schmid 2014; Lecocq 2010.

⁶ Lecocq 2010, 376

⁷ Ibid., 379.

assumed power in 1968.⁸ In contrast to what was common in the region, Lieutenant-Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré, the leader of the coup, did not himself seize power, but transferred it to the democratically elected president Alpha Oumar Konaré on 8 June 1992. What accompanied these events was the establishment of the *Comité transitoire pour le Salut du Peuple*, encompassing 15 civilian and 10 military members, and one of the most democratically oriented constitutions the continent had seen so far.⁹ It was only in 2002, that Amadou Toumani Touré was himself elected president and in 2006 that his presidency was put to the test when facing another Tuareg insurgence in the north. Endowed with the experiences of the 1990s, Toumani Touré's actions were characterised by prudence and the will to avoid resentment and repression against the Kel Tamasheq as much as possible.¹⁰ As during the 1963/64 rebellion, the 2006 insurgence rested wholly on actions undertaken by the Tuareg clan of the *Kel Adagh* of the *Adrar* region in the north of Kidal. While the National Pact of 1992 – designed as a plan for peace to the 1990s rebellion – was rejected broadly by the south, the Algier Agreement that was meant to put an end to the 2006 conflict, provoked discontent not only by the south but also from within the north.¹¹

This detail hints at the overwhelming problem of fragmentation, which burdens the country not only in the guise of a north-south divide. Rather, it has to be regarded as a nation-wide and multi-layered fragmentation in political, economic, ethnic, social and religious terms.

Starting with the north, the variety of actors consists of Tuareg tribes, Arabs and the ethnic minorities of Fulani and Songhay. Tensions exist amongst different Tuareg tribes as well as within the respective social strata of those tribes (most drastically visible in the relations of Imghad, Ifogha and Bellha).¹² Furthermore, frictions exist between Arabs, Tuareg and the central government in Bamako respectively, a situation that is linked to the marginalisation of the two groups by the government and to the Tuaregs' strong aspirations for an independent state.¹³ The French colonial strategy of favouring the "whiter" people of the north to the detriment of the southern population contributed to reinforcing mutual distrust.¹⁴ This division was most dramatically visible in the context of the 1990s, when the Songhay occupied a prominent role by forming the *Ganda Koi*, a counter militia to the Tuareg rebellion.¹⁵ What is more, this situation of fragmentation represents not only a colonial heritage but Bamako has deliberately strengthened and exploited these tensions in the post-colonial period in order to divide and control the north.¹⁶ The economic characteristics that distinguish north and south do further

⁸ N'Diaye 2008, 163.

⁹ Ibid., 164.

¹⁰ Lecocq 2010, 396.

¹¹ Ibid., 397.

¹² Ibid., 368. and Lecocq et al. 2013, 345.

¹³ Chauzal and van Damme 2015, 38 and Bøås and Torheim 2013, 1280f.

¹⁴ See Høyer 2013.

¹⁵ Lecocq 2010, 370.

¹⁶ See Chauzal and van Damme 2015, 39.

deepen these fault lines. Whereas the economy in the south consists mainly of gold mining and cotton, the north is heavily dependent on agriculture and tourism, which makes it especially vulnerable to exogenous and ecological shocks. The 2012 food crisis made the severity of this dependence even more visible and further contributed to a sense of marginalisation among the northern population.¹⁷ With Mali's vast territory and its central location in West Africa, which provides the country with extensive borders to seven neighbouring countries, geography is another feature that has to be taken into account when trying to analyse the roots of today's conflict.¹⁸ Thus, its remote location, lack of state control and low-density population had further set the stages for northern Mali becoming a hub for drug and human trafficking as well as for migration and refugee flows from neighbouring countries.¹⁹ In this vein, the region is highly exposed to foreign strategic (Algeria, Libya, Morocco) and religious (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Libya, Kuwait) influences, often in the form of new social and economic networks as well as in the guise of charitable organisations.²⁰ Both variants substitute economic and social services that are not or hardly delivered by the central government and thus shift loyalties even further away.

The 2011 Libyan crisis profoundly influenced and further aggravated these conditions by paving the way not only for the MNLA but also for jihadi movements.²¹ The MNLA itself can be described as a purely secular movement and consisted mainly of three different groups: Tuareg with a history as former Libyan soldiers, Tuareg separatists of the 2006 insurgency and young Tuareg who had recently founded the *Mouvement National Azawad* (MNA). *Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb* (AQIM), which has its roots in Algeria, *Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest* (MUJAO), which emerged from within the ranks of AQIM and *Ansar Dine* supplemented the range of actors in the north with an Islamist dimension. Particularly noteworthy here is the organisation of Ansar Dine. Developed, amongst others, by Iyad ag Aghali, a former fighter of the 1990s rebellion who had abandoned plans for independence in favour of a broader integration of the Tuareg society into the Muslim world, this organisation depicts clearly the uneven acceptance/rejection of radical Islam within the Tamasheq society.²²

Despite the fact that societal cohesion is considerably higher in the south, the speed with which discontent regarding the events in the north led to the coup in March 2012, demonstrated even in this part of the country a general dissatisfaction with the central government.^{23,24}

¹⁷Ibid., 25.

¹⁸See Moulaye and Niakaté 2011, 5.

¹⁹See ibid.; Chauzal and van Damme 2015, 22, 27; Bøås and Torheim 2013, 1285.

²⁰See Bøås and Torheim 2013, 1285.

²¹ Lecocq et al. 2013, 345.

²² Ibid., 346.

²³ See Chauzal and van Damme 2015, 12.

²⁴ A timeline of events between October 2011 and January 2013 can be found in figure 1 in annex 4.1.

1.2 Engagement of international actors (other than the EU)

Since the EU cannot combat the fragile situation in Mali and in the Sahel in general alone and given that local ownership is one of the main principles in the European Union's foreign, security and development policy, the EU relies a lot on cooperation with other actors on the ground. The main international and regional organisations and partners of the EU playing a big role in Mali are the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), the G5 Sahel²⁵, the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC)²⁶, the World Bank and civil society.

The most important international partner in Mali is the UN with its mission MINUSMA (see next subsection) and ECOWAS. Two other missions are in place in Mali that will not be covered in the next subsection: the AU Mission to Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL) since August 2013²⁷ and the G5 Sahel Joint Force since July 2017²⁸. The recently established G5 mission has been also welcomed by the UN:

“Recognizing the determination and ownership of the Governments of the Group of Five for the Sahel States (G5 Sahel) to address the impact of terrorism and transnational organized crime, including through the conduct of cross-border joint military counter-terrorist operations [...]

*Welcoming the deployment of the Force Conjointe des Etats du G5 Sahel (FC-G5S), and underlining that FC-G5S efforts to counter the activities of terrorist groups and other organized criminal groups will contribute to create a more secure environment in the Sahel region, with a view to supporting MINUSMA fulfil its mandate to stabilize Mali, and commending the European Union's pledge to provide support to the FC-G5S of 50 million Euros [...]*²⁹

Besides, several other big international organisations are conducting programmes in Mali, such as the World Bank, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), UNDP and the UN Food Programme as well as the UNHR.

The regional EU Sahel Strategy additionally includes other actors, such as the Arab League, the Arab Maghreb Union, USA, Canada, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the West African Police Information System developed with Interpol, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the World Customs Organization (AIRCOP) .

²⁵ The “G5 Sahel” was formed on 16 February 2014 in Nouakchott in order to establish a permanent framework for regional coordination efforts by Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso. See Secretariat Permanent du G5 Sahel 2017

²⁶ The Lake Chad Basin Commission was established on 22 May 1964 and consists of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria and the Republic of Central Africa. Egypt, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo and Sudan hold observer status. The LCBC has the mandate for the regulation of the ecosystem and water resources of the Lake Chad Basin and for the promotion of regional integration, peace and security. For more information see The Lake Chad Basin Commission

²⁷ See Mission de l'Union africaine pour le Mali et le Sahel (MISAHEL) 2014.

²⁸ See Institute for Security Studies (ISS) 2017.

²⁹ United Nations Security Council 2017.

Case-in-Case Studies

The specific case studies in Mali include two case studies from the “Council foreign policy” and one case study from the “Commission foreign policy”. Concerning the “Council foreign policy”, the analysis will focus on the advisory and training mission EUTM Mali and the Capacity Building mission EUCAP Sahel Mali since they constitute a main part of the EU’s approach to transforming the SSR in Mali. The importance and visibility of EUTM Mali for the EU can be seen as well by the visit of the HR/VP Federica Mogherini on 4 June 2017 in the margins of the 3rd G5 Sahel Ministerial Meeting. Being a training mission under the CFSP framework that aims at enabling security forces to provide stability and security and to support the SSR, EUTM provides the opportunity to scrutinise the EU engagement in the SSR reform.³⁰

The “Commission foreign policy” will be analysed via its engagement in the framework of the Regional National Programme (RIP) and National Indicative Programme (NIP) in development aid. While the fragile national institutions, corruption and weak government situation, are already indicated very early as the main problem in Mali³¹, the Commission case study will cover the field of Rural Development and Food Security (sector ii of the NIP=, namely the project for “Water Supply and Sanitation Support Programme for Local Authorities”, PACTEA 2. The second highest amount of development aid in the NIP is going to this sector (see table 1).

1.3 The European Union’s multiple engagement in Mali

The Malian crisis has led to a steady increase in attention and action by several states and international stakeholders during the last years. This chapter draws an overview about some particularly important actions by other stakeholders in order to identify the role of the EU and EU member states’ engagement in Mali which has to be seen in this broader context of actions.

After the 2012 rebellion and coup d’état and on the request of the Mali government for help in combating insurgents advancing toward the south, France rapidly decided to immediately launch a unilateral military operation in Mali, Opération Serval, on 11 January 2013, based on the UN resolution 2085 of 20 December 2012.³² As the former colonial power, France has a special relationship with Mali given that the French presence in West Africa dates back to the 19th century (French West Africa) and Mali was held as a colony since the late 19th century.³³ Besides, France’s security focus on Mali seems to build on the assessment that AQIM and related groups pose a direct security threat to the country. France has declared that it is at war with the group on 27 July 2010 after the group had kidnapped and

³⁰ An overview of SSR in Mali since 2005 can be found at ISSAT 2016.

³¹ “The EU is determined to support Mali in restoring the rule of law and re-establishing a fully sovereign democratic government with authority throughout Malian territory, for the benefit of the whole population.” See paragraph 3, Council of the European Union 2012.

³² See United Nations Security Council 2012.

³³ See Schmid 2014.

killed French nationals.

In the wake of the French-led military mission, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed its regional African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), authorised by the UN resolution 2085, already in January 2013 instead of September 2013, as it was initially planned. AFISMA, a mission based on a French-backed proposal, was mandated to support the training of Malian security forces and the stabilisation and recovery of the northern territory of Mali. The major contributions for the mission came from the US (\$104 million), Japan (\$120 million), the EU (\$75 million), France (\$63 million), the AU (\$50 million) and Germany (\$20 million).³⁴ In July 2013, the African-led mission AFISMA came under the authority of the United Nations' Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), established by the UN Security Council Resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013.³⁵ MINUSMA is mandated to support political reforms and transitional authorities in the stabilisation of the country. With the adaptation of UN Resolution 2164 on 25 June 2014³⁶, the Council adjusted the mandate to “focus on duties, such as ensuring security, stabilisation and protection of civilians; supporting national political dialogue and reconciliation; and assisting the reestablishment of State authority, the rebuilding of the security sector, and the promotion and protection of human rights in that country”³⁷. On 29 June 2015, the Security Council further amended the mandate by the Security Council Resolution 2227. It mainly mandated the mission to support the ceasefire, the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, the dialogue with and among all the stakeholders involved in the reconciliation process, to protect civilians and contribute to stabilisation, the promotion and protection of human rights.³⁸

For the current authorisation as of July 2017, MINUSMA has a personnel strength of 10 981 militaries, 1 707 police officers and 1 180 civilians deployed and an approved budget (07/2016-06/2017) of around \$933 million.³⁹

Opération Serval ended on 15 July 2014 and was followed by its successor Opération Barkhane, which launched on 1 August 2014 in close cooperation with the G5 countries in order to fight terrorist groups in the Sahel, and is still ongoing.⁴⁰ While the French operation has its mandate for counterterrorist activities in the whole Sahel, MINUSMA is charged with the stabilisation and security only in Mali.

EU member states not only contribute to UN engagement in Mali, but also (and often more) actively engage at European level. The EU is involved in Mali in manifold ways and through different organisations and paths. Above all, as a response to “violent extremism, radicalisation, illicit trafficking

³⁴See Maru 2013.

³⁵ United Nations Security Council 2013.

³⁶ United Nations Security Council 2014.

³⁷ United Nations 2016.

³⁸ United Nations Security Council 2015.

³⁹ United Nations General Assembly 2016; United Nations 2017; MINUSMA 2017.

⁴⁰ Ministère de la Défense 2016.

and terrorism in parallel with challenges of extreme poverty and fragile governance in the Sahel”⁴¹, the Council adopted the overall EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel in 2011 (EU Sahel Strategy).⁴² This comprehensive strategy especially acknowledges the interconnectedness of security and development between the countries in the Sahel (security-development nexus). In order to achieve a sustainable and inclusive political and socio-economic development, the EU attributes to itself a potential role in fostering a closer regional cooperation between the countries. This shall be done by capacity building “both in areas of core government activity, including the provision of security and development cooperation”, and in “encouraging economic development for the people of the Sahel” and thereby “helping them achieve a more secure environment”⁴³. The EU Sahel Strategy includes the support of human rights, security and rule of law, resilience and democratic governance as well as in the fight against terrorism, radicalisation, violent extremism and illicit trafficking. In order to provide a framework for the implementation of the EU Sahel Strategy, the EU developed a Sahel Regional Action Plan (RAP) for the years 2015 – 2020 after a revision of the Strategy during the Foreign Affairs Council on 17 March 2014.

The RAP focuses on the four pillars for the implementation of the EU Sahel Strategy:

1. Prevention and countering radicalisation,
2. Creation of appropriate conditions for youth,
3. Migration and mobility,
4. Border management, fight against transnational organised crime and illicit trafficking.⁴⁴

The Action Plan is to be “carried out with the full ownership and under the primary responsibility of the countries concerned, and in coordination with key international and regional organisations and other partners” (relevant partners see previous sub-section). As such, the RAP aims at applying a comprehensive approach by identifying bridges and synergies between various EU and MS initiatives and activities for the years 2015-2020.⁴⁵ Besides, the RAP includes the establishment of a European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the Sahel. With the Council Decision 2013/133/CFSP, the EU appointed the EUSR on 18 March 2013. The primary focus of the EUSR lies in “the implementation, coordination and further development of the Union’s comprehensive approach to the regional crisis, on the basis of its Strategy, with a view to enhancing overall coherence and effectiveness of Union

⁴¹ See European External Action Service 2011.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Council of the European Union 2015.

⁴⁵ Cooperation with regional initiatives is included in the RAP as well, such as the Bamako ministerial platform, the Nouakchott Process, the dialogue and cooperation platform between EU, Maghreb and Sahel and the Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative that aims to be supported under the 11th EDF with €1.5 billion. See: European Commission 2015.

activities in the Sahel, in particular in Mali”.⁴⁶ The EUSR shall not only engage with all other relevant actors on the ground in order to enhance the EU’s understanding of its own role in the Sahel, but also serve as a representative of the EU in relevant fora.

The economic cooperation through Partnership Agreements between the EU (European Community at that time) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) regions traces back to 23 June 2000, when the first ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, the so-called “Cotonou Agreement”, was signed. The agreement was originally based on three pillars: 1) Development cooperation, 2) Political cooperation and 3) Economic and trade cooperation. After its second revision in March 2010, some new aspects have been stressed in particular, adapting to changes in the political, economic and security environment.⁴⁷ In February 2014, West African States⁴⁸, ECOWAS and UEMOA signed an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the EU, laying the ground for a deepened economic partnership in order to help West Africa to “integrate better into the global trading system and [will] support investment and economic growth in the region”.⁴⁹

With a growing number of refugees coming from Africa to Europe, the European Union introduced a new Migration Partnership Framework in June 2016 with the priority countries of origin and transit – Mali, Nigeria, Niger, Senegal and Ethiopia.⁵⁰

Programmes of the European Commission

The spending for the EU Sahel Strategy in the 10th EDF (2008-2013) amounts to €1.5 billion and is forecasted to be €2.4 billion in the 11th EDF from 2014-2020.⁵¹ The Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) for West Africa (2014-2020) has a focus on regional and economic integration, peace, security and regional stability and resilience, food and nutritional security and natural resources. The RIP is agreed on by the EU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), includes support up to €1.15 billion (see table 2), compared to a budget of €595 million in the 10th EDF (see table 1) .

⁴⁶ Council of the European Union 2013 Article 3.

⁴⁷ These aspects include: 1) The importance of regional integration in ACP countries and in ACP-EU cooperation and a broad and inclusive partnership, 2) The interdependence between security and development (“no development without security), 3) The achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, food security, HIV-AIDS and sustainability of fisheries, 4) Climate change as a major subject for the EU-ACP partnership, 5) New trade relationship with the reaffirmation of the role of the Economic Partnership Agreements in order to boost economic development and integration into the world economy. See European Commission 2013.

⁴⁸ Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. See Council of the European Union 2014.

⁴⁹ European Commission 2015 See also: Council of the European Union 2014.

⁵⁰ European Commission 2016.

⁵¹ European Commission 2016.

| | |
|--|-----------------------|
| Focal Sector I: Deepening regional integration, improving competitiveness and EPA | 70% of total: 418 M€ |
| Focal Sector II: Consolidation of good governance and regional stability. | 20 % of total: 119 M€ |
| Non-Focal Sector (other programmes) | 10 % of total: 60 M€ |

Table 1. The RIP Budget 2008-2013. European Commission (2008, p.49). Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013. EC – West Africa.

