FS III 91-101

# Mesomobilization Contexts:
## Organizing and Framing in Two Protest Campaigns in West Germany

Jürgen Gerhards and Dieter Rucht

Berlin, February 1991

# Zusammenfassung

Der Beitrag analysiert den Mobilisierungsprozeß von zwei Protestkampagnen: die Mobilisierung gegen den Besuch von US-Präsident Reagan 1987 in Berlin und gegen die Tagung des Internationalen Währungsfonds und der Weltbank 1988 in Berlin. In beiden Kampagnen gelang es, die auslösenden - an sich "harmlosen" - offiziellen Ereignisse als problematische Ereignisse zu definieren und viele unterschiedliche gesellschaftliche Gruppen für eine ausdrückliche Unterstützung der jeweiligen Kampagne zu gewinnen. Entscheidend für den Mobilisierungserfolg beider Kampagnen war eine spezifisch ausgerichtete intermediäre Struktur. Im Gegensatz zur vorhandenen Literatur, die sich bei der Frage nach dem Erfolg von Mobilisierungen vor allem auf Mikromobilisierungsprozesse und damit die Aktivierung von Individuen konzentriert hat, versuchen wir exemplarisch die Bedeutung von Mesomobilisierungskontexten (Vernetzung von Gruppen) aufzuzeigen. Diese haben in den beiden Kampagnen eine doppelte Funktion übernommen: Sie bildeten die Struktur der Mobilisierung, insofern sie die entscheidenden Planungs-, Vorbereitungs- und Vernetzungsleistungen erbracht und die Ressourcen beschafft haben. Sie ermöglichten zum zweiten eine ideologische Integration der Kampagnen, indem sie das jeweilige Ereignis mobilisierungswirksam interpretierten. Wir haben die ideologischen Konstrukte zur Problematisierung der offiziellen Ereignisse anhand von Flugblättern rekonstruiert. Für jede Kampagne kann jeweils ein zentrales Deutungsmuster - die "Imperialismus-Ideologie" und die "Hegemonialmacht-Ideologie" - identifiziert werden, an das Gruppen mit jeweils sehr unterschiedlichen Anliegen anknüpfen konnten.

# Abstract

The paper analyzes the process of mobilization against the US president Ronald Reagan's visit in Berlin in 1987 and the IMF and World Bank congress in Berlin in 1988. In both campaigns the organizers succeeded in defining the - per se unobtrusive - official events as problematic, thus gaining the support of a multitude of social groupings. The decisive factor for the success of these protest campaigns was a specific intermediary structure of mobilization. In contrast to the prevailing literature which focuses on micromobilization contexts and, consequently, on the ways in which individuals become activated, we aim at demonstrating the relevance of mesomobilization contexts on the level of groups and networks of groups. These contexts had a dual function in both campaigns. They provided the structural basis for mobilization in preparing and coordinating the campaigns, and in collecting the resources required for action. Second, mesomobilization contexts achieved an ideological integration insofar as they interpreted the triggering events in a way which was inducive to protest mobilization. In the paper, the ideological frames to problematize the official events are reconstructed by an analysis of leaflets. In each campaign, a "master frame" - the ideology of imperialism and of hegomonic power - could be identified. These master frames allowed for a "frame bridging" of many groups with different specific concerns.

# Mesomobilization Contexts: Organizing and Framing

# in Two Protest Campaigns in West Germany[1]

Jürgen Gerhards and Dieter Rucht

## I. Conceptual Framework and Research Question

Various, and sometimes contradictory, theories and concepts are offered to explain successful mobilization for collective protest. Recent work in this field involves some progress insofar as it attempts to integrate several theoretical concepts into a common framework (Klandermans/Tarrow 1988; McAdam/McCarthy/Zald 1988). For example, Bert Klandermans and Dirk Oegema (1987) distinguish between different steps of mobilization and relate specific explanatory variables to each of these steps. The starting point for a successful mobilization is the existence of a mobilization potential which, in turn, depends on macrostructural factors - e.g., demographic and ideological variables. These factors generate a predisposition toward positive attitudes of individuals and social groups regarding the means and goals of mobilization. In order to transform these objectively given dispositions into subjectively perceived definitions of problems, there must be collective actors with their own resources and access to networks to reach the "available" mobilization potential and to offer meaningful inter-pretations of the issues at stake as a precondition for consensus formation with regard to a specific campaign (Klandermans 1988; Snow et al. 1986).

The existence of a mobilization potential, however, is only a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for actual protest. The potential has to be activated. Again, this activation requires that collective actors who have resources and access to networks gain access to the mobilization potential, convince people to participate in collective protest and thus achieve action mobilization (Klandermans 1988)[2].

---

1 A first version of this paper was presented at the XII World Congress of Sociology, Madrid, 9-13 July, 1990. We are grateful to Andreas Braun and Bernd Maywald for collecting data on both campaigns, Doug McAdam and the colleagues of our research unit at the Berlin Science Center for critical comments on earlier versions of this paper, and Jeffrey Butler for copy-editing the manuscript and translating the leaflets documented in the appendix.

2 The steps needed for successful mobilization for protest participation could be marked as follows: macrosociological conditions ---> mediating structures and frames ---> mobilization potential ---> mediating structures and frames ---> protest activities.

In recent years, various authors have emphasized the relevance of mediating structures for consensus formation and action mobilization. Doug McAdam et al. (1988) have proposed the concept of micromobilization context, defined as any small group setting which intermediates between the individual and the broad macro context. Micromobilization contexts (i.e. contexts for mobilization on the microlevel) are said to encourage individuals to participate in protest activities in different ways (McAdam 1988: 135 f; McAdam et al. 1988: 713ff). First, they provide the context for framing issues, causes and solutions (Snow et al. 1986; Snow/Benford 1988)[3]. Second, they offer interpersonal rewards and solidarity incentives, which solve the free-rider problem and help motivate members to participate in collective action. Third, they serve as the "organizational staging ground for the movement" (McAdam et al. 1988: 715) insofar as they provide members, leaders and communication networks.

Besides the involvement of individuals into mobilization processes through micromobilization contexts there is also a need for linking and integrating the micromobilization contexts themselves. We assume that mobilization will be only successful in quantitative terms if micromobilization contexts can be linked with each other and thus allow for a kind of "bloc recruitment" (Oberschall 1973: 117; Jenkins 1983: 62). We suggest using the term mesomobilization contexts[4] to denote those groups and organizations which coordinate and integrate micromobilization contexts[5]. Mesomobilization contexts play a similar role as micromobilization contexts; in contrast to the latter, however, they do not mobilize individuals but groups. In fulfulling this task, they have a twofold function. First, they provide a structural integration by organizationally connecting groups with each other, collecting resources, preparing protest activities and doing public relations. Second, they aim at an ideological integration of the various groups and networks in developing a common frame of

---

3 "The term 'frame' (and framework) is borrowed from Goffman to denote 'schemata of interpretations' that enable individuals 'to locate, perceive, identify, and label' occurrences within their life space and the world at large. By rendering events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective." (Snow et al. 1986: 464)

4 We think that this term, and its corresponding level, more adequately grasp what Mc Adam et al. have in mind when they refer to micromobilization contexts: "...we come away convinced that the real action in social movements takes place at some level intermediate between the macro and micro. It is there in the existing associational groups or networks of the aggrieved community that the first groping steps toward collective action are taken. It is there that the decision to embed the movement in more formal movement organizations is reached. And it is there, within the SMOs themselves, that the strategic decisions are made that shape the trajectory of the movement over time. Most of our research has missed that level of analysis." (1988: 729)

5 Neidhardt (1985: 197) has even suggested considering social movements as "mobilized networks of networks". Similarly, Gerlach and Hine (1970) have emphasized more the horizontal than the vertical linkage of social movement groups. The authors saw "segmented, polycephalous, integrated networks" - SPIN-organizations - as an ideal type of social movement organization.

meaning. This serves to interpret the issue at stake and to link the specific concerns to this issue.

Hence, intermediary contexts of mobilization have a dual structure, consisting of both mesomobilization and micromobilization contexts. The former link and integrate various micromobilization contexts; the latter motivate and mobilize individuals within and outside of the existing groups.

While the relevance of micromobilization context, especially of framing processes, has been stressed in recent literature, and respective conceptual work is underway, the aspect of "networking", that is the coordination and integration of various groups for the purpose of initiating a protest campaign, has been largely neglected[6]. This is our starting point. We intend to demonstrate the usefulness of the concept of mesomobilization contexts by investigating two prominent cases of mass mobilization in the recent history of the Federal Republic of Germany: the protest campaign against the visit of Ronald Reagan in 1987 and the campaign against the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) Congress in 1988. Both events took place in Berlin. From the perspective of the mobilizing groups, these campaigns were successful in the sense that a large number of groups and individuals were mobilized, and that the activities were widely debated in mass publics[7].

In this paper, we will primarily provide an analysis of the structure and frames of the mesomobilization contexts in the two campaigns. We are incapable of assessing the relative weight of mesomobilization contexts compared to other variables refered in the literature, e.g., the political opportunity structure, the frequency and intensity of similar protest activities in the past, etc. On a descriptive level, however, we can demonstrate that, first, mobilization was not a result of an aggregation process of individual discontent, but occurred rather through the activation and coordination of already existing protest groups. Second, we will show that these groups succeeded in combining their own primary concern with the new issue by relating two different ideological frames. A master frame designed for the issue at stake was connected to the group-specific frames and thus allowed for the alliance of very heterogeneous groups in the same mobilization campaign.

---

6 For empirical analyses of the networks underlying a social movement see, for example, Rucht and Kretschmer (1987) and Klandermans (1990).
7 In the case of protest against the IMF-conference, we counted 688 articles and short news reports in Berlin-based newspapers.

## II. A Descriptive Account of Two Cases

In the following, we will briefly summarize the course of the events in both cases and emphasize their similarities.

