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## Feeling Europe: political emotion, knowledge, and support for the European Union

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Theories of political emotion suggest that feelings towards an issue or candidate are often better predictors for support than attitudes or preferences. We investigate whether this conjecture also holds for more abstract political entities, such as the European Union (EU), and test whether EU citizens' feelings toward the EU are significant predictors of their EU support. We first review existing research and provide theory-driven propositions of how positive and negative emotion may influence EU-related attitudes. Second, using multilevel regression models fitted to *Eurobarometer* data, we estimate how feelings toward the EU are associated with support for the EU. In line with our hypotheses, analyses show that positive emotions are positively associated with EU-support, while negative affect is negatively associated with it. Contrary to some theoretical predictions, however, these effects are not mediated by individuals' use of EU-related information.

**Keywords:** affect; emotion; cognition; attitudes; European Union

### Introduction

More often than not, policy makers and public commentators across Europe have expressed concerns about the “emptiness” and “insubstantiality” of the European Union (EU) as experienced by its citizens (e.g. Giner 2006; Müller and Hettlage 2006; Risse 2004). It is often lamented that this emptiness and insubstantiality are, amongst other factors, responsible for the lack of citizens' commitment towards the EU and sustained support of EU institutions and policies, as indicated, for example, by the lively debates on solidarity in the face of refugee admissions or in view of the upsurge in right-wing political populism in many European countries. In notable contrast, these and other issues are frequently characterized by an affectively laden discourse that is said to stir emotion instead of promoting debate and calm deliberation, with possibly detrimental consequences not only for citizens' immediate issue appraisals and political behavior, but also for their attitudes towards the European Union more generally. Whether policy makers aim at imbuing the European Union with feelings and emotions to move it from peoples' “heads to their hearts” (Ismer 2011) or whether they strive to de-emotionalize and rationalize populist propaganda – the emotions that citizens harbor towards the European Union have become an important public concern.

Contrary to these observations, the role of emotion is still poorly understood and conceptualized regarding matters of national or supranational politics. It remains largely

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unknown whether and how emotions might strengthen or weaken support for a political entity, for instance nation states or the European Union. Second, and more profoundly, there are no empirical studies addressing the role of citizens' feelings toward the EU that might substantiate this line of reasoning. Amongst other things, this is certainly due to a prolonged neglect of emotions in social science theory and research. Given that many of the existing studies on EU-related attitudes are dominated by utilitarian, cognitivist or symbolist accounts (e.g. Gabel 1998b; Hooghe and Marks 2005), our aim is to more closely investigate the role of emotions in citizens' support for the European Union. Taking into account the existing research on political emotion, we do not assume emotions to be mere confounds distorting more established determinants of support for the EU, for example expected utility. Rather, we suggest that citizens' feelings towards the EU are additional and independent predictors of their support for the EU and that this association is linked to the knowledge that citizens have about the EU. These propositions rest on theories arguing that the feelings we harbor towards political entities or candidates need not be immediately *caused* by these entities. Rather, we tend to *attribute* emotions provoked by other objects or actions (such as political rhetoric and mobilization) towards these entities. Positive and negative emotions then have different consequences for one's motivation to rely on and use knowledge about the entities in question, again affecting out attitudes towards them.

The first part of this article is devoted to explicating this proposition by reviewing studies on the role of emotion in political affairs and their role in the formation of political attitudes. In the second part, using *Eurobarometer* data, we estimate multilevel regression models to investigate whether emotions towards the EU can reasonably be considered predictors for people's support for the EU. Subsequently, we account for knowledge and information related to the EU as moderators of the effects of emotions on support for the EU. Finally, we discuss our findings and highlight a need for future research.

### **Attitudes towards the European Union**

The broad range of existing approaches to EU-related attitudes and support for the EU has produced an almost equally large number of reviews and proposals for categorizing the field, in sociology as well as in political science (e.g. Díez Medrano 2003; di Mauro and Memoli 2016; Gaxie 2011; Hobolt and de Vries 2016). The larger parts of these approaches can be categorized into four distinct perspectives on why people hold EU supportive attitudes.

First, *utilitarian* accounts assume that cost–benefit calculations and rational deliberation are the primary determinants of EU-related attitudes. According to this view, citizens profiting from the EU, for example in terms of economic prosperity or security, are likely to hold positive attitudes towards the EU. Research in this tradition suggests that the more affluent citizens are, the more likely they are to benefit from European integration. Accordingly, studies looking into associations between individual-level socio-demographic factors (e.g. income, education) and support for the European Union have shown that, for instance, higher income is linked to stronger support for the EU (Gabel 1998a, 1998b; Herzog and Tucker 2010; Hooghe, Huo, and Marks 2007). On a national level, research has established that macroeconomic indicators such as the EU's economic performance or net benefits gained from EU funding are strong factors explaining support for the EU (Anderson and Reichert 1995; Eichenberg and Dalton 2007). Recent research also emphasizes the importance of subjective appraisals of EU benefits regarding one's

own life and the prosperity of one's country rather than the factual benefits in producing support for the EU (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Verhaegen, Hooghe, and Quintelier 2014),.

Second, *cognitive mobilization* accounts (Inglehart 1970a) suggest that cognitive resources and intellectual capabilities are significant predictors of support for the EU since they help understanding the EU as a highly abstract political entity, stimulating interest in and attachment to the Union. Along these lines, studies have shown, for example, that more politically interested individuals are more likely to support the European Union (Janssen 1991; Inglehart 1970b). Recently, research using more direct measures of cognitive mobilization – in particular one's knowledge about the EU – has become more influential. However, there still is disagreement on whether the acquisition of knowledge related to the EU is actually positively (Westle and Johann 2010) or negatively (Elenbaas et al. 2012) associated with support for the EU. This is because information acquisition can either reflect people's interest in and generally positive attitudes towards the EU, or represent a critical stance toward the Union.

Generally, utilitarian as well as cognitive mobilization accounts have been criticized for overestimating people's ability to engage in cost–benefit analyses of EU-membership and to hold or acquire the necessary information to engage in such analyses. Addressing this critique, a third paradigmatic view suggests that one's attachment to and identification with the EU are more significant predictors of supportive attitudes (Bruter 2005; Hooghe and Marks 2004). Studies have also shown that citizens perceiving the European Union as a threat to their own national culture are less likely to support it, even if they or their country profit from EU-membership (McLaren 2002, 2007). In a similar vein, research indicates that national pride (Carey 2002) and negative attitudes towards immigrants and foreigners reduce favorable attitudes towards the EU and enhance Euroscepticism (de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005; de Vries and van Kersbergen 2007).