Corresponding to the RIP, the National Indicative Programme (NIP) for Mali is designed by the European Commission (DEVCO and ECHO) in close cooperation with the EU delegation in Mali, the national authorities and the national authorising officer (“ordonnateur national”) who engages with the EU delegation and the different ministries.⁵² The NIP for the timeframe of 2014-2020 budgets for a total of €615 million and focuses on four main sectors: 1) Reform of State and Consolidation of Rule of Law (€280 million), 2) Rural Development and Food Security (€100 million), 3) Education (€100 million) and 4) Road Sector (€110 million) (See table 3).

Enveloppe A : 615 000 000 EUR (100% du PIN)

| Désignation | Montant En million € | En % du total |
|--|-------------------------|---------------|
| Secteur 1 : Réformes de l’Etat et consolidation de l’Etat de droit | 280 | 45,5% |
| Secteur 2 : Développement rural & sécurité alimentaire | 100 | 16,3% |
| Secteur 3 : Education | 100 | 16,3% |
| Secteur 4 : Secteur Routier | 110 | 17,9% |
| Appui société civile | 10 | 1,6% |
| Appui Ordonnateur National | 7 | 1,1% |
| Facilité de Coopération Technique (TCF) | 8 | 1,3% |
| Total | 615 | 100,0% |

Table 3. Financial Overview of the NIP. European Commission (2014, p.20). Programme Indicatif National 2014-2020.

Despite the Regional and National Indicative Programmes financed under the EDF, Mali is one of the main recipients of funds through the EU Trust Fund for Africa, with nine projects approved so far, amounting to €151.6 million and linking development and security actions. The projects adopted in December 2016 are now in the contracting phase.⁵³ Concerning the G5, the Emergency Trust Fund has recently been mobilised to €450 million to “support additional projects to bolster security, governance,

| Priority areas | Indicative budget (€ million) |
|--|----------------------------------|
| Priority area 1: Peace, security and regional stability | 250 |
| Specific objective 1.1: Strengthening regional mechanisms to promote and maintain peace and stability and post-crisis operations | 50 |
| Specific objective 1.2: Support for regional initiatives to address the main threats to peace, security and stability | 200 |
| Priority area 2: Regional economic integration and support for trade | 575 |
| Specific objective 2.1: Establishment of an integrated regional economic area | 50 |
| Specific objective 2.2: Supporting private sector competitiveness | 125 |
| Specific objective 2.3: Support for the transport sector | 200 |
| Specific objective 2.4: Support for the energy sector | 200 |
| Priority area 3: Resilience, food and nutrition security and natural resources | 300 |
| Specific objective 3.1: Resilience and food and nutrition security | 200 |
| Specific objective 3.2: Protection of the environment, biodiversity and climate change | 100 |
| Non-focal sector: Institutional support for regional organisations/TCF | 25 |
| TOTAL | 1150 |

Table 2. The RIP Budget 2014-2020. European Commission (2015, p.15) Regional Indicative Programme. EU – West Africa.

⁵² Interview with DEVCO officials in Brussels, 08.03.2017.

⁵³ Council of the European Union 2017.

job creation and the resilience of the people affected in key parts of Mali and in the region as a whole.⁵⁴ Besides, in the time from 2015-2018, four projects of around €12.4 million are carried out under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP). Those projects include the field of SSR (€5 million), Dialogue and Peace (€2 million), local economy in northern Mali (€5 million) and Social and Community Cohesion (€400.000).⁵⁵⁵⁶

Adding to the EU's commitment through political and diplomatic activities, two CSDP missions have been established in Mali: one European Training Mission (EUTM Mali) was established in February 2015 and has its mandate extended until May 2018 and one EU Capacity Building Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) that was established on the request of Mali in April 2014.⁵⁷

As part of the EU's approach to provide SSR support, EUCAP Sahel Mali (2015-2017) is a civilian CSDP Advisory, Assistance and Training mission with a mandate to support the Police, the National Guards and the Gendarmerie to "enhance their level of interoperability and law enforcement capacity, in particular to fight terrorism and organised crime while fully respecting Rule of Law and Human Rights"⁵⁸.

EUTM Mali (2013-2018) aims at improving the functioning and operational effectiveness of the Malian Armed Forces under civilian authority through advisory support and training, and to contribute to their respect for the rule of law and international standards of conduct, including international humanitarian law, protection of civilians, in particular women and children, and human rights"⁵⁹. The training activities are complemented by broader international support for the provision of equipment for the Malian Armed Forces. As of July 2016, 23 EU and 4 Non-EU member states are contributing to the mission with an overall personnel strength of 506.

The EU engagement, the instruments and relevant actors are well summarised in the Council Conclusion of 20 April 2015:

"In the context of its comprehensive approach, including the contribution of the EU Institutions, the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the Sahel as well as of EU Member States, the EU reiterates its commitment to support regional and country-led and owned initiatives in the framework of the Action Plan, using all its relevant instruments, in particular the regional and national indicative programmes under the European Development Fund as well as Member States' programmes, and also including the CSDP Missions

⁵⁴ European Commission 2017.

⁵⁵ See Peace Direct 2017.

⁵⁶ During the formulation of this case study, the IcSP, originally created as an instrument for crisis management and peacebuilding, has been in a process of amendment that would, in light of the security-development nexus, open IcSP for security related projects. See also Pawlak 2017.

⁵⁷ See Council of the European Union 2014.

⁵⁸ Council of the European Union 2012, 4.

⁵⁹ Council of the European Union 2012.

EUTM Mali, EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUCAP Sahel Mali, and the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace.”⁶⁰

2 Case Study Mali: Features of EU Crisis Response during policy formulation – Policy Output

This section will provide a systematic analysis of EU foreign policy in the realm of crisis response policy in Mali focussing in a first step (in line with the overall RQ 1) regarding the features of the output of EU policy-making in Brussels, along two sets of four criteria in terms of 1) Problem definitions and objectives/ priorities, and 2) strategies and instruments (policy measures or programmes).⁶¹ In the first set, ‘strategic objectives’ (or ultimate, global, overall) are differentiated from ‘intermediate objectives’ which are to some degree instrumental for reaching the strategic objectives and hence could also be qualified as ‘strategies of first order’ or ‘grand strategies’. While looking for objectives means to answer *what* an actor wants to achieve, searching for strategies is about *how* an actor wants to reach his/her objectives.

The analysis is based on a selected sample of EU documents from the Council and Commission side alike, which will method-wise be scrutinised in terms of systematic qualitative content analysis. For the overall case of Mali, this means to analyse core EU documents outlining EU policy, here for *Council foreign policy* the following documents will be scrutinised: a) EU Council conclusions to Sahel and Mali (2010-2016) and b) the 17 Council decisions concerning the mandate for EUTM Mali (2013-2014).

For investigating the respective criteria in *Commission foreign policy*, a) the Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) for West Africa and the National Indicative Programme (NIP) for Mali, both for the years 2008-2013 and 2014-2020 and b) the document specific to the EC programme PACTEA 2, the case-in-case for an in-depth analysis, are analysed. The selection criteria for this choice of reference documents are ‘political salience’ as well as some ‘coverage of the overall time span’ for this report, covering EU crisis response policy from 2010 to 2016.

As selected in subsection 1.3, EU foreign policy will be analysed in detail for two cases-in-case, the first covering Council foreign policy, and the later Commission foreign policy: 1) the 2013 mandate of the EUTM Mali military mission, and 2) development policy in the sector of rural development and food security via DEVCO/ECHO.

⁶⁰ Council of the European Union 2015.

⁶¹ These criteria a building upon the basic standard policy-analysis set of criteria for systematically analysing policies across all policy fields, issue areas or types of policies. See, for example, Lauth and Wagner 2006.

2.1 Characteristics of EU's policy vis-à-vis Mali: problem definition and objectives

How did the EU define the challenges regarding Mali after the 2012 rebellion? Which distinct features characterised the EU's problem definition as foundation for its engagement in Mali?

The EU support for Mali has a long history, dating back to the Lomé Convention of 1975 which provided the first framework for cooperation, followed by the EU-ACP Partnership Agreement from 23 June 2000, revised on 25 June 2005 and on 22 June 2010 (Cotonou Agreement) as described in the previous chapter. Nevertheless, before the deterioration of the situation in the year 2012, Mali has never been a priority on the European foreign and security policy agenda. The EU engagement has been intensified since 2011 and Mali now constitutes the arena for one of the biggest engagement of the EU in the framework of CSDP.

Problem definition in EU Council Conclusions and Decisions

From the early beginning of Council conclusions and decisions, organised crime, terrorism, poverty, unresolved internal conflicts and fragility of states are defined as the main problems in Mali.⁶² In the course of the aggravation of the conflict, those problems intensified and therefore were described more detailed throughout the Council documents. Generally, five big dimensions can be found:

1) Organised Crime, 2) Terrorism, 3) Food and Nutrition Crisis leading to Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and refugees, 4) the Deterioration of the Security Situation and 5) the Deterioration of the Humanitarian Situation (see table 5 in annex 4.3).

1. **Terrorism** has been identified as another major problem in Mali from 2010 on. Especially the activities of terrorists (AQIM) and the growth of Al Qa'ida and affiliates' presence in the north of Mali presented a major threat.⁶³ Mali as a "haven for terrorists"⁶⁴ is marked by persisting violence, "which is a threat to the security, stability, territorial integrity and development of the country and the wider Sahel region"⁶⁵. It is remarkable that terrorism as well as the deterioration of the security situation (see point 2) is increasingly put as *the* main problem in Mali and therefore on top of the agenda, shifting more and more away from the focus on development to a focus on (hard) security. The security-development nexus plays a big role in Mali, but one can detect a smooth deviation from pure development to security.⁶⁶
2. In the years 2012 and 2013, in which the two European missions (EUTM Mali, EUCAP Sahel Mali) were prepared to be established, the state was described as "**deterioration of the**

⁶² Council of the European Union 2010.

⁶³ See Council of the European Union 2011; Council of the European Union 2012; Council of the European Union 2012; Council of the European Union 2012.

⁶⁴ Council of the European Union 2012.

⁶⁵ Council of the European Union 2015 See also Council of the European Union 2015.

⁶⁶ At this point the definition of security is crucial. In the last years, the concept of "development" has changed as well, being more and more interconnected with security, shifting away from the classical definition of development. The "security first" approach underlines this as well.

security situation⁶⁷, “serious political and security crisis”⁶⁸, “dramatic changes in Mali”⁶⁹ and “grave concern about consequences of instability in the north of Mali on the region and beyond”⁷⁰.

3. For the dimension of organised crime, especially “**regional and trans-boundary dimensions** of the crisis, including terrorism, organised crime, arms smuggling, human trafficking, drug trafficking, refugee and migration flows and related financial flows”⁷¹ were defined as the main challenges in Mali. Recently, in June 2016, the dimension of organised crime has shifted its focus especially on smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings.⁷²
4. In 2012, a severe and acute **food and nutrition crisis** added up to the other security problems, leading to an increase of IDPs and refugees (15 million at that time).⁷³ **Migration**, as a real problem or challenge closely related to food shortages, has been mentioned for the first time only in a Council document of April 2015.⁷⁴
5. In parallel to the deterioration of the security situation, an **aggravation of the humanitarian situation** has been named as a fifth serious problem in Mali, especially with a focus on the oppression of local populations and breaches of international humanitarian and human-rights laws.⁷⁵

For completion, the problem definition of the European Commission will be taken from the RIPs and NIPs from the 10th and 11th EDF as well as from the specific documents concerning the case-in-case study, which is PACTEA 2.

Problem Definition by European Commission through RIPs and NIPs

Security, Organised Crime and Food and Nutrition Crisis constitute the three problem categories within Commission documents which show the most overlap with problem definitions as outlined by the Council:

1. **Security** depicts a core concern in the framework of both, RIPs and NIPs, and throughout a time span of roughly ten years. However, a changing perception of security becomes apparent. Despite the RIP 2008-2013 stating, “armed conflicts have been the most destabilising and

⁶⁷ Council of the European Union 2012

⁶⁸ Council of the European Union 2012

⁶⁹ Council of the European Union 2013.

⁷⁰ Council of the European Union 2013

⁷¹ Council of the European Union 2014

⁷² See Council of the European Union 2016

⁷³ See Council of the European Union 2012

⁷⁴ See Council of the European Union 2015

⁷⁵ See Council of the European Union 2012; Council of the European Union 2013.

impoverishing factors at all levels⁷⁶, security was rather referred to as regional stability⁷⁷. This changed markedly when “**Peace, Security and Regional Stability**”⁷⁸ became the first focal sector of the RIP 2014-2020 with a particular emphasis being put on the security situation in Mali. In this vein, security in Mali was also mentioned in the NIP 2008-2013 in close and more or less exclusive connection with regional stability⁷⁹, whereas in the NIP 2014-2020 an encompassing definition of security was applied that incorporated also its institutional and economic dimension⁸⁰. Thus, this problem definition has seen a gradual and qualitative shift from stability to security.

2. **Organised Crime**, in particular in line with cross border crime and in the guise of human and drugs trafficking, money laundering and every time more with reference to terrorist networks, has been a key challenge identified within both, RIPs and NIPs since 2008.
3. **Food and Nutrition Crisis** has, as outlined in Council documents as well, been a focal sector of concern within RIPs and NIPs. While RIP 2014-2020 stresses the regional dimension of the problem, NIP 2008-2013 places particular emphasis on the fact that “(...) le risque alimentaire s’est ainsi pour partie transformé, passant d’une insécurité conjoncturelle, essentiellement rurale et due à des facteurs climatiques, à une insécurité structurelle, désormais aussi urbaine et péri-urbaine.”⁸¹ By furthermore taking into account that food crises have been a severe and recurring problem of the past (2005,2010,2012)⁸² as well as by also considering the political-security dimension that are inherent to those crises⁸³, one can note that this problem has occupied a prominent role and received a comparably elaborated analysis in Commission documents.

In close connection with the problem of food and nutrition crisis, the overall **fragile economic situation** has been mentioned throughout the documents. Further core problems as outlined in RIPs and NIPs (while not mentioned explicitly in Council documents) have been **migration** and **democracy and the justice sector**.

1. Due to the detailed analysis of the West African/Malian **economic situation** as elaborated in RIPs and NIPs, it turns out necessary to have a closer look at its various dimensions:
 - a. Among the central concerns regarding the overall economic situation is the poorly diversified character of the domestic markets, the consequential vulnerability of the

⁷⁶ European Commission 2008.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 2, 22, 45, 49.

⁷⁸ European Commission 2015.

⁷⁹ European Commission 2008.

⁸⁰ European Commission 2014, 10.

⁸¹ European Commission 2008.

⁸² European Commission 2015.

⁸³ European Commission 2014.

economies to exogenous shocks as well as the defective state of economic infrastructure (roads, energy, and internet). Continued emphasis has been put on these particular challenges throughout both NIPs and RIPs and improvement seems to lack according to the recurring attention the problem area receives.

- b. Another focal issue within the economic sector is the problem of corruption. Accompanying features in NIPs are the defective influence of corruption on democratic developments⁸⁴ as well as the widespread problem of impunity.⁸⁵
- c. Education and Employment are further problems, closely related to the fragile economic situation. Special emphasis is put on rural unemployment and a growing urban informal sector⁸⁶, lack of primary and professional education⁸⁷ and the lack of human capital.⁸⁸ Finally, attention is drawn to a growing inequality, distributed along gender and regional fault lines.⁸⁹
- d. Ranging among the core priorities is the problem of migration. Although being referred to in earlier documents rather as domestic challenge⁹⁰, its transboundary dimension has been taken into account from the very beginning as well.⁹¹
- e. Finally, democracy and the justice sector depict recurring and closely interwoven problem areas. Among these, the need for societal cohesion and the development of an active civil society is stressed.⁹² The Commission also attach great importance to the development of a genuine rule of law and SSR sector, that guarantees the respect of law (in particular human rights)⁹³ and provides equal access to the justice sector for all citizens.⁹⁴

⁸⁴ European Commission 2008, 11.

⁸⁵ European Commission 2014, 11.

⁸⁶ European Commission 2008, 18.

⁸⁷ European Commission 2014, 16.

⁸⁸ European Commission 2008, 12.

⁸⁹ European Commission 2014, 16.

⁹⁰ European Commission 2008, 19.

⁹¹ European Commission 2008, 12.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ European Commission 2014, 11.

⁹⁴ European Commission 2008, 10.

2.2 Characteristics of the EU policy approach in Mali: Operational Strategies and Instruments

Which policy strategies and which policy instruments has the EU defined as adequate for reaching the strategic objectives elaborated above?⁹⁵ As a common-sensual definition, a policy strategy, by linking objectives with instruments, defines *how* objectives will be achieved, and *how* instruments will be used as tools for this purpose. Partly, grand strategies were covered in the previous sub-section in as far as these were declared by the EU as intermediate objectives. In this section in addition grand strategies will be elaborated which have been addressed by the EU as policy premises or principles. ‘Instruments’ in turn are conceptualised as operational tools for implementing a strategy in order to accomplish in a first step operational (‘tactical’) objectives of the respective policies, considered stepping stones for accomplishing, ultimately, the strategic objectives.

2.2.1 The EU’s Intermediate aims and Operational Strategies

As the purpose of this project is to analyse the EU conflict and crisis management in order to detect not only very case specific features, but also general characteristics of EU policy making, the three cases of Mali, Afghanistan and Iraq can not only be scrutinised separately. It is important to ascertain overall pattern that enable a broader perception of EU conflict and crisis management characteristics. For the sake of comparison between the three cases, we worked on the Iraq case inductively to categorise the overall EU strategic objectives, grand strategies and operational strategies in order to try to apply them to the cases of Mali and Afghanistan to find out if there are similar pattern present. Concerning the Sahel in general and Mali especially in this study, similar strategic objectives as for the Iraq case can be found, namely peace, stability and prosperity.⁹⁶ Throughout all Council decisions and conclusions, Mali is seen in the wider context of the Sahel region, being aware of actual and potential spill-over effects of Mali’s instability to the neighbouring countries and the whole Sahel region. Therefore, the overall strategic objectives of peace, stability and prosperity are often connected and interlinked to the whole region. Mali in this perspective plays a key role in achieving the overall EU strategic objectives.

