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85 The social and cultural constitution of emotion in language, discourse and the body

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Abstract: Many existing theories of emotion suggest that the relationship between emotions and the social world is mediated by language. Following this assumption, this chapter first clarifies some terminology related to emotion and how emotions are associated with symbolic orders. Second, the chapter discusses different approaches at how language is involved in shaping and constructing human emotion. Language here is primarily referred to as a key element and facilitator of culture, both in terms of its capacity to establish symbolic realities and in view of communicating and establishing these realities within language communities. The chapter will discuss this potential with regard to emotion-related norms and values, both of which are expressed and communicated through language and exhibit a specific grammar on their own. It will also look at social practices and the pragmatics of language and discuss how practical and tacit knowledge coalesce to form emotional practices. This also includes a discussion of how public discourse as a realm of the institutionalized and politicized use of language affects emotions. In a third step, the chapter discusses different ways in which the cultural shaping of emotion is related to specific social groups and collectives as constituents of the social world and how identity and the politics of identity contribute to the emergence of collective emotions and emotion repertoires.

1 Introduction

What are emotions? How do they shape social life and individual well-being? And how are they in turn shaped by social and cultural affairs? These are central questions of almost any discipline concerned with understanding emotions as *explanans* and *explanandum*, as Georg Simmel pointed out when he suggested to look at emotions from the perspectives of 'primary' and 'secondary' emotions, the former asking which social relationships bring about which emotions, the latter capitalizing on the question of how emotions in turn affect social relationships (Gerhards 1986). Contemporary accounts have predominantly focused

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on the former question and looked at the various ways in which emotions are socially and culturally constructed or – more recently – even constituted. Existing research has shown how certain types of feelings are contingent on the social world, how they become associated with cultural emotion concepts, and how feelings and emotions affect social action and the fabrics of society. This includes the conjecture that emotions do not arise arbitrarily across individuals, but rather in more or less patterned and structured ways, for instance in relation to power hierarchies, politics, or inequalities. It also means that emotions are linked to social norms, values, and practices, with regards to the situations in which emotions are experienced as well as in view of the cultural meanings attached to them. Most theories suggest that this relationship between feelings and the social world is mediated by language in the broadest sense. Following this assumption, this chapter first clarifies some terminology related to emotion and subsequently discusses different approaches at how language is involved in shaping and calibrating human emotion. Language here is primarily referred to as a key element and facilitator of culture, both in terms of its capacity to establish symbolic realities and in view of communicating these realities within language communities. The chapter will discuss this potential with regard to (a) emotion-related norms and values, both of which are expressed through language and exhibit a specific grammar on their own; (b) social practices and the pragmatics of language; and (c) public discourse as a realm of the institutionalized and politicized use of language. In a third step, the chapter discusses different ways in which the cultural shaping of emotion is related to specific social groups and collectives as constituents of the social world and how identity and the politics of identity contribute to the emergence of collective emotions and emotion repertoires.

2 Emotions and symbolic orders

A central assumption of debates on the role of human emotions for the Social takes the view that emotions are social and cultural constructs. This means, first, that emotions do not occur entirely arbitrarily or even randomly across individuals, but more or less systematically and in a somehow structured or organized manner. Emotions hinge on social forms and the patterns of social organization and thus may depend on, amongst other things, existing power relations, social inequalities, or the structure of social networks. Second, this means that emotions are not only tied to these formal or social structural aspects of society, but likewise to the contents and meanings – *the symbolic orders* – that are inextricably linked to these forms. This includes socially shared norms, values, and beliefs but also institutions, practices, customs, and traditions. Importantly, symbolic orders can be specifically tailored to emotions and the situations in which they arise, i.e., at the ways in which emotions are momentarily experienced, communicated, and reflected upon and at their more general cultural significance, for instance regarding their cultural appreciation or taboo status, their commodification and political exploitation, or their importance as an object of science.

Although many works stress that emotions are socially and culturally constructed, they often still conceive of emotions – and in particular the subjective emotional experience

which is characteristic of an emotion – as physiological and personal phenomena (see Bericat 2016). Some of the classics in the sociology of emotion, for example, assume that human subjects experience and perceive emotions, as well as communicate and express them. In her seminal study, Arlie Hochschild (1979) defines emotions "as bodily cooperation with an image, a thought, a memory – a cooperation of which the individual is aware" (Hochschild 1979: 551). Along similar lines, Peggy Thoits (1989: 318) argues that emotions consist of cognitive appraisals, changes in physiological or bodily sensations and expressive gestures, different constellations of which become culturally classified as emotions and conceptualized using words like shame, guilt, or embarrassment. Still more radically, Theodore Kemper (1987) understands emotions as "autonomic-motoric-cognitive states" (Kemper 1987: 263).