A fourth perspective suggests that citizens' relations to the political institutions that are immediately relevant for everyday life determine EU-related attitudes. These approaches usually account for the institutional structure of “double allegiance” characteristic for the EU, i.e. for the fact that secondary allegiance towards the supranational institution follows allegiances to the nation state (e.g. van Kersbergen 1997; de Vries and van Kersbergen 2007). From this perspective, support for and trust in national governments should also encompass their policies of European integration (Franklin, van der Eijk, and Marsh 1995; Wagner 2010) and hence promote trust in European political institutions, which in turn should be associated with support for the EU (Kaina 2006; McLaren 2007).

When surveying the existing research related to these four paradigms, it is interesting to note that many of them make references to feelings and emotions, although often implicitly. For example, the general intuition that utilitarian determinants of support for the EU should have a more “diffuse” emotional counterpart is prevalent in the literature (Hewstone 1986; Inglehart and Reif 1991; Niedermayer and Weste 1995). However, feelings are almost exclusively treated as the “softer” components of EU-related attitudes (Boomgaarden et al. 2011; de Vreese, Boomgaarden, and Semetko 2008; van Spanje and de Vreese 2011) or as part of European identification (Bruter 2005, 2008; Evans 2000; Hooghe and Marks 2003, 6; Kaina and Karolewski 2009). Although this is in-line with classical sociological theorizing of the importance of emotions for the formation of attitudes and identities (e.g. Blumer 1936; Goffman 1959), they have long remained an epiphenomenal or residual concept. Research on European identification, in particular, makes recurrent reference to the important role of emotion, because feelings and emotions are seen as integral to the concept of identity (e.g. Deutsch 2006; Eder 2009; Keulman and Koos 2014). However, although empirical studies often account for the emotional

dimension of identity in their measurement models, emotions are hardly ever investigated regarding their independent contribution to explaining EU-related attitudes. There is but one study we know of that has explicitly attended to the question of emotions affect attitudes towards the European Union (Vasilopoulou and Wagner 2017).

The development and institutionalization of emotion research over the past decades has substantially advanced our understanding of the social and cultural antecedents of emotion and their consequences for thinking and behavior (Clore and Huntsinger 2007). Likewise, many studies have demonstrated that emotions can – and indeed should – be both analytically and empirically distinguished from attitudes (Allen, Machleit, and Kleine 1992; Breckler 1984). This distinction is particularly relevant when emotions and attitudes are directed at the same object, as in our case the European Union.

Therefore, existing research concerned with explaining attitudes towards and support for the European Union might profit from a more detailed investigation of how emotions are linked to other and more thoroughly established predictors of these attitudes. This promises to shed light on the question whether emotions should in fact be considered independent predictors of support for the European Union, inform policy makers' attempts at strengthening support for the European Union, and to better understand the repercussions of emotionalizing and aggravating political rhetoric and mobilization.

### **Emotions in politics and political affairs**

The democratic ideal of an educated and interested citizen who has adequate knowledge of political affairs and engages in rational decision-making has proven inadequate for the most part – primarily because it overestimates people's ability to acquire and analyze information and their willingness to act rationally upon this information. Alternative views hold that the average citizen has only limited capacities in acquiring and considering politically relevant information. A certain detachment of politics from people's everyday lives, little consequences of one's political actions, disorientation through excess supply of (often questionable) political information, and the ambiguity of political stimuli have been suggested to either induce feelings of uncertainty and indifference (Granberg 1993, 71; Lodge, Taber, and Weber 2006, 16) or to stir emotions such as hate or indignation (Shoshan 2016; Salmela and von Scheve 2017) in many citizens.

The theory of symbolic politics (Edelman 1964; Sears 1993) argues that one way in which uncertainties and indifferences can be transformed into meaningful social and political ties is to imbue abstract political symbols and objects (e.g. parties, politicians, nations) with personally relevant experiences, which become evident in subjective feelings and emotions towards these symbols. This conjecture is in line with Durkheim's (1912) propositions that values like solidarity or reciprocity can only be effective guides of everyday behavior once the symbols that represent these values become "emotionally charged". Hence, once abstract symbols are imbued with perceived subjective relevance, citizens' may develop affective dispositions towards and become emotionally attached to (or repelled from) these symbols. As we will argue in the following, these affective responses to political symbols can serve as a key factor in the formation and change of political attitudes.

### ***The cognitive consequences of emotions***

With the emergence of emotions as a topic in the social sciences, there has been an increasing interest in the relationships between feelings, beliefs, and attitudes (e.g. Fiedler and

Bless 2000). One key finding in this field is that feelings (as a qualitative phenomenal experience) and beliefs (as relations to propositional representations) make conceptually and empirically independent contributions to the formation of attitudes (Breckler 1984; Fabrigar and Petty 1999). In relating these findings to political attitudes, studies have argued that individuals remain rather inattentive to politics and political information unless new information prompts emotional reactions, calling existing emotional attachments to political symbols into question (Marcus and Mackuen 2004; Marcus, Neuman, and Mackuen 2000).

This conjecture is based on an understanding of *affective information processing* as part of a dual-process architecture of reasoning (Evans 2008). Affective information processing is conceptualized as occurring rapidly, often outside conscious control and awareness, and according to associative and heuristic principles. Affect in this sense is usually understood as a very basic phenomenal feeling with a positive or negative valence that underlies more complex and discrete emotions (e.g. fear, shame, anxiety) (see Barrett 2012, for a detailed exposition). Conversely, propositional, belief-based processing is assumed to involve conscious, deliberate thought with more attention to detail. Importantly, affective processing has been shown to operate faster and to precede deliberative processing. Therefore, thinking and behavior – and thus beliefs and attitudes – are often significantly influenced by affective processing.