### 1. The anti-Reagan campaign

A short visit by US president Ronald Reagan in Berlin was planned for July 12, 1987 . Once this plan became known to the public, protest groups began - as on various other occasions, including a visit of Reagan in Berlin five years earlier - to mobilize for a protest campaign[8]. This campaign aimed at demonstrating that Reagan and the political course he represented were not acceptable to the groups protesting and that he was therefore not welcome. The leaflet calling for the central mass demonstration said that Reagan "represents interests in the USA which will stop at nothing in their efforts to make the USA the undisputed world and military power" (see Appendix A).

The first considerations and initiatives for organizing a protest demonstration had already begun in December 1986. More concrete preparations started in February 1987 and increased in intensity in the weeks before Reagan's visit. Various events in these weeks - among other things clashes with police, arrests, seizures, house search, the suicide of a political figure being held for questioning - had already provided for an explosive political situation in advance of the visit. Large police contingents - among these West German police forces - as well as the media-hype in regard to a "battle" on the occasion of the Reagan visit heightened the atmosphere further.

The day before the visit, around 50,000 people demonstrated with the motto "We are saying no to Reagan's policy". Some 3,000 demonstrators were part of the so-called "autonomous block", the most militant wing of the protest groups. A wide spectrum of 140 political groups joined the call for the demonstration. Among these were the youth organizations of some parties and unions, left-extremist, humanistic, religious, feminist, peace movement and ethnic groups.

While Reagan gave his speech to around 20,000 residents of Berlin under heavy police protection, so as to quickly leave the city again relatively unscathed, there were several

---

8 Aside from this specific event, the political climate among the protest groups in this period was already heated. This was not only due to various policies of the conservative administration as it used a strategy of the carrot and the stick toward the protest groups. More specifically, tensions existed due to the national census carried out at that time and the costly and resplendent ceremonies and festivals to celebrate the 750th anniversary of the city of Berlin. This anniversary, by the way, was the immediate reason for inviting Reagan to visit Berlin.

clashes in the city between demonstrators and the police. The Kreuzberg district, the stronghold of the militant political scene, was cut off from the outside world. Public transportation to and from Kreuzberg was shut down. Several hundred persons were surrounded by police and detained for several hours. In the nights that followed, further clashes occurred with the use of riot batons and tear gas, chases and arrests in Kreuzberg. Innocent bystanders and journalists were injured.

Only a few days after these occurrences, the "Alternative Liste"[9], with the support of the SPD, made a motion to unseat the Senator for Inner Affairs who was responsible for the police action. This was defeated by the governing majority of the CDU and FDP.

## 2. The anti-IMF campaign

In 1988, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank held their yearly congress in Berlin from the 21st through the 27th of September. All established parties in Berlin greeted the two bodies as welcome guests of the city of Berlin. Two years before the start of the congress, protest groups began the preparations for and the organization of a mobilization against this congress. The planned protests were designed to emphasize that the IMF and World Bank, as representatives of a world economic order which actively pushes ahead the exploitation of the Third World countries by the Western industrialized countries, were not welcome in Berlin. With the public mobilization, the protesters wanted to induce the two institutions to cancel the debts of the Third World countries, as they were an expression of an unjust world order.

Although the preparations and the first public events for the mobilization already began two years before the congress, they increased in intensity in June, July and August 1988 and reached their climax during the congress itself. The opposition manifested itself in a variety of different events and actions. We counted a total of 475 different public actions which were made up of informational meetings, stage productions, sketches, memorial services, religious services, smaller demonstrations and two large events - a counter-congress with experts speaking against the policies of the World Bank and the IMF, and a large demonstration.

As in the case of the mass demonstration against the Reagan visit, 133 groups called for the demonstration against the IMF and World Bank congress, and some 80,000 people responded to the call and took part in the demonstration.

---

9 The "Alternative Liste" was then an autonomous party on the state level, ideologically close to the national green party. Later the "AL" became a part of the national organization.

The preparations of the security agencies went on parallel to the preparations and activities of the protest groups. Police from West Germany were again assembled in Berlin in large numbers - the spokesman for the Senator for Internal Affairs said that this was the largest deployment in Berlin since the war. The media again hyped up a great battle between opponents of the congress and the security forces, and, again, violent clashes between demonstrators and the police occurred. The encirclement of several journalists by the police set off a widespread - also international - public indignation. The resulting vote of no confidence against the Senator for Internal Affairs responsible for the action was defeated in Parliament, though.

\* \* \*

The campaign against the Reagan visit and that waged against the IMF-congress show some fundamental similarities[10]. The direct triggering occurrence was a non-obtrusive event in both cases: a state visit and a congress are actually "harmless" events. They became conflictual political issues only because they were symbolically loaded and consequently seen as problematic by certain groups. In addition, the processes of mobilization also share some common characteristics. The first significant activities for protest mobilization were carried out by a few groups months before the events. Finally, more than 130 different groups supported each campaign and organized a mass demonstration which attracted tens of thousands of people.

We can conclude from the large number of support groups that the integration of preexisting groups into the process of mobilization was successfully achieved. Moreover, this seems to have had a positive effect on the mobilization of such a huge

---

10 Although many similarities in the two campaigns can be stressed, some differences have to be mentioned as well. The cause for protest showed two differences which also led to differences in the mobilization:

a. Reagan only spent a few hours in Berlin. The anti-Reagan campaign, apart from some/minor protest activities, focused accordingly on organizing one particular protest activity, namely a mass demonstration one day before Reagan's visit to Berlin. The IMF and the World Bank in Berlin met for more than a week; thus the anti-IMF campaign did not focus on just one major protest event but on many single events during the whole week of the official congress. Consequently, much more energy had to be invested to prepare and carry out all these activities in the latter case. At a closer look at the preparatory work that preceded the major protest events (Gerhards 1991) we registered 475 meetings and actions in the case of the anti-IMF campaign, whereas "only" 81 could be found in the case of the anti-Reagan campaign.

b. The need for a critical framing of the IMF-congress was also greater compared to that of Reagan's visit. There had already been mobilizations against visits of Ronald Reagan in Berlin in 1982 and in Bonn in 1985; a "package" (Gamson 1988) of interpretations had already been developed. The IMF and the World Bank, on the other hand, were fairly new issues for which patterns of interpretation first had to be developed. The framing required was more elaborate. Given the fact the initial situation for mobilization was more difficult in the case of the IMF-campaign, but the number of mobilized groups was about the same in both campaigns, we conclude that, in relative terms, mobilization was more successful in the anti IMF-campaign compared to the anti-Reagan-campaign.

number of participants in the mass demonstrations. In the following, we want to analyze in greater detail how mesomobilization contexts succeded in integrating micromobilization contexts. First, we will analyze the structure of these integration processes, second the ways in which the issues were framed.

## III. The Structure of Mesomobilization Contexts

As already mentioned in our descriptive accounts, both cases had a mass demonstration as a highly visible core event. It is not our intention to analyze the demonstrations themselves and the conflicts related to them, but to take a closer look at the structure and process of mobilization. Here we will focus on the groups/movements which supported the calls for the mass demonstrations. First, we will analyze the range and general characteristics of the groups which have supported the mass demonstrations.

### 1. The composition of the support groups

a. Our starting point is a two-page leaflet which was published several days before the mass demonstration in each case (see Appendix A and B). These leaflets give us condensed information about the organizational result on the mesolevel and the content of the mobilization process. The design and layout of the leaflets are similar. The front page includes the slogans and arguments in support of the demonstration, and the call for action. (We will refer to these aspects in Chapter IV.) The back page comprises - in alphabetic order - a list of all groups and organizations which explicitly supported the call for the mass demonstration[11]. It has to be stressed that a group's support for the call for action is usually based on a collective decision by several key members or all members of the group.

The list entails 140 supporting groups for the anti-Reagan campaign and 133 groups for the anti-IMF campaign. When looking at the concerns and ideologies of the groups in each case, their great heterogeneity becomes apparent. They include a wide range of organizational forms - such as subdivisions of established parties, environmental

---

11 Focusing on these two lists does not mean that they provide a complete listing of all supporting and/or participating groups. First, from media reports immediately following the events we know that, in the end, the number of "official" supporting groups was somewhat higher than the number given in the list. Second, there were also more or less organized groups participating in the preparatory work and/or in the protest event itself without, however, being included in the list. This is particularly true for most of the militant groups called "Autonome". One reason for their absence on the list as individual groups is their semi-underground status. The groups are simply not interested in being publicly identified. Moreover, because of their highly radical stance, some of these groups would not agree with the claims and slogans of the leaflet and therefore would not explicitly support this specific call for action, although they took part in the demonstration and/or related activities.

associations, loose circles of politically engaged artists, sections of trade unions, neighborhood initiatives, international friendship committees, religious groups, co-operatives, student representative bodies, etc. In social terms, they range from Turkish women to "US-Americans for Peace", from "Revolutionary Workers from Iran" to lesbian groups, from "artists for peace" to self-help groups of unemployed. In ideological terms, they include orthodox Marxists, Greens, Christians, atheists, anarchists, liberals etc. In both campaigns the integration of a multitude of heterogeneous groups, of micromobilization contexts was successfully achieved.