Somewhat to the contrary, interactive and relational perspectives emphasize the social situatedness and contingent character of emotion. For Norman Denzin (1984: 66), emotions are best analyzed sociologically from a phenomenological standpoint. As *self-feelings*, they are lived, imagined, situated, and temporally embodied experiences that permeate the stream of consciousness as well as the entire body. Jack Katz (1999) likewise speaks of emotions as "self-reflexive actions and experiences", emphasizing that the "self-reflection in emotion is corporeal rather than a matter of discursive reasoning" (Katz 1999: 7). Through emotions, he suggests, individuals "reach back sensually to grasp the tacit, embodied foundations" (Katz 1999: 7) of their selves. Finally, Ian Burkitt (2014) advocates a thoroughly relational view of emotions, in which he supposes, on the one hand, the presence of different components of emotions – e.g., psychological, physical, linguistic, biographical – and, on the other, emphasizes that emotions are primarily to be understood as indices of social relations.

Part of this conceptual plurality is certainly due to a lack of clarity regarding the distinction between close relatives like affect, feeling, and emotion. In the following, I would like to propose an understanding of how these notions are linked and what this means for the broader connections of culture, language and emotion (von Scheve 2017; von Scheve and Slaby 2019). A key feature of emotions, as discussed in many theoretical paradigms and disciplines (e.g., *Conceptual Act Theory*; Barrett 2014), is that they are *intentionally directed* affective stances towards some object or entity which are categorized according to culturally prevailing prototypical constellations of objects, situations, and affective stances to which we typically refer using specific emotion words, such as anger, guilt, shame, embarrassment, or joy (see also Russell [1991] for an elaboration of the notion of emotions as prototypes). Although there certainly is no direct matching between emotional experiences and specific lexical terms (Sabini and Silver 2005), it is equally clear that every language, and its words for emotions in particular, "imposes its own system of classification upon human emotional experience" (Wierzbicka 1992: 546), thereby altering and even constituting this very experience (Bamberg 1997).

Language and the emotion words that categorize situated affective experiences therefore not only represent but at the same time constitute specific kinds of evaluative world-relations, for instance a relation to an imminent danger in the case of fear, to an insult or offense in the case of anger, or to a severe loss in the case of grief. An "affective stance" is a specific mode of being and bodily orientation towards the world that has meaningful

evaluative qualities and usually involves a specific action potential or readiness. As part of an emotion, this stance normally involves a certain *subjective feeling* or *feeling towards* (Goldie 2000: 58) as a specific phenomenal experience, although feelings frequently occur unrelated to emotions, as in, for instance, sensations like pain. Any understanding of emotion must accommodate this prototypical directedness towards evaluatively salient classes of objects. Emotion then is an affective and cognitive process unfolding along culturally categorized evaluative relations that links an individual to a specific matter of concern. Fear thus comprises affective processes and cognitive appraisals for which individuals face an imminent danger; anger comprises those thoughts and affects that relate someone to an offense or insult; and grief would comprise dynamics relating an individual to a situation of significant loss. Importantly, the lexical terms we use to denote these relations are an essential *part* of an emotion proper.

This view of emotions necessarily implies that emotions are inextricably tied to culturally established and thus historically contingent linguistic categories. They likewise involve elements of conceptual knowledge and understanding over and above physiological processes, affect and feelings. Emotions also presuppose and contribute to shaping an intelligible domain of value, that is, socially instituted and culturally codified domains of significance, combined with normatively proper ways to deal with them (e.g., what we find disgusting or praiseworthy, how to respond to specific dangers, or how to adequately deal with conflict, loss, mischief, and so on). Moreover, emotions (and emotion categories) are closely related to reflective self-relations since they provide sources for self-understanding, anchoring individual narratives of value and importance and provide default ways of making sense of actions, decisions and commitments. In virtue of the intrinsic connection between emotions, lexical terms and linguistic categories, and associated types of value, emotions relate individual traits and experience to a cultural repertoire and thus provide intelligibility and accountability to individuals within a sphere of acculturation and belonging. This, amongst other things, explains the close association of emotions with canons of norms, values, customs, and traditions. Based on this understanding, the following section will outline how culture – in different understandings of the term – is and becomes associated with emotion.

3 Culture and emotion

Culture comes to bear in this understanding of emotion in different ways, not least depending on which understanding of culture one employs. Conceiving of culture as encompassing socially shared patterns of meaning-making and corresponding practices is widespread not only in sociology (Reckwitz 2003) but also in neighboring disciplines such as political science and social and cultural anthropology. Likewise, this view of culture is an important component of most sociological approaches to understanding the generation, experience, and communication of emotion. In this section, I will first focus on values and norms as integral to shared patterns of meaning-making and, second, capitalize on embodied approaches to (shared) meaning, as found in practice theories.

