Does European Integration Lead to a “Presidentialization” of Executive Politics?

Ministerial Selection in Swedish Post-War Cabinets

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Paper presented at the ECPR General Meeting in Pisa, 6–8 September, 2007
Abstract

In this paper, we address recent claims that (1) European parliamentary democracies are undergoing a process of “presidentialization”, and (2) that these developments can, in part, be explained by European integration. Using data on ministerial selection in Swedish cabinets during the years 1952–2006, we find that (1) there appears to be a slight tendency towards a “presidentialization”, which is indicated by an increase of individuals with an expert background being appointed, and (2) there exists some preliminary support for the notion that Sweden’s political and economic integration into the EU is part of the explanation for this.
Introduction

According to recent research, executive-legislative relations in parliamentary democracies are undergoing important changes. More power resources are concentrated to Prime Ministers and their autonomy vis-à-vis parliamentary groups is increasing. These developments have prompted some scholars to speak of a “presidentialization” of contemporary parliamentary politics (Poguntke & Webb 2005). Regrettably, few systematic efforts have been made to assess the validity of what we henceforth will refer to as “the presidentialization thesis”.

This thesis is not simply a descriptive statement about contemporary changes in parliamentary systems, but involves a set of interrelated claims about the driving forces of these changes. The diminishing importance of traditional political cleavages, the changing role of the media, and the growing complexity of the state are all said to be important factors. But the internationalization of political decision-making, and in particular European integration, has been deemed the most important force in accounting for changing executive-legislative relations. In particular, the simultaneous political and economic integration of the EU member states has landed more power in the hands of PMs who – unlike party organizations and parliaments – are key participants to the increasingly important political bargains made in the Council of Ministers and the European Council.

This paper has twin aims. In order to assess the validity of the presidentialization thesis we (1) study the development of a quantitative indicator of the presidentialization of the Swedish PM over the years 1952 through 2006, and (2) preliminarily analyze whether any changes in this indicator can be attributed to increased economic and political integration of Sweden into the European Union.

To gauge the extent of presidentialization in the Swedish case we utilize information on ministerial selection. More specifically we focus on measuring the background of ministers. If expertise is increasingly favored over generalist party or parliamentary experience in the process of ministerial selection, it indicates a trend towards a presidentialization of executive politics. Indeed, several classical texts emphasize party- and parliamentary experience as a defining feature of parliamentarism (e.g. Verney 1959/1992). And although truly comparative efforts are rare, the empirical evidence does suggest that the recruitment of non-partisan ministers is more frequent in presidential systems (Blondel & Thiebault 1991; Strøm 2000b; Amorim Neto & Strøm 2006).

In the section immediately following this, we present the presidentialization thesis as it is laid out in the literature. We begin by proposing a narrower definition of presidentialization amenable to empirical testing and go on to discuss the potential effects of European integration, and the data we use. We then chart whether there appears to be a trend towards presidentialization in Sweden. Lastly, we evaluate the relationship between European integration and ministerial selection. Our conclusions are that there appears to be a slight tendency towards a “presidentialization” of Swedish politics, and we find some support for the idea that Sweden’s integration into the EU is part of the explanation for this.
The presidentialization thesis

*Presidentialization – conceptualization and debate*

Presidentialization has become a catchword in recent studies of executive politics in parliamentary democracies. Although the alleged concentration of powers around heads of government is hardly new, Michael Foley’s (1993; 2000) books on “The British Presidency” sparked off a debate on ‘presidentialism’ that has spread from the United Kingdom to other parliamentary systems. It indicates a strengthened role and status of the Prime Minister’s position towards other political players although, in most cases, no changes have been made in formal, constitutional structures. Presidentialization can thus be understood as more powers concentrated around Prime Ministers while, at the same time, their autonomy vis-à-vis parliamentary parties increases (Poguntke & Webb 2005).

Similar observations have been made about the Swedish case (Aylott 2005). In particular, the former Prime Minister, Social Democrat Göran Persson, has been “accused” of leading his government in a presidential manner. The former PM seemed to have become less dependent on parliament and the support of his party, deriving much of his mandate directly from the electorate. When his government lost power to a centre-right coalition after the 2006 elections, Persson took personal responsibility for the defeat and resigned as PM and chairman of the party.

In spite of the general appeal of this term, as can be judged from the broad usage of it, there is a general vagueness in the public and academic debate of notions of ‘presidentialism’ (Helms 2005). In general, growth of resources along with more formal and informal powers at the disposal of the chief executive is believed to indicate a trend towards presidentialized executive politics (Poguntke & Webb 2005). Still, in many cases, Prime Ministers in parliamentary systems can be more powerful than their presidential counterparts. After all, presidents do have to share power with the parliament, and the balance between the two differs widely among presidential systems. In light of this, we believe that it is insufficient to use simple indicators of power resources to measure the presidentialization of parliamentary systems. Rather, it is preferable to use key features of the two regime types as the starting point in a study on presidentialization.

However, the definition of parliamentary systems is contested. Some scholars use long lists of propositions to define it (see e.g. Verney 1992/1959; von Sydow 1997), while others need only a single defining feature, namely, the accountability of the government to the parliament (Sartori 1997/1994). For Sartori parliamentary governments are “appointed, supported and, as the case may be, dismissed, by parliamentary vote” (Sartori 1997/1994: 101). A more fruitful position seems to be the one advocated by Lijphart (1999: 117-8), who considers parliamentary systems as consisting of three defining features. First, the government is responsible to parliament in the sense that it is dependent on the parliament’s confidence and can be removed from office through a vote of no confidence. Second, in a parliamentary system, the head of government (normally called the Prime Minister)
is selected by the parliament, although this selection can take many forms. Third, and finally, Lijphart notes that parliamentary cabinets are collective or collegial. In contrast, presidential systems, according to Lijphart, have the opposite defining features. The head of government – the president – cannot under normal circumstances be forced to resign by a parliamentary vote of no confidence, presidents are popularly elected for a fixed time span, and, presidential systems have a one-person, non-collegial executive.

We are quite aware that this represents only a minimalist conception of a parliamentary system since such a configuration of certain basic institutions cannot guarantee more than a very limited amount of citizen control over public policy. For example, the vision of parliamentary democracy, as distinguished by Strøm (2000a) from parliamentarism, requires that the citizens indirectly control the cabinet, through their control over the parliament (Strøm 2000a: 268ff). This idea of a continuous chain of delegation implies that the parliament must exert a considerable degree of control over the PM and his or her cabinet. Accordingly, a weakening of parliamentary control over the PM and the cabinet has to be interpreted as a step towards undermining parliamentary democracy. Such a focus on chains of delegation and parliamentary control over the PM and the cabinet certainly provides a better base when it comes to reasoning about the normative implications of the shifts in domestic power relations that are currently debated under the label of presidentialization.