In order to get a more systematic view of the composition of the groups/organizations, we aggregated all the groups with the same goal into one category and classified them according to two analytic criteria in each case[12]. First, there are groups/organizations which are oriented toward a more general goal, or which could be seen as multi-issue groups. Parts of these groups make up the overall infrastructure of the predominantly leftist milieu. Second, there are groups/organizations which have a specific concern or distinct recruitment base (defined, for example, by ascriptive characteristics). In this category we also include groups which were especially created to prepare the protest event (anti-IMF groups and anti-Reagan groups). Table 1 (p. 10) gives an overview of the distribution of various kinds of groups supporting the two protest events.

b. Analogous to our distinction between two level of intermediate structures, we also differentiate two mobilization potentials: Whereas the potential focussed on by micromobilization contexts consists of individuals, the potential addressed by mesomobilization contexts is composed of groups and organizations. Focusing on the latter aspect, in a second step of our analysis we intend to determine the extent to which the overall mobilization potential of mesomobilization contexts - measured as the total number of existing groups in various segments of the leftist alternative milieu in Berlin - was activated. Although we cannot rely on a satisfactory data base, we have at least enough information to give some tentative answers[13]. Drawing on the 1984 and 1989 issues of the "Stattbuch Berlin" (a collection of self-portrayals of groups and organizations in the alternative milieu in West Berlin), we have rough indicators of the

---

12 Of course, attributing some groups to these main categories is arbitrary. For instance, a group called "Women for Peace" could be classified either among women's groups or peace groups. In this particular case, however, knowing that women in this group mostly were and still are engaged in other women's issues, we classified the group under women's groups. Our general rule was to categorize a group according to its dominant, or more stable, collective identity.

13 Again, our analysis remains incomplete. Unfortunately we do not have data on all the types of groups listed in Table 1. Morever, we do not have data on the completeness and representativeness of the listed groups included in the "Stattbuch". Only after having completed an ongoing reserch project to analyze the size and changes in the "alternative" movement sector in Berlin, drawing on the four editions of the "Stattbuch" and additional sources, we will be able to present adequate answers.

absolute size of various alternative segments at different points of time. We have obtained figures from these sources about the size of some of the segments listed in Table 1. In Table 2 (p. 11), these numbers are compared with those of the Berlin-based support groups in the two protest events.

Because both official events - the visit of a US president representing the world's most powerful nation on the one hand, and a major international congress representing the "world capitalist interests" on the other - are highly significant in political terms, we expected that the groups with general political aims could be relatively easily mobilized, and therefore should be overrepresented. As the data indicate, however, groups and organizations with general political aims were only mobilized to a low degree in both campaigns. We have no explanation for that, and we have no comparative data so as to know whether or not this low share of activation is unusual for these kinds of protest events.

A second assumption was that the groups attributed to the second category - i.e. single-issue groups - will be recruited to very different degrees, depending on how "close" or "distant" their concerns are to the topics associated with the events which set off the protest campaigns. We hypothesize that groups engaged in issues which are not or only indirectly related to the events, be it that their spatial horizon is very limited (e.g., neighborhood groups), be it that their issues do not seem to be connected to foreign policy and international economy, will be hardly mobilized. Completely in line with this expectation are the findings concerning the peace groups and the Third World groups. The anti-Reagan demonstration was supported by most existing peace groups in the city. Given the fact that US president Reagan was perceived as an exponent of military bloc confrontation and a risk for peace (see Chapter IV), it is no wonder that his visit could mobilize so many peace groups in Berlin. Similarly, the IMF and World Bank Congress in 1988 mobilized a high share of the Third-World groups in Berlin.

c. Since the official events inciting the protest activities were rather similar, both events occurred in the same city and the time span between the events was only 15 months, we expected a considerable degree of overlap between the supporting groups in the two cases. In fact, however, only 47 groups/organizations, i.e. roughly one third of all groups in each case, signed the call for action for both the anti-Reagan and the anti-IMF demonstration. This means that about two thirds of the groups were recruited either for one or the other campaign. Among these two thirds, 22 groups from the anti-IMF campaign were not from Berlin (including 3 based in foreign countries), whereas all the groups in the anti-Reagan campaign were based in Berlin.

**Table 1: Support for the anti-Reagan and anti-IMF demonstrations**

| Kind of Groups | Absolute Number | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | anti-Reagan | anti-IMF | |
| | | total | Berlin-based |
| **1. Groups with non-specific aims** | | | |
| Groups of general infrastructure | 2 | 4 | 3 |
| Party organizations | 16 | 11 | 5 |
| General political groups | 6 | 5 | 4 |
| Christian groups | 11 | 8 | 8 |
| **2. Issue-groups** | | | |
| Event-specific groups | 0 | 2 | 1 |
| Peace groups | 33 | 18 | 17 |
| Third world groups/ international cooperation | 12 | 29 | 21 |
| Human rights/citizenship | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| Women's groups | 13 | 22 | 22 |
| Ecological/antinuclear groups | 6 | 6 | 5 |
| Cultural groups | 11 | 3 | 3 |
| Student and youth groups | 10 | 6 | 3 |
| Ethnic groups | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| Trade Unions | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Neighborhood groups/ urban problems | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| **3. Non classified groups** | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| Total | 140 | 133 | 111 |

**Table 2: Activation of Selected Segments of the Alternative Movement Sector in West Berlin**

| Kind of Groups | Total of Groups in Berlin | | Berlin-based Support Groups | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | | anti-Reagan | | anti-IMF | |
| | 1987 [1] | 1989 [2] | abs. | % [3] | abs. | % [4] |
| General political groups | 41 | 50 | 6 | 14.6 | 4 | 8 |
| Peace groups | 42 | 27 | 33 | 78.6 | 17 | 63 |
| Third world/ international cooperation | 41 | 37 | 12 | 29.3 | 21 | 56.8 |
| Women's groups | 125 | 129 | 13 | 10.4 | 22 | 17.1 |
| Ecological/antinuclear groups | 73 | 75 | 6 | 8.2 | 5 | 6.7 |
| Cultural groups | 328 | 324 | 11 | 3.4 | 3 | 0.9 |
| Ethnic groups | 62 | 75 | 3 | 4.8 | 1 | 1.3 |
| Neighborhood groups/ urban problems | 62 | 56 | 4 | 6.5 | 4 | 7.1 |

1    Number of groups based on the mean of the groups registered in the 1984 and 1989 edition of the "Stattbuch Berlin".

2    Number of the groups registered in the 1989 edition of the "Stattbuch Berlin".

3    Percentage of support groups in relation to the total of groups in 1987.

4    Percentage of support groups in relation to the total of groups in 1989.

***

Summarizing the above findings, we can state that both protest campaigns were supported by a large number of heterogeneous political, humanitarian and cultural groups. In the anti-IMF campaign, the Third World groups played a special role; in the anti-Reagan campaign, the peace groups were an important factor. In each case the mobilization potential of groups in these two areas was largely exhausted. This can be interpreted as a success for the organizers.

## 2. The structure and process of mobilization

a. How were the support groups linked to each other? Based on several interviews with important organizers of both campaigns and some written material, we want to shed some light on the underlying structure and the process that enabled the block recruitment of groups and organizations.

In the anti-Reagan campaign, COORD-A[14], a relatively large and stable network of local groups, played a key role. COORD-A not only gave the initial impulse for the campaign but also remained its control center during all of its phases. COORD-A was already established with the rise of the new peace movement in the early 1980s. It comprises a broad range of groups which go far beyond the issue of peace, including religious, humanistic and political groups with rather different ideological backgrounds, specific aims and tactical preferences. One or more representatives of these groups usually meet once a month to exchange information and discuss common concerns.

When members of this network became aware that president Reagan was to visit Berlin, they decided to launch a protest campaign. As in joint protest activities that had been organized in the past, they created a special task force ("Arbeitsgruppe") to prepare and coordinate the anti-Reagan campaign. This group involved experienced delegates from the core organizations of the network. Apart from organizational and technical matters, the task force also formulated a first draft of the leaflet calling for common action. This first version was produced three months before the protest event. Then the draft version was sent to the networks's core groups to get their reactions. Some minor revisions were made based on this feedback. Together with a letter asking for official support, the final version of the leaflet was sent to the outer circle of groups belonging to COORD-A as well as to other groups who had agreed to support the call for action. Parallel to this, the core organizers directly contacted members of other groups with whom they had

---

14 We used a code for this network in order to guarantee its anonymity.

personal ties. Through this process of direct and indirect activation the number of support groups grew from 38 initial endorsements in April 1987 to the 140 groups that eventually signed the call for action, and were thus represented in the official list of support groups.

For the IMF-campaign, the pattern of mobilization deviated to some extent from that of the anti-Reagan campaign. From the very beginning, the IMF-campaign was conceptualized as both a Berlin campaign and a nation-wide campaign. It therefore had a twofold structure. For the purpose of the national campaign, it was primarily COORD-B[15] together with a special sub-committee which served as the basic coordinating group. COORD-B is a nation-wide network of highly politicized leftist third world groups. At the core of COORD-B, three full-time organizers were employed to coordinate the various groups and to organize the campaign. Two additional organizers were employed by COORD-B in Berlin in the last three months before the IMF conference. The national green party provided a good deal of the financial resources necessary to fulfill these tasks. In Berlin, the various activities were coordinated by a separately created committee, COORD-C, which comprised several of the groups listed in Table 1[16]. At a later stage of the preparatory work, COORD-A, after having formed its own working group for the anti-IMF campaign, joint COORD-C. The first draft of the central leaflet was written by four people from COORD-C who were selected to represent by and large the political spectrum of the mobilizing groups. Then the leaflet was sent to the groups belonging to COORD-C and to other groups who were supposed to support the call for action.

As a broad range of protest activities beyond the central mass demonstration had been planned, COORD-C formed a subgroup for each of the specific tasks: a group to prepare (a) a "counter-congress", (b) the mass demonstration, (c) the week of daily protest activities, (d) the measures to influence the mass media, (e) the publication of an anti-IMF journal, and (f) the coordination with non-Berlin based protest groups. The Alternative Liste was a key factor in COORD-C. Given the resources of a party in the state parliament - money, staff, infrastructure - the Alternative Liste played a crucial role for the Berlin-based organization in the campaign. For instance: the Alternative Liste employed three people for nine months to prepare the campaign. In general, the organization and coordination of the anti-IMF campaign was based on a much more

---

15 We again used a fictituos name to guarantee the group's anonymity.
16 In addition, the so-called "Autonome", the most radical wing of militant activists, had established a coordinating group which, however, could only represent this political spectrum. Because these coordinating groups were largely independent from each other and had different opinions about tactical questions, their relationship was marked by some tensions and rivalry. Only in the last few weeks before the protest event could these dividing lines be overcome and common activities became less problematic.

