

# **Berliner Studien zur Soziologie Europas**

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## **Contested European Citizenship: Results from a 13 Country Survey**

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## **Abstract**

European citizenship consisting of equal economic, social, and political rights for all EU citizens has come under pressure in recent years due to the different crisis the EU had to face. Based on a survey conducted in 13 EU member states we examined to what extent EU-citizens support the notion that citizens from other European countries should enjoy the same rights as nationals. Overall, only 56 % of EU citizens support the idea that EU foreigners and national citizens should be treated equally. In addition, we find remarkable variations between the countries. Multivariate analysis indicates that cultural factors on the individual and the country level have a strong impact on attitudes towards Europeanised equality, whereas structural factors that are related to individuals' and a countries' socioeconomic position are only of minor importance. One can conclude from our findings that the EU is not only situated in an institutional but also in a legitimacy crisis.

## **Keywords**

European citizenship, attitudes towards equal rights, legitimacy, survey research

## Introduction

When flying from a non-European country to one of the member states of the European Union (EU), the passengers approaching the passport control are divided into two groups; those with an EU passport and those with non-EU passports queue in separate lines. The burgundy colored European passports are a symbolic expression of European citizenship. Every EU citizen is allowed to move, settle, and work in any EU member state, and owns a set of political rights, particularly the right to vote and to stand as a candidate for municipal elections in the member state of residence. Finally, freedom of movement includes the entitlement to the same social security benefits as national citizens. By establishing a European citizenship consisting of equal economic, social, and political rights, the European Union has replaced the nation-state concept of equality with the idea of a Europe-wide equality for all European citizens. However, the legal institutionalization of Europeanized equal rights is only one side of European integration, because legal regulations ultimately require the citizens to believe in the legitimacy of the regulations. In the case of European citizenship, this legitimacy has come under pressure in recent years. Since 2010, the EU has found itself in the greatest crisis since its emergence. The Eurozone crisis, the sovereign debt crisis, the economic crisis, the refugee crisis, and Brexit have all not only challenged the European integration process as a whole, but also the idea that all EU citizens should have the same rights. One of the main reasons why a majority of Britons voted to leave the European Union was that they did not want other EU citizens, especially from Eastern Europe, to have the right to live and work in the UK (Hobolt, 2016). The idea of equal rights has also been questioned in other European countries. Several countries tried to deny or reduce social benefits for EU migrants, either through legislation or in practice.<sup>1</sup> Euroskeptic parties have increased in importance in many EU member states. In their eyes, the nation-state and not the EU is the true sovereign; and thus sovereignty rights should be returned from EU institutions to the member states, borders between them should be controlled, and the number of migrants coming from outside and inside Europe should be reduced (Brack and Startin, 2015).

In contrast, left and cosmopolitan parties, as well as center-left politicians, have defended the idea of European citizenship. E.g. French president Emmanuel Macron said *'We can no longer choose to turn inwards within national borders; this would be a collective*

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<sup>1</sup> In January 2019, the Austrian government introduced a new legislation, which reduces family benefits and family tax reductions for EU migrants to the level of the country in which the children reside, although the parent(s) live and work in Austria. In reaction to this legislation, the EU launched an infringement procedure against Austria, arguing that it breaks with the non-discrimination rule of the European Union. Sources: <https://www.courthousenews.com/ireland-cant-hinge-family-benefits-on-employment-status/> (last access: 26.02.2019); [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-19-664\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-19-664_en.htm) (last access: 26.02.2019). In the case of Ireland, the European Court of Justice ruled in February 2019 that the withholding of family benefits for an unemployed Romanian immigrant collides with EU legislation.

*disaster*.<sup>2</sup> One can assume that not only politicians but also citizens are divided into two camps and thus constitute a new cleavage structure. Some might consider themselves at risk as a result of European equality, open borders and EU migration. For others, European citizenship opens up new opportunities to go abroad or to take advantage of EU migrants as workers paid below the national average wage level.

Against this backdrop, we examine to what extent citizens oppose or support the notion that EU migrants should enjoy the same rights as themselves within their nation-state. Drawing on the literature on attitudes towards migration on the one hand and on cleavage theory on the other, we attempt to explain differences in peoples' attitudes within and between countries. In an original survey conducted in 2016 in 13 EU member states, we asked respondents whether they support the notion that EU migrants should be permitted to vote in local elections, should be allowed to work in their country, and should receive the same social security benefits as nationals.

Survey results show that only 56 percent of respondents support the idea that EU migrants and national citizens should be treated equally. In addition, we revealed a remarkable variation between countries: Whereas in eight countries a majority is in favor of European citizenship, people from Hungary, Slovakia, and the Republic of Cyprus oppose this idea. Multivariate analysis indicates that ideational factors on both the individual and the country level have a strong impact on attitudes, whereas structural factors related to an individual's and a country's socioeconomic position are only of minor importance. Anti-cosmopolitan attitudes, political right-wing orientations, identification with the nation-state and the strength of anti-immigrant parties in a country are the most important factors explaining attitudes towards European citizenship. These findings lead us to conclude that the EU is not only in an institutional but also in a legitimacy crisis.

### **From national to European citizenship**

European societies of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century are generally characterized as nation-state societies. Alongside the creation of national institutions, people who live within a territory of a specific nation-state became citizens of that nation-state. As a result, non-members (i.e. members of other nation-states), were excluded and thus treated differently. For British sociologist Thomas H. Marshall, the reinforcement of national citizenship status is one of the most significant preconditions for intrastate social inclusion (Marshall, 1949/1983).

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<sup>2</sup> Source: [https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/english\\_version\\_transcript\\_-\\_initiative\\_for\\_europe\\_-\\_speech\\_by\\_the\\_president\\_of\\_the\\_french\\_republic\\_cle8de628.pdf](https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/english_version_transcript_-_initiative_for_europe_-_speech_by_the_president_of_the_french_republic_cle8de628.pdf); (last access: 15.09.2019).

However, the European integration process has not only changed the institutional settings of the EU member states, but has also transformed the notion of citizenship. Institutionalizing a European citizenship status means to provide equal rights to every EU citizen, regardless of the EU country they come from or reside in. Firstly, open access is granted to all national labor markets within the EU for all EU citizens (Maas, 2007). Secondly, since the Maastricht Treaty, the EU has guaranteed a number of fundamental political rights for all EU citizens (freedom of speech and assembly, right of petition, freedom of association, and the right to elect the European Parliament) under the umbrella of 'EU citizenship'. These rights also include the right to vote and to stand as a candidate for municipal elections in the member state of residence. Thirdly, freedom of movement appends additional rights, which are connected to welfare privileges (Ferrera, 2005; Bruzelius and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2017; Seeleib-Kaiser and Pennings, 2018), including the entitlement to the same social security and tax benefits as nationals, as well as the right to subsidized housing. According to these rights, every foreign EU employee is entitled to live with their family, and the family is entitled to receive the same family allowances as nationals.