Yet for the purposes of this paper, which mainly intends to make an empirical contribution to the debate about shifting power relations in parliamentary democracies, it seems sufficient to accept the aforementioned basic features as defining of parliamentary and presidential systems. Accordingly, a development towards the former system becoming more like the latter without changing the formal, constitutional, structure would constitute a presidentialization. Therefore, we define presidentialization as a trend towards (a) more autonomy of the executive vis-à-vis parliamentary parties, (b) increasing leadership centered electoral processes, and (c) decreasing collegiality/collectivity within the executive.\(^1\) This definition puts the emphasis on the increased autonomy of the chief executive as follows from a separation of powers-system.

Nevertheless, the public debate and much of the research on this matter has focused mainly on the electoral dimension, i.e. the extent to which electoral processes have become increasingly leadership centered (Mughan 2000). We believe instead that executive-legislative relations and the collegiality in the executive are central for understanding the phenomena of presidentialization. If relations between executives and parties in parliament are unchanged, as well as relations between PMs and other ministers within cabinet, then it would be hard to

\(^1\) Poguntke & Webb (2005:5) define presidentialization as “the development of (a) increasing leadership power resources and autonomy within the party and the political executive respectively, and (b) increasingly leadership centered electoral processes”.
claim that there is indeed a process of presidentialization going on. We accordingly focus on these two defining features of the parliamentary/presidential divide.

How can presidentialization, understood in this way, be measured? In the present paper we focus on one proposed indicator: ministerial selection. As an indicator of the executive’s autonomy vis-à-vis parties in parliament, the extent to which ministers are recruited from parliament is used. In parliamentary systems ministers are usually members of parliament (Verney 1959/1992; De Winter 1991).

Why such a mode of ministerial recruitment is an essential control mechanism for parliamentary systems becomes evident when Strøm’s (2000a) ideas about chains of delegation in parliamentary democracies are once more taken into account. According to Strøm (2000a), each link of the stylized chain of delegation can be characterized as a principal-agent relationship. When it comes to the executive-legislative relationship that is the center of our discussion, the parliament is the principal that delegates powers to its agent, the PM and his or her cabinet. From the parliament’s standpoint, selecting ministers with a parliamentary background helps to mitigate typical principal-agent problems. The risk of adverse selection, that is, uncertainty about a minister’s preferences, is reduced because PMs are usually better informed about ministerial candidates taken from parliament. Likewise, the threat of moral hazard, that motives to act contrary to the parliament’s interests, is ameliorated when a minister with a parliamentary background are chosen because their preferences are likely to be more similar to MPs than those of ministers taken from outside the parliament.

Thus, ministers in parliamentary systems are not only ministers but at the same time members of parliament, although they are sometimes obliged to leave their position as MP’s during their time in cabinet, as is the case in Sweden since 1975. Moreover, in Sweden, the Head of State is not even formally involved in the appointment of cabinet ministers: hence, the power to select the latter (especially in single-party cabinets, which is typical of post-war Sweden), resides completely in the hands of the Prime Minister to be.

Under these conditions (i.e. almost no constraints on the PM’s right to appoint), presidentialization and weakening of parliamentary control would imply that over time, fewer ministers are recruited from parliament. Instead it can be expected that other types of experience become more important, such as expertise from different societal sectors. In presidential cabinets ministers are more of expert advisors to the president (Lijphart 1999: 118). We will thus investigate if other types of experience become more important over time, such as experience in trade unions, in businesses or in public administration. We will also seek to evaluate to which extent Prime Ministers make political recruitments, i.e. select ministers with

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2 Elsewhere we focus on another proposed indicator, cabinet reshuffles, i.e. the turnover rate of cabinet ministers. Frequent cabinet reshuffles may indicate the growing autonomy of the PM vis-à-vis other ministers, as would follow from a presidentialized executive. The PM’s position is accordingly strengthened while other ministers become more dependent on his confidence. As indicated by frequent turnovers, the collegiality/collectivity in cabinet decision-making is undermined (Bäck, Persson, Vernby 2007).
previous political careers, since in presidential systems, non-partisan ministers are frequently recruited (Amorim Neto & Strøm 2006), while the opposite is true in most parliamentary systems (Blondel & Thiébault 1991). If we witness a trend towards fewer ministers with previous political background, while instead more ministers with expert background become hired, it may indicate a growing autonomy of the Prime Minister vis-à-vis other cabinet ministers.

However, since minority governments have to build parliamentary majorities, we may find that most ministers still have a parliamentary background because, more than in majority governments, these ministers must have both socializing skills (some form of incentive compatibility with MPs) and expertise of parliamentary techniques (because winning a vote in the assembly cannot be taken for granted). Hence, the drop in parliamentary expertise of ministers may not be spectacular because of the specific political conditions of minority cabinets. On the other hand, we may expect coalition governments to include a higher proportion of ministers with parliamentary experience than single-party cabinets do, as each party has less executive positions to fill and will tend to select their parliamentary heavyweights. Permaning multivariate analyses and controlling for the type of cabinet therefore seems to be warranted if we want to gauge the effect of European integration on presidentialization with this type of indicator.

The president-like domination of the political executive by leaders such as Margaret Thatcher, Tony Blair, Silvio Berlusconi and Göran Persson is often explained by short-term contingent factors, such as the parliamentary support on which they can draw, their current standing with the electorate, and their personalities (Webb & Poguntke 2005: 337). However, contingent factors such as these constrain and shape executive leadership in all types of democratic regimes. We are instead looking for evidence of a long-term development of a stronger chief executive reflecting an adaptation to underlying structural causes of presidentialization. This development is hypothesized to promote the selection of non-party technocrats or politicians lacking parliamentary experience. The major factor that is believed to cause this trend, European integration, is discussed next.

The hypothesized effect of European integration

In their effort to explain the ongoing presidentialization of executive politics Poguntke and Webb (2005) find support for four major explanatory factors, although they have not tested their hypotheses statistically. European integration, as we will focus on in this study, is accordingly not the only plausible explanatory factor of presidentialization. Besides the internationalization of politics (of which European integration is one important aspect), they claim that macro-societal

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3 Note, however, that according to Strøm’s (2000b: 196) descriptive and temporal analysis, non-party appointments represented 3 percent or more of the ministerial personnel in a third of 17 OECD countries (1945–1997). In Sweden in particular this author recorded a trend towards less, and not more, non-partisan appointments until the mid-nineties.
factors such as the erosion of cleavage politics, the changing structure of mass communications, and the growth of the state all account for presidentialization.