3.1 Values and norms

To the extent that we accept that thoughts, ideas, memories, imaginations, and beliefs are essential features of an emotion – i.e., of a prototypical evaluative world-relation reflecting particular concerns – we can assume that emotions are always and necessarily social and linguistic and discursive phenomena. This is because ever since the inception of the sociology of knowledge by Karl Mannheim (1929) it has become commonplace that the mind is inextricably tied to the social world and that most of our attitudes, desires, and beliefs are of a social and collective, rather than an individual nature. Language is essential for this coupling not only because it allows one to articulate, denote, and represent these cognitive components of emotion, but also because it enables their communication and sharing across individuals within a designated language community, thus creating a shared social reality (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Laitin 1977).

How the social world impinges on people's mental lives and their thoughts and beliefs is well documented, for example, in sociological research on values and attitudes. Findings from this line of research show that attitudes regarding, for instance, the environment, immigration, or social justice are highly correlated with individuals' socio-demographic characteristics, such as educational attainment in the case of right-wing or xenophobic attitudes (Zick and Küpper 2015). Likewise, values research indicates that the relevance of different values like self-direction, tradition, or conformity (Schwartz 1992) differs significantly across countries (Gerhards 2009) and is, moreover, subject to considerable historical variability (Inglehardt 1977).

What does this mean for emotions? Let us take the self-direction of children, valuing their independent thought and action, their choosing, creating, exploring, as an example of how values and attitudes and their (historical) variability are linked to emotional experience. In contemporary Western societies, autonomy, self-determination, and, above all, the physical and psychological well-being of children are considered sacrosanct. Their disregard, as in cases of child labor and child abuse, thus consistently produces strong emotional responses such as anger and indignation. In other historical and cultural contexts, however, these emotions are quickly relativized because of different underlying values and concerns, when, for example, child labor was the rule rather than the shocking exception.

As important components of culture, values are relevant for emotions in another respect. As "conceptions of the desirable" (Kluckhohn 1951) they not only reflect preferred maxims of action, but may also refer to the desirability and thus the cultural significance of specific emotions. One of the defining criteria for values and moral norms is their universality and sharedness within society and across situations (Turiel 1983). If one values freedom, honesty, and fairness, one usually does so regardless of a specific context or social situation. Values, therefore, can refer to emotions that are particularly esteemed or eschewed in a culture. Tsai (2007) suggested the term "ideal affect" to refer to the affective states that people value, prefer, and ideally want to feel. For example, we disregard envy and rage in most contemporary Western societies, regardless of the situations in which they arise. In contrast, feeling rules as instances of social norms are bound to specific situations. We are supposed to feel sad at funerals and happy on New Year's Eve. Values can hence incorporate what a "good feeling" actually is and means.

Emotions in this sense are also often objects (indeed also the objects of other emotions, for instance the fear of shame) that are treated in a particular way, as in artistic representations or public debates, for example regarding religious feelings or fear of social decline. Typically, attending to emotions is facilitated by language. Text and talk have a considerable say in whether we cherish or despise certain emotions (for example in literature), they pre- or proscribe specific emotions vis-à-vis specific acts, events, or objects (as in socialization and processes of *Gefühlsbildung*; Röttger-Rössler 2019), and they render emotions political, as matters of debate and negotiation (Lutz 1990). This is also why social and cultural anthropologists frequently speak about hyper- or hypo-cognitive emotions (Levy 1984), i.e., those emotions which either have a wide array of lexical terms and linguistic concepts or those which rather only play a minor role in a culture. As Peter Stearns (1994) traces for the concept of *coolness* in the US, historical studies demonstrate that the cultural presence and significance of emotions are subject to constant change. Needless to say, the place of certain emotions in culture and the value we attach to these emotions is hardly ever taken for granted, but is subject to political interests, issues of power relations, and public negotiations.

Aside from values, the concept of culture in the sociology of emotion also usually contains norms and rules that are widely regarded as socially shared reference points in the construction of meaning and significance. Unlike values that represent general and situation-independent ideas of what is good and desirable, norms and rules have a strong deontological character that are more strongly oriented toward questions of *ought* and corresponding social expectations. Moreover, social norms are often also situation-specific in that they prescribe what to do and expect from others in a specific situation. In addition, in cases of deviant behavior, formal or informal sanctions usually enforce and maintain social norms. Deviant behavior in this regard includes social actions, like littering, as well as showing inappropriate emotions, for instance joy at a funeral.