14

professional structure than the anti-Reagan campaign. COORD-C had a similar function as CORD-A for the anti-Reagan campaign in coordinating the various groups and organizing the mass demonstration.

b. Moving beyond the immediate mobilization process, it is interesting to shed some light on the historical background of the micro- and mesomobilization contexts. The basic structure of the context fueling the two campaigns in the second half of the 1980s had already been formed in the first years of the decade. In particular, the COORD-A network emerged with the rise of the new peace movement in that period, although it included many protest groups which had been formed previously. Activities similar to those of the anti-Reagan and anti-IMF-campaigns had already been carried out several times by this network, including a large anti-Reagan demonstration in June 1982[17]. In comparing the 175 support groups from this demonstration to the 140 support groups in 1987, we found that 50 groups were identical. Given the fact that a certain share of the 1982 support groups no longer existed in 1987 and that some of the 1987 support groups did not yet exist in 1982, this shows the structural continuity of the micro- and mesomobilization contexts. The mobilization for the two campaigns we focus on was based on a preexisting network of experienced groups. Beyond the continuity of the Berlin protest sector over time, it is important to stress its extraordinary size. An alternative protest sector is especially well developed in Berlin (Claesens/de Ahna 1982). West Berlin is, so to speak, "the capital" of the leftist and alternative movements in West Germany (Roth 1989). In comparison to other cities in the Federal Republic of Germany, not to speak of other countries[18], protest conditions are especially favorable in Berlin.

* * *

In summarizing our findings on the process of mesomobilization for both campaigns, the following points could be made:

---

17 This demonstration was even larger than that in 1987. According to the organizers, about 100,000 people participated in that event.

18 We have to keep in mind the fact that West Germany as whole is probably also exceptional in regard to these kind of activities. Looking at the next IMF and World Bank conference after Berlin, it becomes obvious that both the size of the mass demonstrations and the violent activities accompanying the event in Berlin were far from being "normal". The congress held in September 1989 in Washington provoked little protest. There were only few oppositional groups in this case. Some fifty people joined for a parallel meeting in a Presbyterian church. In addition, some members of more militant US groups such as Earth First and Rain Forest Action Network organized a small blockade which, in accord with an agreement with the police, did not last longer than 4 minutes. In addition, some 60 non-governmental organizations held a congress which, however, was hardly noticed by the international press. With this level and type of mobilization in mind, it becomes obvious how successful the Berlin groups were in terms of mass mobilization.

a. Both campaigns were backed by an impressive number of preexisting groups and organizations out of a broad ideological spectrum which included political, humanitarian, Christian and cultural groups.

b. The core groups of the overall network set up special preparatory committees, mesomobilization contexts, designed exclusively to coordinate the groups and the protest activities, i.e., to formulate a platform for joint action, to mobilize the outer circle of the network, to collect resources such as money and technical equipment, and even to negotiate with the police on the eve of the protest events. These preparatory teams served as professional and semi-professional planners and organizers on the meso-level, whereas the numerous activities designed to inform and mobilize sympathizers and public bystanders were carried out by the micromobilization groups of the inner and outer circle of the overall network. Activated members of these groups mobilized their own constituency and probably also friends and aquaintances.

c. In contrast to the anti-Reagan campaign in which the preparatory work was done quasi-routinely by a working group from the existing COORD-A network, the anti-IMF-campaign was coordinated by a committee specially formed for this purpose. Supported by a nationwide mobilization network and the local and federal green party, the organization of the anti-IMF campaign became a higly professionalized enterprise.

Although we know from the sheer number of the support groups that the mobilization and integration process was successful, we have only scant knowledge about the reasons why these groups were successfully linked and mobilized for the specific campaigns under investigation. One crucial factor is certainly the fact that delegates from some forty of the existing groups had met regularly over several years, thus creating close interpersonal ties and overlapping memberships. This network allows for backing a specific campaign without exerting any pressure in ideological or organizational terms. The coordination process is very flexible. Each group decides autonomously whether, and under what conditions, it would participate. Moreover, each interested group has a chance to influence the planned activities at an early stage of planning. Given the fact that relatively large common protest campaigns have been already organized in the past, there was a certain probability that many groups belonging to the local network might also join in the next campain. What McAdam has found in a different context could be demonstrated in our cases as well: The left community is held together by a dense network of overlapping "bridging" ties that link the various groups together. Up to now, we have identified these brigding ties both on the level of an underlying, more or less permanent infrastructure and of a specific structure which was exclusively designed for the concrete campaign.

No matter how solid and interlinked such an organizational structure becomes, it provides only the structural basis for a mobilization process. The issue at stake has to be perceived as important and provoking, the forms of the proposed action must be acceptable, and the organizers and allies must seem to be reliable. In order to activate the existing structure for concrete support and to attract many people from the wider mobilization potential, this structure has to create and apply a kind of "software". Beyond its more general ideological pattern familar to the leftist network, such a software must be designed for the specific campaign. Therefore, a second crucial task for a successful mobilization is an adequate framing of the issue.

## IV. The Framing of the Issues

Framing processes play a decisive, though seldom empirically analyzed, role in mobilization campaigns. The chance for protesters to exert influence on the society consists of their capacity to make their definition into a public definition of the problem, to convince as many groups and people as possible with their framing of the situation, to bring about support for their cause, and to motivate participation in the protest (Klandermans 1988). Pushing through public definitions of problems and their solutions is not just one of many components of protest campaigns and social movements which have to be considered in an analysis. It is rather a key factor to the extent that mobilizing the public is the path open to movements for exerting influence on the society. Usually protest movements do not have other resources (money, power, connections) at their disposal, or these only in small amounts. In this respect, mobilization communication attains a meaningful role.

Before we begin with the analysis of our empirical material, there is a need for terminological clarification. The framing concept, as it has been introduced into the study of social movements by Snow et al. (1986), has been developed mainly on the basis of symbolic interactionism. The concept, however, hardly has a theoretical tradition in the political sociology[19] which deals with phenomena termed as "belief systems", "ideology", "cognitive schemes", etc. As the literature in this field is not overly clear and precise, we would like to introduce some definitions. For our encompassing category we refer to belief systems as suggested by Philip E. Converse (1964: 297): "We define a belief system as a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional

---

19 An indicator for the neglection of belief systems research is the fact that the influential and often cited article from Philip E. Converse (1964) is not mentioned in the work of David A. Snow et al. (1986). Snow and Benford (1988) only refer to the work of Converse in a later article.

interdependence." In a second step, depending on whether belief systems refer to individuals or collectivities, we can distinguish between individual belief systems or mass belief systems. In the former case the concept refers to individual configurations of interrelated ideas and attitudes situated in the minds of individuals. These ideas serve to interpret the world. The category of individual belief systems is meant to be synonymous to that of cognitive schemes (for an overview, see Schissler/Tuschhoff 1988). In the second case, it refers to the interpretive patterns of collective actors as they are presented, for example, in programs, resolutions and leaflets. We suggest calling the belief systems of collective actors frames[20]. Both cognitive schemes (indivual belief systems) and frames (collective belief systems) may involve different degrees of conceptualization (Converse 1964). If cognitive schemes are conceptually elaborated, we refer to these as ideological schemes; if frames are conceptually elaborated, we call these ideologies.

Our analysis is focused on the frames of the mobilizing actors; the frames of other actors (media, state) and the case of competing frames are excluded from the analysis. The reconstruction of the frames of the mobilizing actors is based on an analysis of the two central leaflets, signed by all the groups and on an analysis of some of the leaflets written by the different groups themselves. We will be concentrating on three questions. 1. What is the central interpretive frame, the master frame (Snow et al. 1988: 475), which integrated and motivated the different groups to participate in the protest campaigns. 2. What are the mobilization capacities of the two master frames? 3. To what extent can the different groups which supported the mobilization, but primarily pursued other objectives, combine their own group-specific frame with the IMF-issue or with the Reagan visit, i.e. how successful are they in frame-bridging? (Snow et al. 1986)

## 1. Master frames

To be successful, mesomobilization contexts must not only organizationally link and coordinate heterogeneous groups, but also integrate these groups ideologically. How can this ideogical integration be demonstrated empirically? We believe that the two leaflets represent a commonly shared interpretation of Reagan's visit and the IMF-conference respectively. This is an interpreation which marks both an internal

---

20 The definition becomes still more complicated if questions of operationalization are included. In part, belief systems of collective actors can only be reconstructed by referring to individual belief systems, e.g., by interviewing members of elites representing collective actors. Another possibility for operationalization is to analyze public statements of collective actors. By contrast, the reconstruction of mass belief systems by aggregating individual interpretations, as was done by Converse (1964), seems less convincing.

18

consensus but which is also meant as a position to be demonstrated to the external world. We consider the two leaflets signed by all supporting groups as valid indicators for the groups' common frames. To analyze the leaflets, we draw on a method for analyzing decision-making processes developed by Robert Axelrod (1976). The internal structure of frames can be investigated with the help of this method. We can reconstruct a relatively closed and highly conceptualized interpretative frame, both from the leaflet written by the mobilizing actors for the demonstration against the Reagan visit as well as from the leaflet for the demonstration against the IMF congress. The frame in each case consists of a framework of arguments referring reciprocally to each other. The interpretive frame for the IMF congress will be termed as an "ideology of imperialism", the frame for the Reagan visit as a "hegemonic power ideology"[21]. Because both frames are highly conceptionalized we use the term ideology[22]. We will first describe the structure of the argumentation of both frames in the following sections and then compare them in regard to their functions.