When traditional social cleavages like religion and class no longer dictate voter loyalties, other factors, such as personal qualities of the party leaders, become more important. The erosion of cleavage politics thus accounts particularly for electoral presidentialization, which we have chosen not to cover in this study. Similarly, the growing and changing role of mass communications seems to be another obvious candidate in accounting for electoral presidentialization. To the contrary, the growth and the increased complexity of the state provides a plausible explanation of executive presidentialization, since it creates a pressing need for greater coordination from the centre. Although we do not discard this potential cause, there are two main reasons why we do not scrutinize it in the present paper: first, it is not quite clear how the growth of state is thought to affect the relation between executives and legislatures as well as the relation between the PM and other ministers in cabinet; second, amongst the factors conducive to the increasing bureaucratic complexity and organizational specialization of national core executives we find the internationalization of politics, both directly through adaptations to European integration in member states and indirectly through general transnational policy learning, as the most important factor.

Hence, even though we believe interrelated processes are at work, we prefer to concentrate this explorative effort on the potential impact of European integration on changes in executive-legislative relations and relations within the executive. By doing-so, we try to enrich the intense debate about the domestic impact of Europe, firming under the label of “Europeanization”. Europeanization research asks how EU politics as an independent variable affects policy, politics and polities of the member states as dependent variables (Börzel 2002; Cowles et al. 2001; Radaelli 2003). Thus, Europeanization approaches focus on dimensions, mechanisms and outcomes of domestic change (Börzel & Risse 2006). While this literature has brought about important insights on domestic effects of intensified integration (even on non-member states; cf. Schimmelpfennig & Sedelmeier 2005; Egeberg 2005), it has mainly dealt with the policy dimension, that is, Europe’s impact on domestic policies and sector-specific administrative structures (cf. for an exception: Anderson 2002), leaving EU’s influence on member states’ politics and polities

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4 We are quite aware that, unfortunately, the concept of Europeanization has been defined in at least three different ways (cf. Börzel & Risse 2007): (1) as emergence of distinct structures of governance; (2) the “top down” process by which European level institutions and decisions shape and transform domestic politics and institutions; (3) “the process of (a) construction, (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of […] rules, procedures, policy paradigms […] and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies” (Radaelli 2003: 30). However, by now it seems to have become a commonplace to use the second meaning of the concept of Europeanization referring to the “domestic impact of Europe” as we do (cf. Börzel & Risse 2007).
understudied (Börzel & Risse 2007). Thus, the contribution of this paper consists of an attempt to combine two literatures, the ongoing debate on presidentialization and the rapidly growing literature about the domestic impact of Europe.

Surprisingly, Europe’s impact on executive politics has hardly been touched upon by empirical research, even though the role of member states’ governments in the integration process is hotly contested among the two major schools dedicated to explaining the dynamics of the integration process. While European integration means that a substantial part of domestic politics is now decided at the supranational level, scholars of the integration process have disagreed about the implications of this development for the political systems of the member states.

Intergovernmentalism perceives member states in complete control of the integration process and assumes therefore that the power of national governments will not be challenged. Instead, member states’ governments will be strengthened by European integration due to their role as architects of EU integration and key policy brokers (Moravcsik 1993; 1998; Milward 1992; Hoffmann 1982). In contrast, neofunctionalism emphasizes the constraints that EU imposes on member states’ governments and predict that with intensified integration, supranational actors will take charge of the integration (Haas 1958; Sandholtz & Stone Sweet 1998; Stone Sweet & Sandholtz 1997). Moreover, national executives are supposed to lose importance even in the domestic context since the EU – by creating new decision points – provides domestic actors with new and independent channels of political access and influence at the European level, so that they can bypass or circumvent national governments (Marks 1993; Sandholtz 1996).

Whereas both schools yield quite different implications for the impact of Europe on domestic politics and polities, they are mainly dedicated to the aim of explaining the dynamics of the integration process and, therefore, treat the EU as an outcome variable. As mentioned, Europeanization research adopts the opposite causal perspective. Although the literature has not extensively dealt with Europe’s impact on national politics, its basic analytic frameworks can be fruitfully applied to empirical questions about Europe’s impact on politics and polities.

Regardless of the empirical gaps in the literature, a majority of scholars appears to side with the state-centrist perspective of the intergovernmentalists, and agree that national governments are the most powerful member state institutions in European affairs and may capitalize on this fact at least in the short and medium run. The simple logic of two level game theory as elaborated by Putnam (1988) implies that the transfer of domestic issues to a supranational level strengthens the core executives and increases their autonomy from domestic political and societal pressure (Moravcsik 1994; Anderson 2002). Since the integration process creates a two level game, it inevitably increases the autonomy of national governments in

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5 This can be explained by the fact that policy change is more accessible for empirical research. Europeanization scholars seem to agree that the domestic impact of Europe is mostly felt with regard to policy standards and instruments, while the institutionally more entrenched administrative structures, policy styles and policy paradigms have been less affected and are shaped by stronger inertia (Olsen 2002; Börzel & Risse 2007).
Council negotiations. In addition, the difficulty of scrutiny, due to the lack of transparency at Union level (secrecy of Council deliberations), and the lack of parliamentary resources at the national level, create even greater information asymmetries in executive-legislative relations. In fact, it is by now commonplace among scholars of the integration process to consider national parliaments to be the political losers of European integration (Maurer & Wessels 2001).

When theoretical frameworks developed in Europeanization research (cf. Bauer et al. 2007) are applied to the issue of domestic presidentialization, the alleged trend of presidentialization can be explained by two alternative mechanisms that correspond with different ideas about the goals of the PM. Given our focus on the selection of ministers, both hypothetical empirical mechanisms yield the same predictions, that is, a presidentialization of executive politics, as measured by an increase in the selection of non-party technocrats.

According to a political opportunity approach, Europe represents an emerging opportunity structure offering some actors additional legal and political resources to exert influence, while constraining the opportunities of others (Hèritier et al. 2001). Europeanization redistributes domestic political resources; it shifts the control over domestic agendas, modifies who can participate in domestic decision-making, increases information asymmetries and alters perceptions of legitimacy (Moravcsik 1998). Such a political opportunity approach is also popular among scholars of presidentialization. As has been argued by Poguntke and Webb (2005: 350) national chief executives are provided with additional power resources and autonomy vis-à-vis potential sources of domestic political dissent (including their own cabinet and parties) due to the process of European integration.