When it comes to the intermediate aims and the respective grand strategies, the three categories deducted from the Iraq case are quite applicable for Mali as well, that is (1) Democracy and

⁹⁵ Note: In this report (Deliverable 7.1) the analytical focus is on the output dimension of EU policy-making that is the output of decision-making in the policy-making machinery in Brussels. Thus here the analysis is confined to the choice and definition of strategies and instruments but not encompassing their translation into action that is policy implementation. The latter is going to be investigated as next step of the policy-cycle model underlying this project in following reports covering individual comprehensive case studies in a comparative manner as Deliverables 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3.

⁹⁶ See for example Council of the European Union 2012; Council of the European Union 2014; Council of the European Union 2015.

Democratisation, (2) International Cooperation and Internationalisation, and (3) State-building and Reconstruction and Development. Given the specificities of the threefold intrastate conflict in Mali (Tuareg vs. government; Islamist groups vs. government; Inter-militant rivalry in northern Mali), we need to add a fourth category in order to develop a comprehensive analysis of EU engagement in Mali: (4) Peace and Peace-Building.

Even though EU Council decisions and conclusions do not explicitly state democratisation as a primary objective of EU policy in Mali, it is an underlying objective which becomes obvious by taking a look at the EU's operational strategies of local ownership including democratic elections and an inclusive national dialogue and reforms.

First and foremost, local ownership as an integral part of EU crisis and conflict management is not only crucial for the overall engagement in Mali, but also especially in the dimension of democracy. All documents particularly stress the importance of Malian, regional and African ownership of projects and programmes.⁹⁷ The concept of local ownership and its implementation or success in the case of Mali will be deeper analysed in an extra chapter of this study (chapter 3.2.3). The foundation of local ownership lies in the implementation of democratic elections, as a precondition for all further development of the country towards a functioning democracy. Very early after the coup d'état, already in March 2012, the EU called for democratic elections.⁹⁸ For one year, a democratic electoral process has been mentioned as a main prerequisite in order to establish the democratic order in Mali (again). One year later, in April 2013, a slight shift to a stronger emphasis also on the role of the EU itself in the process of democratic elections can be noted, as the EU was not only very strongly "determined to support transition through elections and reconciliation"⁹⁹ but also highlighted its "readiness to provide technical and financial assistance"¹⁰⁰. Being "dedicated to the democratic process, including free and fair elections, both at home and abroad"¹⁰¹, the EU has deployed an Electoral Observation Mission (EOM) between June and September 2013 (before and during the presidential elections on 28 July and 11 August) as well as for the legislative elections (24 November and 15 December) the same year.¹⁰² Closely connected to the democratic electoral process is the operational strategy to establish an **inclusive national dialogue**, which is of major importance in the EU approach to the conflict management (or even settlement) in Mali. Given the variety of different groups and actors with

⁹⁷ See Council of the European Union 2013; Council of the European Union 2015; Council of the European Union 2012; Council of the European Union 2012; Council of the European Union 2015.

⁹⁸ Council of the European Union 2012.

⁹⁹ Council of the European Union 2013.

¹⁰⁰ Council of the European Union 2013.

¹⁰¹ Delegation of the European Union to the United States of America 2017.

¹⁰² For more information on the EU Observer Mission see European Union External Action Service 2013 For the conditions for an EU Electoral Observer Mission see Delegation of the European Union to the United States of America 2017.

opponent positions that fight against each other (see chapter 1), the EU gives particular importance to the “essential”¹⁰³ inclusive national dialogue, which it is “prepared to support”¹⁰⁴. The EU, in a chronological order, “encourages”¹⁰⁵, “calls on Malian authorities to follow up their pledge to set up a National Dialogue and a Reconciliation Commission”¹⁰⁶, “promotes”¹⁰⁷ and even “urges all Malian parties to begin credible and inclusive consultations open to all communities and to all non-terrorist armed groups of northern Mali with the aim of achieving broadly founded and lasting peace through a sustainable political solution”¹⁰⁸. The EU sees an inclusive national dialogue as a strategy to achieve not only reconciliation and peace, but also to provide for local ownership, the establishment of sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as restoring state authority in northern Mali.

Of particular interest is the fact that the call on an inclusive national dialogue continued from October 2012¹⁰⁹ until February 2015¹¹⁰. It took two and a half years to reach an agreement during the Algiers peace negotiations on 1 March 2015. Three groups have been signatories to the *Accord for peace and reconciliation in Mali emanating from the Algiers process*: the Malian government, the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA)¹¹¹ and the Platform of armed groups (the Platform).

The government and loyalist fighters had signed the agreement already on 15 May, the Platform and two other groups forming part of the CMA, whereas a representative of the rebel Coordination of Movements of Azawad (CMA) had finally signed on 20 June after the agreement of amendments. These mainly state that the rebel fighters should be included in a security force for the north and that the population of the northern part should be better represented in the government institutions.

The final Algiers peace agreement looks like a success for the EUs engagement in this field. However, even though all signatories to the Algiers agreement had met regularly and outlined their commitment in implementing it, the agreement has not been implemented by the parties until today. Therefore, it

¹⁰³ Council of the European Union 2012.

¹⁰⁴ Council of the European Union 2012.

¹⁰⁵ Council of the European Union 2013.

¹⁰⁶ Council of the European Union 2013.

¹⁰⁷ Council of the European Union 2013.

¹⁰⁸ Council of the European Union 2014.

¹⁰⁹ Council of the European Union 2012.

¹¹⁰ Council of the European Union 2015.

¹¹¹ “The CMA is comprised of the Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad (MNL), the Haut Conseil pour l’Unité de l’Azawad (HCUA), the Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad (MAA), a faction of the Coalition du Peuple de l’Azawad (CPA), and a splinter group of the Coordination des Mouvements et Fronts Patriotiques de Résistance (CMFPR–II). The Platform is comprised of the Coordination des Mouvements et Fronts Patriotiques de Résistance (CMFPR–I), the Groupe d’Autodéfense Touareg Imghad et Alliés (GATIA), and splinter groups of the CPA and the MAA. [...] Whereas the recognition and inclusion of all contending actors in the peace process constitutes a commendable constructive approach to resolving conflicts, the actual fragmentation within the various groups demonstrates the absence of leadership among the movements, which in turn leads to a lack of clarity as to the issues in contention and the appropriate means to address them.” See Nyirabikali 2015.

has not (yet) provided a big step forward in improving the security situation or even providing peace in the country.¹¹²

Additionally, in order to pave the way to democracy, reforms as operational strategies are at the core of EU policy. In the field of reforms, the EU focuses mainly on the sectors (a) consolidation of state institutions, justice and police, (b) SSR and (c) compliance with human rights and international humanitarian law. Since all three sectors are closely interconnected with the intermediate aim of state-building and more important in that category (see table 4 on p.28 or annex 4.2), they will be described and analysed later in this section.

The next overall intermediate aim of EU engagement is “international cooperation”, including in the context of Mali regional cooperation in the Sub-Saharan Africa and West Africa in general. This shall be achieved through bi- and multinational dialogues as well as partnerships between the countries in West Africa. The EU approach to this strategy is twofold: On the one hand, the EU calls for bi- and multilateral dialogue and cooperation between the countries of the region in order to achieve “regionally-owned processes”¹¹³ and for further regional integration. On the other hand, the EU itself conducts bi- and multilateral dialogues with other international actors that are present in Mali.¹¹⁴

As for the first approach in regional integration, the EU primarily emphasises the high importance of the regional engagement of the G5 Sahel. Through various tools, which will be outlined in the next sub-chapter, the EU strongly supports the regional integration of the Sahel.

Concerning the second part of the objective, the EU highlights in almost every Council conclusion and decision its endeavours to conduct bi- or multilateral dialogues and closely cooperate with other international actors in Mali, especially with the UN (MINUSMA), ECOWAS and the AU. It sees itself also in the position to “mobilise the international community”¹¹⁵ for more engagement in Mali, not only in terms of resources, but also in terms of political relevance.

The third intermediate objective in the EU’s approach to Mali consists of state-building through reconstruction and development. The majority of EU engagement is carried out in the framework of this objective. In general, state-building shall be achieved through the operational strategies of (a) capacity building, (b) security governance and (c) empowerment of institutions, personnel and civil society. The first operational strategy of capacity-building includes the consolidation of state institutions, justice and police, as already mentioned above, SSR, and territorial integrity.

¹¹² See United Nations Security Council 2017.

¹¹³ Council of the European Union 2012.

¹¹⁴ See Council of the European Union 2010; Council of the European Union 2014; Council of the European Union 2016.

¹¹⁵ Council of the European Union 2012.

The close interlinkage of these operational strategies becomes visible when having a closer look at the RIPs and NIPs issued by the European Commission. Peace, security and good governance with a particular emphasis on reforming the justice sector have been key concepts here and cannot be regarded in isolation. What becomes equally obvious is the fact that in Commission documents, good governance is also closely linked to the financial state of the government in terms of efficiency, transparency and budgetary control. Furthermore, migration and decentralisation policies are vital when it comes to good governance in Mali.¹¹⁶

Consolidation of state institutions, justice and police thereby presents the most important strategy in order to rebuild the Malian state. From the very first Council document, “restoring the rule of law and re-establishing a fully sovereign democratic government with authority throughout Malian territory”¹¹⁷ has been one of the main focuses of EU engagement and continues to be the priority in all EU engagement in the following years.¹¹⁸ In 2015, especially the reform of the justice and security sectors as well as the fight against impunity and a focus of human rights were added.¹¹⁹

The second very important step towards state-building is the Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Mali. With the call “on Malian authorities to prepare to launch a substantial reform of the security sector after the elections”¹²⁰, the EU already had a focus for a strategy after the envisaged democratic elections in Mali in 2013. In this regard, the EU focused on *supporting* and *assisting*¹²¹ “national and regional endeavours related to security reform”¹²², pointing at local ownership. In the framework of the UN Resolution 2071 (2012), especially the CSDP missions (EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali) play an important role in promoting SSR and “contributing to building inclusive, effective and accountable national armed and security forces”¹²³. Being tools for achieving the SSR, the CSDP missions will be portrayed in more detail in the next subchapter of this report when it comes to tools.

Also connected to SSR, but rather relating to the second operational strategy for state-building, which is security governance, the EU sets territorial integrity as a primary strategy. Building on the premise that security governance can only function when based on territorial integrity, the EU emphasises this precondition (only) in the first half of 2013¹²⁴. This comes not as a surprise considering that the EU has established EUTM Mali in exactly that period, which has the operational strategy of enabling Malian

¹¹⁶ European Commission 2008, 45. European Commission 2008, 44f, 57.

¹¹⁷ Council of the European Union 2012.

¹¹⁸ Council of the European Union 2013; Council of the European Union 2014; Council of the European Union 2013; Council of the European Union 2014; Council of the European Union 2013.

¹¹⁹ Council of the European Union 2015; Council of the European Union 2015.

¹²⁰ Council of the European Union 2013.

¹²¹ Council of the European Union 2014.

¹²² Council of the European Union 2014.

¹²³ Council of the European Union 2015.

¹²⁴ Council of the European Union 2013; Council of the European Union 2013.

Armed Forces to restore Malian territorial integrity. Territorial integrity is also very closely linked to the strategy of supporting an inclusive national dialogue since without this dialogue, which should lead to a reconciliation agreement or, in the best-case scenario, peace in the end, territorial integrity will remain an elusive utopia. Similar to Council conclusions and decisions¹²⁵, the Commission combines the aim of territorial integrity often with other strategies, such as unity and sovereignty, since they are mutually dependent. Moreover and linked to the aim of dialogue and reconciliation, the Commission places particular emphasis on the development of an encompassing infrastructure and decentralisation.¹²⁶ These two areas are explicitly stressed as constituting democratic means, fostering participation and thus, in itself enhancing integrity. After May 2013 though, territorial integrity has not been mentioned in Council Conclusions and Decisions anymore. The question why will be treated in the third analytical section of this report.

Going along with territory integrity and the ability of the Malian government to regain sovereignty, is the plea for an immediate end of violence and an immediate cease-fire. Although it was explicitly formulated in Council Decisions and Conclusions only three times (once in March 2012 and the other two times in February and June 2015 calling to respect the cease-fire agreement of May 2014¹²⁷), one can take for granted that this is doubtlessly the first step before even trying to create a functioning security governance at all.

The third pillar of the operational strategies for state-building is the empowerment of institutions, personnel and the civil society. The consolidation of state institutions, justice and police evidently contributes the most in terms of empowering institutions and personnel. However, as the EU sees itself also as a humanitarian actor, also the “observance of human rights and compliance with international humanitarian law”¹²⁸ are of importance in this regard. The training and advice by EUTM Mali shall therefore also include the sector of human rights and international humanitarian law. The Council conclusion of July 2015 further included a paragraph on “bringing justice of those responsible for abuses or violations of human rights”¹²⁹ and additionally the first time a gender perspective where the EU “underlines the need for full involvement of both women and men in the implementation of the agreement”¹³⁰. Two further operational strategies that can be subsumed under the heading of empowerment and that have been added by RIPs and NIPs are “Economic Reforms and Regional Integration” as well as “Rural Development”.

¹²⁵ Council of the European Union 2013; Council of the European Union 2013.

¹²⁶ European Commission 2014, 8, 12, 17.

¹²⁷ Council of the European Union 2012; Council of the European Union 2015; Council of the European Union 2015.

¹²⁸ Council of the European Union 2013.

¹²⁹ Council of the European Union 2015.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

Thereby, economic reforms are primarily linked to the broad and central goal of poverty reduction and envisaged to be achieved best through integration in regional and international markets¹³¹ as well as through a considerable stabilisation of the macroeconomic situation¹³². Here, also the need for improved infrastructure development becomes central.¹³³

A recurring theme within the operational strategy of rural development is the fight against food insecurity¹³⁴ achieved mainly through fostering education, the reduction of vulnerability to environmental risks as well as the development of infrastructure¹³⁵.

Deviating from the EU operational strategies for Iraq, a fourth operational strategy can be added in the case of Mali: Peace and Peace-building. Even though peace also represents an overall strategic objective of the EU in all three cases of Iraq, Afghanistan and Mali, the deterioration of the security situation in Mali has made peace and peace-building as immediate strategy indispensable. Therefore, the EU emphasises very often the need for an inclusive peace agreement leading to reconciliation of the different conflict parties. In this regard, the EU does not only call for a peace agreement as an aim in itself, but also “reiterates its commitment to supporting all efforts to this end and to assisting Mali in the implementation of the peace agreement by using all appropriate means and instruments at its disposal”¹³⁶. Concerning reconciliation, the EU stresses the need for an inclusive national dialogue (as explained above), and supports the Dialogue and Reconciliation Mission (CNDR) established by the government already in 2013 and the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) established in 2014.

In order to achieve all four intermediate aims through grand and operational strategies, the EU has a manifold variation of tools at hand, which it is willing to use in Mali when “relevant”¹³⁷ and “appropriate”¹³⁸. In June 2016, the EU sums the different policy tools up:

“The EU plays an important role in the region, applying its full range of instruments in the field of diplomacy, long-term development cooperation, support for human rights, stabilization efforts, resilience building, humanitarian assistance, and security, including CSDP missions.”¹³⁹

¹³¹ European Commission 2008, 51.

¹³² European Commission 2014, 13.

¹³³ European Commission 2015, 22, 25.

¹³⁴ European Commission 2014, 17; European Commission 2008, 49.

¹³⁵ European Commission 2015, 27, 29, 32.

¹³⁶ Council of the European Union 2015.

¹³⁷ See Council of the European Union 2015; Council of the European Union 2015; Council of the European Union 2015.

¹³⁸ Council of the European Union 2015.

¹³⁹ Council of the European Union 2016.

2.2.2 Policy Tools (Instruments), Programmes, and Measures

In this section, we use the term tools based on the findings and explanations in the Iraq case study. Given the multiple engagement of the EU in Mali, various tools are considered as “relevant and appropriate” supporting the EU strategies on the ground. As shown in table 4 (p.28 or annex 4.2), multiple tools are allocated to the respective strategies, ranging from more regional tools (Regional Indicative Programme, Sahel Strategy, EU Special Representative for the Sahel) to rather national tools (National Indicative Programme, EUTM Mali, EUCAP Sahel Mali¹⁴⁰). As this case study aims at analysing Council as well as Commission programmes, we focus in this section on the selected case-in-case studies, namely EUTM Mali, EUCAP Sahel Mali and PACTEA 2.

Case 1: The EU Training Mission (EUTM Mali) in the framework of CSDP

When the Council decided on 17 January 2013 to deploy a military CSDP mission through EUTM Mali, the EU responded not only to the request for help by the Malian government but also to UN resolution 2071, that called among member states for support through “**military training and the provision of equipment** and other assistance in efforts to combat terrorist and affiliated extremist groups, and to **provide assistance to Mali’s armed and security forces** as soon as possible in order to restore the State’s authority over its entire national territory.”¹⁴¹ . Since then, Mali has not only seen the third extension of the EUTM mandate and an intensified EU activity through the deployment of a second CSDP mission in 2014 (EUCAP Sahel Mali), but an overall EU engagement that strives to fully come up to the requirements that are claimed for in the framework of the comprehensive approach.¹⁴² In doing so, it is important to note that the EU regarded the security crisis in Mali from the very beginning as a key concern for the whole Sahel region, and EUTM thus as an integral part of the Sahel Strategy.¹⁴³ The restoration of the military capacities of the Malian Armed Forces, restoring the territorial integrity of the country as well as a reduction of terrorist threats constitute the central concerns that make up for the strategic objectives of the mission as outlined within the first mandate.¹⁴⁴ In order to account for these challenges, the mission’s operational objectives are roughly based on three pillars: training, advice and education. Moreover, “EUTM Mali shall aim at strengthening conditions for proper political control by legitimate civilian authorities of the MAF” and a “close coordination with other actors involved”¹⁴⁵, in particular ECOWAS and UN, is pursued.