Affects therefore have a genuine informational value that is distinct from that of deliberative and belief-based thought. For example, one may hold the belief that a country's membership in the European Union will yield future benefits, although thinking of the EU may still elicit strong feelings of uncertainty or anxiety. Feelings and emotions can thus be considered information that is used (in addition to other information) in deliberation and argumentation and the formation of attitudes and behaviors. These feelings significantly influence (rational) deliberation on a political issue and hence any ensuing actions (Schwarz and Clore 2003). It is important to note that these affective processes and feelings may originate in non-consciously perceived peripheral information and situational cues and are not directly *caused* by the object to which they are attributed (in this example, the EU) (e.g. Brader and Valentino 2007; Isbell, Ottati, and Burns 2006; Marcus 2012). Political rhetoric and mobilization are examples through which these indirect links can be established. In the above example, feelings towards the EU do not necessarily have to be *caused* by some EU institution, representative, or policy, but can well be the result of domestic politics or related issues or events.

### *Affect and political attitudes*

Given this perspective on the relationship between affect and attitudes, there is debate over the precise direction of this linkage and how it depends on which kinds of feelings. For instance, how exactly do positive and negative feelings influence attitudes and what is the role of specific discrete emotions in attitude formation? Some insights are provided by studies on political decision-making. Marcus, Neuman, and Mackuen (2000) argue that the specific influence of feelings primarily depends on their valence (pleasant vs. Unpleasant) and intensity. Given that political action is costly (e.g. time consuming) and its outcomes are difficult to estimate, it can hardly be explained by rational calculus alone and is likely to involve hunches and gut feelings. Marcus and colleagues have proposed a two-dimensional model of affective processing in which discrete emotions are generated by two distinctly operating “affect systems” (Marcus and Mackuen 1993; Marcus, Neuman, and Mackuen 2000). Activation of the “positive affect” system indicates that current situations, events, or actions are in-line with expectations and previous experiences

and are therefore associated with pleasant feelings. Moreover, it signals that incoming information is consistent with existing general knowledge structures and conducive to one's goals, thus promoting habitual action based on schemas and scripts. In contrast, activation of the "negative affect" system indicates deviations from expectations, situations identified as detrimental to goal-attainment, generally unknown or unpredictable events, and is therefore associated with intense unpleasant feelings. Activity of this system disrupts automatic and habitual behavior and prompts detailed analysis of incoming information (Schwarz and Clore 2007). Positive affect delineates a continuum from very arousing and pleasant emotions, such as joy and enthusiasm, to the near absence of pleasant arousal, such as in depression. Likewise, negative affect encompasses strong unpleasant emotions, such as anxiety and anger, as well as the near absence of negative arousal, such as in calmness (Marcus 2002).

As yet, this model has mainly been tested regarding electoral politics and voting behavior. As a general result, "rational" issue appraisals have been shown to have comparably little impact on voting decisions. Voters have been shown to rely more on evaluations of candidates' moral qualities and their feelings towards candidates than on in-depth assessments of actual policy proposals (Marcus, Neuman, and Mackuen 2000). More specifically, this research suggests that positive affect promotes reliance on pre-existing attitudes and general knowledge structures, for example, established party affiliations. Negative affect interrupts habitual action, promotes in-depth analysis of new information, updates existing knowledge structures, and fosters new action strategies (Marcus 2002; Marcus and Mackuen 1993, 2004). Hence, negative affect is thought to promote what is commonly understood as "rational" behavior in standard rational-choice models. It encourages the acquisition of new information and contributes to a more substantial use of this information (Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007).

In sum, this research provides insights into the general cognitive consequences of affective processing and the effects of positive and negative affect on political issues. However, it has mainly been applied to appraisals of political candidates and we know little on how it influences attitudes towards more abstract political entities, such as the European Union.

### **Feelings and attitudes towards the European Union**

In this study, we are specifically interested in the question whether and how the feelings that citizens of EU member states associate with the European Union are linked to their attitudes towards the EU, in particular their support for the EU. Our goal is to investigate whether the consideration of feelings enhances the explanatory power of more established predictors of support. Given that positive feelings generally signal unproblematic situations that are in-line with existing attitudes, we hypothesize that (H1) positive affect is positively associated with citizens' support for the EU. Conversely, and given that negative affect generally conveys threat- and problem-focused meanings, we hypothesize that (H2) negative affect is negatively associated with EU-support. Also, given that negative affect is supposed to prompt the acquisition of information relevant to an issue, we assume that (H3) negative affect towards the EU is associated with more substantial knowledge about the EU in predicting EU-support. Conversely, positive affect should (H4) be linked to less knowledge about the EU in explaining supportive attitudes.

To test our hypotheses, we use data from the 2005 *Eurobarometer* survey (version 64.2) which is the most recent data set including questions about people's emotions towards the EU.<sup>1</sup> *Eurobarometer* is an established survey conducted on behalf of the

European Commission twice a year, covering a broad range of attitudes, opinions, and demographics across EU member and candidate states. In total, our sample comprises respondents from (at that time) all 25 EU member states, Eastern Germany and Northern Ireland treated as two separate samples.

### **Dependent variable**

Our main dependent variable – general support for the European Union – is measured using two items from the *Eurobarometer* survey, respondents' evaluation of EU-membership (i.e. whether membership is perceived positively or negatively) and their opinion on the further development and advancement of the European political union, i.e. the deepening of European integration. For our main analysis, we built an additive index from these items ranging from 0 (no support) to 3 (highest support).<sup>2</sup>

### **Independent variables**

#### *Emotions*

In *Eurobarometer*, feelings towards the EU are assessed by asking “Does the European Union give you personally the feeling of ... ?” with the forced-choice options enthusiasm, hope, trust, indifference, anxiety, mistrust, and rejection.<sup>3</sup> *Eurobarometer* data documentation (Europäische Kommission/TNS 2005, 41) states that this item is based on dimensional (pleasant vs. unpleasant) theories of emotion and that the forced-choice emotion words are supposed to represent a continuum from enthusiasm (very positive) through indifference (neutral) to rejection (very negative).

#### *Predictors of EU-support*

To account for the more established approaches at explaining EU-support discussed above (utilitarian, cognitive mobilization, identification, and institutional), we included a broad range of additional indicators into the analyses. We clustered these variables into four prototypical groups representing the different accounts. Please note that we do not claim that these groups of variables are in any way definitive or exhaustive indicators of the respective theories. Rather, our aim was to compile and group variables covering the spectrum of known predictors of EU-support in a meaningful way. The *utilitarian* group includes measures of occupational status, educational attainment, perception of whether EU-membership is beneficial, and country net-balance of income/transfers from/to the EU. The *cognitive mobilization* group includes respondents' political interest and knowledge regarding EU institutions and politics. The knowledge indicator is also used to test H3 and H4. The *identification* group includes measures of European identification and of the extent to which respondents perceive the EU as a threat to their national culture. The *institutional trust* group includes measures of political trust in national and European institutions.