Within our framework of research, the underlying theoretical mechanism is that European integration disturbs existing relationships and power equilibria between various domestic actors, more specifically executive-legislative relations and the collegiality in the executive. European integration changes political opportunity structures enabling national executives to push for a power shift vis-à-vis other domestic political actors by exploiting the executive’s key role in the integration process. Within such a political opportunity approach, the Prime Minister is mainly perceived as an office-seeker whose primary goal is to stay leader of government (cf. Luebbert 1986). Thus, as European integration frees the Prime Minister from domestic constraints, making him less dependent on parliamentary and party support, he can afford to select ministers from outside these traditional reservoirs.

Europeanization research has also stressed the role of adaptational pressure as a source of domestic change. According to an institutional misfit approach, European integration can cause institutional misfit, challenging domestic rules and procedures as well as the collective understandings attached to them (Börzel & Risse 2003). This sort of functionalist reasoning can also be applied to executive politics. The argument does not rely on the assumption that national executives or the Prime Minister try to exploit the integration process in order to shift the domestic power balance in their favor. On the contrary, European integration works as a constraint on the PM’s freedom to select ministers.
Such reasoning perceives the Prime Minister mainly as a policy-seeker. Since European integration increases complexity of policy-making and requires national governments to present a united front in supranational negotiations, the integration process confronts national governments with strong functional pressure to reorganize the executive branch of government in order to meet the increased needs for coordinating domestic policy-making (cf. Goetz 2005). A Prime Minister interested in effective policy-making therefore has to intensify the coordination of his or her government’s policy-making from the centre. Moreover, it is likely that he or she prefers recruiting non-party technocrats in order to meet the higher needs for policy expertise and to facilitate policy coordination.

To sum up, both the Europeanization literature and the literature on the Presidentialization of parliamentary democracies hypothesize that we will see changed executive-legislative relations, favoring the Prime Minister, as European integration increases. Focusing on ministerial selection as a measure of Presidentialization, we thus expect there to be an increase of individuals with expert background appointed to the cabinet as European integration increases. This may be due to a changed opportunity structure at the domestic arena, or to changes in the functional need for expertise in cabinet.
Research design and data

*A Swedish case study*

A systematic analysis of presidentialization trends and the effects of EU variables in parliamentary democracies should preferably include a number of countries. However, at this point we do not have access to a data set covering ministerial appointments in a large number of countries across the entire post-war period. We have therefore chosen to analyze the Swedish case more in-depth. We recognize that our ability to generalize the results from this type of single case study is limited. We here discuss the potential generality of our empirical results.

One of the main indicators of leadership power within the executive suggested by Poguntke and Webb (2005: 19) is “a growing tendency of chief executives to appoint non-party technocrats or to promote rapidly politicians who lack a distinctive party power base”. However, the applicability of this type of measure varies across countries, as noted by the authors. In some countries the constitution allows for the appointment of ministers who do not hold a parliamentary seat, making it possible for a strong PM to appoint a large number of non-party specialists, whereas in other countries, a parliamentary origin is a requirement (e.g. in Britain). The Swedish constitution does not include such a condition; ministers in fact have to resign their parliamentary seats when appointed to cabinet. This feature of the Swedish institutional setting makes Sweden a suitable candidate for gauging presidentialization trends, since an increase of PM power is likely to be mirrored in the selection of ministers without parliamentary background.

Thus, the institutional setting suggests that we are here dealing with a most likely case, a case where we would expect a trend towards higher PM autonomy and power. Also, previous research on the topic, performed by Nicholas Aylott (2005), has found that there is in fact evidence in favor of the presidentialization thesis in Sweden. This type of reasoning is of course important if our aim is to generalize descriptive results from a case study, which we strive at here. However, we are also interested in gauging the effect of European integration on our indicator of presidentialization. Thus, we also have an explanatory goal.

Large-\(n\) studies typically have an advantage when it comes to measuring causal effects, since we can estimate regression coefficients, and provide estimates on the likelihood that these effects could have occurred by chance (Bennett 2002: 4).

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6 The main available comparative data set covering a large number of countries is the data gathered by Blondel & Thiebault (1991). However, this data set only covers the 1945–1984 period, which is a problem since presidentialization is mainly expected to have occurred after the 1990s. Another data set on ministerial appointments has been gathered by Huber and Martínez-Gallardo (2003). This data however is not yet available from the authors.

7 Goetz (2006: 85) argues similarly that presidentialization and such changes should be studied in cases, such as Sweden, where the “cabinet ministers may not, at the same time, be members of parliament and ministers often do not have prior parliamentary experience”.

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studies are in general less powerful means to measuring effects (Bäck & Dumont 2007), suggesting that we are not able to achieve our explanatory aim. However, in one respect our study is a large-n study, since we are studying Sweden across time, giving us a large number of units within this case. What is important to determine is of course if we have any within-case variation in our main explanatory variable, i.e. European integration. Since Sweden is a late member of the EU (joined in 1995), there should be substantial variation in European integration across time.8

Data on ministerial appointments

The main data source for this paper is a data set on all ministerial appointments in Sweden, between 1917 (breakthrough of parliamentarism) and 2006.9 Here, we focus on the period after the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), i.e. from 1952, since we do not expect any presidentialization or Europeanization trends before this time. The data set includes information on each individual that has been appointed to a ministerial post during the post-1952 period, and if an individual has held several posts, he or she appears several times in the data set. In total, we are dealing with a data set of 224 individuals who together have held 405 ministerial posts, in 14 cabinets.10 The data set includes information on the social and political background of ministers, which enables us to provide a systematic indicator of presidentialization.

In the analysis of ministerial selection we include a number of variables measuring the background of ministers. Parliamentary experience is a dummy variable measuring whether a minister has held a seat in parliament at some point before the appointment. Held party office is a dummy variable measuring whether the minister has held an important position in the party. Union representative is a dummy describing whether the minister has been the leader or representative of a union. Held private sector position is a dummy variable measuring if the minister has held an important position in the private sector (in an employer confederation or private company). Held public sector position is a dummy variable measuring if the minister has held a high position in the public sector.11

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8 An advantage of focusing on the within-country variation is of course that we do not have to control for institutional and other contextual features. This of course also means that we cannot study the effects of such contextual variables. For example, we expect a varying effect of EU integration in different institutional settings, i.e. EU variables are likely to interact with contextual variables. This type of hypothesis cannot be tested in this study.

9 The data was gathered by Ludvig Beckman, Hanna Bäck, Jörgen Hermansson, and Thomas Persson, at the Department of Government, Uppsala university.

10 A change of government is assumed to occur whenever there is a change in the party composition of the cabinet, or when there is a change of Prime Minister.