Although these European citizenship rights have been in effect for decades, they have rarely been used in a practical manner until their extension to the citizens of the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe in the 2000s, and the subsequent economic and political crises in several European member states (Vasilopoulou and Talving, 2018). In the years after, intra-EU migration increased, especially from poorer to richer EU countries. Between 2008 and 2012, the number of citizens working in another country than their birth country rose by 14 percent (see Eurofound, 2014; Vasilopoulou and Talving, 2018). From 2013-16, the share of people living in another EU country increased by an additional five to seven percent every year, resulting in a total number of 11,8 million EU migrants of working age, which constitutes a total share of around four percent of the working-age population in the EU-28 in 2016 (European Commission, 2018a). Despite this still relatively low level, intra-EU migration gained political salience, especially within the frame of Euroskeptic sentiments, as the discussion around the Brexit referendum shows (Vasilopoulou and Talving, 2018). Based on data over the span of the last 140 years, Funke et al. (2016) show that financial and economic crises have led to political polarization, including an increase in the number of votes for far-right parties with nationalistic and xenophobic tendencies. Additionally, from 2015 on, Europe experienced a rapid increase in the number of asylum seekers in the EU, especially those from Middle Eastern countries, which might also have affected European citizens' general attitudes towards migration, and intra-EU migration and the permeability of borders. These developments culminate in the current situation, in which the legitimacy of European citizenship is being contested in the public sphere, especially by Euroskeptic parties.

There have been several studies examining the acceptance of Europeanized equality, while focusing on different aspects of the concept. To begin with, in the Eurobarometer (EB) surveys different questions have been used to measure attitudes towards European citizenship rights. According to the Standard EB 89 (Spring 2018), 58 percent of

all respondents think that free movement of people, goods and services is the most positive result of the integration process (European Commission, 2018c). The Special EB 477 (September 2018) survey shows that 40 percent of the respondents agreed to the statement that EU foreigners, who stand as candidates in municipal elections, should have the same rights as all other elected candidates, while another 23 percent agreed to the same statement but excluded the right to become mayor (European Commission, 2018b). Measuring attitudes toward active suffrage, however, was not part of Special EB 477.

Vasilopoulou and Talving (2018) analyzed EU citizens' attitudes towards the freedom of movement in the EU, based on EB data from 2015-17. The authors find an overall approval rate of 82 percent for the freedom of movement. In their analysis, a respondent's high social status, a low identification with the nation-state, as well as living in a less affluent country (measured by the country's GDP) have significant positive effects on the acceptance of freedom of movement. Additionally, they revealed several interaction effects between a country's economic situation on the one hand and individual characteristics on the other: The individual effects only manifest themselves in richer countries, whereas in poorer countries, approval does not substantially vary between social status and identification (Vasilopoulou and Talving, 2018).

Using data from a survey conducted in six EU countries in 2016, Ferrera and Pellegrata (2018) reveal that in five out of six countries, citizens who are more vulnerable to economic and symbolic threats generated by the free movement of EU workers are more likely to oppose European equality on the labor market. They also show that country characteristics mediate the relationship between socioeconomic status, experiences of relative deprivation and interpersonal relations on the one hand and attitudes toward the free movement of EU migrants on the other (Ferrera and Pellegrata, 2018).

Although the notion of freedom of movement is in the very heart of the four freedoms, mechanisms revealed by Vasilopoulou and Talving (2018) and Ferrara and Pellegrata (2018) do not necessarily apply to the political and social dimension of European citizenship rights, as they only cover two out of the three rights that constitute European citizenship. None of the studies applies a concept consisting of multiple equality rights, as discussed above. Furthermore, items used by EB surveys have been formulated in a very broad manner. Studies show that respondents often deviate from their value beliefs if they anticipate costs and unpleasant consequences (Diekmann and Preisendörfer, 2003). The items used by Eurobarometer specify general attitudes towards equality rights only, and do not consider that the perception of potential (negative) consequences of applying these rights may change the respondents answering behavior. Therefore, the results might be biased towards greater approval, when comparing them to items that introduce individual costs to the equation.

Acting on this critique, in previous studies we tried to ascertain which values people 'really' believe in by adding potential negative consequences of the idea of a Europe-wide equality to the measurement of attitudes toward European citizenship. In a four-country survey conducted in Poland, Spain, Germany and Turkey (as a candidate

country of the EU) in 2009, we examined the three European citizenship dimensions separately (Gerhards and Lengfeld, 2015). We found relatively high approval rates, varying between 57 to 79 percent depending on the country and the dimension of European citizenship in all three EU countries. Only in Poland, passive suffrage was not supported by a majority of respondents (48 percent). Additionally, we found that citizens from the three EU countries surveyed made a difference between EU and Non-EU migrants: When being asked for granting economic rights to Turks and migrants from Northern America, approval rates were significantly lower, compared to EU migrants. Findings also show that materialist and nationalist values and fear of foreign domination of the national culture were the most powerful explanatory factors, whereas the respondent's level of education and their social status were of minor importance. However, these studies were conducted prior to the main European crises as outlined above, and included three European countries only. Thus, it is not clear whether the results are still valid today and can be generalized to the rest of Europe (Gerhards and Lengfeld, 2015).

In summary, the literature generally finds a majority of supporters of European citizenship. However, these surveys either relied on too broad items, or were conducted at a time when there were only very few intra-EU migrants, no major financial crises and before immigration became one of the most important media topics. Our paper aims to close these research gaps pointed out in this section by examining all three components of European citizenship (civil, political and social rights) with data from a survey conducted in 13 European countries in 2016 and by making use of items, which consider the potential costs of granting rights to EU foreigners.

### **Explaining attitudes towards European citizenship**

Referring to Ferrera (2005: 229), we argue that the opening up of national borders over the course of the past decades challenged the peoples' traditional symbolic code of equality. This process accelerated in recent years in Europe, potentially leading to a backlash against the now more widely used equality rights. In addition to a potential cultural conflict, Ferrera (2005: 229) assumes that the implementation of the idea of a Europeanized equality will 'disturb the existing distribution of material resources and life chances among natives'. Those Europeans being in a weak economic position might interpret migrants as a threat whereas highly educated citizens belonging to a higher social class may perceive Europeanized equality as something, which is in line with their cosmopolitan values and as an additional opportunity for their life chances. Along similar lines, Kriesi and colleagues assume that rising competition and the entry of cultural 'outsiders' will mobilize the objections of insiders (Kriesi et al., 2012; Hutter et al., 2016). These considerations lead to the question if there is still a majority of Europeans supporting European citizenship after the economic and political crises and the subsequent rise in intra-EU migration.

In order to explain attitudes towards European citizenship, we rely on broader theoretical arguments explaining attitudes towards immigration and on the theory of social cleavages (Ferrera 2005; Hutter et al., 2016; Kriesi et al. 2012). In cases where specific attitudes coincide with respondents' structural characteristics and more abstract value beliefs, social cleavages consisting of supporters and opponents are likely to emerge. According to Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007), there are two main strands of argumentation: On the one hand, structural explanations concerning the economic interest, which are frequently applied by examining the impact of the skill-level, employment position and wages on immigration-related attitudes. On the other hand, value based explanations focusing on traits like racial tolerance, preferences for cultural diversity, self-identification and political attitudes (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007: 402–406).<sup>3</sup> We follow this classification by differentiating between structural factors (1) and ideational factors (2), influencing attitudes on both the individual level (a) and the country level (b).<sup>4</sup>

(1) *Structural factors*: The provision of equal civil, political and social rights may counter individual and collective interests emerging from socioeconomic traits. According to social threat-theory (Blalock, 1967; Callens et al., 2015; Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010), we assume that native citizens perceive immigrants first and foremost as competitors for scarce resources. On average, EU migrants have a lower educational level and higher unemployment rates compared to the local population.<sup>5</sup> Hence, they are more dependent on welfare state provisions and will more

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<sup>3</sup> Although we use causal rhetoric throughout our argumentation, our analysis is not causal in a narrow sense. To strictly test for causality, a randomized trial (Hernán, 2018) or panel data (Morgan and Winship, 2014: 363–391) is required. Unfortunately, our cross sectional survey data cannot be categorized as such. Nonetheless, we share the opinion of Miguel A. Hernán who argues that 'without causally explicit language, the means and ends of much observational research get hopelessly conflated' (Hernán, 2018: 617).