## 1.1 The ideology of imperialism as a master-frame

a. The IMF and the World Bank are interpreted as central institutions and supports of a world economic order.

b. The world economic order is, in its basic structure, an order designed for the exploitation of the Southern countries by the countries in the Northern hemisphere.

c. The causes for the exploitation are to be found in the capitalist character of this order, as imperialism in the relationship between North and South and as capitalism within the individual countries.

d. The IMF and the World Bank - with a majority of their members from the Northern countries - support this system because they take part in the exploitation, on the one hand through their own project financing and as their awarding of loans and determining the conditions of repayment. On the other hand, these institutions serve as a guide for the policies of the banks and corporations. After the World Bank and the IMF force the countries to pursue a capitalist course, then the banks and corporations of the industrialized countries follow in carrying out their policy of exploitation. Together, the arguments a - d form the "theory of the world economy".

---

21 Both the term imperialism and of hegemonic power cannot be found in the leaflets themselves.
22 Resuming the respective literature, Hans-Dieter Klingemann (1983: 327) defines ideology "as a far-reaching system of attitudes whose dominant values and principles involve a high degree of commitment and which are stable over time. Typically, ideology is represented by groups whose interests shape the degree of reality present in the content of their statements."

e. The consequences and problems ensuing from the system of world economy are numerous. They are the direct cause for protest activities. The most important consequence is the high indebtedness of Third World countries and the misery and death among the people living there, the destruction of the ecological requirements for life, the particular burdens on women, the weapon exports to the Third World as a special form of exploitation, the exodus of impoverished people who then seek asylum in the First World, the destruction of cultural identities and, finally, unemployment and reductions in the social welfare system in the First World as consequences of the same capitalist system.

f. The demands of the protesters follow from points a through e: the problems formulated can only be solved if the world economic order were to be reformed, and they call for this. They do not want Berlin to play host to IMF and the World Bank as representatives of a problem-producing world economic order.

Similar to the way in which Robert Axelrod (1976) has attempted to reconstruct the structure of decision-making processes of elites through graphically presentating cognitive maps, the structure of the arguments encompassed by the ideology of imperialism[23] could be reconstructed and demonstrated schematically (see Figure 1, p. 21).

1.2 The hegemonic power ideology as a master-frame

The anti-Reagan campaign had a similar, although not as elaborately developed frame.

a. Ronald Reagan is interpreted as a representative of certain circles in the USA who are striving for their nation's unrestricted economic and military dominance in the world.

b. This striving for hegemony finds its empirical expression in four different places:

- The USA is carrying out a unilateral armament against the Soviet Union ("crusade against the east"), the SDI-program and the stationing of medium range missiles in Europe are examples for this.

- The USA is carrying out a policy of military intervention. The bombing of Libya, the invasion of Grenada and the mining of Nicaragua's harbors have shown this.

---

23 The term structure of argumentation could be defined in a similar manner as Axelrod has defined cognitive maps:" A cognitive map is a certain way of representing a person's assertion about beliefs with respect to some limited domain, such as a given policy problem. The representation takes the form of a directed graph of points and the narrows between those points." (Axelrod 1976: 72)

- The USA is supporting the apartheid regime in South Africa and the Contras in Nicaragua and is delivering weapons in the war in the Persian Gulf for strategic reasons.

- With the help of the IMF and special military forces the USA is carrying out the economic subjection of the Third World.

c. At the center of the hegemony thesis is the accusation of unilateral armament. Following this line of argumentation, the possible consequences of an armament policy are explained in greater detail. On the one hand, unilateral armament increases the danger of a new world war, on the other hand, armament also has unacceptable consequences in periods of peace ("Arms do not only kill in war"): poverty, mass unemployment, and the reduction of social services are understood as consequences of the armament policy, women are interpreted as a group hit especially hard by these consequences.

d. The demands of the protesters follow as conclusions from the chain of argumentation.

- They reject armament, interventionist policies, support for unjust regimes and the exploitation of other countries.

- They do not want the American president, who has the responsibility for the problems defined, as a guest in Berlin. Berlin ought to be a city of peace and understanding, a city which is open to the victims of war and exploitation[24]. Again, the structure of the argumentation can be presented schematically (see Figure 2, p. 22).

## 2. The mobilizing capacity of the two master frames

Frames developed by mesomobilization contexts aim at convincing as many groups as possible to adopt the interpretations of the world and to motivate as many groups as possible to participate in protest activities. Besides systematically describing the arguments embedded in frames, we can ask which frame is better suited for mobilizing different groups. In the following we will be supplementing the description of the two frames with the consideration of causality and be giving some thought to the question of which variables influence the mobilizing capacity of frames. In this regard, Snow and Benford distinguish among variables which refer to the internal structure of frames and

---

24 A further chain of argumentation begins at this point. The protesters accused the Berlin Senate of wanting to divert attention from Berlin's actual problems (rescinding the rent restraints, the struggle for the 35 hour work week, the discussion of the national census, the reduction of democratic rights) with the invitation to Reagan.

# Figure 1: Master-Frame of the Anti-IMF campaign
## Imperialism ideology

capitalistic thirst for profits ———————— **World economic order as an imperialistic order** ⟵——— exploitation system

**The IMF and the World Bank as** representatives of an imperialistic order
- policy of restrictive conditions
- structural adjustment policy

**Hunger and poverty in the Third World**

**Women** especially affected

**High indebtedness in the Third World**

**Ecological crisis** - rain forest

**Intensification of social problems in the First World** - poverty - unemployment

**Weapons exports**

**Exodus into the First World**

**Loss of cultural identity**

**Social conflicts**

**Wars**

**Dictatorships**

Figure 2: Master-Frame for the Anti-Reagan campaign:
Hegemonic power ideology

Reagan as the representative of
a country striving for unlimited
world and military domination

**Exploitation of
the Third World**
- with the help of the IMF
- through setting up a
  military interventionary
  force

**Support of
unjust regimes**
- South Africa
- Persian Gulf War

**Military
interventions**
- Lybia
- Grenada
- Nicaragua

**Unilateral
Armament**
- SDI
- medium range missiles

**Danger of
a World War**

**Intensification of
social problems**
- poverty
- unemployment

**Women**
especially
affected

variables that allow for linking frames to the dispositions of potential recepients. In describing both sets of variables Snow and Benford (1988: 205ff) introduce the somewhat clumsy categories "infrastructural constraints of belief systems" and "pheno-menological constraints". The latter are subdivided into the dimensions of "empirical credibility", "experiential commensurability" and "narrative fidelity". In the following we will focus only on the internal structure, namely the argumentative logic of frames. Based on a description of both master frames we will look for internal characteristics which could allow for an increasing capacity for convincing groups and people. According to the work of Wilson (1973) and Snow and Benford (1988: 219ff.), successful framing depends on three elements: diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing. In which ways do the above described master frames fulfill the three framing dimensions, and which differences can be found in this respect?

## 2.1 Diagnostic framing

"Diagnostic framing involves identification of a problem and the attribution of blame and causality." (Snow/Benford 1988: 200)

a. Both frames define not just one but a multitude of problems. The fact that we are speaking of problem definitions here does not mean that the problems are invented, that the indebtedness crisis does not exist and that the USA does not pursue an interventionist policy. It is only that these situations have to be labeled as problems in order for them to become problems. A comparison of Figures 1 and 2 shows that the amount of interpretable problems, the range and diversity of the problems defined is greater in the case of the imperialism ideology[25]. Whereas the anti-Reagan campaign primarily addressed problems related to the issue of peace, the topic catalogue of the IMF-campaign ranged from the peace issue to ecological and other questions. The range and multitude of the problems defined by the master frame creates leverage points for a host of political groups focusing on one or several of these particular problems[26]. We will discuss this aspect below.

---

25 Converse (1964: 208) refers to this dimension as the "range of objects that are referents for the ideas and attitudes in the system".

26 The selection of the resultant problems of a world order defined as imperialistic and those of a hegemonic policy of the USA makes cultural resonance likely. By picking ecological problems, the specific discrimination of women and, in the case of the hegemonic power ideology, the complex dealing with weapons and peace as central topics, three semantic contexts were included for which there are social movements in West Germany which had mobilization campaigns in the more recent future and whose concerns find a widespread public support (Pappi 1988: Table 3). Picking unemployment and the reduction of social services as a consequence of the imperialist world order and the enormous expenditures for armaments creates the reference point for the classic conflict line between labor and capital. Both mobilization processes were thus successful in creating a connection between the specific

A high mobilization capacity cannot only be secured through the sheer range and number of problems enumerated. It is important that these problems be connected to each other in a plausible way. Otherwise, a too broad range of problems could lead to an overextension of the frame (Snow/Benford 1988: 207). The different problems defined by the frames of the two campaigns are not unconnected but understood as different consequences of a system context. Both the imperialism and the hegemonic power ideology try to tie disparate problems together into a meaningful context. The degree of interrelatedness (Converse 1964: 256) seems to be high between the defined problems. The heterogeneity of the problems can be interpreted as the different consequences of one and the same pattern. We suggest, that the possibility of tying individual problems into a larger interpretive framework increases the plausibility of the individual problems.

The ideology of imperialism does not only have a broader, interrelated range, its structure is at same time more abstract and more generalized. The better integrated range is a result of the more abstract and generalized structure of the frame. This can be shown by Figures 1 and 2. Whereas the hegemonic power ideology begins directly with the definition of Ronald Reagan as the representative of a hegemonic world power, the imperialism ideology situates the definition of the IMF and the World Bank in a more abstract framework, which itself is then elaborated again.

b. In addition to defining problems, diagnostic framing also includes the definition of causes. Both frames allow for labeling causes and causal agents (Ferree/Miller 1985: 43f.). A congress and the visit of a country's president are "innocent" events in and of themselves, they only become problems if both guests can be labeled as agents causing the problems which had been defined. The causes for the multitude of problems dealt with in the imperialism ideology are located in the system, the world economic order itself. Behind the causes are causal agents in the sense of concrete persons and institutions: the IMF, the World Bank and the large corporations and banks in the First World. The cause of the problems defined in the hegemonic power ideology are the USA's claim for hegemony; the causes are personalized in the person of Ronald Reagan and he becomes the causal agent. If both institutions, the IMF and World Bank, on the one hand, and the president of the USA, on the other, can be successfully labeled as the

---

issue and issues which had already been defined. If a new issue can be connected with a legitimated value complex, then the cultural resonance of the issue and, consequently, the mobilization power of the frame, will increase.

causal agents for the problems which were highlighted, then there are good reasons to protest against the congress or visit[27].

