



## *Exemplary findings PEU database*



### **Party family of Commissioners (by individual Commissioner)**


Politicization of the EU has become an important research topic. This graph shows the composition of the particular Commissions regarding their Commissioners' party affiliation. Assignment is based on which group in the EP the Commissioner's party in question belonged to at the time (party family groupings build on and further develop Hix and Lord 1997). The graph allows making statements about the relative ideological heterogeneity as well as possible ideological or partisan biases of the various Commissions. This is particularly relevant where we abstain from considering the European Commission a neutral administration. Here, one important insight is that the current College of Commissioners is ideologically more heterogeneous than any of its predecessors.



## Technocratism and Power index

Indices and assessments of politicization of administrations differ substantially. With this Graph we opt for a view that combines a power and a legitimacy logic of politicization. In a first step, Commissioners were assigned to former professional groups (where a person had occupied more than one professional groups, he or she was assigned the category, where the personal had occupied the hierarchically highest post). In a second step, we built two indices of politicization.

Our first index measures political power through portfolio salience. We draw on work by Druckman et al. (2005; 2008) as well as Döring (2007) who assigned numerical values based on expert surveys in 29 European parliamentary democracies. We added new scores for a number of positions that had not been considered in existing works and then took the average value of each position across states to assign a numerical value to each person having served in the Commission. Following this logic, former Prime Ministers have been assigned the highest value (2,27) whereas Activists are the group ranked the lowest (0,22). Our second index measures political legitimacy and differentiates between ‘political’ and ‘technocratic’ professional backgrounds of persons having served in the Commission. Recurring on Schnapp (2004) we assign a positive value of 1 to ‘political’ positions as those offices which are filled and legitimized by democratic elections, and a ‘0’ to all ‘technocratic’ posts that do not fulfil this criterion. The graph clearly supports views on the Commission as growing increasingly politicized until the late 1990s, but showing slightly declining levels of politicization since. This finding contrasts with images of the EU as becoming ever more politicized over time and particularly so since the Euro and migration crisis.



### Development of Commission Directorates (in DGs)

The services of the EU Commission are often treated as monolithic and static. This graph displays the development of Commission DGs according to the number of Directorates they comprised during the respective Commissions. It thus provides sectorally specific information on the EU Commission as an evolving organization. We chose to focus on a small number of DGs to illustrate the changes in the number of Directorates. The observed changes point at three different, potentially relevant explanations. First, increasing numbers of Directorates might reflect the rise in prominence of a policy area. In the EU context this is often related to an expansion of supranational policy making. The ‘greening’ of European policies could thus be linked to an expansion of DG ENV or respectively growing community competences in economics and finance to increasing numbers of Directorates in DG ECFIN. Secondly, portfolios with a strong territorial dimension such as DG AGRI or DG REGIO experience task extension with every round of EU enlargements. This is likely to mirror in organizational differentiation and Directorate growth—a trend that has come to has been curbed more recently. Finally, administrative changes oscillating between high and low numbers of Directorates (e.g. DG HR or DG BUDG) may reflect that horizontal services are at time provided ‘in-house’ and at other times centrally by a separate service (Bauer, 2008), reducing Directorates in the central service in the former case, while pushing the number of directorates up in the latter case.