<sup>4</sup> There are other factors, such as different characteristics of migrants, which may influence citizens' attitudes towards EU migrants; unfortunately, our data set does not contain information about different characteristics of migrants. Hjorth (2016) conducted a survey experiment in Sweden randomizing exposure to cues about recipients' country of origin and family size. Results show that for Swedish respondents, a Bulgarian EU migrant is less entitled to child benefits than a Dutch migrant. In addition, results indicate that the higher the number of children the lower the agreement that an EU migrant should receive the same child benefits as a Swedish citizen. In a similar vein, Reeskens and van der Meer (2019) argue that different criteria of deservingness impact on whether people think that refugees should receive unemployment benefits or not. Based on a survey vignette experiment conducted in the Netherlands, results show that a refugee's country of origin, his labor market reintegration behavior and his culpability for his unemployment are the most important conditions for reduced solidarity.

<sup>5</sup> Sources: [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migrant\\_integration\\_statistics\\_-\\_education#Educational\\_attainment](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migrant_integration_statistics_-_education#Educational_attainment) (last access: 28.02.2019).  
[https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migrant\\_integration\\_statistics\\_%E2%80%93\\_labour\\_market\\_indicators](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migrant_integration_statistics_%E2%80%93_labour_market_indicators) (last access: 28.02.2019).

likely put pressure on less high-skilled citizens in the job market. At this point, competition might occur between EU migrants on the one side and natives who are similarly dependent on state benefits or who perform low-skilled jobs on the other side.

However, the assumption about competition with low-skilled EU migrants does not hold true for all countries. Eurostat data shows that in some countries, the proportion of people with low educational degrees is much lower in the EU migrant population than in the national population, whereas in other countries the two groups exhibit an equal distribution of educational attainment.<sup>6</sup> Accordingly, we include assumptions about the interaction between an individual's position and the country specific context of educational composition of the EU migrant population.

(1a) *Micro-level*: We assume that those in a lower socioeconomic position (in terms of employment status, occupational class and educational attainment) might fear that allowing EU migrants to work and receive social benefits in their country will lead to increased competition and thus a decrease in wages and social benefits. This argument is also in line with the 'losers of modernization' thesis (Betz, 1994, 2003), which says that low status nationals are more likely to show xenophobia and prefer nationalist values, and thus constitute the electoral base for right-wing anti-immigration parties. By contrast, the self-employed and owners of bigger businesses could benefit from increased labor supply. The same holds true for academics that might perceive the opening of labor markets as a chance for their own mobilities. Previous studies have shown that in most countries the less educated and the low skilled tend to be more negatively predisposed towards migrants (Bobo and Licari, 1989; Chandler and Tsai, 2001; Card et al., 2012; Citrin et al., 1997; Ferrera and Pellegrata, 2018; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007). We expect this effect to apply to EU migrants as well.

Explaining attitudes towards intra-EU migration is also connected to the discussion about the causes of electoral success of right-wing populist parties. Some authors argue that the fear of economic hardship and status loss typically affects insiders of the labor market, especially members of the lower middle class, who in response vote for right-wing populist parties (Kurer, 2017; Mutz, 2018). Because these are typically anti-immigrant and Euroskeptic parties, we apply this argument to European citizenship, expecting not only the economically disadvantaged lower classes, but also the lower middle classes<sup>7</sup> to oppose Europeanized equality to counterbalance a feeling or status threat.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Source: [https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=edat\\_ifs\\_9911&lang=en](https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=edat_ifs_9911&lang=en) (last access: 02.10.2019).

<sup>7</sup> Unfortunately, we do not rely on indicators measuring status anxiety, so we can only test the structural component of this argument.

<sup>8</sup> The extent to which people view immigrants as a threat may also depend on a specific economic sector they work in and on their job, which they believe to be particularly susceptible to EU migration (Ferrera and Pellegrata, 2018). As our dataset does not include respective indicators, we are not able to test for these effects.

Ferrera and Pellegata (2018) argue that attitudes toward EU migrants are not only shaped by objective status positions, but also by situational and relational factors, like temporally relative deprivation and trans-EU experiences. The second factor refers to the degree of familiarity and interactions with people from other countries. The authors assume that people who are in contact with foreigners are more likely to support the idea of open European borders (see also Recci 2015; Díez Medrano et al. 2019; Recci et al. 2019). This argumentation is in line with the so-called ‘contact hypothesis’, which states that people who have a more regular contact with foreigners empathized with their situation more. Based on this, we expect a more positive point of view toward migrants and towards the provision of equal rights for EU migrants among those with more transnational experiences and contact with foreigners (Allport, 1979; Callens et al., 2015; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2008; Schlueter and Wagner, 2008).

(1b) *Macro-level*: As stated above, mobility within the EU mainly occurs from poorer to richer countries. Accordingly, the salience and politicization around the consequences of intra-EU migration are likely to be higher in more affluent countries, which attract more immigrants. Vasilopoulou and Talving (2018) revealed an effect of a country’s economic affluence on citizens’ attitudes towards intra-EU mobility, by affecting their individual utilitarian calculations and affective considerations. Apart from discussions about employment and labor market issues, the authors expect ‘concerns over redistributive politics, provision of public services, access to welfare, and competition for the collective goods’ (Vasilopoulou and Talving, 2018: 6). Following these considerations, we expect the approval of Europeanized equality to be higher in less affluent countries, whose citizens are less concerned about these issues.

Competition on the labor market not only influences low-skilled workers, but is dependent on the composition of the migrant population. Mayda (2006) argues, that in countries, where immigrants on average possess higher skills than nationals, the high-skilled nationals oppose immigration more strongly than they do in countries where immigrants are on average less educated than the national population. This assumption is supported by the finding that highly skilled nationals are more opposed toward skilled migration than individuals with a low educational level (Facchini and Mayda 2012).<sup>9</sup> We assume that this interaction of individual and context characteristics is applicable to EU citizens’ attitudes toward equal rights. Accordingly, we expect that low-skilled nationals will show a stronger opposition toward European citizenship in countries where the EU migrant population is on average less skilled than the national population. To test this assumption, we interacted the macro-structural indicator for the difference of educational composition between the national and EU migrant population with the individual educational level.

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<sup>9</sup> In contrast to this finding, other authors show that high-skilled migrants are more favorable towards all nationals, and that high-skilled nationals are less opposed to migration, regardless of the immigrant’s skill level (Hainmüller and Hiscox 2007; 2010).

(2) *Ideational factors*: Several authors argue that ideational factors have a special significance when trying to explain attitudes towards migrants (Dixon et al., 2018; Ferrera and Pellegrata, 2018; Ford and Lowles, 2016; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014).