11 Party position is one of the following: party leader, party ombudsman, member of the party leadership, member or leader of the party executive committee, district position, position in youth organization, leading position in women’s organization. Position in the private sector is one of the following: leader or representative of an employer confederation, member or chair of the executive of a private company. Public sector
Indicators of European integration

As mentioned above, we are not only interested in describing trends of an alleged presidentialization in Sweden, we also aim at performing some explanatory analyses, aimed at gauging the relationships between European integration and our presidentialization indicator. By doing-so, the paper adopts the basic logic of Europeanization research that considers European integration as the independent variable exerting a causal influence on domestic political systems as dependent variable. So far, Europeanization research has mainly focused on EU integration’s impact on domestic policies and the causal mechanisms at work. The preferred research design has been the comparative case study, limited by the number of cases and the dimension of change that can be analyzed at a time (Börzel & Risse 2007). In contrast, this paper focuses on EU’s impact on national politics in the executive realm, and applies a quantitative approach. The research design of this paper is described in figure 1. The causal mechanisms resulting in Europeanization of domestic executive politics will not be addressed directly.

[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

In order to measure the extent to which Sweden has been integrated with Europe, we will use indicators of political as well as of economic integration. Since Europeanization research, due to its focus on policies, relies on sector-specific indicators for the degree of integration, we had to construct our own measures. Concerning political integration, we first use a set of variables denoting the legislative activity of EU institutions as an indicator for the level of European integration. The assumption is that increasing integration is reflected in an increase in legislative activity because as political integration intensifies, more and more law-making authority is transferred to supranational institutions which will produce more and more legislative acts with relevance for the member states. Therefore, the dataset includes Annual Legislative Activity as a variable measuring the total number of legal acts issued by EU institutions in a certain year. Since a number of these legislative acts apply only to limited periods of time, we also calculated a measure for the increasing amount of European legislation. The reasoning for using this indicator is the assumption that an increased level of political integration is reflected in the stock of valid European legislative acts influencing policy-making in the member states. Therefore, we constructed a variable called Cumulated Legislation by cumulating the total amount of annual legislative activity reduced by the annual number of legislative acts ceasing to be in force. Moreover, since the literature has stressed that for the period of

13 The variable is calculated according to the following formula:
“Eurosclerosis” the European Court of Justice was the engine of integration, we also retrieved a variable called Judicial Activism measuring the annual number of European court decisions in order to account for such integration effects.

A look at the indicators reveals that Annual Legislative Activity has been shaped by long-term growth until 1995. Between 1995 and 2006 the number of annual legislative acts has dropped by 1,000. Yet, the level of European integration as measured by the Cumulated Legislation has kept increasing. Here, we find a drop in the early 1980s, since then the amount of European legislation has grown considerably, in particular after 1995 (cf. fig. 2). The Judicial Activity of the European courts shows a robust long-term growth.

In addition to these measures of legislative and judicial activity, we used an expert rating by Tanja Börzel (2006), who has rated the degree and depth of European integration for certain policy areas according to the provisions included in the European treaties (cf. Appendix for details). Whereas her measure distinguishes between degree and depth of European integration, we multiplied the two variables in order to derive one measure for the integration of a certain policy domain. In the next step, we connected Swedish ministers to these policy domains.

Beside indicators of political integration, we will also use an indicator for economic integration, that is, Sweden’s trade with EU member states. This is due to the fact that economic integration is at the heart of European integration and provides a good measure of the extent to which single states become increasingly dependent on the European community. It is commonplace in the literature that, once economic integration has been induced by political integration, economic integration is likely to bring about so-called “spill-over effects” heavily affecting political, cultural and social domains. The abolition of national barriers distorting the common market, can create adaptational pressure on member states, and even non-member states, by mechanisms of “regulatory competition”. Institutional change is then stimulated by the need to improve the functional effectiveness of member states’ institutional arrangements in comparison to those of other participants within the common market (Bauer et al. 2007).

The data on intra-EU trade, as displayed in figure 3, measuring the share of exports and imports to and from EU member states in total trade at a specific point in time, is based on data from Statistics Sweden. The data show that Sweden’s economic integration has experienced a long-term growth since the first Northern enlargement in 1973. In fact, this round of enlargement resulted in a boost of economic integration. In contrast, EU ascension had a much smaller effect.

\[ \text{CumLeg}_t = \text{CumLeg}_{t-1} + \text{AnnLeg}_t - \text{AnnSuspLeg}_t, \] where AnnSuspLeg, is the number of legislative acts suspended in year t.
An analysis of presidentialization trends

The selection of ministers – a trend towards non-political ministers?

One of the main results in previous comparative research is that a parliamentary background is the main career path for becoming a minister. De Winter (1991) shows that on average, 75 percent of the Western European ministers (1945–1985) were members of parliament before joining government. However, this proportion varies substantially across countries, where countries like Ireland, Great Britain and Italy display the highest proportion of parliamentary ministers (about 95 percent), and other countries, such as the Netherlands, on average have cabinets where almost half of the ministers do not have such a background. Sweden is one of the countries, together with Norway, with a relatively low proportion of ministers with an MP background (about 60 percent). De Winter (1991) also shows that many ministers both belong to the party leadership and to parliament, and that a smaller group can be defined as true “insiders”, being parliamentarians of long-standing and belonging to the leadership circles of their party (on average 17 percent).

In Sweden, there are no restrictions on how many and which posts can be appointed. Also, there are no formal requirements on what background, or competence the ministers should hold. However, there are of course informal requirements, implying that the Prime Minister is not completely autonomous in selecting ministers. For example, for a Social Democratic government it has long been common practice that one minister has a background in the labor union. In addition, the Prime Minister often have to take the representativity of the cabinet into account, appointing some women, individuals from younger generations, and more recently, also taking the ethnicity of the ministers into account.

In table 1, we present some information on the background of ministers in Sweden. In our data set, we find that over 60 percent of the ministerial posts appointed were held by a person who had been a member of parliament. We also find that 80 percent of the ministerial posts were held by an individual who had held a post in parliament or in the party. Defining insiders less strictly than De Winter, as individuals who have some parliamentary and party background, we find that 59 percent of the cabinet posts were held by insiders.14 We also present information on “expert” background, defined as a background within the labor union, or a high private or public sector position. A very large share of the ministers have some form of expert background, most notably by having held a high position in the public sector. Finally, looking at the ministers’ social background, we see that about 30 percent of the posts have been held by women, and that less than 15 percent of the ministers have been 40 years or younger.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

14 At this moment, we do not have a reliable measure of the number of years in parliament.
In table 1 we also present the shares of ministerial posts held by individuals with specific backgrounds over decades. Looking at the variables measuring the political background of ministers, we can see that none of them show a clear trend towards ministers having less of a political background in more recent years. There does seem to be a decrease of MPs during the 2000s (from 67 to 58 percent), but no such clear decrease can be found if we look at the party background, which, consistent with Strøm’s findings (2000b), is on the rise until the end of the 1990s.