Arlie Hochschild (1979) has popularized this normative perspective on emotions with her concept of *feeling rules* and corroborated it empirically in her study on the emotion work of flight attendants (Hochschild 1983). A feeling rule "delineates a zone within which one has permission to be free of worry, guilt, or shame with regard to the situated feeling" (Hochschild 1979: 565). These rules specify which emotions are regarded as appropriate and expected in particular situations. Based on this understanding, feelings rules are a subset of prescriptive social norms that indicate what "ought or ought not to be the case" under specific circumstances (Opp 2002: 132). More specifically, these norms demarcate the intensity, direction, duration, and objects of emotions appropriate in a situation (Hochschild 1979; Thoits 2004). Feeling rules can be understood as elements of an overarching ideology, a broader system of the symbolic social order. In the same way as normative orders guide all sorts of behaviors through norms and values, for example fairness, reciprocity, or generalized trust, they guide emotions and their expression. Whereas ideal affect (Tsai 2007) and the culture-specific values ascribed to different emotions are usually not situation-specific but cover a wide range of circumstances, feelings rules are closely tied to specific social situations in which they govern emotional experience and expression. These feeling rules have also been investigated from a cross-culturally comparative perspective, for example investigating the social expectations regarding the sensing and ex-

pression of shame in Indonesia, as Röttger-Rössler (2004) describes using Indonesian case studies, or mass-media mediated compassion, as Scholz (2012) elucidates.

Norms and values are no free-floating and arbitrary "mental objects", but reflect stances and worldviews that are learned and internalized (some would even say "incorporated", see the following section) during socialization within specific social and cultural contexts (see Section 4 on collectivity and identity). This is true for norms and values governing various sorts of behaviors as well as for those directed at emotions. Although norms and values as hallmarks of culture are not monolithic and subject to constant change, those adopted in early socialization certainly are amongst the more fundamental and enduring ones for which there is a broad consensus within a society. This is reflected, amongst other things, in those institutions doing the heavy-lifting of socialization, in particular the family and the educational system. Most socialization processes rely on the operation of sign systems, both verbal and non-verbal. Aside from gestures and facial expressions, language is critically involved in communicating normative emotional expectations, both in written and oral forms (Shields 2002), in establishing emotional consensus (Ambrasat et al. 2014), and in reassuring (one's own) compliance with norms, for instance through the verbal sharing of emotions (Rimé 2009). Moreover, due to their conventional character, linguistic categories of emotion have normative properties as well (Gelman and Roberts 2017).

But the adoption of norms – and to some extent also of values – does not end in adolescence. Most norms are notoriously contested within society and their validity and adequacy are subject to debate and negotiation. Discourse is the main arena in which these negotiations takes place and discourse is primarily – though not exclusively – language-driven. This can be highly specialized discourses, for instance regarding the adequate expression of emotion in management, organizational behavior, and consumer relationships (Fineman 2008; Ashkanasy, Zerbe, and Hartel 2002), but also public discourse concerned with issues that cut across entire societies.

In public discourse, conflicting views and positions regarding these cleavages are debated amongst different social and political groups with the aim to establish hegemonic patterns of seeing and understanding the world. This includes not only dominant ways of talking, writing, thinking and reasoning, but also ways of feeling. Individuals as well as political parties and interest groups have a genuine interest in channeling how "the public" or certain groups within society feel towards contested political issues. This is because, as outlined above, emotions are closely linked to actions, in this case actions that political actors deem desirable. These actors therefore aim at establishing what the "right" and "adequate" and also the socially expected ways of feeling are – they aim at instituting feeling rules. Ahmed (2004) has outlined the general principles concerning the linkages between discourse, language and emotion. In line with the above proposed understanding of emotion, she argues that emotions are relationally constituted (instead of solely being socially constructed) through language and discourse and cannot be conceptualized as merely individual phenomenal feelings. Discourse in this sense is conceived of not only in terms of (structural) semantics, but in a more comprehensive way, encompassing a range of non-linguistic phenomena such as attitudes, thoughts, and beliefs, all of which contribute to the formation of a feeling subject. In line with Foucault (1977), the language of discourse

is intimately tied to power and power relationships that determine and regulate who can speak, what can be spoken about, and who can be addressed. In Ahmed's (2004) view, discourse is the main arena in which the politics of these power relations are enacted. Language thus becomes the key intermediary between politics and emotions.

Discourse provides the very patterns of linguistic classification and categorization that render affect into emotion. Through this rendering, discourse not only provides deontic rules in the form of declarative knowledge – in particular, knowledge about emotions and their appropriateness – but also is a critical agent of subjectivation, i.e., of an audience's (collective) self-conception and self-understanding. Discourse in this view 'makes' the feeling and emoting subject and creates an emotion culture or emotional climate (de Rivera 1992). Concrete 'discursive renderings' and political strategies aimed at establishing these emotional frameworks have recently been analyzed by various authors. Mishra (2017) shows how hatred, *ressentiment*, and anger are crafted politically on a global scale. Furedi (2005) and Wodak (2015) illustrate how discursive strategies of eliciting fear in an audience are used to achieve political ends and to mobilize individuals into political action. George (2016) has investigated discursive renderings and political strategies related to religious injury. In his book (2016), George examines, at an international level, *hate spin dynamics* as political techniques that involve strategic use of offense-giving and offense-taking (George 2016: 5). He concludes that both the under- and over regulation of hate speech have detrimental societal consequences. The under-regulation of discourse involving hate speech and other forms of linguistic harm opens up countless possibilities for the injury of groups and individuals. On the other hand, an overregulation of such a discourse encourages the "manufacture of offendedness as a political weapon" (George 2016: 6).