(2a) *Micro-level*: We hypothesize that a person's attitude towards Europeanized equality is impacted by their general stance towards migrants. On the one hand, there are people who perceive migrants' ways of life, values, and skills as an enrichment for their country and its culture. This may hold true for citizens with cosmopolitan values. Yet, there are also people rejecting this notion and seeing migrants as a threat to their own way of life (Ciornei and Recchi, 2017; Helbling and Teney, 2015; Teney et al., 2014). By relying on prejudice research, we expect that people who believe that immigrants enrich the cultural life of their country would also support European citizenship (Ivarsflaten, 2005). Additionally, people's affectual ties to the nation-state and other collectives should also influence attitudes towards European citizenship: Those who exclusively identify with their nation are assumed to be more skeptical towards Europeanized equality than people who identify with Europe. This corresponds to Hooghe and Marks' (2004) argument stating that people who exclusively hold national identities are more Euroskeptical, whereas a European identity goes along with higher support for European integration. Lastly, political ideology might play a role. Many citizens' basic political orientations can be projected onto a left-right political scale. As left-wing ideologies are more connected with ideas of equality, solidarity, and internationalism (Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990), we assume that people who identify as left-wing would be more strongly in favor of equal rights for all European citizens than people from the political center. Meanwhile, we expect the inverse effect for right-wing people's stances on the topic. Among other things, the idea that citizens should enjoy privileges not enjoyed by non-citizens forms one part of the multiple ideas that constitute right-wing ideologies (Nickerson and Louis, 2008; Sides and Citrin, 2007).

(2b) *Macro-level*: When interpreting current affairs, citizens draw on the explanations provided in the national public discourse. Most importantly, political parties, the government, and social movements provide reference frames by communicating their political opinions. This process of interpreting political topics is also known as 'cueing' (Gilens and Murakawa, 2002; Green et al., 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2005). Using the example of the 'EU integration' topic, Leonard Ray (2003) as well as Gary Marks and Marco R. Steenbergen (2004) showed that elite's cues have a strong effect on public opinion. Moreover, Steenbergen and colleagues (2007) provided evidence that the cueing effect is stronger for extremist than for mainstream parties, as extremist parties tend to represent a certain opinion on a single issue only. In the case of far-right parties, literature suggests that a central ideological trait of this party family is nativism, which 'combines nationalism with xenophobia in that it calls for states to comprise only members of the native group and considers non-native elements to be fundamentally threatening to the monocultural nation-state' (Golder, 2016, p. 480; compare Mudde, 2007). Moreover, the refugee crisis has unquestionably been the cause of a highly controversial debate between political parties within and between European countries

about issues of migration. Although the debates about intra-EU migration and the acceptance of refugees refer to different legal frameworks, some studies show that people's attitudes do not differentiate much between different forms of immigration or groups of immigrants (McLaren, 2001; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007). A study conducted by Hartevelde et al. (2018) suggests that immigration of refugees into the EU led to an increase of Euroskeptic attitudes. As another example, in a natural experiment on several islands in the Aegean Sea Hangartner et al. (2018) show that the exposure to a higher inflow of refugees leads to increased hostility not only towards refugees, but also towards immigrants in general. Accordingly, we expect that the more the political elites and parties operate using xenophobic rhetoric, the more likely it is that people view migration as a threat.

## Data and methods

Our analyses are based on the data from the original *Transnational European Solidarity Survey (TESS)*, conducted in 13 European countries, comprising Austria, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, and Sweden.<sup>10</sup> The basic population were nationals living in private households and eligible to vote in the national parliament elections of the respective survey country. Interviews were conducted using computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI). The final sample consists of 12,500 respondents with approximately 1,000 respondents per country (500 in Cyprus because of its smaller population size). The fieldwork was carried out by Kantar TNS from the 6<sup>th</sup> of June to the 15<sup>th</sup> of November, 2016. Further information on the survey methodology can be found in Table A.1 in the appendix, and all item wordings and recodings of here used variables are shown in Table A.2 in the appendix.<sup>11</sup>

The survey included three items to measure the approval of equal civil, political and social rights, where respondents were asked whether they *totally disagree, tend to disagree, tend to agree or totally agree* to the following statements:

There are people from other countries of the European Union who would like to live in [COUNTRY], these are so called 'EU migrants'. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements about these EU migrants:

- *EU migrants should be allowed to work in [COUNTRY], even if it becomes more difficult for some [CITIZENS OF COUNTRY] to find a job.*

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<sup>10</sup> The TESS survey was conducted in a cooperation between two research groups: One is the international research project *Solidarity in Europe: Empowerment, Social Justice and Citizenship (SOLIDUS)*, which was funded by the European Commission within the Horizon 2020 Framework (Grant Agreement 649489). The other is the research group *Horizontal Europeanization*, which was funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) (FOR 1539).

<sup>11</sup> For more details about the survey, see also Gerhards et al. 2019)

- *EU migrants living in my municipality should be allowed to vote in local elections, even if their votes are decisive for the outcome of the elections.*
- *EU migrants living in [COUNTRY] should receive the same social security benefits as [CITIZENS OF COUNTRY].*<sup>12</sup>

To avoid a bias towards higher approval, the first two items are formulated in a rather restricted way in that they refer to the idea of equality under constrained conditions. By including the potential negative consequences of the notion of European citizenship, we tried to ascertain which values people ‘really’ believe in. As all three rights are constitutive of the general concept of European citizenship, we calculated a summed index and rescaled it to the original scale (1 – 4). We ran a principal component factor analysis, which confirmed that all items load on one latent factor (results not shown but available on request), with Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.75.<sup>13</sup>

To measure the socioeconomic status, we used the respondent’s employment status (1 *unemployed*; 2 *not in labor force/retired*; 3 *in education*; 4 *working*) and occupational class (1 *service classes*; 2 *routine non-manuals*; 3 *skilled workers/technicians*; 4 *self-employed*; 5 *unskilled workers*), which was coded according to the Erikson/Goldthorpe/Portocarero class scheme (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992). The educational attainment was measured by the highest educational degree of the respondent, based on national educational system’s scales, recoded according to the European Social Survey ES-ISCED 2010-2014 scale (European Social Survey, 2018) and summarized into three categories: *low (none/lower secondary)*, *middle (middle and higher secondary)* and *high (tertiary)*. We operationalize the degree of transnational experiences and contact with foreigners by asking the respondents whether they have regular contact with people from other countries and whether they have ever lived abroad for three months or longer.

We measured ideational factors by using three items: Firstly, cosmopolitanism, operationalized by the question whether the respondent believes that foreigners enrich the culture of their home country (1 *totally disagree*; 2 *tend to disagree*; 3 *tend to agree*; 4 *totally agree*). Secondly, the political self-placement on the right-left scale, rescaled into five ordinal categories (1 *left*; 2 *moderate left*; 3 *center*; 4 *moderate right*; 5 *right*) and lastly, the identification with the nation-state, operationalized by a respondent’s exclusive national identification (denial of a European identity). As control variables on the individual level we inserted the respondents age (*in 10 years*) and sex (0 *male*; 1 *female*).

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<sup>12</sup> According to the social rights item, we did not specify potential ‘costs’ to the item. Different to the labor market access and the right to vote, access to social right is directly linked to a monetarized good (amount of benefits) which is distributed among the respective population living in a country. Thus, a further specification of the stimulus was not appropriate.

<sup>13</sup> Additionally, we calculated the reliability coefficient for each country and conducted a confirmatory factor analysis of the three items by country. The values of Cronbach’s Alpha for most countries are acceptable (>0.7), while two countries almost reach this threshold (Sweden = 0.69; Netherlands = 0.67) and only one country has a questionable value of 0.6 (Portugal). Since the items load on one factor in each country, we accept this scale to be sufficiently reliable.