#### *Control variables*

We also account for a range of standard individual-level control variables in our analyses, i.e. age, gender, values, and political orientation, all of which are known to influence EU-support (Hooghe and Marks 2004). Scales of all variables were adjusted to range from zero to two to be comparable with each other.



**Results**

***Preliminary analyses***

Since our theoretical model operates on assumptions of positive and negative affect and not on discrete emotions and the respective labels used in *Eurobarometer*, we have clustered the *Eurobarometer* items into two categories representing positive and negative affectivity (Marcus and Mackuen 1993, 675). An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) confirmed the assumed two-factor structure (Figure 1).<sup>4</sup>

Enthusiasm, hope, and trust load positively on the “positive affect” factor and negatively on the “negative affect” factor. Likewise, anxiety, mistrust, and rejection load positively on the “negative affect” factor and negatively on the “positive affect” factor. Moreover, indifference loads negatively on both factors, because it represents the low activation end of positive affectivity (Marcus and Mackuen 2004, 167). Based on this analysis, we built two additive indices: One consisting of the three items representing negative affect and a second representing positive affect, including the inversely coded “indifference” item, both ranging from zero (low intensity) to two (high intensity).<sup>5</sup>

***Emotions and support for the EU***

We use multinomial logistic regression models to test associations between EU-related feelings and support for the EU (testing H1 and H2). Since EU-support variable and the regression residuals are not normally distributed, we cannot fit linear regression models. Ordered logit regressions are also not applicable because the relationship between each pair of outcome categories is not identical (parallel regressions assumption not fulfilled).




Figure 1. Factor analysis of discrete emotions: Component diagram in rotated space. Source: *Eurobarometer 64.2*. Principal component analysis using Varimax rotation.

Therefore we treat support for the EU as a categorical variable (0 = no support; 1 = weak support; 2 = mid-level support; 3 = strong support) using 0 (no support) as the reference category. To account for the nested data structure, we opted for multilevel random intercept models. The stepwise multiple regressions first test the different explanatory groups of variables separately in five models (*emotions*, *utilitarian*, *cognitive mobilization*, *identification*, and *institutional trust*) and then collate them into one model to assess whether emotions add to existing explanations of EU-support. Table 1 shows multiple regressions separately for the three possible pairs of outcome categories, indicating support for both of our hypotheses.

Positive affect is significantly and positively associated with EU-support (Model 1). In contrast, negative affect is significantly and negatively associated with support for the EU. This association is consistently significant throughout the three pairs of support categories and becomes stronger for higher levels of support.<sup>6</sup> Looking at Models 2–5 containing variables for the alternative explanations, we find that most of the variables in these models are significant predictors of support for the EU as well, especially at higher levels, confirming previous research as well as our hypotheses. For example, European identification and political trust are positively associated with EU-support, whereas respondents' assessment of the EU as a threat to the national culture is negatively associated with it. Only occupational status does not seem to be a notable predictor of EU-support in our models, which is most likely due to its confounding with education.<sup>7</sup>

Looking simultaneously at the various factors associated with support for the EU and the control variables in Model 6, we observe decreasing effect sizes and some of the variables become insignificant, but more so for weak than for strong levels of support. Also, after including variables controlling for general political interest and interest in the EU (e.g. education and identification), the additional effect of EU-knowledge on EU-support becomes negative (although only significant for strong EU-support), which is in line with our theoretical predictions. Importantly, Model 6 shows that even when simultaneously looking at the established variables known to predict EU-support, positive and negative affect – with the exception of an association between positive affect and weak EU-support – remain significant. We interpret this as indicating a robust association between feelings towards the EU and EU-support in the direction we hypothesized. Moreover, effect sizes of positive and negative affect are stronger than many of the more established indicators (e.g. identification and country net balance), and accounting for possible confounds does not change the direction of the effects.

### ***Disentangling the effects of positive and negative affect***

To further investigate the effects of positive and negative affect on support for the EU, we conducted follow-up regressions in which we omitted all control variables that remained insignificant in Model 6 of Table 1 (the “reduced model” in Table 2). Using a marginal effects approach, our goal was to examine how positive and negative affect contribute to explaining support for the EU relative to the more established *utilitarian*, *cognitive mobilization*, *identification*, and *institutional trust* groups of predictor variables. Separately for each of these four groups of variables and for positive and negative affect as predictors (and again separately for weak, mid-level, and strong EU support), we held all variables of the respective other groups constant at their means (dummy variables given their reference value). We then looked at the level of EU-support for each group given the variables representing this group had parameter values one standard error *below* (low level) and one standard error *above* the mean (high level). In the *utilitarian* group of variables, the “low level”

Table 1. Multilevel multinomial regression models on EU-support.

	Null model (0)	Emotions (1)	Utilitarianism (2)	Cognitive mobilization (3)	Identification (4)	Institutional trust (5)	Complete model (6)
<i>Weak support (ref. no support)</i>							
Positive affect		0.341*** (0.09)					-0.011 (0.11)
Negative affect		-1.007*** (0.06)					-0.825*** (0.07)
<i>Membership beneficial (ref. unbeneficial)</i>							
			1.445*** (0.10)				1.157*** (0.12)
<i>Occupational status (ref. other)</i>							
self-employed			0.101 (0.09)				0.210 (0.12)
professional			0.207* (0.09)				0.161 (0.11)
manager			0.302* (0.13)				0.284 (0.15)
employee			-0.007 (0.18)				-0.135 (0.20)
worker			0.184 (0.14)				0.109 (0.17)
<i>Education (ref. age ≤ 17)</i>							
completed age 18–20			0.177* (0.08)				0.161 (0.09)
completed age ≥ 21			0.443*** (0.09)				0.346** (0.11)
Positive country net balance <i>(ref. state contributor)</i>			0.269 (0.20)				0.186 (0.21)
Political interest				-0.024 (0.05)			-0.109 (0.06)

(Continued)

Table 1. Continued.