Looking at the variables measuring expertise, we see different patterns for different variables. For union background there is clearly no trend towards the PM hiring more individuals with this type of experience. Instead, union background was more important in the previous periods, especially during the 1960s (for the vanishing ties between the Social Democratic party and the trade union, see for instance Aylott 2004). Looking at expertise in terms of high positions within the private and the public sector, we can see a slight increase, but this change seems to have occurred already in the 1970–1980 period. In comparison with the 1950s, it is clearly more important to have this type of expertise to become a minister now.

In order to fully describe the trends over the post-war period, we also present the distribution of parliamentary, party, and expert background for each cabinet in figure 4. Looking at the parliamentary background, there seems to be a trend towards fewer ministers with this kind of background since the 1980s. However, this decrease of parliamentarians is starting from a historically high level, with the coalition governments led by Fälldin during the late 1970s–early 1980s including a very high proportion of MPs. This trend during the last three decades is also interrupted by the bourgeois coalition governments 1991–1994 and 2006. Thus, controlling for coalition governments, the trend should become a bit clearer.

[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]

This trend in decreasing parliamentary background is however not accompanied by a decrease in ministers with a party background; in fact this feature reaches its high point in the latest 2006 government. Looking at expert background, it is clear that this feature is more important during the past three decades, but it has been equally important in most cabinets since the 1980s. All in all, there is some, but weak, evidence in favor of a presidentialization thesis, in the sense that PMs to a somewhat higher extent appoint ministers without parliamentary experience.
The effect of European integration

General European integration and ministerial selection

In this part of the paper we investigate the effects of different European integration measures on our indicator of presidentialization, i.e., ministerial selection, more specifically the background of ministers. In the analysis performed here, each portfolio-year is one unit of analysis (individuals can thus appear several times), and the dependent variable describes the type of political and expert background that the appointee to this position has. In order to gauge the trade-offs between different types of ministerial background, we have here chosen to categorize an individual as belonging the one out of four exclusive categories: having an insider background, which is here defined as having held party office and a seat in parliament before being appointed, having an expert background, defined as having held a high position in the private or public sector or a labor union, having both an insider and expert background, and having neither an expert or insider background.

Since we are dealing with a dependent variable with more than two categories, that cannot be ordered, a multinomial logit, or some similar model aimed at estimating the effects of features varying across units on a multiple choice, is an appropriate statistical model. Conceptually, the multinomial logit model is like simultaneously estimating binary logits for all possible comparisons among outcome categories (Long 1997). The coefficients should be interpreted in comparison with the base category, which we is here the political insider category, that is ministers with a background within the party and the parliament.

Besides our main independent variable, European integration, we include two other independent variables in all models. These variables can be referred to as government attributes: the first of these variables measures whether the minister was appointed in a coalition government or a single-party government, whilst the second indicates whether the minister was appointed in a majority or minority government. In table 2 we present our main results from this analyses. In this table we present the results from four multinomial logit models, each including one measure of European integration, measuring annual EU legislation, cumulated EU legislation, judicial activity in the European Court of Justice, and EU trade share.\footnote{We also ran a model including a dummy variable indicating whether Sweden was a member of the European Union at the time the minister was appointed or not. Controlling for the two government attributes as in the models including more fine-grained, continuous measures of EU integration, we found that EU membership has the hypothesized positive effect on the likelihood of recruitment of ministers with expert background (together with or without political insider profile) and ministers without any of the two kinds of competencies (either political or expert) we expect from ministerial personnel, compared to the likelihood of hiring political insiders only. However, the effect is not significant for any of these categories of ministerial profile.}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Main results from multinomial logit models}
\end{table}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Main results from multinomial logit models}
\end{table}
Studying the coefficients for the first political integration variable, measuring annual EU legislation (see model 1), we can see that the coefficients are positive and significant for two categories, having a pure expert background and having a combination of an insider and expert background. As mentioned above, these coefficients should be understood in comparison with the base category, which is the political insider category. Thus, as annual legislation increases, the ministers that are appointed are more likely to have an expert background (either only this type of background or in combination with a political background) than a pure political insider background, in the party and parliament.

Similar results are found when we look at the variables measuring judicial activity (model 3) and economic integration, i.e., EU trade share (model 4). Here again, we see that as European integration increases, there is an increased likelihood that ministers will have an expert background as opposed to a purely political background. These results are completely in line with our hypothesis that we should see an increase in expert ministers as European integration increases, which may be due to a changed opportunity structure, giving the Prime Minister less domestic political constraints, or to a functional need for experts in cabinet. Looking at cumulated EU legislation (model 2), the results are still encouraging, since all coefficients are positive. However, the effect of this EU integration variable is not significant for any of the categories.

Overall, this explorative analysis not only suggests that EU integration matters, but also that functional needs may be the most relevant mechanism triggering changes in ministerial selection, as the only significant results found (for three out of four models) concern the two categories of ministers with an expert profile (with or without political background). Hiring ministers with no insider nor expert profile would be another tempting possibility for PMs if EU integration increasingly frees them from domestic constraints without imposing new, supra-national ones (such as looking for technicians to cope with policy complexity in a multi-level governance system), but we find no significant change towards more recruitment of ministers with such a background as compared to political insiders.

We also find some interesting results for our variables measuring government type. The coalition government coefficient for the expert category is negative and significant for all four models and significant in three of them (1, 3 and 4), suggesting that experts are less likely to be appointed in coalition governments. This is in line with our expectations that we should find a higher proportion of ministers with political experience, or at least less experts in coalition governments as each party has less executive positions to fill and will tend to select their political heavyweights. The other control variable displays even more important effects: minority cabinet coefficient is positive and significant for two categories in all of our models; the category with individuals without an expert or political insider background (1) and the combination category (3). Thus, looking at minority cabinets, individuals with a combination of political and expert background, and individuals without a background as an expert or as a political insider, are more
likely to be appointed than pure political insiders. Whilst the former finding was to some extent expected, as we hypothesized that parliamentary experience is likely to be sought to find support for government policies in parliament, the latter (more recruitment of ministers lacking traditional competencies) may be explained by the fact that line ministers are not the sole policy-makers in minority cabinets. Outside the reservoir of insiders, PMs and parties may fill some positions with personnel who lack both political and expert background instead of looking for experts without insider background, knowing that expertise may be found in parliament, which is bound to have veto power over minority government proposed policies.