The affluence of a country was operationalized by the country's gross domestic product (GDP) 2015 per capita in 1,000 €. The measurement of political cues by elites presented a more complicated task. As we were not in a position to carry out a media content analysis, we could only coarsely measure the concept empirically. We determined the strength of the xenophobic discourse in a country by measuring the proportion of votes in the most recent general elections for parties that were unequivocally against migration and refugees. The greater these parties' representation in their respective parliaments, the greater their influence on public discourse and in turn on voters. Studies by Moshe Semyonov and colleagues (2006) and by Andrea Bohman (2011) have indicated the existence of a relation between the expression of reservations against migrants and the presence of politically influential right-wing populist parties. Finally, the difference in the educational composition between the national population and EU migrants is calculated by subtracting the share of low-skilled people (lower secondary degree or lower) in a country from the respective share in the EU migrant population of that country. Positive (negative) values indicate accordingly, that the prevalence of low educational degrees is higher (lower) in the group of EU migrants.

14

We first calculated relative frequencies<sup>15</sup> for the approval of Europeanized equality by country (for bivariate descriptive analyses of the approval of European citizenship rights and the independent variables see appendix Table A.3). For the multivariate analysis, we calculated stepwise-expanded fixed-effect linear regression models with the European citizenship index as the dependent variable. The full model results are presented in the form of a coefficient plot. The exact numbers, country-dummies and stepwise models (control variables, socioeconomic factors and ideational factors added separately to the model) are displayed in Table A.4 (appendix). To compare the explanatory power of the different models, we compare the within- and between-variances of the models.

To examine the country-level effects, we applied the two-step regression (TSR) approach to our analyses. A TSR approach consists of two regression steps: The first step is conducted at the individual level and the second at the country level. The coefficients from the first step constitute the dependent variables in the second step. In this case, the first step was a pooled OLS regression with robust standard errors. The model included dummy variables for all countries (Spain as reference category), as well as the previously specified independent variables and the control variables from the individual level. The country dummies represent country fixed effects. In a second step, we took the values of the unstandardized coefficients from the pooled OLS regression

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<sup>14</sup> Unfortunately, there was no data available for Poland and Slovakia, reducing our country-sample to eleven.

<sup>15</sup> For all descriptive analyses, sampling weights are used, adjusting the data in terms of age, gender, occupational status, region (nuts 2) and employment status, as well as country size in comparative analyses.

as the dependent variable and macro indicators as independent variables and ran OLS regressions at the country level to examine the effects of country characteristics. As 13 (resp. eleven) countries is not a sufficient number of cases to interpret the coefficients and p-values in terms of statistical inference, the results are presented in the form of scatterplots combined with regression lines.<sup>16</sup> These plots visualize the relationship between the macro factors and the support for equal rights in every country, controlling for composition of individual characteristics.

## **Results**


As Figure 1<sup>17</sup> reveals, overall 56 percent of EU citizens support the idea that EU foreigners and national citizens should be treated equally. In eight out of 13 countries, the data indicates a slight majority in favor of European citizenship, with approval rates between 51 and 63 percent. Only in Portugal and Spain, a vast majority of over 70 percent approves of Europeanized equality. In contrast, citizens from Hungary, Slovakia, and Cyprus do not support the notion of a Europeanized equality. While the general trend slightly leans toward the acceptance of Europeanized equality, results show strong country differences. Compared to results of a previous study in which we used similar items, the approval rates have declined in the three countries that are part of both samples (Germany, Poland, and Spain; Gerhards and Lengfeld, 2015). This finding indicates that our considerations about the impact of contextual changes (financial and political crises, increased migration and the rise of Euroskeptic parties) on the support for European citizenship might be valid. For a serious test of this assumption, however, one would need panel data. The country differences in approval rates could be explained either by differences in composition between the countries, regarding certain individual-level factors like education or ideational factors, or by macro-level differences between the countries. We will further examine this in the next step of the analysis.

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<sup>16</sup> Moreover, due to the low number of countries, we decided to only include one explanatory variable per regression in the second step.

<sup>17</sup> In Figure 1, we adjusted the depiction of the approval index. The index here represents the rate of responses in every answer category (i.e. fully agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree, fully disagree) for all three items across the total number of responses for all three items. For example, 56 percent of responses fell into the category 'fully agree' or 'tend to agree' for all three items.

**Figure 1:** Average approval of European citizenship by country (%)




Note: Source: TESS 2016; own calculations; relative frequencies (weighted)

Figure 2 shows the results of the full linear fixed-effect regression model. The variables concerning the contact hypothesis show significant effects in the expected direction. The results of the three socio-structural factors are mixed: While the employment status shows no significant effect on the attitudes towards European citizenship, we find significant negative effects of the lower occupational classes (in reference to the service classes). The social class position indicator shows that both the lower middle class (skilled workers/technicians) and the lower class (unskilled workers and agriculture/farmers?) exhibit a significantly lower approval of European citizenship than the upper and lower service classes. Thus, our expectations concerning the higher opposition of the lower classes and lower middle class can be empirically confirmed. Furthermore, the respondents with lower and medium educational achievement (in comparison with the high education group) approve of European citizenship to a lesser extent.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> We interpret education as a structural variable and as a form of human capital that eases access to lower positions in the job market, meaning that people with a higher education should feel less threatened economically by migration. However, higher education can also lead to a greater degree of cognitive mobilization, a deeper knowledge of the wider world, and a higher acceptance of foreign cultures

**Figure 2:** Coefficient plot – Dependent variable: Europeanized equality index

Note: Source: TESS 2016; own calculations; average marginal effects (based on logistic regression)

While these effects are significant, they seem to be rather small, compared to the ideational factors' effects. Respondents who think that their country's culture is enriched by foreigners show a significantly more favorable attitude towards European citizenship, as well as people who place themselves on the left side of the political spectrum (in contrast to the political center). Opposite effects are shown for people who classify themselves as politically right, and who hold an exclusively national identity. Overall, value orientations turn out to be more important than structural factors for the explanation of attitudes towards European citizenship. This conclusion is also supported by the higher increase of the  $R^2$  when adding the ideational factors to the model (+ 12.6 percent) in comparison to the increase when adding the structural factors (+ 1.7 percent) (see Table A.4 in the appendix).

Table A.4 (appendix) gives detailed information about effects of the country dummies and the results for the explained variances, both within and between countries. The comparison of the between-country variance between regression models shows that the structural variables do not lead to an increase in the explained variance on the

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(Knutson, 2010; Merkel, 2017). Therefore, one should be careful when interpreting the results of the educational attainment as a structural factor only.


country-level, in contrast to the ideational variables (10 percent increase in the between-variance). However, all country dummies (except Portugal) are still highly significant in comparison to the reference country Spain. This brings us to the conclusion that country differences are partly caused by differences in a country's composition regarding value orientations, but also by other individual- or country-level factors not included in our analysis.