	Null model (0)	Emotions (1)	Utilitarianism (2)	Cognitive mobilization (3)	Identification (4)	Institutional trust (5)	Complete model (6)
EU-Knowledge				0.095 (0.07)			-0.075 (0.08)
European identification					0.818*** (0.08)		0.560*** (0.09)
Cultural threat to national identity					-0.248*** (0.04)		-0.062 (0.05)
National trust						0.257*** (0.05)	0.087 (0.06)
European trust						0.632*** (0.05)	0.437*** (0.06)
<i>Controls</i>							
male ( <i>ref. female</i> )							-0.132 (0.08)
age							0.067 (0.12)
postmaterialism ( <i>ref. mixed</i> )							-0.079 (0.12)
materialism ( <i>ref. mixed</i> )							-0.047 (0.08)
political left ( <i>ref. center</i> )							-0.327*** (0.09)
political right ( <i>ref. center</i> )							-0.143 (0.11)
Constant	0.260* (0.12)	0.727*** (0.11)	-0.426** (0.16)	0.187 (0.13)	-0.104 (0.14)	-0.167 (0.12)	-0.014 (0.25)
Mid-level support ( <i>ref. no support</i> )							
Positive affect		1.924*** (0.09)					1.105*** (0.11)
Negative affect		-2.337*** (0.07)					-1.690*** (0.09)

Membership beneficial ( <i>ref. unbeneficial</i> )	3.032*** (0.09)			2.285*** (0.11)
<i>Occupational status (ref. other)</i>				
self-employed	-0.164 (0.09)			-0.213 (0.13)
professional	0.221* (0.09)			0.112 (0.12)
manager	0.180 (0.13)			0.096 (0.16)
employee	0.011 (0.17)			-0.264 (0.21)
worker	0.164 (0.14)			0.049 (0.18)
<i>Education (ref. age ≤ 17)</i>				
completed age 18–20	0.375*** (0.08)			0.234* (0.10)
completed age ≥ 21	0.626*** (0.09)			0.346** (0.12)
Positive country net balance ( <i>ref. state contributor</i> )	0.575** (0.20)			0.374 (0.21)
Political interest		0.102* (0.05)		-0.077 (0.07)
EU-Knowledge		0.356*** (0.06)		-0.157 (0.09)
European identification			1.668*** (0.07)	0.952*** (0.09)
Cultural threat to national identity			-0.543*** (0.04)	-0.220*** (0.05)
National trust				0.036 (0.07)
European trust			0.380*** (0.05)	0.756*** (0.06)
<i>Controls</i>				

(Continued)

Table 1. Continued.

	Null model (0)	Emotions (1)	Utilitarianism (2)	Cognitive mobilization (3)	Identification (4)	Institutional trust (5)	Complete model (6)
male ( <i>ref. female</i> )							-0.220** (0.08)
age							0.027 (0.13)
postmaterialism ( <i>ref. mixed</i> )							0.006 (0.13)
materialism ( <i>ref. mixed</i> )							-0.015 (0.09)
political left ( <i>ref. center</i> )							-0.398*** (0.10)
political right ( <i>ref. center</i> )							-0.238* (0.12)
Constant	0.628*** (0.12)	0.641*** (0.11)	-0.992*** (0.16)	0.177 (0.13)	-0.278* (0.14)	-0.475*** (0.12)	-0.848** (0.27)
Strong support ( <i>ref. no support</i> )							
Positive affect		3.315*** (0.09)					2.037*** (0.12)
Negative affect		-3.602*** (0.08)					-2.541*** (0.10)
Membership beneficial ( <i>ref. unbeneficial</i> )			4.748*** (0.10)				3.542*** (0.12)
<i>Occupational status (ref. other)</i>							
self-employed			-0.330*** (0.10)				-0.426** (0.14)
professional			0.114 (0.09)				-0.042 (0.13)
manager			0.390** (0.13)				0.222 (0.17)
employee			0.172 (0.17)				-0.211 (0.22)

worker	0.147 (0.14)			-0.080 (0.19)
<i>Education (ref. age ≤ 17)</i>				
completed age 18–20	0.323*** (0.08)			0.042 (0.11)
completed age ≥ 21	0.695*** (0.10)			0.200 (0.13)
Positive country net balance ( <i>ref. state contributor</i> )	0.663** (0.20)			0.462* (0.22)
Political interest		0.243*** (0.04)		-0.007 (0.07)
EU-Knowledge		0.634*** (0.06)		-0.193* (0.09)
European identification			2.518*** (0.07)	1.446*** (0.10)
Cultural threat to national identity			-0.946*** (0.04)	-0.455*** (0.05)
National trust				0.107 (0.07)
European trust				0.993*** (0.06)
<i>Controls</i>				
male ( <i>ref. female</i> )				-0.083 (0.09)
age				-0.070 (0.14)
postmaterialism ( <i>ref. mixed</i> )				0.023 (0.14)
materialism ( <i>ref. mixed</i> )				0.047 (0.10)
political left ( <i>ref. center</i> )				-0.213 (0.11)
political right ( <i>ref. center</i> )				-0.144 (0.12)

(Continued)

Table 1. Continued.

	Null model (0)	Emotions (1)	Utilitarianism (2)	Cognitive mobilization (3)	Identification (4)	Institutional trust (5)	Complete model (6)
Constant	1.300*** (0.11)	0.207 (0.12)	-1.725*** (0.16)	0.409** (0.13)	-0.321* (0.14)	-0.756*** (0.12)	-2.693*** (0.28)
Variance (country level)	0.332 (0.10)	0.208 (0.06)	0.233 (0.07)	0.316 (0.09)	0.332 (0.10)	0.326 (0.10)	0.240 (0.08)
No of countries	27	27	27	27	27	27	27
No of individuals	14,464	14,464	14,464	14,464	14,464	14,464	12,278
LR Chi2		8038.42	7179.02	341.98	3620.23	4408.94	9825.82
<i>p</i>		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R2		0.2186	0.1952	0.0093	0.0984	0.1199	0.3167

Note: *Eurobarometer 64.2*. Data weighted, standard errors in parentheses.

\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ .



Table 2. Multilevel multinomial regression models on EU-support with interactions.