## 2.2 Prognostic framing

Prognostic framing implies "a proposed solution to the diagnosed problem that specifies what needs to be done." (Snow/Benford 1988: 199) The solutions for the problems and the demands are defined in both frames. The solutions are, in principle, the reversal of the defined problems and causes. The wider range and more generalized design of the imperialism ideology made it possible to develop more extensive demands in this case. The argument is that none of the problems can be solved in the long run if the world economic order itself is not changed. The hegemonic power ideology is more specific in that regard. The demands here refer to the three sets of problems which were highlighted: disarmament, stopping the interventionist policies, no support for the apartheid regime. Though both frames offer propositions - rather general and vague propostions, however - to solve the defined problems, they fail to define the means and methods necessary to reach the ends. Assuming that the definition of means to achieve the ends is an important element of successful mobilization (Klandermans/Oegema 1987: 520), then we can observe a particular weakness of both frames in this respect[28]. The frames identify and label problems, causes and causal agents, and potential solutions, but offer little in regard to finding ways to solve the problems. This oberservation is further supported with a look at the third factor of framing processes.

## 2.3 Motivational framing

Motivational framing means "a call to arms for engaging in ameliorative or corrective action" (Snow/Benford 1988: 199). Though consensus on problems, causes and solutions is a precondition for mobilization, it itself does not lead to mobilization. Motives for participation in specific actions must be created (Klandermans 1988). Both frames do not involve an explicit motivational framing. Implicitly, the motivation to

---

27 Along with the causal agents, the protest's addressees and objects of attack (Tarrow 1989: 101-104) are also labeled by the frames to a certain extent. The addressees of the protest were, on the one hand, the two figures labeled as causal agents for the problems defined, Reagan and the IMF and World Bank; on the other hand, however, the Berlin Senate which invited the international personalities to Berlin, also became an addressee for protest.

28 It seems, however, that prognostic framing is by far less important when compared to diagnostic framing dealing with social movements and protest campaigns. In contrast, political parties compete to occupy administrative positions in order to suggest and implement solutions for problems. Therefore, unlike parties, protest groups are hardly expected to offer solutions for the defined problems. Raschke (1985: 386) assumes that social movements have a high capacity for raising problems but a low capacity for problem solving.

participate in the respective demonstration is stimulated by the moralizing manner in which the problems were interpreted. Terms such as exploitation, erosion of social security, unemployment, poverty, destruction, misery and death are morally loaded. They carry in themselves a call to struggle against these evils. A motivational framing specifically designed for the demonstrations cannot be found, however. We can assume that this missing element reduced the mobilization capacity of both frames.

***

Let us make a preliminary summary of our results.

a. Both frames analyzed represent a comprehensive pattern for interpretation: a diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing, and their integration into a broader system of meaning. We assume that the better these three dimensions are integrated, i.e., the higher the degree of <u>interrelatedness</u> of the frames' elements, the higher their mobilization capacity, ceteris paribus.

b. The three dimensions of the frames analyzed are differently accentuated in each ideology. The relative strength of both frames lies in the elaborated diagnostic frame. The definition of several differing problems within one context of meaning together with the identification of causes and concrete causal agents provided a chance to appeal to a number of societal groups which were potentially affected by the respective problems. A weakness of both frames lies in the fact that the means to reach the desired ends, and also the motivations which could transform the perception of problems into protest participation, are only indirectly presented.

c. Despite all of their similarities, differences between the two interpretive frames also appear. The imperialism ideology exhibits a more generalized interpretive framework than the hegemonic power ideology. The former framework proceeds from a theory of the world system and localizes the congress of the IMF and World Bank within this context. At the same time, this theoretical framework's abstractness and theoretical consistency allows a multitude of resultant problems to be brought up and connected with the institutions IMF and World Bank. In comparison, the hegemonic power ideology begins more concretely, the consequences emphasized refer above all to questions of preserving peace. Hence, this ideology will be less able to integrate heterogeneous issues, and thus groups. We assume that the broader the range of a frame is and the more general its foundations, the higher its mobilization capacity will be.

We have focused on analyzing the internal structure of both frames. Their mobilizing capacity, however, depends not only on this internal structure, but also on the leverage

points for the linkage to external recipients. We assume that the described internal structure of both frames was favorable for mobilizing different groups. The mobilization potential to which an appeal could be made was limited, though, due to its leverage points which were restricted to a specific political environment. Both master frames feed on or reproduce classic leftist theories. This is more obvious with the imperialism ideology than with the hegemonic power ideology[29]. Because of the leftist bias of the frames, the mobilization potential of micromobilization contexts was probably limited to the leftist political spectrum. Because of the broad scope of the problems involved in the frames, however, a great share of this spectrum could be activated.

## 3. Frame-bridging: The linking of master frames and group-specific frames

The structural analysis showed that the campaigns against the IMF and World Bank congress and the Reagan visit were successfully arranged by mesomobilization contexts which integrated a multitude of different political groups. The organizational linkage was complemented by ideological integration. The analysis of the master frames has demonstrated that in both cases a host of problems was refered to, thus offering particular leverage points for groups concerned with one of these specific problems. In the following, we want to examine the process in which the groups pick up the master frames' leverage points and link these with their group-specific frames. Chosing this focus of attention, we shift from the analytical level of mesomobilization contexts to that of micromobilization contexts.

Most of the groups normally pursued objectives other than dealing with the problems of the world economy and Ronald Reagan's visit. What reasons did they use to make their participation plausible for themselves and others? In looking at the leaflets of the individual groups from this perspective and comparing them with the central leaflets signed by all of the groups which called  for participation in the large demonstrations, we can detect "bridging phrases" which establish the connection between the imperialism and hegemonic power ideology used by all groups and the group-specific interpretive framework. The data we have only allow us to reconstruct the frame-bridging which took place for the IMF campaign[30]. We will do this using five

---

29 Moreover, the two interpretive frames can be combined with each other. The linkage of the hegemonic power ideology with the imperialism ideology was ideologically prepared, even though it was not carried out.

30 We have too few leaflets for the anti-Reagan campaign. A first reason for this could be that the data are incomplete because of the relatively long period of time between the protest event and the collection of data, so that many leaflets could not even be found any more. The second reason could be that there

examples[31]. The passages we quote will show that frame-bridging is done by the groups themselves and not a construction of the authors of this article.

a. In their leaflet, the <u>peace groups</u> began with the arguments from the imperialism ideology and labeled the world economic order as unjust. The connecting formulation bringing together the ideology of imperialism and the group-specific frame is: "Peace and justice cannot be separated. Therefore, the peace movement has not only a moral obligation for intervention but, according to its own vital interest, must consider Third World problems as its own problems. Injustice leads to a global destabilization which finds its expression in wars." The concept of injustice is the bridge establishing the connection between the peace frame and the imperialism ideology.

b. The <u>ecology groups</u> legitimate their participation in the campaign by focussing their discourse on one consequence of the activities of the IMF and World Bank. The World Bank and IMF finance large projects which lead to a destruction of the tropical rain forests - reason enough to feel themselves addressed as an ecology group and to participate. "The ecological consequences of the policy (of the IMF and World Bank) are alarming. Especially the rapidly progressing destruction of the tropical rain forests, not least through large projects financed by the World Bank and IMF, urgently demand a change in the previous foreign aid policy of the World Bank and IMF." The emphasis on the ecological problems of the policies pursued by the IMF creates the link necessary to convince ecological groups and their adherents that they should participate in the campaign against the IMF and the world bank.

c. The <u>women's groups</u> connected the imperialism ideology with a patriarchy frame. Women in the First and Third World are affected by the capitalist world order. This connection is demonstrated in several points. Thus the austerity policy of the IMF leads to the impoverishment of the people in the Third World. "Especially women have to bear the burden of this situation: In the given system they have the primary responsibility for the immediate survival of themselves and their families, and have to compensate for deterioring life conditions through additional work (both wage labor and unpaid reproductive work)." For many women, this means that they have to resort to prostitution in order to survive. The other side of the impoverishment in the Third World is the wealth in the First World which primarily benefits the men. Correspondingly, they are also customers for "sex-tourism" in the Third World. With

---

actually was less frame-bridging carried out by the different groups. The hegemonic power ideology interpreted the visit by Ronald Reagan primarily under the aspect of armament and the danger of war.

31 In selecting leaflets from different groups we first grouped these in various classes (peace groups, Third World-groups, women's groups, etc.) and then chose randomly one leaflat from each class of groups.

this interpretation of the problem, women's groups legitimated their own involvement as groups for women, and legitimated concrete actions against several travel bureaus which sold flights to Thailand.

d. The neighborhood groups were also able to achieve a specific connection between the IMF campaign and their group-specific objectives. They anticipated that the local government would limit the freedom of the citizens in Berlin in order to ensure a trouble-free course of the congress: they expected traffic controls, a possible cordoning off of districts in the city and interruptions in the subway. They were not willing to accept such limitations, especially not for a guest who - here was the starting point for the imperialism ideology - was responsible for exploitation and misery in the Third World. "The Berlin Senate is assuming responsibility for the security of these ladies and gentlemen who are responsible for exploitation, the worldwide indebtedness crisis and hunger, terror and war. Kewenig's (the Senator for Interior Affairs at that time) proven security machinery will be unleashed on us so that they can make their arrangements without serious 'work accidents'... We will have to pay for the security needs of the bankers with considerable restrictions."

e. The unions, as the organizations representing the interests of the workers, attempted to establish the bridge to the IMF issue by focussing on the impairment of worker interests. These interests are affected by the IMF policy in various ways: first, the austerity policy of the IMF leads to unemployment and low wages in the Third World countries and to the repression of the unions in these countries: "This causes the unemployment of thousands of people." Second, the policy of devaluing the currencies in the Third World weakens their import possibilities which leads to production losses and increased unemployment in the First World: "Lacking capacities for imports in developing countries...may cause a decrease of production in First World countries." Third, the indebtedness crisis is likely to induce a worldwide disintegration of the monetary system. This would also lead to considerable impoverishment in the industrialized countries, "thus causing social misery of broader strata in industrialized countries and the emergence of political crises as was the case in the world economy of the 1930s."