To test for country-level factors, we applied the two-step-regression approach and plotted the results as scatterplots. Figure 3 shows that GDP (per capita) does not have an impact on a country's level of acceptance of Europeanized equality. However, the share of anti-immigrant votes in the last election shows a strong negative association, and a p-value under 0.01, despite the low number of countries. Because Hungary constitutes an outlier in terms of the share of anti-immigrant votes, we ran an additional regression without this case, with a similar result (depicted by the dashed line).<sup>19</sup> However, when interpreting these results, we must consider that we are not able to make assumptions about the direction of causality. Liesbet Hooghe (2007) spoke of a top-down process of elites influencing the attitudes of regular citizens. In contrast to this interpretation, this could also occur as a bottom-up process. The strength of anti-immigration parties would then result from the proportion of citizens who are predisposed to reject Europeanized equality and who vote for anti-immigration parties precisely for this reason. We assume that both of these theories are correct and that this thereby constitutes a dynamic, self-reinforcing process, even if we are unable to verify this empirically.

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<sup>19</sup> These results are confirmed by the goodness-of-fit measures (Table A.4 in the appendix): The GDP per capita has no explanatory power, whereas the variance explained by the share of anti-immigration party votes is very high with a  $R^2$  of 51 percent.

**Figure 3:** Scatter plots and regression lines of country-coefficients and macro-variables



Note: Source: TESS 2016; own calculations; average marginal effects of country-dummies (based on logistic regression); OLS-regression lines

To examine the context of educational composition, we firstly analyzed the relationship between educational difference and acceptance rates. The pattern supports our assumption that the acceptance of European citizenship is lower in countries, where EU-migrants are on average less skilled than the national population, than in countries with more highly skilled immigrants. Secondly, we examined the association between the coefficients of the dummy variables of having a low or medium educational level with the country composition regarding educational attainment of EU migrants (not depicted). The country-patterns do not match the theoretical predictions and show no considerable differences of the influence of education on the attitudes toward equal

rights between the countries.<sup>20</sup> Moreover, the explanation of country differences by using relatively vague macro-indices has certain limitations, because these variables do not take national historic developments and particularities into account (Mahoney 2004).

## **Conclusion**

European citizenship consisting of equal economic, social, and political rights for all EU citizens is an institutionalized and constitutive element of the European Union. We assume that the legitimacy of this European citizenship has come under pressure in recent years as a result of the different crises the EU had to face, and the increased numbers of EU migrants. Based on a survey conducted in 13 EU member states in 2016 we examined to what extent EU citizens support the notion that citizens from other European countries should enjoy the same rights as nationals, and how one can explain differences in attitudes towards European citizenship within and between countries. Overall, only 56 percent of EU citizens support the idea that EU foreigners and national citizens should be treated equally. In addition, we find remarkable differences between the countries. Whereas in eight countries a majority is in favor of European citizenship, people from Hungary, Slovakia, and the Republic of Cyprus do not support the notion of a Europeanized equality.

Multivariate analysis indicates that ideational factors on the individual and country level have a strong impact on attitudes towards Europeanized equality, whereas structural factors that are related to individuals' and a country's socioeconomic position are only of minor importance. Anti-cosmopolitan attitudes, political right-wing orientations, identification with the nation-state and the strength of anti-immigrant parties in a country are the most important explaining factors. One limitation of these results is the fact that the country-level analysis is based on a sample of 13 EU countries out of 28, meaning that both the explanatory power for the European Union as a whole, as well as the effects themselves, should be treated as preliminary results, which have to be further examined in future studies. Moreover, the explanation of country differences by using relatively vague macro-indices has certain limitations, because these variables do not take national historic developments and particularities into account (Mahoney 2004).

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<sup>20</sup> In further analyses, we tested additional macro-variables (increase/decrease (2014-2018) and share (2018) of EU migrants, share of social spending of GDP, share of people who find it difficult to live on current income), but we could not find any significant effects. Additionally, we calculated cross-level interaction effects between an individual's structural traits (occupational class and educational attainment) and the macro-conditions of the country. In contrast to Vasilopoulou and Talving (2018), we could not find any interaction between the individual position and the affluence of their country. Results are available on request.

Finally, in comparison to the results of a survey conducted by XXX in 2009 the approval rates have declined in the countries that are part of both samples. This result may indicate that the different EU crises, the increased migration and the rise of Euroskeptic parties have negatively influenced support for European citizenship. However, we cannot directly test this connection, as panel data is required for that. As EU citizenship has been a core element of European integration since 1951, our findings may indicate that the EU is not only facing an institutional but also a legitimacy crisis.<sup>21</sup> However, the results of our study seem to contradict other empirical findings. Vasilopoulou and Talving (2018) found a much higher approval rate of 82 percent for freedom of movement. The different findings might be traced back to differences in how attitudes were measured. First, the Eurobarometer item used by Vasilopoulou and Talving specifies general, un-conditioned attitudes, which may be conflated by social desirability. The items used in our survey are formulated in a more realistic manner as they consider the potential (negative) consequences of institutionalization of European citizenship. Second, whereas Vasilopoulou and Talving (2018) investigated only one dimension of EU citizenship, namely to work in another EU country, our study has taken all three dimensions of European citizenship into account.

Although our study builds upon a cross sectional design only, we assume that the recent crises have led to the de-legitimization of European citizenship, one of the core and constitutive elements of the European Union. Moreover, the most important factors affecting attitudes toward EU citizenship are ideational ones: Political right wing orientations, nationalism, and anti-cosmopolitan attitudes. Thus, classical EU policies focusing on improvement of economic living conditions, including EU wide social policy initiatives, do not seem to be effective measures to strengthen the legitimacy of EU citizenship. Seen from this point of view, the EU faces a serious dilemma, as it has no suitable antidote.

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<sup>21</sup> Our concept of legitimacy refers to Max Weber's (1985) notion of legitimacy. Weber argues that legitimacy is ultimately produced by citizens' *beliefs in* the legitimacy of an institution. However, one has to keep in mind that our study refers to 13 member states only, whereas the European Union currently consists of 28 countries. Although it is not possible to generalize our results to all EU member states, we have no reason to believe that the 13 countries do not reflect the range of possible country differences between the member states.

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## Appendix

Table A.1: Survey methodology of the TESS survey

<b>A. SURVEY DESIGN</b>	
Population	Adult population, eligible to vote in national elections of the selected countries, who are residents in private households and available by phone (landline or mobile).
Interview mode	Computer assisted telephone interviews (CATI)
Execution of fieldwork	Kantar TNS (formerly known as infratest dimap) Berlin, a public opinion research company specialising in electoral and political research, carried out the survey in the thirteen countries in collaboration with national, affiliated institutes belonging to the TNS group. The fieldwork was coordinated and conducted by <i>TNS Triple C Centre</i> in Brussels from 6 June to 15 November 2016.
Target of net interviews	12.500 interviews in total, with 1.000 per country except for Cyprus (500)
Average interview duration (planned)	25 to 30 minutes
<b>B. SAMPLING DESIGN</b>	
Contact method	Landline/mobile mix of the gross sample which reflects the current standard proportions of Eurobarometer Flash.
Sampling	<p>Random digit dialing (RDD) in all countries except Sweden:</p> <p>The procedure to generate a RDD sampling frame is as follows: Listed telephone numbers from a recent point in time are drawn from a database. The database that is not limited to single number providers and can be used to identify area codes and active blocks of telephone numbers as a part of the process of creating a RDD database. In this process, the two last digits of the numbers are deleted and replaced by 00 to 99. By this, also numbers not listed have a positive probability of being selected.</p> <p>In Sweden the sample frame was different compared to the other countries, because an address register containing 90 % of all Swedish aged 16 years or more exists there. In this register, not only the landline numbers are listed, but also all registered mobile numbers (except prepaid cards).</p>

Due to the high percentage of registered persons a random sample of persons drawn based on this register. This means that the Swedish sample was a sample of individuals and not of households as it was for landline numbers in the other countries.