*European integration of the policy domain and ministerial selection*

We now turn to our last measure of European (political) integration, measuring the integration of the specific policy domain that the minister controls. As mentioned above, this measure is based on an expert rating of the level of integration of the policy domain, and this information is then connected to specific ministers, giving us a variable that not only varies (some) over time, but also across ministers. Just as in the previous analyses, our dependent variable categorizes the background of ministers into four categories, and we apply a multinomial logit model to our data. The results from two multinomial logit models are presented in table 3, one focusing on all ministers, and one where only heads of departments are studied.

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

The model where we study all ministers in our sample (model 5) yields rather disappointing results, since there is no significant effect on either of the categories when European integration of the specific policy domain of the minister increases. The effects on all three categories are however positive, giving some support to the idea that individuals that do not have a pure political background are more likely to be appointed to a ministerial post that deals with highly integrated policy areas.

In model 6 we focus on a sub sample of ministers, ministers that are heads of departments. In Sweden, it is relatively common to have ministers that are not in charge of a department, but act instead as deputy ministers. These ministers have been excluded from the analysis presented in model 6, in order to focus our analysis on ministers that can be seen as “controlling” a policy area in question. Also, ministers who are heads of departments are typically the most important cabinet members, and the posts where we should see the biggest effect of European integration since the PM’s decisions about staffing are more important for these posts. We do in fact find slightly more interesting results for this model, most importantly, the effect of policy integration is positive and significant for the expert and insider category, suggesting that people with expert background are more likely to be appointed to high ministerial posts controlling integrated policy areas. This may suggest that there is a functional need to appoint experts for such posts.
Changes in probabilities for different types of integration measures

Since the unstandardized multinomial coefficients do not tell us much about the size of the effects of our different measures of integration, we also present discrete change coefficients, which indicate the change in the predicted probability of a specific outcome when we move from the minimum to the maximum on the independent variables. The discrete changes for each measure of integration and each category of ministerial background are presented in figure 5.

Looking at the discrete change coefficients for the political insider category, we see that the results are quite clear, since all coefficients are negative, suggesting that as European integration increases, there is a decrease of appointees being political insiders. When we move from the minimum to the maximum on the variables measuring annual legislative activity, judicial activity, and EU trade share, ministers are roughly 20 percentage points less likely to be insiders, for a 15 percentage points difference when we use the policy-specific integration measure. The smallest effect recorded is that of cumulated EU legislation, which decreases the probability of a political insider being appointed by 8 percentage points only.

The results for the second category, measuring whether the minister has both an expert background and a political insider background, are also pretty clear, with all integration measures exerting substantial, positive effects (16–23 percentage points), again with the exception of cumulated legislation (3 percentage points difference). Thus, overall, as European integration increases, there is an increase of ministers with an expert background, once more giving support to the idea that integration comes with a functional need for expert ministers.

In general, the effects for the expert only category are not as large as the effects for the combination category (4–10 percentage points), but the results again support the conclusion that integration leads to an increase of experts. Note however that the greatest change (10 percentage points) comes here with the cumulated legislation indicator. One integration measure, the policy integration variable, however does not exert a positive effect (–4 percentage points).

For the last category, ministers without insider nor expert background, again four out of five integration measures record a negative – albeit very limited (–2 to –5 percentage points) – effect, whilst cumulated integration displays no effect at all. Although almost imperceptible, this effect is in the opposite direction of what the presidentialization thesis in general and the impact of EU integration in particular, if we assumed a mechanism of changed opportunity structure, would suggest. Again, we therefore find that our results give more preliminary support to the mechanism of functional needs of EU integration, rather than its alternative, as triggering an effect on domestic ministerial selection.
Conclusions

According to recent research, parliamentary democracies are becoming more like presidential systems. Scholarly observers report that Prime Ministers’ status, and autonomy vis-à-vis parliamentary parties are on the increase (Poguntke & Webb 2005). Moreover, according to this “presidentialization thesis”, these developments are, to a large part, explained by the increasing internationalization of politics, and in particular by European integration. As a consequence of European integration, a substantial part of domestic politics is now decided on a supranational level; an arena where chief executives have the upper hand against other domestic political actors. The normative implications of such an alleged trend for the parliamentary democracies in the member states are severe. “Presidentialization” implies a weakening of parliamentary control that disturbs chains of delegation and increases risks of agency drift on part of the Prime Minister and his or her cabinet.

In this paper, we have inquired into the validity of these claims by looking at the specialization of executive positions in Sweden. We argue that, if there is a presidentialization at work, then expertise in the area of the portfolio at hand, rather than general party or parliamentary experience, should be increasingly favored in the process of ministerial selection. Arguably then, any trends towards a presidentialization of executive politics should reveal themselves in changes in these indicators. This should be especially so in Sweden, where the institutional structure is relatively conducive to such developments.

Our findings suggest that there is some evidence in favor of an ongoing presidentialization trend. It appears that Prime Ministers, to a somewhat higher extent, reward expertise, rather than party- and parliamentary experience, when filling cabinet positions. However, there appears to be more variation across governments, than across time. In our multivariate analyses, we assess to what extent variations across time can be explained by European integration. The analyses reveal that as European integration increases, the ministers that are appointed are more likely to have an expert background, either as pure experts or in combination with a political background. Consequently, the hypothesis that European integration leads to an increase of ministers with expert background and a corresponding decline in ministers with political experience is supported.

Our results suggest that European integration has, to some extent, disturbed existing relationships and power equilibria between various domestic actors in Sweden and, thus, transformed executive politics. However, to state that European integration has modified political opportunity structures in one member state does not imply that all national executives will actually exploit these opportunities (cf. Börzel & Risse 2003). It seems reasonable to assume that integration’s impact on the domestic power balance will vary according to national settings. The increasing autonomy of executives with regard to national parliaments supposed to take place due to European integration seems to depend largely on the national organization of executive-legislative relations, and on the divisive potential of EU integration issues amongst voters and parties. National legacies regarding the parliamentary
accountability of governments are likely to have far-reaching implications for the awareness of political actors and the perceived legitimacy of power shifts in favour of the national executive. In light of this, it would be fruitful to inquire into whether our findings also hold for other comparable parliamentary democracies.