¹⁴⁰ Even though during the writing of this case study, the EU agreed upon the regionalisation of the EU efforts and especially EUCAP Sahel Mali. See Council of the European Union 2017.

¹⁴¹ United Nations Security Council 2012, 4.

¹⁴² Council of the European Union 2013.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 3.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 5.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

The *operational tools*, applied to these ends, again, encompass the provision of “training support for (...) the MAF”, “training and advice on command and control, logistical chain and human resources” and finally “training on International Humanitarian Law, protection of civilians and human rights.”¹⁴⁶

While the mission’s overall mandate remained by and large the same throughout the years, some changes have been added within the third mandate, indicating an intensification of EU efforts in the region. While the first mandate limited its activities to the south of the country, focussing in particular on the training centre in Kolikouro close to Bamako, the third mandate envisaged a considerable geographical extension up north to the river Niger loop, including the particularly affected and largely unstable northern areas of Gao and Timbuktu. What is more, the 3rd mandate incorporates a contribution to the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process (DDR) as outlined in the Algiers peace agreement, thus responding to a pledge made by the Malian government.¹⁴⁷ Finally, the process of regional/international cooperation has been intensified by the 3rd mandate, as it provides for enhanced cooperation and interoperability with the newly created G5 Sahel.¹⁴⁸

However, this newly established cooperation does not only indicate a mere intensification of engagement, but must be viewed together with other activities as jointly constituting the fundament for the intermediate aim of *regional and local ownership*. In this respect, the *train the trainer* (TTT) - and *monitor the trainer*-strategies as well as the focus on a gradual decentralisation and handover of authority to the Malian counterparts must be especially highlighted.¹⁴⁹

Further intermediate aims of the overall EU strategy for Mali are echoed throughout the mandates:

- “Internationalisation”, above all referring to the close alignment of EUTM operative strategies with the strategies outlined in UN Resolution 2071 but also what regards the mission’s provision for cooperation with ECOWAS, AU and G5 Sahel.
- The “comprehensive approach” fostered through:
 - coordination of EU member states’ bilateral activities in Mali;
 - cooperation with and exploration of synergies with EUCAP Sahel Niger
 - close cooperation of the Council-led EUTM mission and the EU Delegation in Bamako which shall provide “local political guidance (...) in close coordination with the EU coordinator for Sahel.”¹⁵⁰

After five years of engagement, mere numbers seem to paint a rather positive picture what regards the success of EUTM Mali: 26 European countries are currently engaged in the mission, among them 22 member states. At last, 580 servicemen and women have been deployed and by now eight battle

¹⁴⁶ EUTM Mali - Public Affairs Office 2017, 3.

¹⁴⁷ Council of the European Union 2016, 3.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 4.

¹⁴⁹ EUTM Mali - Public Affairs Office 2017, 1.

¹⁵⁰ Council of the European Union 2013, 8.

groups have been trained and five battle groups retrained. Since the beginning of the mandate, 8000 soldiers received training which makes up for 2/3 of the Malian Armed Forces.¹⁵¹ Yet, when having a look at the overall security situation, preliminary conclusions should only be drawn cautiously and whether fruitful reforms can be achieved remains to be analysed in Deliverable 7.2.

In sum, EUTM Mali seems to display a rather positive example when only taking into account policy output. Among the range of intermediate aims of the EU in Mali, the mission focuses by and large on state building and coherence in this realm is given what regards the responsiveness of strategic objectives and operative strategies as well as operative strategies and operational tools respectively. Furthermore, close linkages are given when it comes to other intermediate aims, in particular what regards the strive for local ownership and the comprehensiveness of the EU's approach in Mali. However, the overall and long-term effectiveness remains questionable, above all when taking into account the relatively short-term deployment of the mission. Whether achievements made so far are sustainable on the long run and if and when a smooth handover of authority will be possible, remains to be seen.

Case 2: The EU Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP Sahel Mali) in the framework of CSDP

The mandate for the CSDP civilian mission EUCAP Sahel Mali of 25 March 2014 can be regarded as closely linked to its military counterpart. With the deployment of the mission, the EU entered for the first time a field, where it pursues a double engagement in terms of CSDP engagement.

Strategic objectives are quite related to the ones of EUTM Mali, namely the restoration and maintenance of democratic order, of state authority and legitimacy throughout the whole territory and the redeployment of the Malian administration.¹⁵² At the core of the mandate lies the implementation of the Security Sector Reform (SSR) as set out by the government and roughly summed up as support for the internal security forces (gendarmerie, National Guard and police). In terms of operational objectives, the EU mission thus aims at “improving their operational efficiency”, “re-establishing their hierarchical chains”, “reinforcing the role of judicial and administrative authorities” and “facilitating their redeployment to the north”¹⁵³.

In terms of operational tools, the mission set out the ultimate goal of training a third of the staff of Mali's internal security forces, providing individual training to senior and intermediate staff on the base of 100 hours over 4 weeks respectively. The content of the training encompasses “management and command, professional ethics, human rights and gender equality, intelligence techniques,

¹⁵¹ EUTM Mali - Public Affairs Office 2017.

¹⁵² Council of the European Union 2014, 4.

¹⁵³ European External Action Service June 2016.

professional intervention, criminal policing, counter-terrorism and public order”¹⁵⁴ and thus reveals some parallels with the EUTM mission mandate.

Similar to EUTM Mali, EUCAP Sahel Mali can be ranged under the intermediate aim of state-building. However, it reveals also considerable overlap with the aim of democracy. Particular emphasis here lies (even more than in the framework of EUTM) on the strategy of ownership outlined in the mandate that is achieved by a *train the trainer* concept, but, in contrast to EUTM Mali, also by an explicit involvement of the civil society and the Malian parliament¹⁵⁵. What is also interesting in this respect is the fact, that the mission states the possibility of recruiting international and local staff “if the functions required cannot be provided by personnel seconded by Member States”.¹⁵⁶

Furthermore, the mission is also explicitly embedded in the EU’s comprehensive approach in the Sahel and the mandate – also in close resemblance to EUTM – calls for consistency with EU development programmes, coordination with the Head of Delegation in Bamako and the Special Representative for the Sahel, and, even more as in EUTM, strives to explore synergies not only with EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Niger, but also with the EUBAM Libya Head of Mission.¹⁵⁷

Case 3: The European Commission’s engagement: Food Security (PACTEA 2)

The third case-in-case for an in-depth analysis is part of the European Commission programmes in the 10th EDF for “Water Supply and Sanitation Support Programme for Local Authorities”, PACTEA 2. The programme planned for the time 2013-2017 builds on the previous programme PACTEA 1 that had been aligned with the national strategies and the achievement of the Millenium Development Goals. With an overall budget of €30 million, PACTEA 1 aimed at enabling local authorities’ access to drinking water and sanitation in the regions Ségou, Mopti and Kayes. In the course of PACTEA 1, more than 304 000 inhabitants have gained access to drinking water, 1 710 family latrines and 238 public latrines were built and the local authorities capacities regarding water policy and management have been enhanced. However, in the regions of Koulikoro and Sikasso, some deficits have been detected by the European Commission, especially in terms of lacking equipment in the centres and a still relatively low percentage of the overall population’s access to water and basic sanitary infrastructures. Furthermore, high differences can be detected between urban and rural areas.¹⁵⁸ The second phase of the programme (PACTEA 2) in the years 2013-2017 aims at contributing to reduce poverty and to improve health conditions of the populations of rural and semi-urban centres in the regions of Koulikoro,

¹⁵⁴ EUCAP Sahel Mali 2017.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Council of the European Union 2014, 9.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 15.

¹⁵⁸ European Commission/DEVCO 2013, 33.

Sikasso, Segou and Tombouctou ensuring sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation. Its **main goals** are as follows:¹⁵⁹

- Construction of 70 rural water distribution systems, 110 boreholes for the mobilisation of water resources and installation of a piezometric network and about 2.000 sanitation units
- Assistance to the start-up of the water users' association
- Execution of 130 ortophoto maps as territorial communities tools for planning
- Strengthening the local authorities capacities in the health, water and sanitation sector.
- Contribution to the achievement of the MDG by increasing the drinking water supply rate
- Consolidation of the results of PACTEA 1.

The overall objective of PACTEA 2, reduction of poverty, does not fit quite well in the framework of objectives and strategies as outlined above. However, it constitutes a central part of development aid in the field of food security, especially with regard to the security-development nexus that is increasingly gaining importance. As the EU has recognised in the last years, development and security are becoming more and more intertwined. In this regard, poverty does play a role in the overall objectives of the EU in terms of stability and peace, although not explicitly stated in the Commissions document as such. However, the connection between PACTEA 2 and security is included insofar, as the risk of growing insecurity in the regions could affect the programme, especially in the region of Tombouctou.

By strengthening local authorities' capacities, the programme can be assigned to the operational strategy "Empowerment of institutions, personnel and civil society" under the third grand-strategy of "Reconstruction and Development".

Table 4: Mali – EU Objectives, Strategies, Tools (also in annex 4.3)

| Strategic objectives | Intermediate aims grand strategies | Operational Strategies (Transformative mechanisms) | POLICY TOOLS operational Instruments & policy programmes/ measures |
|--|---|---|---|
| Stability Peace Prosperity | 1 Democracy 1.1 Democratisation | 1. 1.A. Ownership <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lasting solution whereby African ownership is paramount • Democratic elections • National Dialogue 1.B. Reforms <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consolidation of State Institutions, Justice and Police • SSR | 1. 1.A. Regional Indicative Programme (EDF) IcSP PACTEA 2 1.B. National Indicative Programme (EDF) IcSP EUTM Mali |

¹⁵⁹ See Lotti Ingegneria S.P.A. 2013.

| | | | |
|--|---|--|--|
| | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Human Rights/International Humanitarian Law | |
| | <p>2 International Cooperation including regional cooperation</p> <p>2.1 Internationalisation including regionalisation</p> | <p>2. Bi- and multilateral Dialogue & partnership (socialisation)</p> <p>2.A Cooperation and Dialogue between countries of the region</p> <p>2.B Cooperation and Dialogue of EU with other international actors</p> | <p>2.</p> <p>2.A. EU Sahel Strategy EUSR for the Sahel EU Trust Fund Support ECOWAS Regional Indicative Programme Regionalisation of EUCAP</p> <p>2.B. Mobilise international community Close cooperation with AU / UN</p> |
| | <p>3 State-building</p> <p>3.1 Reconstruction and Development</p> | <p>3.</p> <p>3.A Capacity-building</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consolidation of State Institutions, Justice and Police • SSR <p>3.B Security governance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Territorial integrity • Immediate end of violence/ ceasefire <p>3.C Empowerment of institutions & personnel & civil society</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consolidation of State Institutions, Justice and Police • Human Rights/International Humanitarian Law | <p>3. EU Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF)</p> <p>3.A. EUCAP Sahel Mali</p> <p>3.B. EUTM Mali IcSP (SSR)</p> <p>3.C. EUTM Mali Resilience building PACTEA 2</p> |
| | <p>4 Peace</p> <p>4.1 Peace-Building</p> | <p>4.</p> <p>4.A Peace Agreement</p> <p>4.B Reconciliation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inclusive National Dialogue • Dialogue and Reconciliation Mission (CNDR) by gov. 2013 • Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) 2014 | <p>4.</p> <p>4.A. Participation in proposed Follow-Up Committee/ Mechanisms IcSP (Dialogue and Peace)</p> <p>4.B. Part of international Mediation team</p> |

3 How effective is the EU crisis response – in terms of policy output?

Policy-making is basically about identifying challenges and objectives, defining strategies and choosing instruments considered appropriate for achieving the said objectives and ultimately mitigating if not resolving the perceived challenges. This process may be more pro-active, if policy objectives are springing from domestic preferences formation processes and more re-active, if policy objectives are

related to external challenges not originating from domestic concerns and preferences. Pro-active and re-active policy-making process might be analytically distinct; however, in real-world terms both dimensions are more or less interconnected in one and the same process, not least a) in cases where externalities of the domestic agenda-setting are influencing external/ international incidents and processes, or b) in cases in which external incidents and processes might infringe on domestic preferences and interests. Both policy realms might vary in their interdependence – in terms of Keohane’s and Nye’s categories – via respective ‘sensitivities’ or ‘vulnerabilities’¹⁶⁰ – the degree of which presumably impacts on the responsiveness of any political system, including the EU’s foreign policy machinery.

While ultimately gauged in terms of impact effectiveness (reaching policy objectives and resolving the respective challenge/ problem influencing one’s preferences and interests)¹⁶¹, this report (Deliverable 7.1) is about the category of ‘output effectiveness’ here defined along the categories of a) *actor coherence/ actor unity & determinacy (covered in sub-section 3.1)*, b) *process coherence/ continuity & visibility of policy features, core concepts and institutional involvement (covered in sub-section 3.2)*, and c) *substantial consistency/ match of appropriateness according to expert literature (covered in sub-section 3.3)*. Since these terms and concepts are used in social science as much as in EU and EU foreign policy literature in many different ways, they must – for the sake of clear and unambiguous meanings – be operationalised for the following empirical investigation; this will be done at the beginning of each of the following sub-section.¹⁶²

Gathering relevant information on these criteria, indicators and their variations defined above are obviously problematic: How can we know or get to know the relevant information ultimately underlying our evaluations of output effectiveness without researchers being ‘participant observers’ across the many issues and levels of complex policy-making processes covered in our case studies? Nevertheless, even if analysts are participant observers, no one will ever get the full picture of a multi-actors and multi-level policy-making process. The best we can do regarding this challenge is to provide for a thorough investigation of documents and context information coming from the object of investigation, i.e. the European Union, its institutions and Member States, based on pertinent documents, expert literature and background talks with involved policy-makers of all levels of the policy-making process in Brussels and on-site of our cases. However, even then, the inferred judgements remain highly subjective that is interpretations. Moreover, availability of required information and data is a major challenge and thus the listed indicators are representing an ideal-

¹⁶⁰ Keohane and Nye 1977, 13-17.

¹⁶¹ Please note, ‘unity of action (or deeds)’ is part of evaluating ‘outcome effectiveness’ that is policy implementation by EU institutions and Member States due in Deliverables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4.

¹⁶² The method part of section 3, gathering all the sub-sections’ method elements, is available as table 11 in annex 4.9.

typical set of items which in reality will have to be applicable and applied merely selectively. Lacking viable alternatives, we can only take the ‘second best’ way which, however, is inter-subjectively transparent and evidence-based to allow any reader to monitor and, if applicable, verify or question our findings.

3.1 EU Output Effectiveness as Actor Coherence: output unity and determinacy

The concept of ‘coherence’ is commonly used rather arbitrarily in political practice as well as in academia or public debate.¹⁶³ If used for analytical purposes a specification of meanings is required. For our purposes, Nuttall proposal is followed understanding coherence to mean a) the ‘absence of contradictions’ (thus synonymous with ‘consistency’), b) absence or degree of internal struggles between institutions (‘turf battels’), and c) as institutional interaction bound ‘to the service of a common purpose’.¹⁶⁴ For our purposes, ‘coherence’ of EU policy-making is used in relation as ‘actor coherence’ in terms of ‘speaking with one voice’ (in sub-section 3.1.1 and 3.1.2), ‘process coherence’ as continuity and consistency of defining policy features (in sub-section 3.2.1), as continuity of consistency of core political concepts (sub-section 3.2.2 and 3.2.3), as well as institutional coherence in subsection 3.3.

How united is the EU in formulating its foreign policy? Since the EU is a multiple-actor policy maker this question aims at identifying and balancing relevant incidents of *horizontal* (in-)coherence/ (dis-) unity that is among EU institutions (the Council, the Commission, and the EU Parliament) as well as of *vertical* (in-)coherence/ (dis-)unity that is between EU institutions and EU Member States. For both sub-categories, the criterion for output effectiveness is ‘unity of voice’; since policy-making especially in democratic political systems is always about finding political compromises, unity of voice is manifest (indicated), if *viable* compromises are found and formulated as policy output that is decisions manifest in authoritative statements and documents by EU institutions and MS.

‘Viability’ is here indicated by a) the relative effort required to reach consensus on any given compromise prior to a decision taken (Do reports on initial disagreement and delayed compromise-finding surface in public reports or background talks?), and b) regarding post-decision making, by deviant positions and statements of MS and EU institutions. Non-viable compromises are thus indicated by compromises falling apart if considering part-takers’ statements and positions – not yet to speak about policy implementation that is outcome effectiveness in terms of unity/ dis-unity of action – after a decision was taken in and by EU institutions.

¹⁶³ For a thorough and conclusive treatment of this term’s history in EU policy-making and the field of EU studies as much as of the various dimensions and faces as well as political remedies for improving ‘coherence’, see Gebhard 2011.

¹⁶⁴ See *ibid.*, 111f. Nuttall 2005.

As additional indicator for ‘measuring’ actor unity/ unity of voice, we are taking up Daniel Thomas’ suggestion of considering the ‘determinacy’ of wording chosen by the EU when formulating its policy documents and statements in the following sub-section.

How united is the EU in formulating its foreign policy?

1.1 How controversial are core issues and thus are compromise-finding processes?

1.2 Are compromises found viable in terms of supported and maintained by post-decision statements and positions taken by participating actors?