Stratification	NUTS 2 regions
Selection of respondent	If the number selected was a mobile number, the target person for the interview was the owner of the mobile phone. On the contrary, if the number was a landline number, the target person could have been every adult person living in the household eligible to vote. Therefore, in this case in a second step the target person had to be selected by chance. This was done using the last birthday method to identify the respondent among all persons eligible to vote in the household.

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### C. FIELDWORK EXECUTION AND RESULTS

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	Fieldwork period	people-views	Number of interviews	Average view length (minutes)	inter-length	Response rate <sup>22</sup> (in %)
Austria	June 6 - July 6		1.010	30		1.3
Cyprus	June 7 - June 22		500	23		2.7
France	10 Oct - 5 Nov		1002	27		5.3
Germany	June 6 - July 1		1.001	28		3.0
Greece	June 9 - July 1		1.000	24		5.1
Hungary	June 6 - June 30		1.001	29		9.5
Ireland	10 Oct - 14 Nov		1.000	25		2.6
Netherlands	June 6 - July 5		1.000	39		5.5
Poland	June 6 - July 1		1.000	27		4.4
Portugal	June 6 - July 1		1.000	27		7.7
Slovakia	June 6 - July 5		1.000	29		7.6
Spain	June 6 - July 6		1.001	26		2.3
Sweden	June 7 - July 13		1.000	32		6.1

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### D. WEIGHTING

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The weights took into account the national landline/mobile ratios, but factored in the possible response selectivity. The sample structure was compared to the actual population structure

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<sup>22</sup> Share of completed interviews of the adjusted gross sample.

along age, gender, labour market status, regions (NUTS II), employment status (known from Eurostat 2016 and the Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) database), and the highest level of completed education (measured with the ES-ISCED 2010-2014 scale from the European Social Survey (ESS Round 7: European Social Survey 2016)).

Table A.2: Item wording and recoding of variables

Variables	Range	Item Wording
<b>A. EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS</b>		
EU migrants	1-4	<p>'There are people from other countries of the European Union who would like to live in [COUNTRY], these are so called 'EU migrants'. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements about these EU migrants.'</p> <p>(1 totally agree, 2 tend to agree, 3 tend to disagree, 4 totally disagree)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EU migrants living in [COUNTRY] should receive the same social security benefits as [CITIZENSOFCOUNTRY].</li> <li>• EU migrants should be allowed to work in [COUNTRY], even if it becomes more difficult for some [CITIZENSOFCOUNTRY] to find a job.</li> <li>• EU migrants living in my municipality should be allowed to vote in local elections, even if their votes are decisive for the outcome of the elections.</li> </ul> <p><i>Recoding:</i></p> <p><i>Approval rates (1=1, 2=1, 3=0, 4=0)</i></p> <p><i>Index (1=4, 2=3, 3=2, 4=1), sum of all three items divided by three</i></p>
<b>B. SOCIETAL AND POLITICAL VALUES</b>		
Political ment	Place- 1-5	<p>In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". How would you place your views on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?</p> <p><i>Recoded into 5 groups (1-2=Left; 3-5=Moderate Left;6=Centre; 7-9=Moderate Right;10-11=Right)</i></p>
Society: Enriched	Culture 1-4	<p>I will now read to you several statements about society. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (1 totally agree, 2 tend to agree, 3 tend to disagree, 4 totally disagree) [COUNTRY]s cultural life is generally enriched by people coming to live here from other countries.</li> </ul>

*Recoded (1=4, 2=3, 3=2, 4=1)*

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Identification	0,1	<p>Some people think of themselves as [NATIONALITY], others as Europeans, and others as citizens of the world. What about you?</p> <p>(1 Yes, 2 No)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Do you feel [NATIONALITY]?</li> <li>• Do you feel European?</li> </ul> <p><i>Recoded (Exclusive national identity (1) = "Do you feel [NATIONALITY]?"=1 &amp; "Do you feel European?"=2; Integrated European Identity (2) = "Do you feel European?"=1)</i></p>
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### C. SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES

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Employment status	1-7	<p><i>Which of the following applies to your current employment situation? Are you...</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1 Full time employee (30 hours a week or more).</li> <li>2 Part time employee (less than 30 hours a week).</li> <li>3 Self employed.</li> <li>4 Retired/pensioned.</li> <li>5 Housewife, doing housework or otherwise not employed.</li> <li>6 Student.</li> <li>7 Unemployed.</li> </ol> <p><i>Recoded (7=1, 4-5=2, 6=3, 1-3=4)</i></p>
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Class according to "Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero" (EGP)	1-9	<p>What is your current occupation?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1 Employed professional (employed doctor, lawyer, accountant, architect).</li> <li>2 General management, director or top management (managing directors, director general, other director).</li> <li>3 Middle management, other management (department head, junior manager, teacher, technician).</li> <li>4 Employed position, working mainly at a desk.</li> <li>5 Employed position, not at a desk but travelling (salesmen, driver, etc.)</li> <li>6 Employed position, not at a desk, but in a service job (hospital, restaurant, police, fireman, etc.).</li> <li>7 Supervisor.</li> <li>8 Skilled manual worker.</li> </ol>
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9 Other (unskilled) manual worker, servant.

*Recoded referring to EGP class scheme (Service classes (1)=1-3; Routine non-manual (2)=3-6; Skilled workers/technicians (3)=7-8; Self-employed (4); Unskilled manual workers & agriculture (5)=9*

*Remarks: The category "Self-employed 4" was defined by another variable indication the respondent's employment situation (see above); If respondent was currently not part of the active labor force, we asked them a similar question to indicate their prior occupation.*

Education	1-3	<p>What is the highest level of education or vocational training you have achieved?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1 No formal qualification, only primary education.</li> <li>2 Lower secondary education.</li> <li>3 Upper secondary vocational education.</li> <li>4 Upper secondary education.</li> <li>5 Post secondary education, advanced vocational education below bachelor's degree level.</li> <li>6 Medium duration higher education at university or polytechnic college.</li> <li>7 Long higher education at university or polytechnic college.</li> <li>8 Other.</li> </ol> <p><i>Recoded (Low (1) =1, 2; Medium (2) = 3-5; High (3) = 6, 7)</i></p>
Sex	0,1	<p>self-generated by interviewer, 1 male, 2 female</p> <p><i>Recoded (0 = Male; 1 = Female)</i></p>
Age	18-95	<p>Can you tell me your year of birth, please?</p> <p><i>Recoded (Age= 2016 - year of birth)</i></p>
Contact with Foreigners	0,1	<p>Do you have regular contact to people from other countries in your circle of friends and acquaintances?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1 No, none</li> <li>2 Yes, but only with foreigners living in [country of resp.]</li> <li>3 Yes, but only with foreigners living abroad</li> <li>4 Yes, with foreigners living in [country of resp.] and to foreigners living abroad</li> </ol> <p><i>Recoded (0 = 1,3; 1 = 2,4)</i></p>
Stay Abroad	1,2	<p>Have you ever lived abroad for three months or longer, either for private or professional reasons?</p>

1 Yes

2 No

Recoded (0 = 2)

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#### E. MACRO VARIABLES

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GDP 2015      11.2-45.8      Gross Domestic Product per capita, 2015, in 1000 €