Aside from these intentional political strategies aimed at attributing and eventually also evoking emotions in certain groups, Ural and Berg (2019) have investigated the more subtle, yet potent affective patterns of discourses on emotions, belonging, and religious minorities. Using media coverage following the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks in 2015 and the public debate that followed the publication of Michel Houellebecq's *Submission* shortly after, they trace the ways in which discourse establishes (and is part of) the affective relations between different social groups, in particular "the Muslims" and a contrarian "secular We". Although this discourse operates with references to emotions using a broad range of emotion words, its more meticulous workings are linked to the creation of antagonistic subject positions ("religious emotional" vs. "secular rational" subjects) and their consequences for subjectivation and, ultimately, for social life. Ural and Berg (2019) argue that after the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks, speakers in the discourse are keen to establish not only a specific *we*-ness in opposition to those committing the attack or empathizing with the attackers, but that this "we" becomes associated with a range of emotions, such as concern, fear, and vulnerability. Interestingly, this secular "we" and its emotions are intimately linked to the values of an open and liberal society and result, at least in part, from these values being questioned or coming under attack. Language here not only is the main arena for talk *about* emotions – for example, which emotions are adequate or inadequate to experience in view of the attacks – but language also constructs a shared symbolic, and ultimately social, reality in which social groups and categories become affectively related to one another.

In a similar vein, the debates surrounding the publication of Houellebecq's *Submission* include constructions of a 'We' that is portrayed as being prone to a variety of emotions, in particular fear, disgust, and fascination. Various commentators have accused Houellebecq for inciting fear of Islam within liberal democratic societies, and some have extended this reasoning to acknowledge that this is what 'our' societies stand for, i.e., the toleration of literary fictions of various kinds, even if they are playing with people's collective fears (Walther-Jochum, Berg, and Ural 2018). At the same time, fear of Islam is a constant point of reference throughout the literary criticism of *Submission*. Many commentators state that fear of Islam is in fact widespread in Western societies and not just simply a literary fiction. Walther-Jochum, Berg, and Ural (2018) argue that this proposition – the attribution of an emotion to a social collective – contributes to the construction of some 'secular We' that is construed in stark opposition to Muslim subjects.

3.2 Practices and the body

Existing approaches to emotion account for culture not only in terms of norms and values, but also in the unanimously presumed bodily nature of emotion. These bodily and physiological facets of emotion are not to be confused with a presumed "natural" or "biological" core of emotions. On the contrary, in recent years the sociology of the body has exhaustively described the complex interactions between body, culture, and society (Cregan 2006; Shilling 2016). For example, Luc Boltanski's term *somatic culture* (Boltanski 1976: 154; Meuser 2004: 207) highlights the bodily dimensions of culture as well as the cultural dimensions of the human body. Robert Gugutzer (2004: 68) points to the different forms and possibilities of socio-culturally *imprinting* bodies, with a view, for instance, to physical health, fitness, behavior, taste, or style. Pierre Bourdieu (1984) has described these forms as *physical capital* that is to be developed and accumulated in modern society. One could draw on Foucault and the concept of discourse to make a similar argument about a socio-cultural formation of the body. Here, as Foucault (1978) illustrates in his study on power and sexuality (Gugutzer 2004: 74–75), the focus would, however, be less on the notion of an accumulation of capital rather than on the discursive knowledge of the body. Thus, if emotions are associated in various ways with bodily feelings, as most theories assume, then they are also always cultural in the sense that bodies are constantly subjected to processes of cultural framing and configuration.

Looking at understandings of culture that are less concerned with the mental and the cognitive, but more geared towards social action, such as in practice theory, emotions can almost be understood *as* practices or at least as components of practices, as forcefully and convincingly argued by Scheer (2012). Following Reckwitz (2003: 289), practice theories conceive of collective forms of knowledge not as purely mental or cognitive *contents* of some sort as "knowledge about" or "codes within" discourse or communications. Instead, they emphasize forms of practical and tacit knowledge and understanding that are inscribed in actors' bodies, bringing about corresponding – and often non-reflexive – habitual behaviors. According to Schatzki (1996: 89), practices can also be understood as *conglomerates* of speech and action. Given such insights into practices, it seems reasonable to

also consider emotions as components of these conglomerates. In most instances, routines of speech and action are accompanied by routines of feeling and sensing, as in the practice of visiting a stadium or attending a concert or participating in a protest march. Moreover, it is not just routines of feeling and sensing, but, as it were, *emotional practices* (Scheer 2012), which include all the components of emotions like feelings, expressions, or bodily symptoms.