1.3 How strict or ‘determinant’ are policy prescriptions as part of EU outputs, i.e. documents and statements?

3.1.1 Actor unity

The relatively short time between the first request by the Council to the HR/VP and the Commission to draft concrete proposals for further EU engagement in Mali (23.07.2012) and the launch of EUTM Mali in February 2013 already shows a quite high consensus among EU Member States and institutions on EU involvement in Mali. With the Malian president’s “call” for support with the view to restoring the country’s integrity on 18 September 2012, the process speeded up and already until the end of the year a draft Council Conclusion including a mandate for EUTM Mali for 15 months had been on the table (see table 6 in annex 4.4). The Council adopted the Decision 2013/34/CFSP establishing the European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali) on 17 January 2013 and the mission has been officially launched in Bamako on 20 February 2013. Considering the very short time period, there could hardly be any big postponements due to long revisions triggered by controversial positions among the Member States.

Given the short time since the launch of EUTM Mali, EUCAP Sahel Mali and PACTEA 2, official statements deviating from the position that the EU should further engage in Mali through its missions do not exist – quite the contrary: There is common sense that the EU should further increase its engagement in Mali, not only through EUTM and EUCAP, but also in the framework of development aid. For instance, the Council prolonged EUTM Mali’s Mandate for the third time on 23 March 2016 (until 18 May 2018), extending the mission area towards the Niger loop including the municipalities of Gao and Timbuktu.¹⁶⁵ The EU also strengthened its support of security in the region through the regionalisation of the EU Sahel Strategy in June 2017, establishing a regional coordination cell based within EUCAP Sahel Mali.¹⁶⁶ This would have been hardly possible if any Member State had shown reluctance or obtained a rather controversial position towards the EU engagement.

¹⁶⁵ EUTM Mali 2017.

¹⁶⁶ Council of the European Union 2017.

What cannot be overestimated in the case of Mali is the role of France. As already indicated in the introductory part of this report, France has been central in pushing for stronger EU engagement in Mali. The enormous role can for instance be seen when taking a look at the French operation Serval that came quite “surprising” at a time, where EU and UN engagement had been in the planning.

After the terror attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015, France sought to „step up its operations in Syria“ in its „determination to combat terrorism“ and therefore asked the European partners for support in Mali:

“I have asked the defense minister to take up this matter tomorrow with our European colleagues under article 42 (7) of the Treaty on European Union, the solidarity clause, which states that when one State is attacked, all the Member States shall have the obligation to provide aid and assistance because the enemy is not just France’s enemy, it is Europe’s enemy.”¹⁶⁷

Being the main actor in drafting Council conclusions and as a main stakeholder before implementing the EU missions, France doubtlessly influenced the scope and intensity of EU engagement to a great extent. The other member states committed quite fast with political, financial and human resources and a larger legitimacy and broad consensus for a need to engage in Mali has been there from the beginning, due to the UN resolution as an umbrella.¹⁶⁸

3.1.2 Policy determinacy

How strict or ‘determinant’ are policy prescriptions as part of EU outputs, i.e. documents and statements? As additional indicator for ‘measuring’ actor unity/ unity of voice, we are taking up *Daniel Thomas’* suggestion of considering the ‘determinacy’ of wording chosen by the EU when formulating its policy documents and statements.¹⁶⁹ The more stringently a wording is that is the less room for manoeuvring and interpretation it provides for individual actors in EU foreign policy-making, the greater is the determinacy. Strict formulations may on the one hand indicate a stronger resolve for a prescribed policy course, on the other hand, a high determinacy also indicates a stronger commitment and compromise viability of a given policy prescription. The analytical criteria used for the respective text analysis and ‘frames’ are gathered in table 9 (annex 4.7). The more often we find strict wordings, the greater the determinacy and the greater output effectiveness along the lines of this category.

Building on Thomas’ framework, Council conclusions and decisions from the case study Mali were inductively analysed in order to extract those verbs used by the EU in official documents. These verbs used by the EU could be categorised in four categories, ranging from the strongest to the weakest

¹⁶⁷ France Diplomatie - Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères 2013.

¹⁶⁸ Interview with EEAS officials in Brussels, 7 March 2017.


¹⁶⁹ Thomas 2012, 549f. Since we are not starting from assumption that mono-causal explanations are viable, we also do not assume ‘actor unity’ to be the one and only factor ‘determining’ policy effectiveness (success or failure). Hence, we take as our premise what Thomas presented as his result that is that ‘policy coherence’ may be a necessary but certainly not a sufficient pre-condition for effectiveness. For other usages of the concept of “determinacy” see, for example (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005... etc.)

wording. The EU is strongest and hence most determined when acting as an (1) executing institution, less strong but still acting when being a (2) supporter, not acting but still somehow determined when being (3) expressive and passive or weak when being rather (4) reflective in its wording.

For some expressions, only syllables were used for coding since with word stems it is easy to grasp all possible parts of speech, from verbs over nouns to participles (see table 9 in annex 4.7). This linguistic analysis is carried out with the programme atlas.ti.

The linguistic analysis of the relevant Council and Commission documents has shown that the EU shifted from a rather non-active position in 2010 and 2011 towards a more supportive and executive actor from the years 2012-2016 (see graph 1). However, it has to be clarified that especially in the later documents, the EU’s increasing supportive position, focusing on support to local actors – especially the G5 – is in line with the EU’s overall principle of local ownership (more on local ownership see section 3.2).

Graph 1. Determinacy Mali in Council and Commission documents



3.2 EU Output Effectiveness as Process Coherence: Continuity and Visibility of Core Policy Features, Concepts and Institutions

‘Process coherence’ is in this study operationalised in terms of continuity and visibility of a) core policy features (regarding documented policy premises & objectives, strategies & instruments), and b) core concepts (comprehensive approach, conflict sensitivity, local ownership). Hence, if core policy features or core concepts characterizing EU policy output, identified in previous sections, are continuously and consistently reappearing in EU documents and statements, this indicates a high degree of process coherence and contributes to a positive input for the overall evaluation of output effectiveness along the line of vertical and horizontal actor coherence (s.a.). If features and concepts are not regularly

reappearing but are used indeterminately or are successively phase-out over the time span covered by the selected EU documents, this constitutes evidence for a lack of coherence and hence a negative input to the overall evaluation of output effectiveness.

This criterion and its indicators will also be analysed in two steps: First a quantitative text analysis is conducted based on those sample documents identified for this case study for empirically analysing the features and core concepts of EU policy-output in previous sections. Second, the quantitative results will be contextualised and qualitatively interpreted for assessing the quality of effectiveness along the lines of our second category of output effectiveness.

The guiding questions for addressing this second category hence read as follows:

How coherent is the EU process of policy-formation?

- 3.2.1. How continuously used and visible are, throughout the process of policy-formulation on the strategic and operational level, in terms of identified policy features (premises & objectives, strategies & instruments), and
- 3.2.2. Core concepts: comprehensive approach, conflict sensitivity?
- 3.2.3. How coherent is the EU in policy formation regarding its local dimension?
- 3.2.4. How coherent is the involvement of EU institutions?

3.2.1 Continuity and visibility of policy features

Output coherence is in this study operationalised first in terms of continuity and visibility of core policy features (regarding documented policy premises & objectives, strategies & instruments). Hence, if core policy features characterizing EU policy output, identified in previous sections, are continuously reappearing in EU documents and statements, this indicates a high degree of coherence and contributes to a positive input for the overall evaluation of output effectiveness. If features and concepts are not regularly reappearing but are used indeterminately or are successively phase-out over the time span covered by the selected EU documents, this constitutes evidence for a lack of coherence and hence a negative input to the overall evaluation of output effectiveness.

The chronological analysis of problem definitions in Council documents has shown that all five indicated categories in chapter 2.1 of this report (organised crime, terrorism, food crisis, deterioration of the security as well as of the humanitarian situation) have been running throughout all Council conclusions and decisions from 2010-2016. However, the latest Council documents put a special focus on the regional and trans-boundary dimension, especially in terms of organised crime and terrorism. This shift towards the regional dimension can also be underpinned by the field of food security, mainly in Commission documents. Here, the Commission identified a move from an economic insecurity towards a rather structural insecurity (see chapter 2.1).

Additionally, in April 2015, the Council included migration for the first time as a problem in its conclusions about the Regional Action Plan 2015-2020. This does not come as a surprise when taking a look at the numbers of asylum applicants in the EU coming from Mali. In 2014, the number of total asylum applicants from Mali in EU/EFTA amounted to 13,125, the highest number from 2008-2016 (see table 7 in annex 4.5). The Commission, however, has put migration much earlier on its agenda, as it has recognised it as a focal problem in Mali already in the RIPs and NIPs from 2008-2014. Since the competence and responsibility for development policy, of which migration is part of, lays with the Commission, the inclusion of migration in Council documents as well could serve as an indicator for a shift towards securitisation of the migration issue. Relating to that, the Commission also shifted its focus from an economic focus on regional stability in the RIP 2008-2013 towards a stronger security focus in the RIP 2014-2020. Besides, the comparison of the EU Sahel Strategy (2011) with the Regional Action Plan (2015), which had been designed to implement the Sahel Strategy, shows a similar shift: although not included in the EU Sahel Strategy, the Regional Action Plan sets its focus on migration and border management as well as trans-national movements.

In sum, as to problem definition, the EU ensured overall coherence throughout its documents although the focus has definitely strongly shifted towards the regional dimension of the crisis and Mali and towards a stronger focus on security, including migration.

Throughout the time frame of analysis in this study, the EU's overall strategic objectives, intermediate aims, grand and operational strategies as well as policy tools did not show high deviation. Taking into account the relatively short time of EU engagement in Mali, a bigger change in strategies or tools would be very surprising. Therefore, in the case of Mali, high coherence accounts for the EU objectives, strategies and tools.

3.2.2 Continuity and visibility of core concepts: Conflict sensitivity and comprehensive approach

Another dimension of process coherence concerns the continuous and consistent use of core policy concepts ('conceptual coherence'). In its core documents and major policy statements, EU foreign policy actors have declared their concern for a conflict sensitive ('conflict sensitivity') and a comprehensive policy approach ('comprehensive approach') as indispensable prerequisites for effective and successful conflict and crisis management. Due to its even more prominent appearance in EU documents, a third core concept that is 'local actors'/'local ownership' will be covered separately in the following sub-section.

As additional indicator for 'measuring' output coherence of core concepts, we are taking up a similar approach to a quantitative analysis in order to find out if the respective concepts do continuously appear in EU documents or not. The analytical criteria used for the respective text analysis and 'frames' are gathered in table 10 (annex 4.8). The more of these words are present in EU documents, the higher

the chance that the concepts are continuously applied or at least mentioned in EU documents. Council conclusions and decisions from the case study Mali were inductively analysed in order to extract those words used by the EU in official documents in the context of conflict sensitivity, comprehensive approach and local ownership (see table 10 in annex 4.8). This linguistic analysis is carried out with the programme atlas.ti.

“Conflict sensitivity”

The term *conflict sensitivity* has gained more and more attention in EU crisis and conflict management throughout the last years. A conflict sensitive approach is central for all EU engagement, as stated in the main policy documents concerning the EU’s approach to conflict prevention.

The meaning of the conflict sensitive approach already dates back to the European Union Programme for the Prevention of Conflicts in 2001, in which the EU stated that

“Successful prevention must be based on accurate information and analysis as well as clear options for action for both long- and short-term prevention. It requires enhanced field cooperation. Coherence must be ensured in early warning, analysis, planning, decision-making, implementation and evaluation.”¹⁷⁰

In 2007, the EU the first time explicitly links a “conflict sensitive assessment” to coherence and consistency in its Council Conclusions on Security and Development by:

“[...] systematically carrying out security/**conflict sensitive assessments** and conflict analysis, where appropriate, in the preparation of country and regional strategies and programmes.”¹⁷¹

However, a comprehensive definition of what a conflict sensitive engagement actually means, is lacking in most of the documents. In the academic debate, mainly three approaches to a conceptualisation of conflict sensitivity prevail. As a matter of space constraint, they are listed here in a very simplified form:

1. “Do No Harm”- approach by Anderson (1999)¹⁷². This understanding of conflict sensitivity includes the recognition that all actions affect a conflict. The aim with a conflict sensitive engagement is to avoid negative impact and maximise the positive impact of the actions.
2. “Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)” by Bush (1999)¹⁷³. This broader approach includes not only the causality from action to conflict, but also the fact that the conflict also

¹⁷⁰ Council of the European Union 2001

¹⁷¹ Council of the European Union 2007

¹⁷² See Anderson 1999. See also APFO et al. January 2004; Barbolet et al. 2005. A comprehensive discussion about the different conceptualisations of conflict sensitivity is provided by Haider 2014

¹⁷³ See Bush 1998

has effects on the action. It therefore requires a two-way assessment of the action-conflict relationship.

3. “Aid for Peace” approach by Pfaffenholz and Reyhler (2005)¹⁷⁴. This approach draws upon the two-way assessment of the PCIA-approach, but has as a starting point the examination of the needs of the local context and includes the dimension of contributing to peace building.

As for the Commission and the Council, all references to conflict sensitivity can be allocated rather to the first “Do no harm”-approach or between the first and the second approach. The EU institutions almost copy the concept of *Saferworld*¹⁷⁵, as for example in a Commission document of 2013 in which it aims at “ensuring that EU actions avoid having a negative impact and maximise the positive impact on conflict dynamics”. Later in the document, the Commission even stated: “By applying a pro-active conflict sensitive approach we increase the EU’s adherence to the “Do No Harm” principle”¹⁷⁶.

Even though an official EU staff handbook from June 2015 about “Operating in situations of conflict and fragility”¹⁷⁷ seems to include more than a “Do No Harm”-approach, evaluations reported to the Commission still take as a benchmark the “Do No Harm” approach.¹⁷⁸

As this H 2020 project and this report provides a “conflict sensitive unpacking of the EU comprehensive approach to conflict and crises mechanism”¹⁷⁹, we will apply the EU concept of conflict sensitivity to our case studies since an evaluation of EU action does only make sense if evaluated with appropriate measures. Even though the discussion about the appropriateness of the EU’s adoption of one of the narrow concepts has to be conducted at some time, we will take the existent EU approach for now. Hence, for analysing the continuity and visibility of conflict sensitivity at the output-stage of EU policy-making we will evaluate whether conflict sensitivity has been continuously reappearing in EU documents and statements; if so, this indicates a high degree of coherence and contributes to a positive input for the overall evaluation of output effectiveness. If the concept is not regularly reappearing but is used indeterminately or are successively phase-out over the time span covered by the selected EU documents, this constitutes evidence for a lack of coherence and hence a negative input to the overall evaluation of output effectiveness.

¹⁷⁴ See Pfaffenholz 2005.

¹⁷⁵ Saferworld is a NGO that is often financed by the EU in order to provide it with conceptual frameworks. The “Do not harm” approach by Saferworld has been defined as: 1. Understand the context; 2. Understand the nature of intervention; 3. Analyse the interaction between the intervention and the context and 4. Avoid negative impacts and maximise positive impact. See Saferworld June 2012.

¹⁷⁶ See European Commission - International Cooperation and Development 2013.

¹⁷⁷ See Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development - EuropeAid and European Commission June 2015

¹⁷⁸ See ICF Consulting Services Limited February 2016

¹⁷⁹ As stated in the EUNPACK project proposal.

The vagueness about the EU's definition of conflict sensitivity, about how to deal with this concept and how to include it in EU crisis and conflict management becomes more than obvious when talking with officials from EU institutions in Brussels. Whereas ECHO officials at least showed awareness of the "Do No Harm"-approach, three officials of the EEAS (two of them in CMPD) have not known conflict sensitivity as a concept. After explaining it, the persons interviewed stated that the "EEAS automatically acts conflict sensitive, without knowing, since CSDP aims at reconciliation"¹⁸⁰. This answer is symptomatic for beautiful EU concepts that have not only remained unexplained to EU officials, but are also not even formulated in a comprehensive manner with practical guidance for the persons in charge. If not even the persons responsible in the Crisis Management Planning Directorate have a clue about the concepts that are so central for EU engagement, a big question mark can be put over the probability of a conflict sensitive approach during the implementation of EU programmes. One EEAS official even called the concept a "luxury concept"¹⁸¹, while the real motives that are taken into account before planning an EU engagement are not primarily local needs, but rather political risks and benefits, budgetary impacts, risks for human beings, security interests or the cost of (non-) commitment. Another dilemma of any EU engagement in any destabilised country presents the balance between the need to keep stability in the country in order to prevent migration or radicalism and preserving the status-quo that might feed the ongoing conflict.¹⁸² In Mali, for instance, the role of the government in the outbreak of the crisis is quite controversial. While the EU works together with the government and takes the government as a partner, others find that the "direct collusion between the state and local militias has never been so explicit, demonstrating that local spoilers of peace processes might in fact not be so local"¹⁸³.

The quantitative analysis shows that the concept of conflict sensitivity in fact had been part of EU documents throughout the years (see graph 2). This could actually confirm coherence in terms of continuity and visibility of the concept. However, it also draws even more importance on the question considering the lack of knowledge of EU officials of the whole concept as such.


¹⁸⁰ Interview with EEAS officials in Brussels, 7 March 2017.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Interview with ECHO officials in Brussels, 6 March 2017.

¹⁸³ Guichaoua 2016.

Graph 2: Mali – Core Concepts



“Holistic/Comprehensive Approach”

The second of the three main principles of EU action consists of the *comprehensive approach* (CA). Often used interchangeable with the terms *holistic approach* or more recently the *integrated approach*, the concept of the CA has many meanings. It covers everything, from consistency between policies (security-development nexus) and an understanding of all stages of the conflict cycle over a joined-up deployment of EU instruments and resources and shared responsibilities of all levels (EU and member states) to coordination with international partners and conflict sensitivity, local ownership and lessons learned. Hence, in EU terms, a comprehensive approach covers all aspects that have to be taken into account in EU engagement. In the sense of the EU concept and in the light of recent literature, we will adopt the notion of a comprehensive approach with four dimensions by Post (2015)¹⁸⁴ as followed:

1. Crisis Management Instruments and Activities – What?
“The first CA dimension applies to the coordination of different types of crisis management activities such as development, political or security means.”
2. Timeframes – When?
“A second dimension deals with the different timeframes of comprehensive crisis management and asks how short-term and long-term crisis management instruments can be linked.”
3. Geographical Levels – Where?
“A third dimension which can be observed refers to different geographical dimensions of conflict and its potential international, regional and local levels.”
4. Crisis Management Actors – Who with whom?