Source: Eurostat [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/national-accounts/data/data-](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/national-accounts/data/database?p_p_id=NaoTreepor-)  
[base?p\\_p\\_id=NaoTreepor-](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/national-accounts/data/database?p_p_id=NaoTreepor-)

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[2&p\\_p\\_col\\_count=3](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/national-accounts/data/database?p_p_id=NaoTreepor-) (last access 01.04.2019)

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Political Cueing      0-0.65      Share of anti-immigrant party shares

Coded like Hobolt & de Vries (2016) with data from

<http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/>

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Source: TESS 2016

Table A.3: Relative frequencies of independent variables by approval to different rights and index

	Right to work	Right to vote	Right to social benefits	Approval-Index
<b>Total</b>	56.8	50.8	63.1	56.9
<b>Contact to foreigners</b>				
[0] No	53.7	49.0	59.3	54.0
[1] Yes	67.3	61.0	68.7	65.7
<b>Lived abroad</b>				
[0] No	59.6	54.6	64.2	59.5
[1] Yes	70.1	61.9	67.4	66.5
<b>Employment status</b>				
[1] Unemployed	50.8	53.7	64.1	56.2
[2] Not in labour force/retired	59.8	54.7	64.5	59.7
[3] In education	78.0	68.3	69.6	72.0
[4] Working	62.4	55.9	64.7	61.0
<b>Occupational class</b>				
[1] Upper class (I)	68.2	58.9	67.6	64.9
[2] Upper middle class (II)	67.5	59.2	65.9	64.2
[3] Center middle class (IIIa)	61.2	54.7	64.5	60.1
[4] Lower middle class (V & VI)	51.4	53.4	60.5	55.1
[5] Self-employed (IVab & IVc)	59.2	49.3	60.2	56.2
[6] Routine non-manual (IIIb)	63.3	55.2	66.8	61.8
[7] Unskilled manual workers & agriculture	57.5	59.0	64.8	60.3
<b>Educational attainment</b>				
[1] Non- or primary	60.3	61.2	71.4	64.2
[2] Lower secondary	54.7	58.6	63.7	59.0
[3] Middle secondary	50.3	45.4	52.7	49.4
[4] Higher secondary	62.8	55.6	66.7	61.8
[5] Tertiary	75.5	63.9	73.4	70.9
<b>Foreigners enrich culture</b>				
[1] Totally disagree	31.9	33.2	41.6	35.6
[2] Tend to disagree	47.6	42.5	54.6	48.2
[3] Tend to agree	63.0	57.2	64.7	61.6
[4] Totally agree	76.8	69.0	77.7	74.5
<b>Identity</b>				
[1] Only National	40.4	39.1	46.7	42.1
[2] European Identity	66.9	60.2	69.3	65.5
<b>Political self-assessment</b>				
[1] Left	70.9	71.2	78.1	73.4
[2] Moderate Left	75.5	69.5	76.0	73.7
[3] Center	57.4	54.1	61.3	57.6
[4] Moderate Right	59.1	47.4	59.8	55.4
[5] Right	39.6	35.0	48.4	40.9

Source: TESS 2016; own calculations; n=9.698; Notes: relative frequencies (weighed)

Table A4: Linear fixed-effect regression on the European citizenship approval index

Index	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	-			
Age (in 10 years)	<b>0.02**</b> (0.01) *	<b>-0.01*</b> (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
	-			
Sex (Ref.: Male)	<b>0.08**</b> (0.02) *	<b>-0.08***</b> (0.02)	<b>-0.08***</b> (0.02)	<b>-0.09***</b> (0.02)
<b>Stay abroad</b> (Ref.: No)		<b>0.14***</b> (0.02)	<b>0.10***</b> (0.02)	<b>0.07***</b> (0.02)
<b>Contact with foreigners</b> (Ref.: No)		<b>0.21***</b> (0.02)	<b>0.17***</b> (0.02)	<b>0.11***</b> (0.02)
<b>Employment status</b> (Ref.: Working)				
Unemployed			-0.07 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)
Not in labour force/retired			-0.04 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)
In education			0.10 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.05)
<b>Occupational class</b> (Ref.: Service classes)				
Routine non-manuals			<b>-0.06**</b> (0.02)	<b>-0.04*</b> (0.02)
Skilled workers/technicians			<b>-0.13***</b> (0.03)	<b>-0.10**</b> (0.03)
Self-employed			<b>-0.11*</b> (0.05)	-0.07 (0.04)
Unskilled workers			<b>-0.12**</b> (0.04)	<b>-0.08*</b> (0.04)
<b>Educational level</b> (Ref. High)				
Low			<b>-0.19***</b> (0.03)	<b>-0.08**</b> (0.03)
Middle			<b>-0.18***</b> (0.02)	<b>-0.10***</b> (0.02)
<b>Cosmopolitanism</b>				<b>0.26***</b> (0.01)
<b>Political Placement</b> (Ref.: Centre)				
Left				<b>0.21***</b> (0.03)
Moderate Left				<b>0.22***</b> (0.02)
Moderate Right				<b>-0.06**</b> (0.02)
Right				<b>-0.19***</b> (0.03)
<b>Identity: Exclusively national</b> (Ref.: European)				<b>-0.26***</b> (0.02)
<b>Country-Dummies</b> (Ref. Spain)				
Netherlands	- 0.48*** (0.04)	-0.46*** (0.04)	-0.50*** (0.04)	-0.36*** (0.04)
Germany	- 0.31*** (0.04)	-0.30*** (0.04)	-0.32*** (0.04)	-0.33*** (0.04)

Poland	- 0.36***	(0.04)	-0.33**	(0.04)	-0.34***	(0.04)	-0.18***	(0.04)
Sweden	- 0.67***	(0.04)	-0.68***	(0.04)	-0.70***	(0.04)	-0.69***	(0.04)
Greece	- 0.51***	(0.05)	-0.49**	(0.05)	-0.51***	(0.05)	-0.32***	(0.04)
Hungary	- 1.10***	(0.04)	-1.04***	(0.04)	-1.03***	(0.04)	-0.92***	(0.04)
Austria	- 0.45***	(0.04)	-0.47**	(0.04)	-0.48***	(0.04)	-0.40***	(0.04)
Cyprus	- 0.80***	(0.06)	-0.85***	(0.06)	-0.85***	(0.06)	-0.58***	(0.06)
Ireland	- 0.35***	(0.04)	-0.38**	(0.04)	-0.40***	(0.04)	-0.31***	(0.04)
Portugal	- 0.16***	(0.04)	-0.15**	(0.04)	-0.12**	(0.04)	0.03	(0.04)
Slovakia	- 0.91***	(0.04)	-0.89**	(0.04)	-0.87***	(0.04)	-0.69***	(0.04)
France	- 0.63***	(0.04)	-0.63***	(0.04)	-0.62***	(0.04)	-0.54***	(0.04)
Constant	3.35***	(0.04)	3.12***	(0.04)	3.26***	(0.05)	2.46***	(0.06)
$R^2$	0.11		0.13		0.14		0.27	
$R^2$ within	0.00		0.03		0.04		0.19	
$R^2$ between	0.28		0.16		0.16		0.26	
$R^2$ overall	0.01		0.03		0.05		0.19	

Source: TESS 2016; own calculations; n=9.698; Notes: Linear regression with robust standard errors  
 \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$