If one accepts the conjecture that emotions are intimately tied to bodies, that bodies and bodily behaviors are not merely "natural" biological entities, but substantially contingent on culture and society, then it follows that emotions are likewise constituted culturally. Bodily practices – tacit ways of doing and saying in specific contexts – such as those involved in dancing, childrearing, courtship, schooling, fitness, apparel, or the workplace, are essential vehicles for how emotions are attuned to a dominant culture. Practices, much like social norms and values, do not exist in a social vacuum, but are by definition socially shared amongst a number of social actors. To fully comprehend the social and cultural nature of emotions, we therefore also have to come to an understanding of the principles of social sharing and the consequences of this sharing for emotions. How is the sharing of norms and values facilitated by language? Who shares common values? For whom is a social norm a valid code of conduct and for whom is it not? Who engages in the same bodily practices and whose practices differ significantly? The following section attends to these questions and also elucidates the potential consequences of sharing for emotions.

4 Collectivity and identity

Although various approaches to emotion frequently capitalize on the role of culture in emotion, they only rarely attend to the social-relational scope of this role and thus to the collective aspects of emotion that are integral to their understanding as culturally constituted. Although a substantial number of inquiries has looked into the sociality and collectivity of emotion from a social structural and social functional perspective (Collins 2004; von Scheve 2009), these studies often tend to neglect the cultural scope to which different forms of collectivity revert. On the one hand, social structural accounts focus on the analysis of patterns and regularities in emotional experience across individuals who, for example, share a common social background, live in the same neighborhood, city, or county, or are members of the same social group or community. On the other hand, functional accounts capitalize on the consequences of emotions for group cohesion, social solidarity, conflict within and between groups, and the reproduction of social and political boundaries. This section aims at further elaborating some of these principles of social differentiation and at elucidating how they relate to and emerge from culture and what their repercussions are for the generation of emotion.

4.1 Social positioning and linguistic categorization

A range of sociological and social psychological studies have documented systematic differences in the emotional experiences of people who differ in terms of their social status

(Rackow, Schupp, and von Scheve 2012), of whether they are employed or unemployed (von Scheve, Esche, and Schupp 2017), or whether they have an immigrant background or belong to the native population (De Leersnyder, Mesquita, and Kim 2011). Also, individuals from Eastern and Western cultures have been shown to differ in terms of their emotional experiences and in the ways they express and communicate emotions (Mesquita and Leu 2007; Tamir et al. 2016). Moreover, an array of studies has pointed out differences in emotional experience that related to the social and linguistic categories associated with these differences, such as gender (Simon and Nath 2004) or age (Mather and Pondzio 2016). All of these studies more or less explicitly assume that social positioning, cultural background, and social classifications become affectively meaningful because they are tied to linguistic terms and categories and are symbolically ordered and valued, all of which bring about differences in how individuals see and appraise the world, in the values and norms they adhere to, and in the social practices into which they are socialized. Within cognitive sociology and the sociology of knowledge, these social formations have also been referred to as *thought communities* that exhibit comparable cognitive structures, language uses, and stocks of knowledge (Bernstein 1974; Brekhus 2015; Zerubavel 1999). Culture in emotion is thus tied to certain characteristics, resources or social positions that actors share or do not share. This kind of cultural and linguistic "proximity" is supposed to bring about similarities in people's emotional responding in a rather aggregate sense, where the actual "sharing" of emotion (Salmela 2012) is not particularly distinct. Research on this sort of cultural differences rarely makes assumptions about the phenomenological consequences of cultural proximity that is rooted in, for instance, social category membership or a common social background. Moreover, criteria like category membership or social positioning are usually taken as indirect evidence of emotionally relevant cultural differences and thus of emotional experience. In favor of this assumption, social, spatial, and historical contexts certainly give rise to similarities and differences in how people engage with the world and derive meaning and significance from this engagement. As Göller (2015) points out, culture is always dependent on these inter-subjective and collective forms of meaning making and expression.

This perspective gives rise to questions about the (symbolic) limits and boundaries within which collective patterns of meaning making – as a hallmark of culture – and emotions coalesce. These boundaries are easier or more difficult to pin down depending on the social categories and positions we are interested in. We might be tempted, for example, to take gender as a social category that can be identified with reasonable effort to investigate gender differences in emotion, based on gender-specific roles and stereotypes. However, as Shields (2013) argues from an intersectional perspective on the relationship between gender and emotion, such a categorization is fraught with pitfalls because not only social categories but also social positions and cultural backgrounds frequently overlap. Another critical example are nation-state and geographical enclosures of culture, especially in times of globalization and transnationalization.