¹⁸⁴ Post 2015, 82.

“The fourth dimension of elements to be coordinated refers to different crisis management actors either within a system or an organization or with other actors and to the extent and with what effect their activities are coordinated.”


How? “Finally, the question how different means are coordinated is relevant for all dimensions and also between them.”

As the underlying principle of all EU action and therefore the EU’s comprehensive approach is local ownership and since local ownership is part of conflict sensitivity, the concepts can be visualised as in the adjacent illustration.

For the first dimension (“What?”), it is obvious that the EU uses its wide range of its instruments and tools at hand in Mali. As can be seen in table 4 (annex 4.2), the EU uses diplomatic, political and military instruments in order to achieve its four grand strategies. The two missions EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali are accompanied by programmes framed in national and regional strategies and indicative programmes under the EDF. The EU also carries out programmes under other financial instruments, especially under the EU Trust Fund, as well as short-term programmes under the IcSP. Furthermore, the EU established Special Representative (EUSR) for the Sahel in order to ensure better coordination on the ground and better communication between the field and Brussels. When it comes to its diplomatic instruments, the EU has been part of the international mediation team in Mali as well as in the proposed Follow-Up Committee for the Peace Agreement.

The time dimension (“When?”) falls short in the case of Mali. Given the very short period of EU engagement so far, it is hardly possible to assess how the long-term and short-term instruments are linked or which instruments will really be long- or short-term. For instance, it is not clear, how long the two missions will be in place, which were planned to be short-term measures but extended regularly. What can be said in this regard is that the EU already shows a very high scope of engagement, implemented in a rather short time.

Regarding the third dimension (“Where?”), the EU pursues a rather regional approach. The national efforts are always seen in a broader, regional dimension, taking the whole sub-Saharan region into account, in the part of problem analysing but also when it comes to effects of programmes to the whole region. The EU clearly sees the interconnectedness of the sub-Saharan countries and the importance of a regional approach, which can also be underpinned by the recent regionalisation of



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EUCAP Sahel Mali. Besides, the regional approach is not surprising considering the nature of the EU as a regional organisation itself. For sure, it is not the primary aim of the EU to “export” its own structure, but this is, where the EU can be a best advisor. Considering the actions in Mali itself, it is self-evident that the EU’s efforts concentrate in the south of the country when it comes to development aid. Recently, also Timbouctou has been included in, i.e. PACTEA 2, but the progress there relies on a stable security situation. It remains a difficult task to balance the locations of its programmes and not exacerbate the conflict through programmes concentrated in the southern part of Mali while the security situation in the north does not allow for more engagement and therefore the north is, so far, quite “left alone”, not only by the government, but also when it comes to EU programming.

As for the fourth dimension (“Who with whom?”), the EU stresses in all its documents the close cooperation with regional and international bodies, especially with ECOWAS, the UN, the AU and, recently growing, the G5. Remarkably, all Council documents emphasise the importance of cooperation with these bodies, but in comparison rather seldom mention the importance to work with national or local bodies, left alone communities. The question of the extent and the effect of the coordination of activities with other actors will be covered in the next phase of the project when it comes to implementation.

Considering all four dimensions, the EU approach seems quite comprehensive. However, when considering the fifth dimension (“How coordinated?”), the difficulties of inter-institutional cooperation between the EEAS and the Commission with its respective Directorate-Generals DEVCO and ECHO have to be taken into account (see section 3.2.4). The coordination problems somehow hinder a real comprehensive approach since without institutionalised cooperation and coordination, a comprehensive approach remains an utopia.

The quantitative analysis reveals that before and after the phase of the implementation of the two CSDP missions the concept of “comprehensive approach” has been more stressed in EU documents. During the “high phases” of CSDP launching, however, a shift can be detected towards local ownership. It seems that as soon as the EU is not involved through CSDP missions in Mali, the role of local ownership increases. Which is quite paradox, taking into account that local ownership becomes more important when an “outsider” – in this case the EU – enters the stage (see graph 2).

3.2.3 How coherent is the EU in policy formation regarding its local dimension?

The overall EUNPACK project, as an innovative element of analysis, emphasises the local dimension of EU crisis response policy that is the significance of involving and cooperating with local actors, state and non-state, NGO and Civil Society actors. For the evaluation of output effectiveness, however, we do not consider the *perception* of these local non-state and state-actors relevant, but rather their incorporation into EU policy-making. Hence, this aspect of ‘process coherence’ is addressed in this separate sub-section of this part of the analysis. In view of the wide-spread dis-satisfaction with the

results of peace- and state-building (if not outright failure)– not just of the European Union but also of other international actors, to name only the United States or the United Nations – the EU itself has not least as part of its Comprehensive Approach of 2013, ascribed to a shift from a top-down to a bottom-up policy approach; an outright evidence was provided as part of the above policy analysis when identifying ‘local ownership’ as one of the explicit grand strategies of EU crisis response.¹⁸⁵ This policy shift is also reflected in the pertinent expert literature on peace- and state-building addressing the local turn/ non-state turn/ hybrid turn (of governance)/ bottom-up turn in the state- and peace-building community.¹⁸⁶

As to incorporate this policy claim and important dimension, the evaluation of output-effectiveness will also address the EU’s performance regarding the inclusion of ‘locals’, here on the level of policy-formulation. The concept of ‘locals’ encompass state- as well as non-state actors, in terms of civil society organisations (CSO), traditional and customary authority and justice structures, non-state or non-statutory armed actors.¹⁸⁷ Our first concern must be *why* the EU considers involvement of locals important.

“Ownership” *ideally* stands for sharing or embracing EU premises (including basic policy norms of ‘good governance’ that is democracy, human rights and rule of law), policy analyses, the formulation of policy objectives, adequate strategies and use of policy tools as legitimate and effective for policy-making. It is not just about constitutive characteristics of local people, but also a relational concept qualifying the political balance between outsiders and insiders of during the process of state- and peace-building. The concept contains also a post- or neo-colonial dimension in terms of outsiders more or less aiming at empowering or imposing local communities and actors.¹⁸⁸ Certainly, this ownership can take different qualities, for examples these premises and other policy-making elements could be an intrinsic part of local actors’ identity and generic parts of their sets of political values, interests and preferences. In contrast, ownership could be a more superficial quality of actors ascribing to EU policy preference merely due to instrumental and opportunistic purposes.¹⁸⁹

Thus, it will be important to analyse the degree of matching normative premises and political preferences of the EU and respective local actors or existing tensions between the outsiders and the locals. In this context, it is also significant *how* the locals are included in terms of envisaged involvement into EU activities (i.e. patterns of communication & involvement), a) regarding the

¹⁸⁵ See chapter 2.2.

¹⁸⁶ See for example Richmond, Björkdahl, and Kappler 2011; likewise compare EUUNPACK D 3.02.

¹⁸⁷ The author gratefully acknowledges the inspiration and information underlying this part provided by the MA-thesis of Philipp Neubauer (MA-IR, FU-HU-UP, 2017).

¹⁸⁸ See Donais 2009.

¹⁸⁹ However, these quality dimension will become relevant in the following Deliverables under WP 7 (7.2, 7.3, 7.4) when EU policy implementation will get the centre stage of analysis.

different stages of a policy-making cycle (i.e. during policy formulation, implementation and assessment), and b) whether it is done proactively or merely at the demand of the respective locals. Moreover, it is significant which *role* are ascribed to ‘local actors’: are they conceived as mere condition takers or also as condition makers, as actual providers of security or justice, or structural facilitators of inclusion, oversight and legitimacy. Hence the control of locals over the policy-making process in practice and on the ground matter throughout the policy-cycle.¹⁹⁰

The questions guiding research on this aspect read as follows:

1. Why are ‘locals’ represented in EU documents and policy formulation (policy output)?
2. What kind of local state and non-state actors are considered during the input and outcome phase of policy-making?
3. Which patterns of communication & involvement and which roles are foreseen, recommended or supposedly required for successful engagement?

When it comes to local ownership in EU Council conclusions and decisions for Mali, it is mostly referred to regional or national ownership, with national meaning the Malian government. For instance, the EU stresses “National Ownership” with “regionally-owned processes”¹⁹¹, African ownership being “paramount”¹⁹² or “Malian, regional and African ownership is essential”¹⁹³. The National Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission aims at enabling “Mali’s key players to take ownership of the results of the process of negotiation, including with all non-terrorist and non-criminal armed movements which agree unconditionally to respect the unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Mali”¹⁹⁴. In its conclusions on the EU Sahel Strategy, the EU stresses the need for “support to local and regional endeavours” and that “the primary responsibility and ownership for peace, security and development is with the governments of the Sahelian region”¹⁹⁵. Similar focus can be detected in the Sahel Regional Action Plan 2015-2020:

“The implementation of the Action Plan will be carried out with the full ownership and under the primary responsibility of the countries concerned, and in coordination with key international and regional organisations and other partners, in particular the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), the G5 Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the World Bank, as well as with civil society.”¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁰ See Donais 2008, 6f.

¹⁹¹ Council of the European Union 2012.

¹⁹² Council of the European Union 2012.

¹⁹³ Council of the European Union 2012.

¹⁹⁴ Council of the European Union 2013.

¹⁹⁵ Council of the European Union 2014.

¹⁹⁶ Council of the European Union 2015.

In line with the EU Sahel strategy, the EU “reiterates its commitment to support regional and country-led and owned initiatives in the framework of the Action Plan”¹⁹⁷. Concerning the peace agreement of May and June 2015, the EU furthermore stresses that “the primary responsibility for delivering these commitments rests with all Malian parties themselves”¹⁹⁸. However, it is quite difficult to find out, whom exactly the EU addresses in its Council decisions and conclusions when referring to local ownership. Basically, local ownership in EU documents can be put into four categories: “National”, “Malian”, “Regional” and “African” ownership (see annex, table 5). Whereas national ownership by OECD definition means the government’s ownership, the term Malian ownership lacks a clear definition (government, NGOs, civil society?), like the other terms as well.¹⁹⁹ The Commission documents relevant to this case study do not provide much more details, although one specification could be found. In the NIP of 2008, “appropriation” (the French term for ownership) at one point explicitly refers to local authorities (“collectivités territoriales”) in the framework of decentralisation, the natural resources management and the environmental protection.²⁰⁰ We can assume that local authorities do not mean the Malian government, but the Commission leaves us in the dark with regard to who it explicitly means by local authorities.

The only specifications that are made in Council documents relate to the national dialogue necessary for a peace agreement between the groups involved in the conflict. Here, the EU clearly indicate, which local actors are meant: “representatives of the northern population”²⁰¹, “armed groups not involved in terrorist activities”²⁰², “all non-terrorist and non-criminal armed movements which agree unconditionally to respect the unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Mali”²⁰³ as well as “civilian representatives”²⁰⁴. Those groups should agree to a peace agreement and take the full responsibility to implement this agreement.

When going beyond the pure phrasing of local ownership, the EU puts a strong focus on supporting regional forces, especially ECOWAS and a strengthening of the G5. ECOWAS has been the most important partner in Mali, as emphasised in nearly all Council documents, but the G5 constitutes one other very central regional partner and actor in the Sahel, which is constantly developing towards a stronger regional “institution”.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Council of the European Union 2015.

¹⁹⁹ According to OECD definition, national ownership means “the effective exercise of a government’s authority over development policies and activities, including those that rely – entirely or partially – on external resources. For governments, this means articulating the national development agenda and establishing authoritative policies and strategies”. See OECD Statistics Directorate 2007.

²⁰⁰ European Commission 2008, 92.

²⁰¹ Council of the European Union 2012; Council of the European Union 2012.

²⁰² Council of the European Union 2012; Council of the European Union 2013.

²⁰³ Council of the European Union 2013.

²⁰⁴ Council of the European Union 2013; Council of the European Union 2013.

Concerning national ownership, the EU coordinates with the Malian government on how engagement is carried out in order to ensure that the government can take over at one point of time, i.e. in the sector of health care. Nonetheless, the field of health care provides an example for the difficulties that can arise in the course of EU engagement. The EU, namely ECHO, provides free health care for the Malian population which is existential for an improvement of the humanitarian situation. Building local capacities and structures and providing training to local health care staff “needs to be done”²⁰⁵, but where the locals are able to take over, the care is stopped. Hence, it is very difficult to provide a transition plan and the exit strategy therefore remains very viable. What strikes the most, is that the provision of free health care is against Malian law.²⁰⁶ Engaging in a way that is against the law of the respective country clearly shows the conflict line between local ownership and conflict sensitivity that has to be balanced somehow.

Furthermore, the EU also lacks an exit strategy of its engagement through the two missions as an indispensable element in order to make the aim of local ownership credible in the end. When scrutinizing EU documents and taking into account the quite “regular” prolongation of missions and EU engagement, approaches to exit strategies can hardly be found. Although the timeframe of EU engagement doubtlessly depends on the development of the situation in Mali, one could expect at least some kind of indication about how long the EU foresees its engagement and how it plans the gradual transition. However, the issue of local ownership in the implementation phase of EU engagement will be addressed in the next step of this project.

In sum, although the concept of local ownership continues to be stressed as highly important in EU documents, it lacks specifications and/ or definitions of who is really meant when speaking of *local*.

3.2.4 Institutional Coherence

Institutional coherence is conceptualised as horizontal-internal coherence of policy-making across Community and Council foreign policy domains. This type of ‘coherence’ is first of all about technical and procedural policy coordination ‘across pillars’. However, this dimension might become political and politicised, if Member States might be tempted to interfere with procedural coordination.²⁰⁷

For our analytical purposes, ‘institutional coherence’ is defined as involvement of EU institutions and agencies according to the governing rules as ultimately defined in the Treaty of Lisbon, and respective operational mandates. It becomes manifest in terms or regular engagement of the mandated institution as well as successfully policy coordination during the decision-making and output generation of policy-making among EU institutions, the Council, the Commission, but also the EU Parliament. If our empirical investigation shows significant overlap or even doubled responsibility for

²⁰⁵ Interview with ECHO official in Brussels, 6 March 2017.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ See Gebhard 2011, 107f.

the same assignment, ‘turf wars’ among agencies or significant time-lags in decision-making, this indicates weak or lacking institutional coherence.²⁰⁸

When it comes to inter-institutional cooperation within the Commission, several points can be made. In order to ensure a comprehensive approach, both bodies ECHO and DEVCO have to work together closely. As it is day-to-day-business in Brussels, there are informal meetings in terms of coffee breaks, lunch etc. in order to exchange views between the officials. But there are, of course, also formal inter-service meetings, regular written cooperation and meetings considering the allocation of funds. Especially when it comes to the Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) and the formulation of the Multi-annual Framework (MAF), some caveats can be detected in ECHO-DEVCO Cooperation. ECHO invites DEVCO for comments on the HIP, but the comments made by DEVCO have been weak and wishes are only limited taken into account. On the other hand, DEVCO invites ECHO for formulating the MAF, which is mostly consistent and therefore only minor adjustments by ECHO have been made, in order to make better links between humanitarian and development aid. However, three sectors covered by the MAF do not cover the priorities of ECHO, which are nutrition, health and rapid response. Even though the included food security covers nutrition to some extent, the rest is left out.²⁰⁹ Answers to the question why this is the case could not be provided since the officials had not been there when the MAF was discussed. This again shows the difficulty of grasping the institutional memory of an institution, in which the persons in charge change their positions regularly. Changes or adjustments in the MAF can hardly be made, ECHO could only try to influence the mid-term review at the time of interviews, but this is seen to be a quite difficult task.²¹⁰ Still, when it comes to comments or advice taken into account by the other Commission service, there is the impression that ECHO has more to say when it is invited by DEVCO than the other way around.

An important aspect of cooperation between ECHO and DEVCO is information sharing and access. As a matter of its institutional nature, ECHO is “not part of any political agenda”²¹¹ and therefore a politically independent actor of the EU, strongly emphasizing the principles of neutrality and the Humanitarian Aid Consensus. According to ECHO officials, information sharing is therefore very difficult, if not impossible, in order to avoid not only denied access by locals but also to prevent partners from being at stake. What is shared or not shared with DEVCO and the EEAS depends on a kind of common “intelligence sense”²¹² of a maximum of detailed information that can be provided by ECHO. Taking into consideration that the main challenge in Mali identified by DEVCO is access, since without access monitoring cannot be assured, the policy of information sharing could be reconsidered

²⁰⁸ See Missiroli 2001; Gebhard 2011; Bartholmé 2007.

²⁰⁹ Interview with ECHO officials in Brussels, 6 March 2017.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Ibid.

in order to enhance a comprehensive and more effective engagement of the EU. Besides, DEVCO is quite unsatisfied with the decreased annual envelope for Mali by ECHO which is closely connected to an overall budget cut of ECHO from last year (€42 million) to this year (€27 million).²¹³

The most difficult coordination problem of DEVCO concerns the cooperation with EU member states. Member states are “not keen in sharing plan priorities”²¹⁴ and therefore often hamper the dialogue and an overall comprehensive approach. Despite the deficiency in information sharing with EU member states, the integrated approach is “pretty advanced”²¹⁵ in Mali, with a good overview of actions by the Commission and EU member states.