\* \* \*

Each of the groups which participated in the mobilization could name reasons why they wanted to take part in the IMF campaign. They legitimated their involvement through semantically connecting group-specific interpretive frameworks with the IMF frame; they motivated their members and their potential followers to participate in the

campaign against the IMF and World Bank congress using argumentative persuasion. The development of a homogeneous interpretive master frame which at the same time supplied connecting links for the integration of group-specific interpretive frameworks was one of the preconditions for a broad integration of different groups within the left-alternative spectrum. The successful process of frame bridging by the micromobilization contexts probably improved mobilization "on lower levels", namely that of individuals.

## V. Conclusions and Perspectives

The IMF and World Bank congress and Ronald Reagan's visit in Berlin were non-obtrusive, individual and short-lived events. They became controversial because they were defined as problematic events. Being perceived in that way, the events eventually provoked tens of thousands of people to protest.

Mesomobilization contexts played a crucial role in this process. They succeeded in coordinating and integrating a wide array of preexisting political, humanistic and cultural groups, in formulating a platform for joint action and in organizing resources. On the mesolevel, the targets of mobilization were groups, not individuals. It was only at a later stage of the mobilization process that the emphasis shifted to the microlevel and to the grass roots of the network, where members of activated groups also tried to mobilize friends and sympathizers who were non-members.

In order to become mobilized, groups have to be informed, motivated and convinced. In both campaigns, this was achieved by a relatively concerted discourse. Drawing on interpretive master frames described as the imperialism and hegemonic power ideologies, a homogeneous interpretation was developed, which stated that the institutions IMF and World Bank or the president of the USA were causal agents for a multitude of social problems in the world. The addressees for protests and demands were made visible, and solutions for the defined problems were offered. At the same time, the two master frames provided an opportunity to connect the various group-specific frames with the IMF or the Reagan discourse by frame bridging.

What conclusions can be drawn from the two case analyses? First, we will look to see what can be eventually learned from our empirical analyses for a theory of mobilization for collective action. Second, we will speculate about the probability of similar mobilization processes in the future.

a. The existence and crucial role of mesomobilization contexts has been empirically demonstrated. This was the main purpose of our essay. Together with micromobilization contexts, mesomobilization contexts form an intermediary structure. This structure is designed to transform the dispositions toward protest created by macrosocial conditions into manifest protest activities. Whereas micromobilization contexts refer to the activation of individuals within and outside of groups, mesomobilization contexts relate to the structural and ideological integration of preexisting groups and networks. At its present state, however, the concept of mesomobilization is more a catch-word than an elaborated analytical tool. It has to be specified in the context of the concept of social movement organizations (McCarthy/Zald 1977).

We believe that with regard to the structural aspect of mesomobilization contexts it would be useful to distinguish between several analytical tasks. First, the given infrastructural network existing indepently from the specific mobilization campaign has to be identified. Based on such an underlying infrastructure a mobilization structure specifically designed for the purpose of a particular campaign emerges. We hypothesize that the better the preexisting network is integrated (while respecting each group's autonomy) and the more successful previous mobilization campaigns in this contexts have proven, the more successful - ceteris paribus - the actual campaign will be. Second, the analysis should distinguish between the various functions of the mesomobilization contexts themselves. One task is to develop the initial idea for the campaign, and thus to give the first impulse for the preparatory work. Another task is to motivate and link the core groups who take over the major responsibility for collecting organizational and material resources. Here we hypothesize that a certain division of labor and a certain degree of professionalism is desirable in terms of mobilizational success. Finally, groups at the outer circle of the network have to be at least mobilized to participate in the protest event itself and to activate in turn individuals who are not directly involved in protest groups. On this microlevel of mobilization, we assume that the more heterogenous (in ideological and social terms) and the more inclusive micromobilization contexts are, the more people can be motivated to participate in the protest event. It would be certainly necessary to develop these organizational tasks and roles in more detail and to formulate more specific hypotheses regarding the conditions under which and the forms in which such a structure works better or worse. In particular, it would be fruitful to examine the relays which link networks, groups and individuals.

As in the case of structural aspects of mesomobilization contexts, also the analysis of framing is not very advanced. This applies more with regard to the empirical investigation than to the conceptual development of framing. In order to progress further on a conceptual level we think it would be useful to go beyond the description of frames and develop explanatory hypotheses. The reference point for formulating such hypotheses is the criterion of the mobilization capacity of frames. With regard to the internal structure of frames we attempted to reconstruct some variables which determine the capacity of frames to convince and mobilize. The problems related to empirical methods in analyzing frames result from the fact that the objects of analysis are texts. The research question refers to the system of meaning represented by these texts and not so much to the analysis of particular and isolated elements of meaning. As far as methods are concerned, one of the most difficult problems seems to be in making a controlled empirical analysis of these complexes of meanings. In our analysis, we pursued two strategies which we believe suited for further elaboration. First, difficulties of data analysis can be at least partially compensated for by the selection of the texts.The use of only one leaflet signed by the support groups in each case, has reduced the text corpus to only two pages. At the same time, however, we think that these two pages can be considered to be a highly meaningful source. Similar procedures to reduce data could also be applied in other cases. Second, in order to analyze the texts we used a graphical presentation of the argumentative structure. This provides at least a tentative reference point for a controlled comparison of the internal structure of various frames.

b. What conclusions and conjectures can be drawn from the two case analyses for the future of mobilization processes? Several authors in political sociology have recently asserted that, at least for the FRG, the mobilization potential for unconventional political action at the individual level has increased during the last two decades. Fuchs (1990) and Fuchs and Rucht (1991) come to the conclusion that the protest potential, i.e., the individual willingness to take part in unconventional protest activities, increased rapidly up until the mid-seventies, then remained at a relatively high level with a further slight increase.

Generalizing the results of the two case studies we can assume that, at least in Berlin, this latent protest potential will also transform itself into manifest protest participation in the future. A leftist-alternative infrastructure consisting of a multitude of micromobilization contexts and coordinating mesomobilization contexts has emerged in the arena of interest groups and movement initiatives; these contexts are the mediating structure and serve as catalysts to transfer the protest potential into actual protest participation on different occasions. Finally, a relatively uniform interpretive frame

forms the cultural prerequisite for interpreting different, but not just any, occasions and framing them as issues worth protesting against.

Since the individual willingness to take part in political actions has increased, the intermediate structure for protest activities continues to exist, and a set of elaborated leftist master frames is available, we can expect that manifest protest participation will likely occur in the future[32].

---

32 It has to be emphasized, however, that the recent developments in Germany and Europe may undermine these conditions favorable for protest. Our analysis has demonstrated that the ideological suprastructure of intermediate mobilization contexts relies heavily on "classical" leftist worldviews. Due to the rapid decay of socialist societies in Eastern Europe the respective ideologies may also lose their credibility.

34

## References

Axelrod, Robert, 1976: The analysis of cognitive maps. S. 55-76 in: Robert Axelrod (ed.), Structure of Decision. The Cognitive Maps of Political Elite. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Claesens, Dieter and Karin Aha, 1985: Das Milieu der Westberliner "scene" und die "Bewegung 2.Juni". pp. 20-183 in: Wanda von Baeyer-Katte et al. (eds.), Gruppenprozesse. Analysen zum Terrorismus 3. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.

Converse, Philip E., 1964: The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics. pp. 206-261 in: David Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent. New York: Free Press.

Fuchs, Dieter, 1990: The Normalization of the Unconventional. Forms of Political Action and New Social Movements. WZB Discussion Paper FS III-90-203.

Fuchs, Dieter and Dieter Rucht, 1991: Support for New Social Movements in Five Western European Countries. WZB Discussion Paper FS III-91-104.

Ferree, Myra Marx and Frederick D. Miller, 1985: Mobilization and Meaning: Toward an Integration of Social Psychological and Resource Perspectives on Social Movements. Sociological Inquiry 55: 38-61.

Gamson, William A., 1988: Political Discourse and Collective Action. pp. 219-244 in: Bert Klandermans/Hanspeter Kriesi/Sidney Tarrow (eds.), International Social Movement Research 1. Greenwich/London: JAI Press.

Gamson, William A. and Andre Modigliani, 1989: Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach. American Journal of Sociology 95: 1-37.

Garfinkel, Harold, 1976: Bedingungen für den Erfolg von Degradierungszeremonien. pp. 31-40 in: Klaus Lüdersen/Fritz Sack (eds.), Seminar: Abweichendes Verhalten III. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.

Gerhards, Jürgen, 1991: Die Mobilisierung gegen die IMF- and Weltbanktagung in Berlin: Gruppen, Veranstaltungen, Diskurse. in: Roland Roth/Dieter Rucht (eds.), Neue soziale Bewegungen in der Bundesrepublik, 2nd revised and enlarged ed. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (forthcoming).

Gerlach, Luther P. and Virginia Hine, 1970: People, Power. Change. Movements of Social Transformation. Indianapolis, New York: Bobbs-Merrill.

Jenkins, J. Craig, 1982: The Transformation of a constituency into a movement. pp. 52-70 in: Jo Freeman (ed.), Social Movements of the Sixties and Seventies. New York/London: Longman.

Klandermans, Bert, 1988: The Formation and Mobilization of Consensus. pp. 173-198 in: Bert Klandermans/Hanspeter Kriesi/Sidney Tarrow (eds.), International Social Movement Research 1. Greenwich/London: JAI Press.