	Reduced model (1)	Interaction positive affect knowledge (2)	Interaction negative affect knowledge (3)
<i>Weak support (ref. no support)</i>			
Positive affect	-0.047 (0.11)	-0.388 (0.25)	-0.049 (0.11)
Negative affect	-0.808*** (0.07)	-0.809*** (0.07)	-0.669*** (0.15)
EU-Knowledge	-0.073 (0.08)	-0.231 (0.13)	0.014 (0.13)
Positive affect*EU-Knowledge		0.354 (0.23)	
Negative affect*EU-Knowledge			-0.142 (0.14)
Membership beneficial ( <i>ref. unbeneficial</i> )	1.147*** (0.11)	1.145*** (0.11)	1.147*** (0.11)
<i>Occupational status (ref. other)</i>			
self-employed	0.112 (0.16)	0.113 (0.16)	0.115 (0.16)
professional	-0.155 (0.20)	-0.150 (0.20)	-0.154 (0.20)
manager	0.270 (0.14)	0.269 (0.14)	0.273 (0.14)
employee	0.139 (0.10)	0.141 (0.10)	0.139 (0.10)
worker	0.208 (0.11)	0.210* (0.11)	0.209 (0.11)
<i>Education (ref. age ≤ 17)</i>			
completed age 18–20	-0.206 (0.11)	-0.205 (0.11)	-0.205 (0.11)
completed age ≥ 21	0.348** (0.11)	0.345** (0.11)	0.348** (0.11)
Positive country net balance ( <i>ref. state contributor</i> )	0.200 (0.20)	0.198 (0.20)	0.198 (0.20)
Political interest	-0.093 (0.06)	-0.091 (0.06)	-0.094 (0.06)
European identification	0.515*** (0.08)	0.512*** (0.08)	0.513*** (0.08)
Cultural threat to national identity	-0.070 (0.05)	-0.071 (0.05)	-0.068 (0.05)
National trust	0.076 (0.06)	0.078 (0.06)	0.077 (0.06)
European trust	0.430*** (0.06)	0.428*** (0.06)	0.428*** (0.06)
<i>Controls</i>			
male ( <i>ref. female</i> )	-0.133 (0.08)	-0.134 (0.08)	-0.133 (0.08)
political left ( <i>ref. center</i> )	-0.333*** (0.09)	-0.330*** (0.09)	-0.333*** (0.09)
political right ( <i>ref. center</i> )	-0.145 (0.10)	-0.146 (0.10)	-0.147 (0.10)
Constant	0.064 (0.21)	0.219 (0.24)	-0.018 (0.23)

(Continued)

Table 2. Continued.

	Reduced model (1)	Interaction positive affect knowledge (2)	Interaction negative affect knowledge (3)
Mid-level support ( <i>ref. no support</i> )			
Positive affect	1.065*** (0.11)	0.655** (0.25)	1.066*** (0.11)
Negative affect	-1.671*** (0.09)	-1.673*** (0.09)	-1.798*** (0.19)
EU-Knowledge	-0.138 (0.09)	-0.336* (0.15)	-0.158 (0.13)
Positive affect*EU-Knowledge		0.424 (0.23)	
Negative affect*EU-Knowledge			0.120 (0.17)
Membership beneficial ( <i>ref. unbeneficial</i> )	2.286*** (0.11)	2.283*** (0.11)	2.286*** (0.11)
<i>Occupational status (ref. other)</i>			
self-employed	0.095 (0.17)	0.097 (0.17)	0.094 (0.17)
professional	-0.276 (0.21)	-0.271 (0.21)	-0.279 (0.21)
manager	0.066 (0.16)	0.064 (0.16)	0.064 (0.16)
employee	0.087 (0.11)	0.089 (0.11)	0.085 (0.11)
worker	-0.225 (0.12)	-0.223 (0.12)	-0.227 (0.12)
<i>Education (ref. age ≤ 17)</i>			
completed age 18–20	-0.131 (0.12)	-0.131 (0.12)	-0.131 (0.12)
completed age ≥ 21	0.362** (0.12)	0.360** (0.12)	0.362** (0.12)
Positive country net balance ( <i>ref. state contributor</i> )	0.382 (0.21)	0.380 (0.21)	0.382 (0.21)
Political interest	-0.070 (0.06)	-0.067 (0.06)	-0.070 (0.06)
European identification	0.914*** (0.09)	0.910*** (0.09)	0.915*** (0.09)
Cultural threat to national identity	-0.226*** (0.05)	-0.227*** (0.05)	-0.227*** (0.05)
National trust	0.025 (0.06)	0.028 (0.06)	0.026 (0.06)
European trust	0.748*** (0.06)	0.744*** (0.06)	0.747*** (0.06)
<i>Controls</i>			
male ( <i>ref. female</i> )	-0.225** (0.08)	-0.226** (0.08)	-0.227** (0.08)
political left ( <i>ref. center</i> )	-0.406*** (0.10)	-0.402*** (0.10)	-0.407*** (0.10)
political right ( <i>ref. center</i> )	-0.252* (0.12)	-0.253* (0.12)	-0.254* (0.12)
Constant	-0.804*** (0.22)	-0.611* (0.25)	-0.781** (0.24)

(Continued)

Table 2. Continued.

	Reduced model (1)	Interaction positive affect knowledge (2)	Interaction negative affect knowledge (3)
<i>Strong support (ref. no support)</i>			
Positive affect	1.986*** (0.12)	1.432*** (0.26)	1.986*** (0.12)
Negative affect	-2.546*** (0.10)	-2.547*** (0.10)	-2.524*** (0.24)
EU-Knowledge	-0.181* (0.09)	-0.508** (0.17)	-0.171 (0.13)
Positive affect*EU-Knowledge		0.559* (0.24)	
Negative affect*EU-Knowledge			-0.020 (0.21)
<i>Membership beneficial (ref. unbeneficial)</i>			
	3.545*** (0.12)	3.541*** (0.12)	3.545*** (0.12)
<i>Occupational status (ref. other)</i>			
self-employed	-0.013 (0.18)	-0.008 (0.18)	-0.014 (0.18)
professional	-0.190 (0.22)	-0.186 (0.22)	-0.193 (0.22)
manager	0.251 (0.16)	0.250 (0.16)	0.250 (0.16)
employee	-0.021 (0.12)	-0.019 (0.12)	-0.023 (0.12)
worker	-0.374** (0.13)	-0.372** (0.13)	-0.376** (0.13)
<i>Education (ref. age ≤ 17)</i>			
completed age 18–20	-0.178 (0.12)	-0.176 (0.12)	-0.177 (0.12)
completed age ≥ 21	0.214 (0.12)	0.212 (0.12)	0.214 (0.12)
<i>Positive country net balance (ref. state contributor)</i>			
	0.492* (0.21)	0.490* (0.21)	0.491* (0.21)
Political interest	-0.012 (0.07)	-0.008 (0.07)	-0.011 (0.07)
European identification	1.416*** (0.10)	1.412*** (0.10)	1.416*** (0.10)
Cultural threat to national identity	-0.461*** (0.05)	-0.462*** (0.05)	-0.461*** (0.05)
National trust	0.100 (0.07)	0.103 (0.07)	0.101 (0.07)
European trust	0.978*** (0.06)	0.974*** (0.06)	0.977*** (0.06)
<i>Controls</i>			
male (ref. female)	-0.102 (0.09)	-0.103 (0.09)	-0.103 (0.09)
political left (ref. center)	-0.211 (0.11)	-0.205 (0.11)	-0.211* (0.11)
political right (ref. center)	-0.154 (0.12)	-0.155 (0.12)	-0.155 (0.12)
Constant	-2.711*** (0.24)	-2.383*** (0.28)	-2.719*** (0.25)
Variance (country level)	0.225 (0.072)	0.225 (0.072)	0.225 (0.072)