Regarding the coordination between the Commission and the EEAS, the lack of institutionalised cooperation rather hinders a comprehensive approach to the Mali conflict. There is cooperation in place, but only because of the people that pursue it, not because of official requirements.²¹⁶ Therefore, considering the high volatility of persons in charge in EU institutions, this quite good cooperation seems to be more than fragile. Coordination mechanisms between the Commission and the EEAS would be a necessary requirement in order to ensure continuous coherence and an integrated approach between the institutions. Several complexities complicate the cooperation between the EEAS and the Commission: the chain of command for development programmes and the chain of command for CSDP programmes are different. Whereas the CSDP programmes have a top-down approach, the Commission programmes use a bottom-up approach with ideas coming from the delegations being reformulated with the expertise in Brussels. Therefore, there is quite a “political struggle or even competition between the institutions, including funding as well”²¹⁷. Another problem in the relationship between the EEAS and the Commission is that the political security and defence expertise is owned by the EEAS, but most of the means to implement the policies are in the hands of the Commission. An example here is the Commissions programming in the EU Trust Fund. Many programmes are in place that touch sensitive issues, such as migration, security and defence. This again shows the shift in the Commissions programming from development towards more security and defence or, in other words, emphasises the strong security-development-nexus that cannot be underestimated these days. When formulating this report, the EDF has been going under review with the Commission identifying security as a priority, which is a quite big development of a body, which is has been responsible for development for a long time. The challenge here is a quite practical one: How can the Commission programmes that have an impact on political security and defence be aligned with

²¹³ Interview with DEVCO official in Brussels, 8 March 2017.

²¹⁴ Interview with ECHO officials in Brussels, 6 March 2017.

²¹⁵ Interview with DEVCO official in Brussels, 8 March 2017.

²¹⁶ Interview with EEAS officials in Brussels, 7 March 2017.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

the EEAS expertise? The Commission's seat in the PSC is by far not sufficient to ensure coherence between the EEAS and the Commission.

3.3 EU Output Effectiveness as Policy Consistency / appropriateness according to experts

How consistent is the substance of EU policy-making? Consistency is here understood as appropriateness of the policy features identified earlier, considered to be given if EU features (problem definitions & policy objectives, strategies and instruments) match or resonate with the analyses and prescriptions of non-EU experts. The match of EU policy features with the analytical dimensions of experts' (problem descriptions, problem evaluations and causal statements), combined with the evidence base and plausibility of the pertinent scholarly research should be indicative of the 'appropriateness' and thus the 'consistency' of EU policy formulation. The more such a match can be certified, the more effective the EU's analytical prescriptive capacity is and thus the higher its output effectiveness.

The guiding questions for addressing this second category hence read as follows:

1. How 'appropriate' are the identified policy features (premises & objectives, strategies & instruments) in view of a given problem/ challenge at hand?
 - Do EU problem-definitions match those of non-EU experts?
 - Do the prescribed policy strategies (grand & operational) match with causal assumptions?
 - Do prescribed instruments/ tools match with strategies and objectives of the EU?

Problem Definitions

By examining Non-EU/local problem definitions, a roughly overlapping picture can be found with regard to key problem categories as identified by the EU. However, some of these categories require, according to the Non-EU/local perspective, a more detailed analysis. Moreover, there seems to be a need for extending the EU list by adding two core problem categories, defined as *mistrust* and *fragmentation*.

According to interviews conducted by ARGA in 2016, the majority of the Malian people asked regard road safety as a priority ranging even ahead of public and food security.²¹⁸ In close connection with this, improvised explosive devices, landmines and explosive remnants of war still depict a major

²¹⁸ Seydou and Dakouo 2016, 43.

security concern.²¹⁹ A range of security concerns as defined within the ARGAs interviews are listed as such by EU definitions as well (e.g. corruption, arms proliferation and a generally weak security sector). What turns out particularly interesting here is the fact that the Malians asked not only consider the poor management of former rebellions a threat to security, but even more the emerging violent confrontation between communities that has often been fostered by this management.²²⁰ Furthermore, a continued weakness and lack of capacity of the Malian army has been identified as important security concern as well as a still inadequate number of police unit levels.²²¹ After all, the gendarmerie enjoys, in particular in comparison to the military, a higher reputation among civilians. This is mainly due to the fact that the gendarmerie is considered to have contributed to help reducing abuses and excesses committed by soldiers. However, this reputation, too, is eroding, due to growing concerns regarding allegations of corruption.²²²

What regards the remaining problem categories as outlined under RQ1 a) – fragility of states, organised crime, food/nutrition crisis and the deterioration of the humanitarian situation – the non EU/local problem definition reveals, by and large, the same challenges. However, in the course of non EU/local problem analysis, two additional categories turned out to be particularly decisive and at the same time rather underrepresented within EU documents:

The first additionally profound challenge underlying the current situation according to Non-EU/local expertise concerns a deep-rooted and multi-layered sense of mistrust within the Malian population. Although originating in the history of the country, this mistrust addresses today various actors. First of all and most “historically”, it concerns a widespread mistrust towards the central government, which has traditionally used and continues to use a divide and rule strategy in the north of the country in order to back proxy forces against the rebellion.²²³ Also and partly as a result of this strategy, the sense of confidence within and amongst communities has been gradually eroding²²⁴. Equally deteriorating has been the degree of trust towards military authorities who, even after EU training, lacked capacity²²⁵ and MINUSMA, which is not considered to present a reliable protection force.²²⁶ In addition to an increased fear of revenge attacks and persecutions from different actors, there is a general sense of distrust present among Malian civilians regarding strategies used by different international actors:

²¹⁹ Sonner and Dietrich 2015, 35.

²²⁰ Seydou and Dakouo 2016, 45.

²²¹ Sonner and Dietrich 2015, 23.

²²² *Ibid.*, 35.

²²³ *Ibid.*, 15., Batten Carew and Dowd 2015, 3

²²⁴ Seydou and Dakouo 2016, 45

²²⁵ Sonner and Dietrich 2015, 22

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, 28.

insufficient understanding of local grievances and a supposed bias towards national unity represent the main concerns in this respect.²²⁷

Closely connected and often interacting with the problem of widespread mistrust is the delicate and multi-layered fragmentation of the Malian society.

First, it must be highlighted, that although 90 % of the Malian population belong to Islam²²⁸, they do not present a homogenous group, neither in religious nor in ethnic terms. While the dominant religious group is formed by the Malékie School - a largely tolerant current of Sunni Islam that has been able to incorporate traditional animist beliefs and practices - there are also influences of Sufism as well as a growing affiliation to the Hanbalite School. The latter bases its understanding of Islamic Law on a strict and literal interpretation of the Qur'an and is closely linked to Wahhabism. In this vein it has been recently fostered by Saudi Arabian support. However, the Hanbalite School must be seen in line with a Quietist Salafism that only rarely uses force (in contrast to jihadist Salafism). In sharp contrast to the majority of the Malian population belonging to the Malékite School, a growing number of influential Islamic leaders, in particular of the Haut Conseil Islamique du Mali, form part of the latter current²²⁹.

In addition to the outlined intra-religious fractions, there is a multi-faceted ethnic division with the main tensions evolving around racial, social and economic issues. However, these divisions are of course often blurry and tend to overlap and reinforce each other.

Originating in the French colonial period, a broad sense of belonging in northern Mali is based on a very basic distinction between "black" and "white" parts of the population.²³⁰ This distinction roughly divides the groups of "black" Songhay and Fulani (Peules) (both active in the conflict) on the one hand and "white" Arabs and Tuareg on the other²³¹. However, this distinction falls short of incorporating other important actors such as the lower social strata of the *bellah* from within Tamsheq society. Representing the descendants of former slaves, this group reveals both a "black" origin but at the same time a sense of identity that is linked to the Tuareg society. With this background, the group is particularly blurring the lines of belonging, as it has been actively involved in the Ganda Koy, a militia created for the first time as an opposition to the 1990s Tuareg rebellion²³². However, this also reveals the fact that fractions do not only open up along racial distinctions, but also with regard to social cleavages, with many groups in the north revealing stiff and pronounced hierarchical structures. What

²²⁷ Ibid., 27,37.

²²⁸ Dakouo and Sidibe 2017, 1.

²²⁹ Ibid., 3-4.

²³⁰ Høyer 2013, 1.

²³¹ Chauzal and van Damme 2015, 39.

²³² Lecocq 2010, 298,350.

regards the Tamasheq society, it is not only necessary to draw distinctions between different Tuareg tribes, of which the most important within the actual conflict is the Kel Adagh²³³. There are also divisions within those tribes, in particular between the above mentioned *bellah*, *ifogha* and *imghad*. These distinctions reinforce the significance of longstanding social hierarchies within Tamasheq societies, but also dynamics of contest and gradual dissolution of certain categories²³⁴. Most basically and translated into European feudal terms: while Ifoghas can be described as a noble class and at the same time represent a leading Tuareg clan in the northern Adagh mountain region²³⁵, the group of Imghad historically rather occupied the position of lower-strata vassals without lineage or clear-cut genealogies²³⁶. However, since the country's independence, social affiliations of this kind became every time more questioned and in particular since the 1990s rebellion, Imghad belonging turned into a strong and emancipative source of identity and belonging²³⁷. Of special importance for the current situation is the fact that amongst the plurality of Tuareg groups present in today's Mali, the claim for independence is most intensely articulated and historically most deeply-rooted amongst the group of the Ifoghas of the Kel Adagh region²³⁸.

Fragmentation, however, is not limited to these tensions but comprises other ethnic and economic cleavages, with the main non-Tuareg actors being of Songhay and Peules origin. While the two Songhay self-defense militias Ganda Koy and Ganda Izo have emerged as response to Tuareg rebellions respectively, the picture becomes more complex when considering peules (Fulani) engagement in conflicts²³⁹. Geographically, this involvement mainly comprises the region of Mopti as it depicts the primary site of peules residence, yet, their communities are spread across ten administrative districts, among them Gao, Tombouctou, Kidal, Ménaka and Bamako.²⁴⁰ Within the region of Mopti, conflicts arose due to three factors:

1. The region represents an agro-ecological space with recurrent conflicts over resource management between cattle dealers, tillers and fishermen. Peules mainly form part of the first group.
2. These resource conflicts have been further aggravated by a (internationally supported) decentralisation policy, which has been blamed for ignoring traditional land rights and thus privileging agricultural over pastoralist life styles.²⁴¹

²³³ Lecocq et al. 2013, 356.

²³⁴ Lecocq 2010, 7,188.

²³⁵ Ibid., 2.

²³⁶ Ibid., 8.

²³⁷ Ibid., 2.

²³⁸ Ibid., 4.

²³⁹ Dakouo 2017. And Dakouo 2016.

²⁴⁰ Dakouo 2016, 2.

²⁴¹ Ibid., 3.

3. As a front line between north and south, the Mopti region has been regularly affected by former Tuareg rebellions, thus fostering resentment in this vein, as well. This situation is further aggravated by recurrent episodes of cattle theft by Tuareg groups.

What is more, the Peules communities claim that their concerns would not have been sufficiently incorporated into the 2015 Peace Accord. Taken together, these factors have contributed to a widespread feeling of marginalisation and have provoked not only the emergence of different auto-defense and political military groups but also the enrolment of Peules in MUJAO and the development of links with Ansar-Dine.²⁴² After all, discontent did not only result in the formation of militant groups but also saw a blossoming of cultural and civilian interest associations with the organisation Tabitaal Pulaku representing the most significant among them.²⁴³

Finally, it turns out inevitable to consider the fragmented character of Mali also in terms of manifold and often overlapping forms of official and local legitimacies. Acknowledging traditional stakeholders has been and will be part and parcel for the process of conflict resolution and mediation, particularly what regards conflict in the areas of land holding, family affairs/social practices and public services.²⁴⁴ At present, there are two forms of legitimacies existing parallel on the local level, one based on elections and being embodied by official state representatives, the other one being performed by religious chiefs, village elders, chiefs of diverse economic associations, etc. This latter form of legitimacy is subject to different rules within different ethnic communities. In order to allow for a sustainable resolution of conflicts and a reduction of intercommunal violence, decentralisation policies and institutionalised local powers have to take into account these different and sometimes competing forms of local realities.²⁴⁵

This mismatch in problem definitions and the lack of clear distinction between the different groups in Mali in the respective Council documents is closely related to the diagnosis made before in terms of lacking conflict sensitivity.

Policy Strategies and Tools

Concerning strategies and tools matching to EU problem definitions some pitfalls can be seen. First of all, EUTM Mali definitely shows progress in terms of contributing to SSR, but has no capabilities when it comes to migration management or “fighting” migration, an issue that is increasingly important on the agenda of EU member states foreign policies, if not *the* most important problem. The only connection between EUTM and migration are the frontiers, but otherwise EUTM cannot do anything

²⁴² Ibid., 4, 7.

²⁴³ Ibid., 5. For a detailed list of civilian and politico-military peules associations see *ibid.*

²⁴⁴ Dakouo, Koné, and Sanogo 2009, 6.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 5, 7.

in this regard. Migration is currently on top of the EU member states problem definition for Mali, but EUTM as a mission cannot deliver in addressing this issue.²⁴⁶ Furthermore, since there is (still) no budget for military and defence, the EU itself cannot provide equipment for its mission. Hence, training without equipment leads to a damage of the European credibility. Related to the financial constraints is the problem, that although the EU supports NATO but does not have the same support for its own missions.²⁴⁷ This two-track strategy obviously has negative implications for EU engagement, not only in terms of financial and personal resources, but also in terms of policy coherence as well.

Additionally and a very important point, is the shift of the Commission from development towards more projects in the fields of security and defence, especially in the EDF review. Since this review has taken place only in March of this year, it remains to be seen how the shift will influence the EU's overall coherence in its comprehensive approach.

As to the operational strategies, only the strategy of *territorial integrity* raises a question. After May 2013, the operational strategy of territorial integrity disappeared from Council conclusions and decisions. Why is this the case? There are basically three possible answers to that question: The first one is that territorial integrity has been achieved very soon, so that the EU did not see the need to include this claim anymore. This can be easily denied since the national dialogue only led to an agreement (let alone success), in 2015 (see above). The second possible answer is that the aim of territorial integrity has served "only" as a justification for the rapid deployment of EUTM Mali. The third possible answer is that a shift of priorities occurred, so that other matters, such as in particular trans-border trafficking, smuggling and migration, prevailed. The third answer here provides the most plausible one.

For now, member states show quite an "appetite to engage"²⁴⁸ in Mali due to the deteriorating security situation and increasing number of terrorist attacks. However, as political priorities of member states can change quite quickly, depending on the development of the international environment but also on domestic factors like e.g. elections, it will remain a difficult task to ensure sustainable long-term engagement with a real long-term strategy in Mali.

Regarding the relatively short engagement of the EU and the short time span between the "outbreak" of the conflict since 2012 in comparison to the other case studies Iraq and Afghanistan, the graph indicates that "one" conflict cycle has already been finalised. Even though the graph suggests a decrease of the conflict, the security situation on the ground draws a different picture. Given that this


²⁴⁶ Interview with EEAS official in Brussels, 6 March 2017.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

probably depicts only the “beginning” of a whole array of conflict cycles, it remains to be seen how the EU engagement evolves in the course of time.

Figure 1. Conflict Cycle: Mali (2007-2015)



© Ingo Peters 2017 (based on UCDP, <http://www.ucdp.uu.se/#country/645>; Global Terrorist Database, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>)

3.4 Intermediate summary: Output effectiveness of EU crisis response in Mali

Taking into account the three dimensions of actor coherence, process coherence and policy consistency, the EU’s policy output towards Mali can be overall regarded as rather effective.

Actor unity within the EU, especially meaning member states, is quite high considering the fast agreement to and implementation of the two EU missions EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali. France being the main stakeholder in the EU engagement definitely played and still plays a very important role in influencing the scope and intensity of EU engagement. The EU has been increasingly determined, especially from the year 2012 on, with the tendency to now drawing back a little, focusing more on local ownership and the support of other international, regional or national organisations and efforts.

When it comes to problem definition, the EU ensured overall coherence throughout its (Council and Commission) documents although there has been a strong shift towards the regional and trans-boundary dimension of the crisis and Mali and towards a stronger focus on security, including migration. The inclusion of migration also in Council documents could serve as an indicator for a shift

towards securitisation of the migration issue. Throughout the time frame of analysis in this report, the EU's overall strategic objectives, intermediate aims, grand and operational strategies as well as policy tools did not show high deviation. Taking into account the relatively short time of EU engagement in Mali, a bigger change in strategies or tools would be very surprising. Therefore, in the case of Mali, high coherence accounts for the EU objectives, strategies and tools indicating rather high output effectiveness.

The core concepts of conflict sensitivity and comprehensive approach show some deviation in its continuity and visibility in EU policy output. Whereas the comprehensive approach has been included as a core concept in the EU's approach to Mali over time, conflict sensitivity falls rather short. The fact that EEAS officials have not known the concept before explaining it to them speaks for itself. The ECHO officials at least were aware of the narrowest definition of "Do No Harm", which can also be contested and does by no means ensure a real conflict sensitive approach. In contrast to conflict sensitivity, a brighter picture can be drawn for comprehensive approach. Not only is it mentioned various time – either in terms of comprehensive, integrated or holistic approach –, the analysis of the four dimensions of the comprehensive approach has shown that the engagement of the EU seems quite comprehensive. However, when considering the fifth dimension ("How coordinated?"), the difficulties of inter-institutional cooperation between the EEAS and the Commission with its respective Directorate-Generals DEVCO and ECHO have to be taken into account (see section 3.2.4). The coordination problems somehow hinder a real comprehensive approach since without institutionalised cooperation and coordination, a comprehensive approach remains an utopia.

When analysing EU (Council and Commission) documents, although the third important concept "local ownership" continues to be stressed in EU documents, it lacks specifications and/ or definitions of who is really meant when speaking of *local*. Additionally, the EU lacks a clear transition plan in order to make the claim local ownership credible in the end.

When it comes to institutional coherence, there is still a lot of room for improvement. Not only are there coordination issues between the EEAS and the Commission, but also within the Commission services, namely DEVCO and ECHO. A closer consultation and higher consideration when writing the Humanitarian Implementation plan and the Multi-Annual Frameworks could ensure higher coherence between DEVCO and ECHO. Besides, information sharing and access remains a viable problem in terms of coherence and policy output.