To conclude, our confrontation of the discourse about presidentialization with insights derived from Europeanization research have proven to be fruitful because, in contrast to the implications of the presidentialization thesis, Europeanization scholars do not expect broad-scale convergence or homogenization but rather a differential impact of Europe on the member states due to a number of intervening variables (Olsen 2002). Studies of meso-level institutions, such as national administrations, suggest that Europe’s impact is differential and mediated by pre-existing institutions (Harmsen 1999; Kassim et al., 2000; Börzel & Risse 2007). Thus, if we wish to gain a better understanding of the effects of European integration on executive politics, further systematic empirical work examining presidentialization trends in other EU member states, as well as states outside the European community, is necessary.
References


Appendix: Policy-domain specific integration measure

The policy domain specific rating of the level of European integration as presented by Tanja Börzel (2006) is based on the following list of policy domains, which we have connected to certain Swedish ministers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Domain</th>
<th>Swedish Minister(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Affairs</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Joint Foreign and Security Policy</td>
<td>• Foreign Affairs/Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Foreign Trade Policy</td>
<td>• Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Foreign Trade Policy</td>
<td>• Foreign Affairs/Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic Affairs/Interior and Justice</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Criminal Law/Interior Security</td>
<td>• Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Civil Law</td>
<td>• Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Civil Law</td>
<td>• Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Civil Law</td>
<td>• Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-cultural Affairs</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Environment/Consumer Safety</td>
<td>• Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Health and Safety of Labour Conditions</td>
<td>• Labour Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Labour/Industrial Relations</td>
<td>• Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Culture and Education</td>
<td>• Labour Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Social Policy</td>
<td>• Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Research and Development</td>
<td>• Education/Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Research and Development</td>
<td>• Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Research and Development</td>
<td>• Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Research and Development</td>
<td>• Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Social Policy</td>
<td>• Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Research and Development</td>
<td>• Education/Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Research and Development</td>
<td>• Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Research and Development</td>
<td>• Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Affairs</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Four Freedoms</td>
<td>• Foreign Affairs/Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Competition and Industrial Policy</td>
<td>• Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Competition and Industrial Policy</td>
<td>• Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Energy and Transport</td>
<td>• Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Energy and Transport</td>
<td>• Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Energy and Transport</td>
<td>• Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Economic Stabilization and Employment</td>
<td>• Labour Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Economic Stabilization and Employment</td>
<td>• Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Agriculture</td>
<td>• Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Agriculture</td>
<td>• Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Structural (Regional) Policy</td>
<td>• Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Currency Policy</td>
<td>• Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tax Policy</td>
<td>• Finance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In case, two or more portfolios held by Swedish ministers corresponded to a certain policy domain, we related all of these ministers to this domain. The reasoning for proceeding like this is as follows: Since policy domains are usually more encompassing than a minister’s portfolio (which, among others, creates the need for coordination within governments), several ministers are affected by an increase in the policy domain’s integration in the EU. Thus, it seems justified to relate all affected ministers to a certain policy domain.

Börzel measures “Degree” and “Depth” of integration of these particular policy domains. The degree dimension varies between 1 and 5, where 1 indicates, *exclusive national competencies* (0% EU), and 5 indicates *exclusive EU competencies* (100% EU). The depth dimension takes the participation of supranational actors in policy-making and the decision procedures in the Council into account. It varies between 0 and 5, where 0 denotes *no coordination at the EU level*, and 5 indicates *supranational order*. In order to derive a single measure for policy domain integration, we have taken the product of both dimensions. For ministers “controlling” several policy areas, an average index was created.
Figure 1. Basic logic of the research design

European Integration
Political Integration
• Annual Legislative Activity
• Cumulated Legislation
• Judicial Activity
Economic Integration
• EU Share of Trade

Europeanization
• Member States’ Policies
• Member States’ Politics
  • Presidentialization
  • Member States’ Polities

Note: Concepts marked in grey are not empirically observed.
Figure 2. Indicators of political integration

Note: CumLeg denotes Cumulated Legislation, AnnLeg denotes Annual Legislative Activity and JudAct refers to Judicial Activity as defined above.
Figure 3. EU trade share as indicator of economic integration

Northern enlargement
Sweden’s EU ascension
Table 1. Backgrounds of ministers in Swedish governments, 1952–2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political background</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of parliament</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Held party position</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP or held party position</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP and held party position</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expert background</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union member</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>22%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Held private sector position</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Held public sector position</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some expert background</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social background</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 or younger</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of observations</strong></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Figure 4. Backgrounds of ministers in Swedish governments, 1952–2007
Table 2. Multinomial logit of ministerial background and four different types of integration measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ministerial background (1)</th>
<th>Ministerial background (2)</th>
<th>Ministerial background (3)</th>
<th>Ministerial background (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not insider or expert</td>
<td>Expert only</td>
<td>Expert &amp; insider</td>
<td>Not insider or expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European integration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual legislation</td>
<td>1.934</td>
<td>3.106**</td>
<td>3.489***</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.670)</td>
<td>(1.524)</td>
<td>(1.448)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulated legislation</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1.583</td>
<td>1.278</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.637)</td>
<td>(1.499)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial activity</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2.430</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.862)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU trade share</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition govt.</td>
<td>1.240</td>
<td>-0.697*</td>
<td>0.645</td>
<td>0.921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.794)</td>
<td>(0.423)</td>
<td>(0.470)</td>
<td>(0.777)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority govt.</td>
<td>1.531**</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>1.166***</td>
<td>1.375**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.724)</td>
<td>(0.431)</td>
<td>(0.392)</td>
<td>(0.679)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>956</td>
<td>956</td>
<td>956</td>
<td>956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Significant at * the 0.10 level, ** the 0.05 level, *** the 0.01 level. Entries are unstandardized multinomial logit coefficients from four multinomial logit models, where type of ministerial background is the dependent variable and political insider (party and parliamentary background) is the base category. Entries in parentheses are robust standard errors (clustered on portfolio).
Table 3. Multinomial logit of ministerial background and policy integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ministerial background (5)</th>
<th>Ministerial background (6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not insider or expert</td>
<td>Expert only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>European integration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy integration</td>
<td>0.069 (0.115)</td>
<td>0.073 (0.101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition govt.</td>
<td>1.395* (0.793)</td>
<td>-0.432 (0.409)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority govt.</td>
<td>1.851*** (0.683)</td>
<td>0.698** (0.355)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>921</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>All</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Significant at * the 0.10 level, ** the 0.05 level, *** the 0.01 level. Entries are unstandardized multinomial logit coefficients from four multinomial logit models, where type of ministerial background is the dependent variable and political insider (party and parliamentary background) is the base category. Entries in parentheses are robust standard errors (clustered on portfolio).
Figure 5. Changes in predicted probabilities for five integration measures

Note: Entries are discrete change values, indicating the change in probability when a variable changes from its minimum to its maximum and other variables are held at some values (EU membership=1, coalition government=0, minority government=1). The discrete change values are based on models 1–4 and 6.