Klandermans, Bert, 1990: Linking the "Old" and "New": Movement Networks in the Netherlands. pp. 122-136 in: Russell J. Dalton/Manfred Küchler (eds.), Challenging the Political Order. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Klandermans, Bert and Dirk Oegema, 1987: Potentials, Networks, Motivations, and Barriers: Steps Towards Participation in Social Movements. American Sociological Review 52: 519-531.

Klandermans, Bert and Sidney Tarrow, 1988: Mobilization into Social Movements. pp. 1-42 in: Bert Klandermans/Hanspeter Kriesi/Sidney Tarrow (eds.), International Social Movement Research 1. Greenwich/London: JAI Press.

Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, 1983: Politische Ideologie. pp. 326-332 in: Dieter Nohlen (ed.) Pipers Wörterbuch zur Politik, Vol. 2. München: Piper.

Kretschmer, Winfried and Dieter Rucht, 1987: Beispiel Wackersdorf: Die Protestbewegung gegen die Wiederaufarbeitungsanlage. Gruppen, Organisationen, Netzwerke. pp. 134-163 in: Dieter Rucht/Roland Roth (eds.), Neue soziale Bewegungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Frankfurt/M.: Campus.

McAdam, Doug, 1988: Micromobilization Contexts and Recruitment to Activism. pp. 125-154 in: Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi and Sidney Tarrow (eds.), International Social Movement Research 1. Greenwich/London: JAI Press.

McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, 1988: Social Movements. pp. 695-738 in: Neil Smelser (ed.), Handbook of Sociology. Newbury Park: Sage.

McCarthy, John D. and Mayer N. Zald, 1977: Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory. American Journal of Sociology 82: 1212-1241.

Neidhardt, Friedhelm, 1985: Einige Ideen zu einer allgemeinen Theorie sozialer Bewegungen. pp. 193-204 in: Stefan Hradil (ed.), Sozialstruktur im Umbruch. Opladen: Leske.

Pappi, Franz Urban, 1988: Neue Soziale Bewegungen and Wahlverhalten in der Bundesrepublik. Teil des Abschlußberichts des DFG-Projekts "Nachwahlstudie 1987. Soziale Bewegungen und Wahlverhalten". Institut für Soziologie der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel.

Raschke, Joachim 1985: Soziale Bewegungen. Ein historisch-systematischer Grundriß. Frankfurt/M.: Campus.

Roth, Roland, 1989: Neue soziale Bewegungen als politische Institution - Anregungen für einen theoretischen Perspektivenwechsel. Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen 2: 33-51.

Schissler, Jakob and Christian Tuschhoff, 1988: Kognitive Schemata: Zur Bedeutung sozialpsychologischer Forschungen für die Politikwissenschaft. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 52/53: 3-13.

Snow, David A. et al., 1986: Frame Alignement Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation. American Sociological Review 51: 464-481.

Snow David A. and Robert D. Benford, 1988: Ideology, Frame Resonance and Participant Mobilization. pp. 197-218 in: Bert Klandermans/Hanspeter Kriesi/Sidney Tarrow (eds.), International Social Movement Research 1. Greenwich/London: JAI Press.

Tarrow, Sidney, 1989: Democracy and Disorder. Protest and Politics in Italy 1965-1975. Oxford: Claredon Press.

Wilson, John, 1973: Introduction to Social Movements. New York: Prentice Hall.

# We say no to Reagan's politics

President Reagan is coming to Berlin (West) for its 750th anniversity. He represents interests in the USA which will stop at nothing in their efforts to make the USA the undisputed world and military power. Billions of dollars are being spent for continually new arms programs. New strategies for waging war are constantly being developed in the USA and in the NATO. Finally, the Reagan Administration is threatening all of humanity with its SDI plans.

Reagan is trying to bury the Soviet Union in the arms race, despite the fact that Gorbachev has made far-reaching disarmament proposals.

Kohl and Reagan have shown in the past that they want to jointly continue the disastrous "crusade against the East". We demand that the federal government take seriously the demand that a war should never again be started from German territory and finally introduce concrete steps toward disarmament.

Arms do not only kill in war. The worldwide consequences stemming from the lunacy of the arms race can no longer be ignored. Poverty, reduction of social services, mass unemployment and impoverishment characterize the social climate. Women, more than half of humanity, are especially affected. Complete equality for women - for all people - cannot be achieved under these conditions. We say no to this type of politics and its consequences.

We demand:
* Disarmament in West and East!
* An immediate, sweeping atomic test ban treaty!
* The immediate removal of all medium range missiles in Europe!
* No militarization of outer space!

The Reagan Administration declared the entire third world to be its sphere of interest and plays "world policeman". For example: it bombed Libya using the bombing of the Berlin discothèque "La Belle "as an excuse. It shot up Beirut, got rid of the government in Grenada and mined the harbors in Nicaragua, openly supported the Contras, and supported the racist white government in South Africa for strategic reasons.

The countries of the "third world" are exploited and forced into submission with the help of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and rapid deployment forces. This forces millions of people to leave their homelands. We say no to this policy!

We demand:
* Hands off Nicaragua, stop the US aggression in Central America!
* No support for the Apartheid regime!
* No weapons deliveries in the war on the Persian Gulf!
* The cancellation of support agreements (WHNS) for intervention in the third world!

A 750th anniversity celebration without Reagan is inconceivable for the Senat - and that despite the fact that they could see the extent to which his political position was rejected by the people of Berlin in 1982.

The social and political conflicts in this city, but also the political skandal of Reagan's Iran-Contra affair, are to be pushed aside in the course of the big celebration. The struggle for the 35-hour work week, the mobilization against the removal of rent controls, the discussion over the national census and the reduction of democratic rights are on the agenda for 1987. We want to make this clear in the next few days.

We don't want this city to be used as a base for the "struggle against evil", we don't want "cold war" slogans with nationalistic undertones to be broadcasted from this city. Berlin (West) cannot fall back into the role of a "thorn in the flesh".

We want Berlin (West) to be:
* a city of peace and reduced tensions!
* a center of understanding and balance!
* an open city for the victims of war, exploitation and repression!

We want Berlin (West) to finally enter the worldwide city partnership with Hiroshima and Nagasaki to do away with all atomic weapons.

We are calling for a:

# Demonstration, Thursday June 11, 17:00

Meeting point: Wilmersdorfer Straße/ corner of Kantstraße * concluding rally: Breitscheidplatz

# PEACE AND ACTION DAY, Friday June 12

in the city center

# For the resolution of the debt crisis - for a just world economic order

In September 1988, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank will hold their yearly meeting in Berlin (West). These two top institutions of the international financial system have a key responsibility in connection with the indebtedness crisis of the "third world" which has been worsening since 1982. Through their rigorous conditions and their so-called structural adjustment programs, the leading Western industrial countries are decisively repsonsible for the economic exploitation of the "third world", for the impoverishment of the people living there and for the brutal destruction of their natural prerequisites for living.

The present foreign debt of the "third world" amounts to the gigantic, prohibitive sum of 1.2 trillion US dollars. The interest and principal payments of these countries far exceed the influx of new capital in the meantime. The debtor countries must expend a larger and larger share of their export income to pay them back, less and less remains for meeting basic internal needs and making domestic investments.

The causes for this situation are rooted above all in the existing world economic order which forces the countries in the "third world" to play a subordinate role tailored to the needs of the Western industrial countries. Through a policy of granting initially cheap loans which changed with the US high interest policy, the problem of indebtedness and unjust exchange relations was intensified. Each attempt at escaping from underdevelopment, dependence and misery is doomed to fail under these circumstances.

The economic ruin of the "third world" is linked with the dissolution of existing social relations, the destruction of cultural identity and especially affects the women, who have to bear the greatest burden of the devastated living and production structures.

Misery and want lead to societal disruptions. Dictatorships, regional conflicts and wars are the consequences. In many countries in the "third world", almost 2/3 of the national budgets are use to purchase weapons and arm the police in the meantime. The weapons manufacturers in the first world earn money from this! More and more people are trying to escape this situation. The borders are closed to them here. As (economic) refugees they are repressed again and usually deported to face exploitation, torture and death. The circle of impoverishment, underdevelopment and militarization is closed again.

Even the people here do no remain unscathed: unemployment, new poverty and the cutback of social services are only other expressions of the same crisis which is driving the "third world" into ruin. We must find a way out.

The disastrous development has to be stopped. The prevailing debt management by the IMF, the World Bank, commercial banks and Western governments with refinancing, new loans and case by case treatment does not provide a solution; on the contrary, it strengthens the dependence and intensifies the crisis.

There is no way out without writing off the debts. The burdens must be borne by those who are responsibie for the situation. This requires, at the same time, a change in international relations and the balance of power. This is why the political and social movements who have to push through their interests against the power cartel of corporations, banks, the IMF, the World Bank and elites need our solidarity.

We support the demand of many countries in the "third world" to lay out the concrete conditions for the debt write-off in the framework of an international debt conference with the equal participation of all countries. The debt payments should be suspended until the negotiations are concluded.

A debt write-off alone will not be able to solve the problems in the long run. As long as the relations between the peoples of the world are regulated by the "free" world market and the principle of the largest possible profit determines political and economic behavior, then the chain of economical crises with their devastating effects will not be broken off.

Resources and finances are tied up world-wide through military armament, both in the "first world" and in the countries of the "third world". We demand concrete arms control and steps toward disarmament. They must be linked with the goal of placing the resources thus freed up at the disposal of the countries in the "third world" for their development. Disarmament and development must be directly connected.

The establishment of a new, just world economic order is unavoidable.

To mark the yearly meeting of the IMF and the World Bank we are calling for a demonstration and rally on the 25th of September 1988 in Berlin (West)!

11:00, Joachimstaler Straße/ corner of Kurfürstendamm

SOLIDARITY WITH THE PEOPLES OF THE "THIRD WORLD"