4.2 Self and identity

Social categories and positions such as class, age, gender, or ethnicity usually do go hand in hand with culturally and discursively charged processes of *self*-categorization, which

are characterized by reflexivity and are essential for social identity (Tajfel 1978). This also gives rise to a significant change in perspectives on the links between culture and emotion, which not only refers to an aggregate form of feeling, but (also) has important phenomenological consequences. For example, one can be personally irritated – like many others – by inappropriate treatment at work, or one can be irritated *as a woman* and *in relation to* all women who are discriminated against in the workplace. One can also – like many other German citizens – look forward to an impending tax cut, or I can be happy *as*, say, a Portuguese, *along with* my other compatriots, about winning the 2016 football World Cup. These categorizations are not only cognitive operations taking place in isolated individuals, but they are conferred through linguistic choices in social interactions, signaling identity and belonging; in institutions, signaling power relations and coalitions; and in public discourse, constructing otherness and exclusion as well as solidarity and commonality.

Both varieties of emotion require comparable cognitive appraisal processes which, in each of the above-mentioned cases, are flanked by salient self-categorizations and social identities. These, in some ways, also presuppose that shared and intersubjective patterns of meaning making are reflexively accessible to individuals as existing or to be established social facts. The culture of emotion here lies not only in common goals, values, and patterns of meaning making, but also in the social collective that is the intentional object of the emotion. Discourse and social practices accentuate social difference and distinctiveness in terms of norms, values, and beliefs, but also with regard to specific types of feeling, which are at the same time constitutive for a social collective.

Examples of this include, for instance, analyses of the emotion of guilt as an identity-constituting emotion of Germans, as Bernhard Giesen (2004) proposed. Even resentment and emotions like anger and rage arising in certain social situations in light of social change can be discursively channeled, normalized, and correspondingly exploited for the development of a collective identity, as Salmela and von Scheve (2017) have shown for right-wing populist parties. Each of these examples is distinguished by a variety of interactions between the cultural foundations of emotions and the construction of collective identities (Owens, Robinson, and Smith-Lovin 2010). Collective identities usually denote those varieties of identity which have a strong *we*-component as regards feelings of belonging and solidarity. Such affiliations are based not just on linguistically represented collective memories, traditions, or rituals (Assmann 1988), but also largely on the shared feelings that are linked to these practices.

4.3 Groups and communities

A more fully developed understanding of the collective cultural dimension of emotion stems from the analysis of group-related emotions and their social consequences. Here, I will mainly focus on approaches dealing with existing (or emergent) collectives like groups and communities which can therefore presuppose existing social structures and symbolic orders in the analysis of emotion. These studies, by and large, consider groups as self-reflexive and identity-relevant collectives whose members can experience emotions *in relation to* and *along with* these collectives. A basic requirement for this type of emotion is a

person's (situationally contingent) self-categorization as a member of a (real or imaginary) social category or group, as illustrated above. At the same time, however, the basic principles of social interaction amongst group members become critical to understanding how certain cultural practices impinge on emotion and how emotion in turn affects the cultural underpinnings of social collectives.

Since Emile Durkheim (1912), sociologists have paid close attention to the ritual nature of social interaction. Durkheim had studied rituals of Australian aborigines, whose performances regularly exhibited euphoric and emotional states of arousal or what Durkheim called *collective effervescence*. Later, Collins (2004) introduced the concept of *emotional entrainment* to describe this phenomenon – a kind of collectively experienced emotion, which sets in due to a shared focus of attention and the synchronization of bodily activities. Durkheim already recognized the essential role that culture played with regard to shared values and beliefs, as well as the performative and hierarchical structure of rituals (von Scheve 2012). They charge ritual acts with intersubjective meaning and, by proscribing ritual behavior, facilitate the shared focus of attention and the synchronization of bodily activities. This, then, results in collective effervescence and processes of emotional contagion (Hatfield, Carpenter, and Rapson 2014). Here, the possibility of social interaction in bodily co-presence is a necessary precondition (at least for Durkheim), for this is the only way to ensure the embodied nature of effervescence. The practical dimension of culture as embodied action – as in repertoires, choreographies, performances, etc. – is thus a key component of this perspective on culture and emotion. More recent studies, however, also assume that mediated interaction is sufficient to generate this type of collective emotionality (Konijn and ten Holt 2011).