(Continued)

Table 2. Continued.

	Reduced model (1)	Interaction positive affect knowledge (2)	Interaction negative affect knowledge (3)
No of countries	27	27	27
No of individuals	12,543	12,543	12,543
LR Chi2	10006.86	10011.55	10010.73
<i>p</i>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R2	0.3161	0.3163	0.3162

\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ .

category represents the reference categories of all other variables, except for occupation (set to “worker”). The category “high level” represents respondents from net benefiting EU-countries, with highest levels of educational attainment, and who judged EU membership as beneficial (occupation was set to the reference category since no other occupational category in the regression model was significant).

Figure 2 shows the likelihood that a respondent belongs to the weak, mid-level, or strong EU support category relative to either high or low levels of the grouped predictor variables. We interpret the differences between high and low levels of these variables as differences in the probability of weak, mid-level, or strong EU support for respondents that have equal parameter values in all but the model in question. For example, bars representing strong support for the EU in the utilitarian group show that respondents who finished education at the age of 21 or above, evaluate EU-membership as beneficial, and are citizens of EU-recipient countries, exhibit on average a 56 percent higher probability of strong EU-support than respondents who finished education at the age of 17 or below, evaluate EU-membership as not particularly beneficial, are workers, and are citizens of EU-donor states.

Figure 2 also shows that all variable groups, except for negative affect, decrease the likelihood of weak EU-support (in the utilitarian group also of mid-level support) at high levels of the parameter values while increasing the chances for higher categories of EU-support (mid-level and strong support). Negative affect has a reversed effect: It heightens the probability of weak EU-support and decreases the probability of higher EU-support, which is in accordance with our hypotheses. Except for the differential impact on different categories of EU-support, indicators linked to the utilitarian group of variables seem to be the strongest predictors of strong EU-support relative to all other indicators.<sup>8</sup> However, respondents with high levels of positive affect have an approximately 30 percent higher probability of being strong EU supporters than those with low levels of positive affect. The latter effect is comparable to the effects of the institutional trust group of variables. Differences between high and low levels in all other models are notably smaller.

### *Affect and EU-related knowledge*

Even though the preceding analyses suggest that the association between EU-related knowledge and support for the EU is not particularly strong (see also Verhaegen and Hooghe 2015), we conducted dedicated tests of our hypotheses H3 and H4. To this end, we estimated regression models including interaction effects between positive and negative affect and EU-related knowledge (see Table 2).




Figure 2. Likelihood that a respondent belongs to the weak, mid-level, or strong EU support category relative to either high or low levels of grouped predictor variables. Source: *Eurobarometer 64*. Note: Probabilities counted with fixed values of all the variables from the Model 1 in Table 2.

Table 2 shows that the interaction effect is positive and statistically significant only for positive affect and strong EU-support (Model 2). Negative affect, however, is not significantly associated with EU-knowledge (Model 3). Since effects of the interaction terms are difficult to interpret based on regression coefficients alone, we took the same marginal effects approach as in the previous models to identify the interaction between positive affect and EU-knowledge in relation to strong EU-support more clearly.

Figure 3 represents associations between EU-knowledge and strong EU support for different levels of positive affect, indicating how positive affect and knowledge interact regarding the probability to be strong EU-supporter. For lower levels of positive affect, an increase in EU-knowledge slightly decreases the probability to be a strong EU-supporter. In contrast, those who harbor strong positive feelings towards the EU show a higher probability of strong EU-support with higher levels of EU-related knowledge. In general, this means that higher levels of positive affect not only weaken the negative association between EU-knowledge and EU-support, but may override the negative effect of EU-related knowledge on EU-support. In this respect, the interaction effect goes beyond our hypothesis. According to H4, we expected a negative association between EU-support and EU-knowledge with slopes going higher and becoming less




Figure 3. Interaction between positive affect towards the EU and EU-knowledge (category of strong EU-support). Source: *Eurobarometer 64.2*.

Note: The figure shows conditional effects of interaction variables with fixed values of all other variables in Model 2 shown in Table 2. Values of continuous or ordinal variables are fixed at their means and dummies set to their reference values. In the procedure, all the integer values of the interaction variables were treated as their different levels/strength. The two highest categories of positive affect were summed to one due to otherwise insufficient number of cases in these categories when combined with EU-knowledge categories.

steep the stronger the positive affect, thus diminishing the negative effect of EU-knowledge on EU-support. Looking at our data and the case of strong support for the EU, respondents with strong positive emotions towards the EU may hold more knowledge in favor of the EU or use the available knowledge to support their positive attitudes towards the EU.

## Discussion

Motivated by ongoing debates about citizens' lack of solidarity and commitment towards the European Union and also in view of recent populist attempts at emotionalizing the political debate, we investigated whether citizens' feelings towards the EU can serve as meaningful predictors for their support of the European Union – above and beyond other well-established predictors of EU-support. Based on existing theory and research, we hypothesized that positive feelings towards the EU should have a positive impact on support for the EU and that negative feelings should be negatively associated with support for the EU. We also assumed that the links between feelings and support should be moderated by knowledge about the European Union in that positive affect reduces the use of EU-knowledge and negative feelings promote it.