The most difficult coordination problem of DEVCO concerns the cooperation with EU member states. Member states are "not keen in sharing plan priorities"²⁴⁹ and therefore often hamper the dialogue and an overall comprehensive approach. Despite the deficiency in information sharing with EU

²⁴⁹ Interview with ECHO officials in Brussels, 6 March 2017.

member states, the integrated approach is “pretty advanced”²⁵⁰ in Mali, with a good overview of actions by the Commission and EU member states.

Regarding the coordination between the Commission and the EEAS, the lack of institutionalised cooperation rather hinders a comprehensive approach to the Mali conflict. There is cooperation in place, but only because of the people that pursue it, not because of official requirements.²⁵¹ Therefore, considering the high volatility of persons in charge in EU institutions, this quite good cooperation seems to be more than fragile. Besides, the shift in the Commission programming towards more security related issues will definitely pose even more challenges to a coherent policy-making between the EEAS and the Commission.

As to policy consistency, problem definitions and strategies show quite high coherence of the EU policy output over time. However, when taking into account Non-EU/ local expertise, there seems to be a need for extending the EU list of problem definitions by adding two core problem categories, defined as *mistrust* and *fragmentation*. This mismatch in problem definitions and the lack of clear distinction between the different groups in Mali in the respective Council documents is closely related to the diagnosis made before in terms of lacking conflict sensitivity.

EU strategies and tools matching to EU problem definitions show quite high coherence over time. However, some pitfalls can be seen. First of all, EUTM Mali definitely shows progress in terms of contributing to SSR, but has no capabilities when it comes to migration management or “fighting” migration, an issue that is increasingly important on the agenda of EU member states foreign policies, if not *the* most important problem. Furthermore, the EU lacks credibility if not being able to provide equipment for its missions as well because of financial constraints for security and defence. Last but not least, due to the high dependence on member states when it comes to foreign and security policy and considering the fact that member states’ political priorities can change quite quickly, it will remain a difficult task to ensure sustainable long-term engagement with a real long-term strategy in Mali which could provide coherence in the end. Against this background, the findings of the study are rated in the table below.


²⁵⁰ Interview with DEVCO official in Brussels, 8 March 2017.

²⁵¹ Interview with EEAS officials in Brussels, 7 March 2017.

| Category | Criteria | Indicators | Output effectiveness |
|--|---|--|--|
| ACTOR COHERENCE/ ACTOR UNITY a) horizontal b) vertical | Unity of voice | 1) Viability of compromises | +++ |
| | | 2) Relative effort required to find compromise pre-decision | +++ |
| | | 3) Determinacy of common documents | + / +++ |
| PROCESS COHERENCE | a) coherence of identified policy features (problem definition, objectives, strategies, instruments) and b) coherence of core concepts | 'Continuity' and 'visibility' of core features and concepts across levels of policy-formulation, i.e. on strategic & operational level Core concepts: 1) 'Comprehensive approach' 2) 'Conflict sensitivity' 3) 'Local ownership' | Policy features + + |
| | | | Core Concepts Qualitatively Quantitatively |
| | c) institutional coherence | Regular involvement of EU institutions and agencies as defined in mandates in EU treaty or basic documents | 1) ++ 1) + 2) -- 2) - / + 3) - 3) +++ |
| | | | - |
| SUBSTANTIAL CONSISTENCY | Appropriateness of identified policy features <(problem definitions, policy objectives, strategies and instruments)> in view of given problems at hand; | 1) Match of EU problem definition with those of the (non-EU) expert community? | - / + |
| | | 2) Match of strategies with causal assumptions? | ++ |
| | | 3) Match of instruments with strategies and objectives? | ++ |

4 ANNEX

4.1 Figure 1: Timeline of events in Mali between October 2011 and January 2013



© Arieff, Alexis. 2013. Crisis in Mali. *Congressional Research Service*. p.5.

4.2 Table 4: Mali – EU Objectives, Strategies, Tools

| Strategic objectives | Intermediate aims grand strategies | Operational Strategies (Transformative mechanisms) | POLICY TOOLS operational Instruments & policy programmes/ measures |
|--|--|---|--|
| Stability Peace Prosperity | 1 Democracy 1.1 Democratisation | 1. 1.A. Ownership <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lasting solution whereby African ownership is paramount • Democratic elections • National Dialogue 1.B. Reforms <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consolidation of State Institutions, Justice and Police • SSR • Human Rights/International Humanitarian Law | 1. 1.A. Regional Indicative Programme (EDF) IcSP PACTEA 2 1.B. National Indicative Programme (EDF) IcSP EUTM Mali |
| | 2 International Cooperation including regional cooperation 2.1 Internationalisation including regionalisation | 2. Bi- and multilateral Dialogue & partnership (socialisation) 2.A Cooperation and Dialogue between countries of the region 2.B Cooperation and Dialogue of EU with other international actors | 2. 2.A. EU Sahel Strategy EUSR for the Sahel EU Trust Fund for Africa Support ECOWAS Regional Indicative Programme Recently: Regionalisation of EUCAP 2.B. Mobilise international community Close cooperation with AU / UN |
| | 3 State-building 3.1 Reconstruction and Development | 3. 3.A Capacity-building <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consolidation of State Institutions, Justice and Police • SSR 3.B Security governance <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Territorial integrity • Immediate end of violence/ ceasefire 3.C Empowerment of institutions & personnel & civil society <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consolidation of State Institutions, Justice and Police • Human Rights/International Humanitarian Law | 3. in general: EU Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF) 3.A. EUCAP Sahel Mali 3.B. EUTM Mali IcSP (SSR) 3.C. EUTM Mali Resilience building PACTEA 2 |
| | 4 Peace 4.1 Peace-Building | 4. 4.A Peace Agreement 4.B Reconciliation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inclusive National Dialogue • Dialogue and Reconciliation Mission (CNDR) by gov. 2013 • Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) 2014 | 4. 4.A. Participation in proposed Follow-Up Committee/ Mechanisms IcSP (Dialogue and Peace) 4.B. Part of international Mediation team |

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4.3 Table 5: Mali – Problem Definition in Council Conclusions and Decisions

| Category | Exact wording | Date / Document no. |
|---|---|--|
| Extreme poverty | - extreme poverty | 27.10.2010 , 15570/10 |
| Fragility of states | - fragility of states | 27.10.2010 , 15570/10 |
| 1. Organised crime | - Organised crime - development of organised crime - int. trafficking, illicit financial flows and ties with extremist groups in Sahel - increase in smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings, drugs and arms in the Sahel regions - regional and trans-boundary dimensions of the crisis, including terrorism, organised crime, arms smuggling, human trafficking, drug trafficking, refugee and migration flows and related financial flows | 27.10.2010 , 15570/10 15.10.2012 , 14926/12 18.02.2013 , 6475/13 20.06.2016 , 10393/16 25.02.2014 , 6295/14 |
| 2. Terrorism | - Terrorism - Kidnapping, Assassination of EU citizens by terrorists (AQIM) - Growth of Al Qa'ida and affiliates' presence in north of Mali, increased terrorist threat - Violent nat. and int. terrorist groups and extremists - emergence and consolidation of a haven for terrorists - persisting violence in northern Mali, which is a threat to the security, stability, territorial integrity and development of the country and the wider Sahel region - recent proliferation of violent attacks and terrorist activities in Mali and neighbouring countries | 27.10.2010 , 15570/10 31.01.2011 , 5932/11 23.04.2012 , 9009/12 23.07.2012 , 12808/12 15.10.2012 , 14926/12 09.02.2015 , 6052/15 16.03.2015 , 7203/15 |
| 3. Food/nutrition crisis → IDP, refugees | - New food and nutrition crisis affecting 15 million people - Deteriorating humanitarian situation in Mali and Sahel region due to food shortages - Acute food crisis - Increasing food insecurity - Current food crisis in the Sahel region - First time: Migration (Sahel RAP 2015-2020) | 23.03.2012 , 8067/12 23.04.2012 , 9009/12 15.10.2012 , 14926/12 22.04.2013 , 8307/13 17.03.2014 , 7226/14 20.04.2015 , 7823/15 |
| 4. Deterioration of security situation | - Deterioration of the security situation - Deteriorating situation in Mali and impact on regional and int. peace and stability - Serious political and security crisis - Political and security crisis - Multidimensional crisis in the Sahel - Dramatic changes in Mali - UN Resolution 2071: grave concern about consequences of instability in the north of Mali on the region and beyond | 23.03.2012 , 8067/12 23.07.2012 , 12808/12 15.10.2012 , 14926/12 19.11.2012 , 16316/12 20.04.2015 , 7823/15 03.01.2013 , 17412/1 11.01.2013 , 5259/13 |

| | | |
|---|---|--|
| <p>5. Deterioration of humanitarian situation</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Deterioration of humanitarian situation - Oppression of local populations, human rights violations (against women) - Breaches of int. humanitarian and human-rights law | <p>23.04.2012, 9009/12 15.10.2012, 14926/12 18.02.2013, 6475/13</p> |
|---|---|--|

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4.4 Table 6: EUTM Mali – Time Frame

| Date | Who requested? | From whom? | What requested? | When delivered? |
|-------------------|--|-------------------------------------|--|--|
| 23.07.2012 | Council (dramatic changes) | HR and Commission | Concrete proposals for Union action in number of areas to respond to the changing situation | |
| 18.09.2012 | President of the Republic of Mali | Union | Support with a view to restoring Mali integrity | |
| 12.10.2012 | UN Security Council invited through Resolution 2071 (2012) | International partners, incl. Union | Provide assistance, expertise, training and capacity-building to support Malian army and security forces | |
| 15.10.2012 | Council | CMPD | Crisis management concept for a CSDP military mission (reorganisation and training of Malian defence forces, include full support of Malian authorities and the definition of an exit strategy) | 19.11.2012: CMC presented by HR |
| 19.11.2012 | Council | Relevant groups | Examine it as matter of urgency (want to approve it by December 2012) | |
| 10.12.2012 | Council | | Approved CMC on possible CSDP mission as an essential element in the Union's comprehensive approach as elaborated in the Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel | |
| 18.12.2012 | RELEX (Foreign Relations Counsellors Working Party) | | Reached agreement on draft Council Decision on EU military mission; Agreed on reference amount of €12,3 million for the common costs (Athena) | |
| 24.12.2012 | President of Mali | HR | Invitation letter welcoming deployment of an EU military training mission | |
| 03.01.2013 | Council | | 17412/12: Draft Council Decision with Mandate for EUTM Mali for 15 months | |
| 11.01.2013 | Council | COREPER | Confirm agreement on draft Council Decision Decide to publish the Council Decision in the Official Journal Recommend to the Council to adopt draft Council Decision as set out in 17412/12 | Council Decision adapted on 17.01.2013: 2013/34/CFSP |
| 17.01.2013 | Council | | adopted Decision 2013/34/CFSP establishing the European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali) | |
| 18.01.2013 | Council | | adopted Decision 2013/87/CFSP on the launch of EUTM Mali. | |
| 21.01.2013 | RELEX | | Agreed the text of a Council Decision on the launch of a "European military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali)" | |
| 08.02.2013 | PSC | | Agreed draft Mission Plan (of RELEX) and draft ROEAUTH with view to forward it to Council, that date of the launch should be 12.02.2013, on | |

| | | | | |
|-------------------------|--|--|---|--|
| | | | condition that unilateral declaration by Mali and Medical air evacuation (MEDEVAC) capacity had been provided | |
| 11.02.2013 | | | Unilateral declaration was received | |
| 15.02.2013 5497/1/13 | Council: Mission Plan and Rules of Engagement are approved; EUTM Mali shall be launched on 18.02.2013; Mission Commander is authorised with immediate effect to start execution of EUTM Mali | COREPER | Confirm agreement on draft Council Conclusion; Recommend that Council adopt the Council Decision on the launch of EUTM Mali Agree the publication of the Council Decision in the Official Journal | |
| 19.02.2013 | Council | | Agreement between EU and Republic of Mali on the status in the Republic of Mali of the EU military mission is approved Sign the agreement in order to bind the Union | |
| 18.03.2013 | Council | | Adopted decision 2013/133/CFSP appointing EU SR for the Sahel | |
| 25.03.2014 | RELEX | PSC to confirm agreement on draft Council Decision | Agreed the text of a Council Decision amending Decision 2013/34/CFSP on ETUM extending the mandate and laying down the reference amount for the period from 19 May 2014 to 18 May 2016 | |
| 28.03.2014 | PSC | | Financial reference amount for EUTM Mali for 19 May 2014 to 18 May 2016 shall be €27.000.000, Mandate of EUTM Mali shall end on 18 May 2018 | |

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4.5 Table 7: Mali – Asylum Applications from Mali in EU/EFTA 2008-2016

| Year | Total Asylum applications from Mali in EU/EFTA ²⁵² | Main countries affected |
|-------------|---|--|
| 2008 | 4,060 | France (3,365) – Italy (420) |
| 2009 | 1,230 | France (800) – Italy (185) |
| 2010 | 1,040 | France (785) – Italy (65) |
| 2011 | 4,130 | Italy (3,015) – France (785) – Switzerland (75) |
| 2012 | 2,670 | France (965) – Italy (785) – Germany (205)/ Switzerland (215) |
| 2013 | 7,005 | Italy (1,805) / France (1,685) – Spain (1,470) – Germany (655) |
| 2014 | 13,125 | Italy (9,790) – France (1,515) – Spain (595) / Germany (530) |
| 2015 | 8,605 | Italy (5,465) – France (1,570) – Germany (560) – Hungary (290) / Spain (225) |
| 2016 | 1,760 | Italy (1,055) – France (445) – Germany (95) / Spain (55) |

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²⁵² Data retrieved from Migration Policy Institute (MPI) 2017.

4.6 Table 8: Mali – Types of *Local Ownership* in Council Conclusions and Decisions

| What kind of ownership? | | Document No. | Exact Wording |
|-------------------------|---------------|---|---|
| National | ownership | 23.03.2012 , 8067/12 20.04.2015 , 7823/15 | National ownership the EU reiterates its commitment to support regional and country-led and owned initiatives in the framework of the Action Plan |
| | government | 17.03.2014 , 7226/14 | efforts in support to local and regional endeavours and the EU will work in close cooperation with regional organisations and national governments in the Sahel |
| Malian | ownership | 10.12.2012 ,17353/12 20.07.2015 ,10999/15 | coherent and comprehensive approach to the crisis in Mali, in which Malian , regional and African ownership is essential The primary responsibility for delivering these commitments rests with all Malian parties themselves |
| | key players | 18.02.2013 , 6475/13 | this will enable Mali's key players to take ownership of the results of the process of negotiation, including with all non-terrorist and non-criminal armed movements which agree unconditionally to respect the unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Mali; |
| Regional | ownership | 23.03.2012 , 8067/12 10.12.2012 ,17353/12 20.04.2015 , 7823/15 | Strengthening of ongoing regional cooperation → regionally-owned processes coherent and comprehensive approach to the crisis in Mali, in which Malian, regional and African ownership is essential the EU reiterates its commitment to support regional and country-led and owned initiatives in the framework of the Action Plan |
| | organisations | 17.03.2014 , 7226/14 | efforts in support to local and regional endeavours and the EU will work in close cooperation with regional organisations and national governments in the Sahel |
| | Governments | 17.03.2014 , 7226/14 20.04.2015 , 7823/15 | The primary responsibility and ownership for peace, security and development is with the governments of the Sahelian region . The implementation of the Action Plan will be carried out with the full ownership and |

4.8 Table 10: Mali – Coding for Quantitative Analysis of Core Concepts

| Concept | Wording |
|------------------------|---|
| Conflict Sensitivity | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sensitive, sensitivity - Impact - Effect - Risk, risks |
| Comprehensive Approach | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comprehensive, comprehensiveness - Integrated - holistic |
| Local Ownership | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Civil, civic, civilian - Local - Non-state - NGO |

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4.9 Table 11: Mali – Method for chapter 3

| TABLE XYZ | | | |
|--|---|---|---|
| Conceptualizing and Operationalizing EU foreign policy ‘output effectiveness’ | | | |
| Category | Criteria | Indicators | Variation & Measurement unit |
| ACTOR COHERENCE/ ACTOR UNITY a) horizontal b) vertical | Unity of voice | 1) Viability of compromises 2) Relative effort required to find compromise pre-decision 3) Determinacy of common documents | 1) Relative distance of positions in decision-making? >>Positional differences as matter of principle or degree? 2) Deviating statements on compromises <i>post</i> -decision Time required finding compromise? >>days, weeks, month? 3) Stringency of formulations/ choice of words [add extra table exemplifying words indicating different stringency] |
| PROCESS COHERENCE | Coherence of 1) Identified policy features (premises, objectives, strategies, instruments) and 2) Core concepts 3) Institutional coherence | ‘Continuity’ and ‘visibility’ of core features and concepts across levels of policy-formulation, i.e. on strategic and operational level Specific concepts: a) ‘Conflict sensitivity’ b) ‘Comprehensive approach’ c) ‘Local ownership’ 3) Regular involvement of EU institutions and agencies as defined in mandates in EU treaty or basic documents | a) & b) Appearance of core features and concepts in basic EU documents on 1) broad policy field, 2) on cases (countries or issues), 3) cases-in-case; 3) involvement more or less matching scope of competencies >overlap or even doubled responsibility for the same assignment, ‘turf wars’ among agencies or significant time-lags in decision-making; |
| SUBSTANTIAL CONSISTENCY | Appropriateness of identified policy features (problem definitions, policy objectives, strategies and instruments) in view of given problems at hand; | 1) Match of EU problem definition with those of the (non-EU) expert community? 2) Match of strategies with causal assumptions? 3) Match of instruments with strategies and objectives? | 1) Common and different elements of a) Problem descriptions b) Problem evaluation c) Causal statements; 2) Plausibility and evidence base according to pertinent research/ expert literature; 3) Plausibility and evidence base according to pertinent research regarding quality & quantity |

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