Looking at the consequences of collectively enacted emotions, studies in the Durkheimian tradition argue that the experience of emotions in ritual contexts contributes to the creation or strengthening of collective identity. They hypothesize that the emotions experienced in ritual contexts 'affectively charge' existing values and beliefs that are constitutive of a group or community, thereby promoting the emotional basis of collective identity (von Scheve et al. 2014, 2017; Páez et al. 2015). Comparable arguments on the close links between culture, emotion, and identity have been developed by scholars of group-based and intergroup emotions (Smith and Mackie 2015). Emotions that are experienced with reference to one's social identity and in relation to or on behalf of a group may, first, be directed at other groups and thus convey the perception of cultural differences and boundaries that exist between groups. At the same time, studies suggest that group-based emotions play a major role in propelling social conflict, since they contribute to the revitalization of collective identity and the emergence of belonging and solidarity as well as demarcation and exclusion. This is because of the specific phenomenological qualities of group-based or *we*-feelings (Krueger 2015; Salmela 2016), which do not necessarily require a substantive group structure, but nonetheless become more likely because of it and can evolve into a constitutive feature of groups.

Although these studies typically refer to groups that already exist, one can argue that coordinated actions and behaviors focused on the emergence of (collective) emotions in masses and gatherings are essential to the formation of groups and collective identities in the first place. This is consistent with the classical sociological understanding of collective

behavior of the Chicago School (Blumer 1951), which has primarily dealt with spontaneous, public and extraordinary formations of the social. On the one hand, these writings emphasize the otherness, normlessness, and deviance of collective behavior, as for instance in protests, marches, demonstrations or mobs; on the other, they are concerned with emerging norms and practices in these contexts (see Smelser 1962).

Research on social movements, in particular, shows just how important emotions are for such social *tipping points* between established and new symbolic orders. A number of reviews summarizes the different modes of action by means of which emotions can promote the formation of groups and communities and collective identities. Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper (2006) describe emotions as the *raw materials* of the gravitational pull and recruitment potential of social movements and as essential inducements for joining movements. In the context of social movements, the emotions at issue are mainly those that arise with respect to established norms and morals, either because these norms and values are considered illegitimate or inadequate, as in the case of gender and sexuality norms in the 1960s, or because valued norms and practices are considered to have been violated or threatened, as in the case of the *Occupy* protests (Mizen 2015). Social movements often use such "raw" affects or emotions to transform them into political convictions and actions, which then contribute to cultural and political change (Goodwin and Jasper 2006: 620). Moreover, and entirely consistent with Durkheim's ideas, emotions play an important role in the internal dynamics of social movements, particularly with regard to issues of solidarity, belonging, cohesion, and identity (Polletta and Jasper 2001).

5 Summary

In recent decades, emotion research in different disciplines has highlighted the various entanglements between culture and emotion, both theoretically and empirically. Distinguishing emotions from related concepts of feeling and affect, this chapter has argued that language and culture are indeed constitutive for emotions, understood as intentionally directed affective stances towards some object or entity which are categorized using linguistic labels and prototypical constellations of objects, situations, and affective stances.

The chapter has argued, first, that language is not only relevant for the linguistic categorization and lexical labeling of specific affective states, but also occupies an essential role in the generation of emotions, in particular when emotions are rooted in values, beliefs, and social norms. Based on this rationale, an essential approach to understanding the social and cultural dimension of emotion is comparative, looking at differences in the experience and expression of emotions between individuals and groups who are assumed to hold distinct values and norms, engage in different language-based socialization practices, and constitute different language communities. The chapter has further shown that language in emotion is also important in an embodied sense, in particular with respect to the performativity, manifestation, and enacting of emotions. Referring to practice theories and the sociology of the body, it has also been shown that bodies are neither simply "natural" nor "biological" entities, but subject to various processes of cultural incorporation,

significantly facilitated through language and discourse, that also shape and contour human emotion.

Second, this chapter has elaborated on the social relational dimension of culture and how it contributes to the constitution of emotions. Culture is supposed to go hand in hand with different social positions and linguistic categorizations as *bearers* of culture, such as class, age or gender. In this sense, emotions can collectively be attributed to these positions and categories in a purely aggregate sense, pointing out differences in people's emotional responding across these categories. Furthermore, such categories and positions are related to processes of self-categorization and social identity as well as to prevailing power relations, all of which affect the phenomenological aspects of emotion, for example through patterns of linguistic choice, discursive practices or social differences in language use. Feeling *on behalf of* or *in relation to* a social group reflects the culturally established meanings and characteristics of as well as the relations between groups and individuals. Finally, research in the tradition of Emile Durkheim points at the mutual linkages between culture and emotion. In particular, when group members gather in physical proximity and/or engage in (mediated) ritual practices, they experience collective emotional entrainment which in turn is supposed to reinforce the group's values and beliefs.

Extending these more established and recent developments in research on emotion, many current endeavors increasingly center on the body and the corporeality of emotions, not least with the aim of developing adequate methods to describe or measure this essential aspect of emotions. Also, there is an increasing interest in including measures of emotion into large-scale surveys to address cross-culturally comparative questions and issues related to differences in social class. Finally, the sociology of emotion has also shown a keen interest in affect studies, as it is prominent in the field of cultural studies, to explore how affect as a more basic and relational category compared to emotion is contoured by language and culture.

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