Our analyses show that citizens' feelings towards the EU are associated with their support for the European Union. This association is in line with our hypotheses, i.e.

positive feelings are associated positively with support for the EU, especially at higher levels, whereas negative feelings show a negative association. Importantly, our analyses suggest that citizens' "gut feelings" towards the EU are a valuable addition to more established indicators of EU-support, in fact exceeding the explanatory power of some competing theoretical models. Although utilitarian considerations seem to be the strongest predictors of EU-support, our study indicates that the influence of citizens' feelings towards the EU is a more significant predictor of their support than indicators related to cognitive mobilization and European identification. It is important to note, however, that we cannot rule out the reverse argument, i.e. that support for the European Union elicits positive feelings towards the EU in the first place. However, this conjecture is hardly plausible in theoretical terms regarding negative affect, since the absence of support would not induce negative feelings towards the EU. Moreover, we have emphasized that the *object* of a specific feeling (in this case the EU) need not coincide with the *cause* of this feeling. Hence, although we cannot determine the precise cause of respondents' feelings towards the EU with the data at hand, we can well estimate their consequences for EU-support. However, our analyses do not fully support the view that the impact of feelings on support for the European Union should be linked to the level of EU-related knowledge. The theoretical conjecture suggests that negative affect towards an entity signals a problematic situation and therefore should prompt the acquisition and subsequent in-depth analysis of additional information about the entity. Positive affect, in turn, signals mostly unproblematic situations and hence no need for further inquiry. We found no significant interaction between negative affect and EU-knowledge, and for the strong EU-support significant interaction of positive affect and EU-related information is somewhat different than expected.

We are hesitant to interpret our findings as a disconfirmation of the theoretical considerations because clearly the data at hand allows only a very limited and indirect test of this proposition. We simply cannot say whether the amount of knowledge regarding the EU is an outcome of, say, respondents being generally well-informed about political matters or whether it is a consequence of negative affect. General knowledge might be not the information needed to reconsider or debunk the attitudes. It is more likely to represent a knowledge acquired due to the positive emotions, as it makes the object of emotion more interesting and salient and so motivated to engage with it and to get to know it better, on the other hand, also makes the use of this acquired information more biased (Isen 2008). This might explain our interaction results: positive affect is not associated with less EU-related knowledge, but rather with knowledge that is supportive of the EU and used to back strong EU-support. However, and more generally, our study highlights the importance of affect and emotion for the ways in which citizens relate to the European Union. To address the challenges of insufficient support and solidarity for European affairs and in view of highly emotionalizing populist rhetoric, policy makers are well advised to account for the "softer" affective factors that create or disrupt individuals' relationships with groups and imagined communities, such as the European Union. Aiming at people's feelings to establish or disrupt (social) bonds is a well-known strategy (e.g. Brader and Valentino 2007). Hence, it is important to attend to the processes and mechanisms that may generate more positive feelings towards the EU and counteract spirals of negative affect. Here, research on rituals and national symbols in the tradition of Emile Durkheim can be suggestive. Some studies have shown that collective emotions experienced, for example, during nation-wide rituals influence national identification primarily through various national symbols (von Scheve et al. 2014). This does not mean, of

course, that factors such as identification or institutional trust should be neglected; they should rather be complemented by affective factors to paint a more comprehensive picture.

A limitation of the present study clearly is the data that is available on feelings towards the EU. In particular, some of the notable consequences of emotions for EU-support might be due to a lack of selectivity between dependent and independent variables. Although there is a clear theoretical rationale that beliefs and emotions are distinct from one another, the possibilities for analytical separation given the data at hand are limited. However, the conjecture that support for the EU and feelings towards the EU are part of the same theoretical construct is not supported by our data in that correlations between our measures are too modest to suspect multicollinearity. In light of these limitations, feelings towards the EU might be conceived of as an “affective umbrella” indicator encompassing many of the latent dimensions that are characteristic for the theoretical models of identification and institutional trust. This is why feelings should not be thought of as competing with, but rather as complementing existing accounts.

Taken together, our study highlights the importance of feelings for the formation of beliefs and attitudes towards the European Union and shows that feelings exert a discrete and independent influence on these attitudes. Future research needs to address the obvious limitations of this study, in particular the lack of selectivity between variables and the measurement of emotions in various European surveys. This does not only relate to the modes and means of measurement, but likewise to the necessity to include measures of emotions in the first place.

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### **Supplemental data**

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13511610.2017.1398074>

### **Notes**

1. We provide detailed information on variables in the supplementary materials.
2. We conducted a series of robustness checks using separate items instead of the additive index in additional regression models reported in Tables S1 and S2 in the supplementary materials.
3. See Scherer (2005) for a discussion of the use of forced choice options in the measurement of emotion.
4. Since all emotion items are dichotomous categorical variables, the EFA was conducted using a matrix of polychoric correlations.
5. As a robustness check, we also conducted select regression analyses with all seven discrete emotions as independent variables, supporting the rationale of our additive indices (see Models 2 and 9 in Tables S1 and S2).
6. The same pattern is evident when looking at separate indicators of support for the EU in Tables S1 and S2. Results of the regression analyses show that positive affect increases the probability of supporting the political union and evaluating EU-membership positively (in comparison to the “neither” category), but decreases the likelihood of evaluating EU-membership as unfavorable (again, with “neither” as the reference category). In contrast, negative affect decreases the probability to support the political union and to evaluate EU-membership positively and increases the likelihood to evaluate EU-membership negatively. The same pattern is evident when considering discrete emotions: enthusiasm, trust, and hope increase the likelihood of supporting the political union and evaluating EU-membership positively, whereas indifference,



- mistrust, rejection, and anxiety decrease it. Looking at the unfavorable evaluation of EU-membership, enthusiasm (not significant), trust, hope and indifference decrease the odds of this evaluation, whereas mistrust, rejection, and anxiety (not significant) increase the odds. The inconsistent impact of indifference confirms its position at the low activity end of positive emotions: it neither increases the likelihood of a positive nor of a negative evaluation of the EU.
7. This pattern remains stable when looking at separate indicators of EU-support in Models 2–6 in Tables S1 and S2.
  8. This is in line with recent research indicating that even when considering the impact of European identification on the EU-support, utilitarian considerations remain the strongest predictor (van Klingeren, Boomgaarden, and de Vreese 2013).

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